

**T.C. KOCAELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI**

**EFFECTIVENESS OF POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
IN THE LIGHT OF LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH**

**(DOCTORAL THESIS)**

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**KOCAELİ 2019**

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(DOKTORA TEZİ)

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KOCAELİ 2019

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## ABSTRACT

The years 1989-1991 can be described as a transitional period in which Poland developed new directions of political actions in Europe. At that time there was a significant change in orientation, shifted from “the East” to “the West”, which depended on political, economic and military independence from the East and inclusion of the state into Western integration structures. However, internal changes which took place at the beginning of the 90s in Poland did not facilitate integration processes. The state tried to deal with many problems related to the economic crisis, political destabilization and increasing social dissatisfaction. However, Western European countries which served as a model of civilizational development for Poland helped to create democratic institutions and restructure the economy, whereas deepening mutual relations with them gave Poland an opportunity to pursue its own interests.

Several years of preparations of the country crowned with its accession to the structures of the European Union in 2004 constituted a turning point in the process of further adjustments to ‘European standards’ and thus contributed to the increase of safety, improvement of working conditions, quality of life, health, and education of citizens, as well as strengthening the prestige of the state on the international stage.

The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the effectiveness of Poland's membership in the European Union in the light of Liberal Intergovernmental Approach. The work was based on the theoretical framework of the Liberal intergovernmental approach.

**Key words:** Poland, the European Union, Liberal Intergovernmental Approach, National Interest, Sovereignty

## ÖZET

1989-1991 yılları, Polonya'nın Avrupa'da yeni siyasi eylem yönleri geliştirdiği geçiş dönemi olarak tanımlanabilir. O zamanlar siyasal, ekonomik ve askeri bağımsızlığa ve devletin Batı entegrasyonu yapılarına dahil edilmesine bağlı olarak Doğu'dan Batı'ya biraz bir kayma vardı. Bununla birlikte, Polonya'da 90'lı yılların başında meydana gelen iç değişimler entegrasyon süreçlerini kolaylaştırmamıştır. Devlet, ekonomik kriz, siyasi istikrarsızlaşma ve artan toplumsal memnuniyetsizlikle ilgili birçok sorunla uğraşmaya çalıştı. Bununla birlikte, Polonya için medeniyetin gelişim modeli olarak görev yapan Batı Avrupa ülkeleri, demokratik kurumlar yaratmaya ve ekonomiyi yeniden yapılandırmaya yardımcı olurken, onlarla karşılıklı ilişkilerin derinleşmesi, Polonya'ya kendi çıkarlarını sürdürme fırsatı verdi.

2004 yılında Avrupa Birliği yapılarına katılımıyla taçlandırılan ülkenin birkaç yıllık hazırlıkları, Avrupa standartlarına daha fazla uyum sağlama sürecinde bir dönüm noktası oluşturdu ve böylece güvenliğin artması, çalışma koşullarında iyileşme; hayat, sağlık, ve vatandaşların eğitiminde kalite artarak devletin uluslararası alanda prestijinin güçlenmesine katkıda bulunuldu.

Bu tezin amacı, Liberal Hükümetlerarası Yaklaşım ışığında Polonya'nın Avrupa Birliği üyeliğinin etkinliğini analiz etmektir. Çalışma, Liberal Hükümetler arası yaklaşımın teorik çerçevesine dayanmaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Polonya, Avrupa Birliği, Liberal Hükümetlerarası Yaklaşım, Ulusal Çıkar, Egemenlik

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK - Home Army  
ARE - Energy Market Agency  
AWS – Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność/ Solidarity Electoral Action  
AWS – UW - Solidarity Electoral Action-Freedom Union  
CBKP - Central Office of Polish Communists  
CBOS - Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej (Center for Public Opinion Research)  
CDU – Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands  
CEE- Central and Eastern Europe  
CJEU - Court of Justice of the European Union  
COMECON - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance  
CFR - the Charter of Fundamental Rights  
CPSU – Communist Party of Soviet Union  
CSU – Christina Social Union In Bavaria  
CUP – Central Planning Office  
EC – European Commission  
ECHR - European Court of Human Rights  
ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community  
ECU - European Currency Unit  
EEC – European Economic Community  
EP- European Parliament  
EU – European Union  
GDR - German Democratic Republic  
KBW - Security Corps  
KKP - National Communication Commission National Communication Commission  
KRD - Internal National Council  
ISPA – Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession  
LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin/ League of Polish families  
MKS - Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee  
MO - Citizens 'Militia  
MP – Member of Parliament  
NATO - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIK - Supreme Audit Office  
NKVD - The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs  
NSZZ Solidarność  
OBOP – Ośrodek Badań Opinii Publicznej  
OECD – The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
PC – Porozumienie Centrum  
PHARE -  
PKWN - Polish National Liberation Committee  
PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/ Law and Justice  
PLN – Polish Zloty  
PO – Platforma Obywatelska/ Civil Platform  
PPS - Polish Socialist Party  
PRL - People's Republic of Poland  
PSL – Polish People's Party  
PZPR - Polish United Workers' Party  
RPR – Rally for the Republic (France)  
SLD – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/ Democratic Left Alliance  
TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
TRJN - Provisional Government of National Unity  
UB - Security Service  
UDF – Union for French Democracy  
USSR – Soviet Union  
US - the United States  
UW - Warsaw Pact  
WRON - Military Council of National Salvation

## INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I analyse the effectiveness of Poland's membership in the EU and verify following hypotheses:

1. "During negotiations and decision-making processes on the most important Community issues, Poland achieves results consistent with its own national interest";
2. "The logic of the Polish government and its approach towards European integration and membership have an impact on Poland's effectiveness in decisions regarding the shape of the community";
3. "European integration has positively affected the process of system transformation in Poland";
4. „Attitude of political parties towards the European Union translates into the attitude of their electorates towards integration”;
5. „Attitude of a given political party towards the European Union has an impact on the negotiating position of the government which creates it”.

This research was conducted with the use of systemic analysis and reductonistic analysis (because theories of international politics which search for causes on the individual or state level can be described as reductonistic, whereas those that search for the cause on the international level can be described as systemic; therefore, in this dissertation it is necessary to include both of them). On the other hand, the applied research technique is the analysis of source material and secondary analysis of quantitative and qualitative existing data.

The subject of my work is the process of Europeanization, the most important element of which is the change of national policies or styles of policy making, related to the issue of membership in the structures of the European Union. Some authors define "Europeanization" as "the export of cultural norms and values represented by the majority of Community members".

What I tried to demonstrate in this dissertation is that the process of Europeanization is not unidirectional and refers to a situation in which member states are obliged to adapt their own institutions, law or policies to the requirements

functioning within the European Union. At the same time, these states try to influence the shape of the decisions taken at the EU level.

The first of the mentioned elements of this vertical process is described as the „down-loading”/”top-down” process, which means introducing patterns of conduct appropriate for the EU system into the national level. This process includes adaptive changes in structures and internal policy of states under the influence of requirements and pressure of the European Union. This is an example of the impact of adaptive “top-down” pressure from the European to the national level.

The second element of Europeanization in the vertical dimension is described as the “up-loading”/“bottom-up” process and it is concerned with the transfer of states’ own preferences onto the Union’s forum. It is supposed to secure and promote national interests, but also strengthen the impact on EU policies and integration processes.

Researchers concerned with the process of Europeanization in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe have to face numerous problems of methodological nature which are typical of reflections on the impact of the EU on the countries of Western Europe. In the case of Central and Eastern European countries there are, however, additional difficulties.

First of all, in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe the accession process was conducted simultaneously with political transformation and the process of transition from communism to democracy. Therefore, these countries undergone deeper and more systemic transformations and changes. However, it is difficult to say which of them were the result of the political transformation and which occurred as a result of Europeanization.

Second of all, the process of Europeanization in Western Europe has been lasting for over 50 years and, therefore, it seems to be easier to identify its effects or lack of them. In Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, this process has been lasting only since 2004, so it is much shorter (even considering the entire accession process which began in the 90s). Therefore, some phenomena recognized as the effect of Europeanization may turn out to be short-lived, while others requiring more time may not have been revealed yet.

Third of all, despite the short history of the impact of European integration on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, several of its phases can be identified. Depending on which of these phases become the focus of the researcher's attention, he or she may draw different conclusions on the influence of integration on parties and positions they take towards the process of integration. Change in the stand towards the integration can be also visible in the case of Western European parties. However, in the case of Central-Eastern European countries the atmosphere surrounding the integration changed in a relatively short time which undoubtedly had an impact on the position of political parties. After the fall of the former system, the integration with Western structures was met with a practically common acceptance. At the moment of starting accession negotiations this situation has changed. Integration ceased to be recognized through the prism of symbols, but became a concrete issue with its economic and political consequences. This influenced the emergence of Eurosceptic attitudes which gained strength in the period close to the accession. However, after joining the European Union, even the most critical Eurosceptic groups have stopped demanding that their countries should leave the EU structures. In addition, the power-seeking groupings, to increase their coalition potential, began to weaken their Euroscepticism (as was the case with the Law and Justice party in Poland).

Membership in the European Union has brought significant benefits for Poland. Nevertheless, its effects and effectiveness can be also analyzed in the context of the restrictions it has brought. This primarily refers to transferring a part of sovereignty to the Community and the necessity to submit to decisions that are not always consistent with Poland's national interest. As some researchers have noted, apart from the efforts to strengthen the positive balance of membership in the EU, Poland's efforts are also focused on ensuring the strong position of the state as an influential member, with ambitions proportional to its size and socio-economic potential. Three important debates that took place in the first years after the accession offered an opportunity for Poland to prove the above-mentioned ambitions. These were: a debate on legal foundations and institutional reforms in 2004-2007 (European Constitution, Treaty of Lisbon); debate on energy and climate issues 2007-2008 (climate package); debate on monetary union related to the crisis of the



euro area in 2012 (Fiscal Pact). The analysis of these three issues can answer the question: is this really the case?

The work consists of an introduction, four chapters, conclusion, annex, bibliography, and a list of tables and graphs. The first chapter presents the theoretical basis of work and the description of the most important content contained in the liberal intergovernmental approach paradigm. The second chapter contains the history of Poland from the Second Polish Republic to 1989. The explanation of Poland's recent history is necessary for the correct understanding of the significance of changes that have occurred in the country since 1989. The third chapter is an outline of relations between Poland and the European Union and then with the European Union. The author presents Poland's path to the European Union from the early 90s until 2004, when Poland became a member of the European Union. In this part, the author also considers the most important issues regarding accession negotiations and their results. The fourth chapter consists of two parts. The first one presents the political situation in Poland after 2004. This is an important issue for the correct verification of the second hypothesis. The second part of this chapter is an analysis of three issues important for Poland and the European Union in the following years after accession. This part also discusses the problem of Poland's conflict with the European Commission, which, similarly to the above-mentioned issues, also helps to verify research hypotheses.

## CHAPTER 1

### 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

#### 1.1. THEORY OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The basis for the majority of academic literature on European integration is the concept of conceptualization and theorizing. Conceptualization, or conceptual notion, is the consideration of the phenomenon in abstract terms. Theorizing, in other words theoretical approach, is the creation of generalized interpretations of phenomena. In accordance with the general position of social sciences, the development and use of concepts and theories helps to understand social, political and economic phenomena as a result of their structuring, direct observation and interpretation. Most EU researchers also share this position (Chrysochoou, Rosamond, Wiener, Diez) (Nugent, 2012: s. 535).

According to Neill Nugent, three types of conceptual and theoretical studies of European integration and the EU itself can be distinguished:

1. Attempts to conceptualize the organizational nature of the European Union (as a state, international organization, as a political system);
2. Attempts to theoretically include the general character of European integration (general theory of integration defined by the author with „great theory”);
3. Attempts at conceptual and theoretical approaches to aspects of the functioning of the European Union (especially decision-making policy - medium-range theories, which in recent years have been the main area of development of EU research).

**TABLE 1:** Type of the theoretical development of european integration

<b>Type of the theoretical development of european integration</b>	<b>Theory</b>
The organizational nature of the EU	-federalism -the central state - multi-level device
Recognition of the general nature of European	-neo-functionalism

integration	-intergovernmentality (intergovernmental theory) -dependence relationship
Theoretical approach to some aspects of the functioning of the EU	-new institutionalism -analysis of political networks -the rationalist approach -constructionism

Source: (Nugent, 2012: s. 535-567).

The problems that are being undertaken in the framework of studies on European integration are: the issue of the emergence and development of the EU, the EU problem and member states, the issue of institutions and decision-making processes, the EU policy issue, the EU issue in international relations.

**TABLE 2:** The Establishment and Development of the European Union

<b>Establishment and Development of the European Union</b>	
Specificity of the research area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ EU - a multidimensional process of creating, deepening, expanding European integration;</li> <li>➤ sectoral integration;</li> <li>➤ vertical integration;</li> <li>➤ horizontal integration.</li> </ul>
Theoretical perspectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ intergovernmentalism and transnationality - different variants;</li> <li>➤ federalism;</li> <li>➤ neo-functionalism;</li> <li>➤ social constructivism.</li> </ul>
Theoretical dimension of research areas (examples)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ <u>Intergovernmental realism</u> -&gt; preferring states with regard to EU enlargement;</li> <li>➤ <u>Intergovernmental liberalism</u> -&gt; preferences and negotiations of governments;</li> <li>➤ <u>Transnational rationalism</u> -&gt; determinants and the essence of normative changes.</li> </ul>

Source: (Wojtaszczyk and Jakubowski, 2012 (a): s. 17).


Regarding the general theory of European integration, B. Rosamond divides into a few main trends<sup>1</sup>:

1. federalism, functionalism and transactionism;
2. containing the concepts of neo-functionalism (which played such an important role in the post-war debate on European integration);
3. new concepts that go beyond the debate between neo-functionalism and the intergovernmental approach that originate, among others, from political analysis;
4. containing statocentric theories (perhaps central-centered): realism and neorealism, liberal intergovernmentalism, confederalism and consensus.

In turn, Konstanty Wojtaszczyk and Wojciech Jakubowski recognize that the theoretical perspectives in European research are primarily:

- 1) Intergovernmentalism and transnationality;
- 2) Federalism;
- 3) Neofunctionalism;
- 4) Social constructivism;
- 5) Gender approaches.

**GRAPH 1: The Paradigm of Integration**



Source: (Wojtaszczyk and Jakubowski, 2012 (a): s. 19).

<sup>1</sup> On the basis of the analysis of Rosamond's text, the typology of the main theoretical trends was made by Dariusz Milczarek in his work entitled: Dariusz Milczarek, *Pozycja i rola Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Wybrane aspekty teoretyczne*, Warszawa, Centrum Europejskie UW, 2003.

Kazimierz Łastawski, for the three main concepts of the development of European integration, recognizes (1) the federalist concept, (2) the confederal (intergovernmental) concept, (3) the functional concept (neo-functional) (Łastawski, 2012: s. 86).

Jacek Czaputowicz, in turn, classifies the integration theory in the following way:

**TABLE 3:** The Classification of Integration Theory

		Analysis level	
		State	Europe
Main actors	Non-state actors	The approach of internal policy	Neo-functionalism
	States	Intergovernmental liberalism	Federalism

Source: (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 342).

The consequence of European Integration for the Member States and a more detailed problem of the implementation of EU policies is the study of relations between the European Union and the member countries. In this area an important issue is the process of Europeanization, understood „*either as a specific effect of integration within the EU, or as a process of acquiring patterns, attributes and values recognized as European*” (Wojtaszczyk and Jakubowski, 2012 (a): s. 9). K. Wojtaszczyk considers institutionalism and the theory of rational choice as the dominant theoretical approach in this area of research. As the author acknowledges, „*EU research in international relations finds its point of reference primarily in the broad spectrum of EU external policies and relations*”. The theoretical dimension is fulfilled in this respect: realism, intergovernmental liberalism, and transnational rationalism and constructivism.

**TABLE 4:** Study of the relationship between the EU and the member states

<i>The European Union and member states</i>	
Specificity of the research area	Consequences of European integration for the Member States; Implementation of European policies.

Theoretical perspective	Articulation of problems and concepts of research identification;  Deficit of universal theory;  Competitive theoretical approaches.
Theoretical dimension of research areas (examples)	Neo-aptiatory approach - compatibility between European and national institutions;  Models of rational choice - interests and strategies of interaction of national actors;  Constructivist theories - changes of national ideas and paradigms.

Source: (Wojtaszczyk and Jakubowski, 2012 (a): s. 19).

## 1.2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH

As Simon Hix points out, „*the first great theory of European integration, which has long been referred to, was neo-functionalism*” (Hix, 2010: s. 43). In the 1960s, the inability of the neo-functionalists to explain the reasons for the slowdown of the integration process, and then the progressive strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation in the Commission, contributed to the emergence of another theory of European integration, or intergovernmentalism, also referred to as an intergovernmental approach.

The classic intergovernmental approach is not a positivist one, but it is based on the reflection of historical and scientific observation of reality. It does not have strictly defined hypotheses, it justifies the key role of states in Europe in various ways (Borkowski, 2007: s. 105). In accordance with the assumptions of the intergovernmental approach, irrespective of the advancement of integration processes, their basic actors are states that operate both internationally and in a rational and selfish way. The fundamental motive for their actions is the implementation of national interests (Poboży, 2012: s. 203). In the reasoning of one of the protoplasts of Stanley Hoffman's intergovernmental approach, the most important thing is the theorem questioning one of the main thoughts expressed by neo-functionalists, according to which integration was a natural consequence of modernization, demanding to go beyond the nation state (which, having fulfilled its historical role, was supposed to further plan). Hoffman (and its continuators) undermines this approach and claims that despite the ongoing integration process, the

state is in excellent condition and still fits the dynamic, modern world, reaffirming its central role in post-industrial Europe (Borkowski, 2009: s. 214). In turn the greatest force of the nation state is the fact that it really exists (Borkowski, 2011: s. 92). However, a possible other political entity must be created from the beginning. In his article from the 1960s, „Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of National State and the Case of Western Europe?”, this author argued that Member States undertake international cooperation if it is profitable for them and contributes to meeting the goals they have set. They are also the driving force of integration, they initiate and control it, and therefore their role can not be completely negated (Hoffmann, 2006: s. 134).

Milward also recognizes that it was the Member States that played a dominant role in formulating the principles of European integration and retained full control over the newly created creation. The author emphasizes that European integration would never be successful if it did not reflect the political will of the leaders of the Member States: „*the integration process did not precede or disregard the political will of the leaders of the member states; it was a mirror image of their will*” (Moravesik, 1998 (a), s. 34). In his opinion, without European integration, the nation-state would be threatened. However, integration alone does not lead to the creation of another form of government, which is to replace the ineffective nation state. It is an act of national will which is to strengthen the nation state for its own purposes. Therefore, without the European Union, the state would not survive (Milward, 1993: s. 56). „*The European Community is a mainstay, an integral part of the post-war construction of the nation-state. Without it, the nation-state would not be able to provide its citizens with the current level of security and prosperity*” (Milward, 1992, s. 18).

The European interests and actions of the Member States are therefore influencing European integration. In this connection, the main goal of governments is to protect their own geopolitical interests (such as national security and sovereignty). Decisions taken at European level are understood as a zero-score game. In this game „*losses are not offset by profits in other areas*” (Hix, 2010: s. 43). Thus, the representatives of the intergovernmental approach oppose the neo-functionalistic „logic of integration”, the „logic of diversity”. It assumes that in areas particularly important for the national interest, a given state prefers to have „*a sense of certainty*”

*or controlled uncertainty and rather rely on itself than to be uncertain and be without control over the implementation of an unproven solution*” (Hix, 2010: s. 44).

According to Hoffmann, the existence of internal political systems is „certain”, while international systems consider it more „hypothetical”. Therefore, when examining international politics, one should search for reality more forcefully. The researcher has the task of finding: relations between constituent parts that are „regular” and achieve a certain level of intensity, components acquiring a certain degree of awareness of their independence, as well as the specificity of an international component that is separate and separate from relations within components (Walz, 2010: s. 50).

Hoffman treats a group of countries taking part in the unification project as a subsystem within the wider international system. Thanks to this, he can simultaneously examine endogenous and exogenous factors and make a clear conclusion that *„differences between states will be strengthened, not weakened”* (Borkowski, 2007: s. 106), which is influenced by:

1. Natural pluralism of society - each political nation is unique and will express its own interests. Nations are creations in which ideas and ideals, past experiences, internal factors of dynamics, as well as leaders play a role. It is always unique and is a prism through which integration will be perceived.

2. The other position of states within the international system - according to Hoffman, all regional subsystems have very limited autonomy. The global position as well as the geopolitical position have a significant influence on the position of states. Therefore, each country will react differently to impulses from the external environment. The consequence of this state of affairs will be the deepening of the difference of interests and political strategies.

3. Disputes about the place of a new, regional identity in a wider international order – *„the fact that integration does not take place in a vacuum makes all actions to create an effective supranational structure trigger the reaction of the international environment. It will be directly proportional to the initial success of integration ... [However] the need to refer to these impulses, even if the area of primary cooperation was model 'technical', will be a deeply political issue, updating the entire potential of difference resulting from the two factors mentioned earlier”* (Borkowski, 2007: s. 104-105). For example, the veto of France for the admission of



Great Britain was strategically motivated, although at that time the scope of the EEC activities was unambiguously economic.

The genesis of European integration should be seen in diplomatic efforts, above all in France, which were aimed at obtaining a de facto dominant economic and political role in Europe, and Germany striving to consolidate their statehood and influence with other methods than previously known in the history of the old continent. In other words, European integration is an act of national will, a project of states wishing to use the emerging Communities solely for their own purposes. The states were to deliberately reconcile themselves with progressive integration, which is the only way to formalize, civilize, and even limit the effects of increasing international interdependence (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 30).

If, therefore, the Member States have delegated tasks to Community institutions, according to intergovernmental theory, their implementation is subject to strict control by the states. Community institutions have a utilitarian and non-autonomous character. Therefore, they are a servile role for the Member States and constitute an instrument for the implementation of national interests by States. Institutions are appointed only to facilitate and improve contacts between representatives of countries who meet at intergovernmental conferences, meetings and negotiations, which are the main forum for establishing cooperation (Poboży, 2012: s. 203-204).

According to the assumptions of the intergovernmental approach, as a result of integration processes, neither the transfer of sovereignty, nor the emergence of a new center of political power, nor the devaluation of nation states takes place. Sovereign competences remain a zone of state governments, not international institutions or a „new decision-making center” (of which neo-functionalists spoke).

Such an approach is therefore a complete denial of both neo-functionalistic assumptions and federalist ideology. For neo-functionalists, modern economic planning requires very advanced technical knowledge. This knowledge is provided only by experts operating in a centralized management body. Only a neutral, supranational governance body is able to cope with coordination problems and break down barriers between Member States, as well as to use information economies of scale (Moravcsik, 1998 (a): s.71). In turn, according to the Federalists, the main premise of delegating powers was ideology (states that supported federalist solutions,

are more inclined to delegate their prerogatives than the state defending national sovereignty).

Stanley Hoffman, dividing the integration areas into the fields of low and high politics, explains why the European Union does not take over the sovereignty of the Member States and thus the role of the new decision-making center. Within the technical and economic integration zones included in low politics, the so-called negative integration. It involves removing barriers to the functioning of the common market and economic freedoms and brings benefits to all Member States, without diminishing the role and importance of national governments. Deepening economic integration is possible and is progressing rapidly between states, because it does not provoke their resistance and conflict. The issue of areas in which basic national interests are involved is different. These are areas related to the sovereignty of the government and issues of national identity, because they easily succumb to „impulses” of integration (Poboży, 2012: s. 204).

This is first of all because states do not want to lose their competences in the fundamental areas of political power and, secondly, because they have different interests in this sphere. Therefore, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to indicate the benefits of political integration for all countries. The advantage over costs that convinces countries to continue integration works in the economy, but not in the political spheres. Therefore, while integration in the economic spheres that bring greater benefits may affect the transfer of tasks to the level of community institutions, spheres related to the sovereignty of the state (foreign policy, defense, internal security) can not be subject to communitarisation (Poboży, 2012: s. 204).

The integration process is carried out by transferring a part of sovereignty to the Community to the Community in order to more effectively pursue interests in the political field<sup>2</sup>. At the same time, the states, however, establish the limits of their sovereignty, very cautiously transferring its part to common institutions, thus guaranteeing an advantage to the national level in integration institutions (Czputowicz, 2012: s. 343).

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<sup>2</sup> An example of this can be the field of migration and employee flows. In the 1960s, first countries first concluded bilateral agreements, after which these issues were regulated at the supranational level within the single market.

### 1.3. THE LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH

The liberal intergovernmental approach is one of the main trends in contemporary theories of international integration, which explains the processes taking place mainly within the European Union and earlier the European Communities (Tosiek, 2013: s. 9). It is a derivative of liberalism and realism in theories of international relations and emphasizes the role of the governments of countries participating in integration and the processes of its development and improvement (Jesień, 2011: s 44).

This is, according to some authors, „*one of the more coherent and bold theories of European integration*” (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 29). Its courage stems first of all from the claim that „*intergovernmental theory is able to describe the phenomenon of integration itself*”. Proponents of this paradigm argue that the development of communities took place mainly through a series of treaty arrangements made at intergovernmental bargains, followed by periods of consolidation. Therefore, the task of this theory is first of all the explanation and analysis of the dynamics that governed the review conferences (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 29).

Janusz Ruzkowski defines liberal intergovernmentalism as a variant of rational intergovernmentalism. In his opinion, Moravcsik, while building his theories, adopted, above all, the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism. In contrast to realistic (classical) intergovernmentalism, a liberal theory of state preferences was incorporated into its liberal variety, as well as certain elements reserved for the supranational approach (ie delegation of competences and international interdependence) (Ruzkowski, 2012: s. 19).

**GRAPH 2.** Development of intergovernmental theory (intergovernmentalism)

Realism
Intergovernmentalism
Liberal intergovernmentalism

Source: (Ruzkowski, 2012: s. 19).

Although the liberal intergovernmental approach is based on the liberal paradigm, according to which the internal relations between power and society play a fundamental role in shaping external policy, and it is not an expression of a generally

accepted realistic paradigm in international relations, in reality also has much in common with it (Tosiek, 2013: s. 10). Put simply, the basic assumption of realism is that the main entities in international matters are nation-states, while their governments coordinate the basic political relations between them (Nugent, 2012: 552).

The author of the Liberal Intergovernmental Approach, A. Moravcsik, thus puts a strong quasi-realistic emphasis on the role played by States on the international stage and emphasizes their relative strength in the negotiation process („*The most important source of integration lies in the interests of the Member States themselves*”) (Moravcsik, 1991: s. 75). The author, on the other hand, rejects (realistic - the company calls it the state unitarity) the view that the government is the only and exclusive exponent of the interests of the state. In this way, the author directs interest in the (liberal) way of internal formulation of the state's preferences, giving the opportunity to ask a new question to expand the theoretical space of speculation: „*whose interests and how does the state implements the European Union?*” (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 334).

The creator of intergovernmental liberalism, Andrew Moravcsik, therefore proves that it is necessary to look at it from the perspective of the theory of international relations (realism) as well as the theory of politics explaining the creation of internal preferences (liberalism) (Anioł, 2011: s. 81-82) to a full understanding of European integration. Moravcsik's theory thus combines the premises of neoliberalism and neo-realism and looks for the main source of integration in the interest of the member states. They deliberately delegate their own powers to supranational institutions, but only when they see significant benefits to them.

It is the Member States that have an overriding role in the negotiation process. They also build various coalitions that support their own position, defend their interests and preferences in negotiations and EU tenders. Therefore, they dominate completely over the spillover mechanism (Anioł, 2011: s. 81-82). Moravcsik states, therefore, that the policy pursued by the European Communities is nothing else than the continuation of national politics through other means (Even when societal interests are transnational, the principal form of political leftovers) and even when

social interests are of a supranational nature, the basic form of their policy remains national (Moravcsik, 1991 (b): s. 25).

National states are clearly seeking to use the Communities to increase their own capacities in pursuing national interests and preferences, while maintaining not only the impact on integration processes, but also supervising them. Although divergent national preferences may stop the pace of integration, the negotiations that take place in the institutional context are structured in such a way that the participating countries obtain absolute benefits (Rosamond, 2016: s. 886). Therefore, integration is instrumentally used for a specific purpose (Ruszkowski, 2007: s. 114).

The unique institutional structure of the European Union is accepted by national governments, because it enables achieving goals that are otherwise unattainable, and also de facto strengthens (and does not weaken) the control exercised by them over internal affairs (Moravcsik, 1993: s. 507). EU institutions strengthen the power of states, increase the efficiency of negotiations and inter-state transactions by reducing their costs, and strengthen the autonomy of state leaders towards internal social groups. The European Union is thus rather an international regime that was designed and created by the Member States to manage economic interdependence (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 335). Any decision to join an international regime therefore requires sacrificing some of the state's autonomy and taking political risk in exchange for certain benefits.

The revolutionary nature of Moravcsik's thinking and his followers is that he does not think that the community system as an absolutely unique construction requires the sui genesis theory. The researcher claims that the dynamics that govern the entire process does not have anything special because the behavior of the governments of EU member states is completely normal in the world of interdependence, and European integration is an example of a completely modern form of power politics, conducted peacefully by democratic countries mainly for economic reasons through the use of asymmetric relationships between them, as well as through the manipulation of institutional solutions (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 31).

Intergovernmental liberalism divides the decision-making process of the European Union into two stages. Each of them has its base in one of the classic integration theories. In the first stage there is a need for Community policy on the part of social and economic actors of particular Member States. These actors (as in

neo-functionalism and the liberal theory of international relations) have specific economic interests and try to make their governments promote these interests in the political process of the European Union. In the second stage, policies are created as a result of intergovernmental negotiations. They take the form of reforms of treaties and budget laws. As in the classical intergovernmental approach, Member States are treated as joint actors. However, supranational institutions have a limited influence on final political decisions. However, in contrast to the classical realistic theory of international relations, the preferences of the Member States are dictated more by means of economic rather than geopolitical interests. They are not (preferences) immutable (different groups may come to power in a given country), but they vary depending on the subject (in one case, a Member State may opt for EU intervention and not in another). Political negotiations can lead to a positive result rather than a zero one (Hix, 2010: s. 44).

On this basis, Moravcsik concludes that understanding the conditions of national policy is a prerequisite and a necessary condition for describing strategic interactions between states. In his opinion, a one-level analysis of European integration will always be doomed to incompleteness and may lead to false conclusions. In connection with the above, the liberal intergovernmental approach integrates the premises of two theories of international relations which until then were perceived as mutually exclusive. This is a liberal theory of creating preferences and an intergovernmental (quasi-realistic) analysis of inter-state negotiations and the institution building process (inter-state strategic interaction).

According to Moravcsik, in connection with even larger budgets and more employed professionals, Member States have the same access to information as international bodies. In most working groups and committees, national experts take part. As a result, Member States are much more likely than non-governmental institutions to act as initiating policy action.

Successful political entrepreneurship is, according to Moravcsik, not related to the asymmetry in access to information (or the ability of innovative thinking). On the other hand, it results from the ability to manipulate information and the ideological attitude of internal interest groups. Transnational institutions have the opportunity to play the role of political initiator only in exceptional circumstances. This is possible if three situations occur:

(1) Organizational problems - means when powerful pressure groups are not organized. This leads to a situation in which internal actors and Member States have no opinion as to the desired outcome of international negotiations;

(2) Representative problems - that is when the prejudices of domestic government institutions affect the poor representation of social groups, who advocate cooperation on a given issue;

(3) Aggregation problems - means at the moment when parliamentary and bureaucratic procedures make it difficult to create a coherent national position (Moravcsik, 1999: s. 283-284).

The system returns to balance when the representatives of the member states and pressure groups adapt to the new situation. The Member States, therefore, take over the supreme role, thus the activity of supranational bodies becomes counter-productive and ceases to be needed (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 38). „*Transnational bodies did not owe their rare successes to political entrepreneurship only to their incredible qualities, as most of the available analyzes emphasized, but rare structural circumstances that enabled them to overcome domestic and transnational problems related to joint decision-making*” (Moravcik, 1993 (a): s. 299). In the case of supranational bodies, the only features that support entrepreneurship are administrative coherence, greater than in the case of Member States, political autonomy, and a central role in transnational links.

The internally coherent theory of autonomy of supranational bodies was formulated by Moravcsik in 1999. The author has already attempted to explain this phenomenon in response to criticisms of the liberal intergovernmental approach (mainly D. Wincott - Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, „*Journal of Common Market Studies*”, 33 (4) 1995). Moravcsik formulated preliminary theses, aimed at explaining the supranational autonomy from the position of intergovernmental theory.

In line with the liberal intergovernmental approach, supranational bodies can achieve some autonomy at the time of fulfillment, which the following conditions:

(1) Increasing the benefits of cooperation - the greater the benefits, the more costly and risky (and therefore less credible) will be the threat of withdrawal from

cooperation or its renegotiation - thus the negotiating position of the Member State is becoming weaker, which can be used by supranational bodies;

(2) At a time when the governments of the Member States are focused mainly on a limited time horizon (ie the time for the next elections), they may become more sensitive to strategies implemented by transnational actors who usually operate on the basis of a longer time horizon and who are ready for short-term concessions in exchange for benefits that are of long-term importance;

(3) At the moment of instability of preferences of intergovernmental actors - at a time when the preferences of Member States are subject to frequent changes (fluctuations), some autonomy may then be obtained by supranational bodies whose preferences show greater stability;

(4) When transnational actors have privileged access to information - a prerequisite for effective control over the agency's operation is a permanent possibility to monitor its operation. At a time when transnational actors have better access to information, they can hide the true meaning of their actions in front of the Member States;

(5) In the case of manipulation of information on two levels - supranational actors have the possibility of increasing their autonomy if they are able to mobilize influential, domestic pressure groups, providing them with selectively selected information;

(6) When weak control mechanisms exist - the weaker the control mechanisms, the more autonomous the supranational authorities have (especially when it is not possible to recall the officials representing them).

Theses formulated in 1995 by Moravcsik violate the rigor of his theory, „*making a breakthrough in it lead to the occurrence of important inconsistencies*”. In the first version of the (imperfect) theory, Moravcsik defends the thesis that there is no asymmetry in access to information, and that the preferences of the Member States are stable. However, when formulating the conditions under which supranational authorities have the opportunity to achieve autonomy, it allows both the possibility of asymmetry in access to information as well as the instability of preferences. The author regains theoretical coherence only in his later works.



### **1.3.1. The Phases of Integration According to the Liberal Intergovernmental Approach**

In accordance with the assumptions of the liberal intergovernmental approach, the integration process, which is the basis of integration dynamics, can be divided into three components, each of which should be explained using other tools:

(1) Phase one - the governments of the Member States formulate a coherent set of national preferences that are to define their position in the negotiations. The interests of states are a resultant of the preferences of intra-national groups, which are articulated by political institutions and implemented in state policy. For realists, the preferences of states are homogeneous and exogenously (externally) data, as they are the result of the impact of the structure of the international system and concern the assurance of economic development, security and strengthening of the state's autonomy (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 335). On the other hand, in the perspective of intergovernmental liberalism, the preferences of the state are diverse and endogenous, that is, they are formulated by the public (in-country), and especially by the most important interest groups.

(2) Phase two - Member States are trying to defend their own preferences during the negotiations. Their goal is to bring about a situation in which your own interests will be better implemented than in the case of a self-directed policy (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 32). The behavior of states is the result of rational actions of governments, which on the one hand are determined by the pressure of internal social groups, and on the other by external strategic constraints. „*The boundary of compromise determines the possibility of better execution of interests within the community in relation to independent action*” (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 335). The European Union is a forum for tenders and negotiations between states. The development of the organization is, however, the result of agreements of an intergovernmental nature (the Treaties of Rome, the Maastricht Treaty), followed by a period of consolidation<sup>3</sup>.

(3) Phase three - Member States' representatives decide whether to delegate some specific part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions in order to better secure the implementation of commitments undertaken in the course of negotiations

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<sup>3</sup> The negotiations regarding the European Monetary Union also had a fully intergovernmental character.

and to strengthen the reliability of their commitment (credible commitment) to these commitments (Moravcsik, 1998 (b): s. 20). „Governments delegate sovereignty to international institutions when potential shared benefits are significant and efforts to ensure that other governments comply with the rules of the game are inefficiently utilized by decentralized or internal means” (Moravcsik, 1998 (b): s. 9). States very cautiously impart competences to common institutions and try to guarantee an advantage within the integration institutions of the national level.

„The decision to join a regime involves some sacrifice of national sovereignty in exchange for certain advantages. Policymakers safeguard their countries against the future erosion of sovereignty by demanding the unanimous consent of regime members to sovereignty- related reforms. They also avoid granting open-ended authority to central institutions that might infringe on their sovereignty, preferring instead to work through intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of Ministers, rather than through supranational bodies such as the Commission and Parliament” (Moravcsik, 1991: s. 27).

Thus, intergovernmental liberalism allows the existence of strong supranational institutions, providing information to the states and reducing the costs of cooperation, but they do not lead to changes in loyalty and transfer of power from nation states to supranational institutions (as is the case with neo-functionalist) (Pollack, 2001: s. 221-244).

**GRAPH 3:** Integration phases according to Intergovernmental Liberalism

**Defining national preferences**



**Defending preferences in negotiations**



**Handing over part of the organization's sovereignty**

### **1.3.2. The Role of the Institution - process of delegation and joint exercise of sovereignty**

The liberal intergovernmental approach assumes that institutions are a reflection of current preferences as well as the distribution of forces that occurs between the most important intergovernmental actors. Explaining the role of the institution in the European integration process, the intergovernmental approach assumes that the existence of strong institutions in the European Union is permissible only because such a state strengthens the positions of the member states on the national arena, enabling them to achieve goals that would otherwise be impossible. EU institutions strengthen the government positions in two ways. First of all, they increase the efficiency of negotiations between Member States (as the regime theory already pointed out). Secondly, they increase the autonomy of Member State governments towards intra-national pressure groups. If unpopular decisions are taken, the EU institutions may become so-called „Scapegoat” (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 36).

The liberal intergovernmental approach does not agree with the interpretation of the theory of regimes, reducing the importance of the institution to the passive role, reducing the costs of the set of rules of conduct. Member States are not able to predict how the future situation will develop, and they delegate mediation, interpretation, implementation and supervisory roles to neutral agencies. This is to ensure continuity in the implementation of the agreed arrangements. According to the theory of regimes, the delegation helps to solve primarily the problem of „incomplete contracting”, but at the same time taking into account the risk of partial loss of control over the agency.

At the time of joint sovereignty (pooling of sovereign), i.e. when switching from unanimous vote to qualified majority voting, Member States also accept the risk of losing control over the decision-making process (in case of voting) in exchange for greater efficiency. *„Delegation is tantamount to greater political risk with greater efficiency of the decision-making process, joint sovereignty means less risk, but proportionally less efficiency. (...) The less attractive for the Member States to maintain the status quo, and the greater the expected benefits of cooperation, the greater the incentive to delegate and jointly exercise sovereignty”* (Moravcsik, 1993: s. 510).

In intergovernmental liberalism, national states concentrated in the European Council are reluctant to transfer their competences to supranational institutions. This happens only when they see their own economic or political interest in it. It is therefore necessary to maintain an overarching role in the institutional system of the European Council. This is the place where the governments of nation states seek to strengthen their internal position (Gołębiowski, 2013: s. 26).

### **1.3.3. Preference Forming Process**

The essence of the intergovernmental approach implies recognition of the society's primacy in defining the preferences of the state and consists of three elements:

1. Assumption about the rational behavior of states in the integration process - this means that the state uses in its actions the means that it considers the most appropriate to achieve its goals.

2. The theory of liberal formulation of the state's preferences based on spontaneous joining of individual players' interests (within a given state organism) - on the basis of internal policy explains how the state's goals are shaped under the influence of internal pressures and interactions (which in turn are often conditioned by constraints and opportunities resulting from economic interdependence) (Nugent, 2012: s. 553).

3. (Consistent with the recommendations of realism) intergovernmental analysis of negotiations conducted by participants of integration (Jesień, 2011: s 44-45) - it is an interpretation of interstate relations in accordance with the principle of intergovernment. It exposes the role of governments in defining inter-state relations. The outcome of negotiations between governments depends primarily on their relative bargaining power and the benefits that can be achieved by reaching an agreement (Nugent, 2012: s. 553).

According to Moravcsik, the general framework of the analysis was assured by the assumption of rational behavior of the state. Within them, the determinant of domestic preferences is the costs and benefits of economic interdependence. On the other hand, the basis for intergovernmental analysis of distribution conflicts between governments is: the relative intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the possibility of emission links. In turn, as a starting point

to analyze the conditions in which governments will transfer powers to international institutions, the theory of the regime is applied (Moravcsik, 1993: 480-481).

The way of creating and articulating the preferences of states is essentially liberal. States in their relations with other states act in such a way as to secure the support of the most important interest groups, which are usually organized in a sectoral manner. Cooperation with other governments is the result of the desire to increase control over the domestic political scene and pressure groups (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 334-335). Therefore, the freedom of states is all the greater the less precise is the articulation of group interests. In matters that are relatively indifferent to public opinion and where the spectrum of positions is very wide, this margin is the largest (Borkowski, 2007: s. 135). The limitations imposed on national governments therefore vary depending on how strong and united the social pressure is (Coskun, 2015, s. 388).

#### **1.3.3.1. Theory of Preference Formulation**

In his analysis, Moravcsik uses the liberal theory of preference formation, referred to by him as the theory of economic interest, or internally motivated, endogenous (political) theory (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 32-35). Moravcsik, sharing Putman's views completely, puts forward the thesis that member states act in the international arena in a deliberate and deliberate way, but on the basis of preferences that are defined in the domestic (national) context („Governments are assumed to act purposively in the international arena, on the basis of goals that are defined domestically”) (Moravcsik, 1993: s. 481).

At the intra-state level, the government aims to build a coalition of support for social groups that constitute its political base: „*The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and practices of political representation. Through this process emerges the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations*” (Moravcsik, 1993: s. 483).

Liberal Intergovernmentalism is based on a liberal model of creating national preferences. Moravcsik, referring to the formulation of national policy preferences, recalls the approach of „liberal commercial” and the „pluralistic approach”. According to the Liberal commercial approach, governments sum up the „political desires” of the main groups representing various sectors of society (including the army, business, public opinion). According to this model, countries are seen as reflecting the interests of society as a whole. According to Moravcsik, European countries are lobbying by national pressure groups (enterprises or NGOs) to adopt or not policy at the international level. Considering these various input data, *„governments decide on the average aggregation of these various interests, he said, „and it must be a middle point of aggregation of these different interests”*.

The basic assumption of the liberal theory of forming preferences is the thesis that the priorities of the Member States are rooted in the domestic and transnational civil society. This society limits the field of action of the governments of the Member States, and *„social groups articulate their preferences, while governments groups them”* („Groups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them”) (Moravcsik, 1993: s. 483). At the national level, the average of expectations and political interests becomes *„national political preferences”* at the international level (LI, 2013).

At the international level, the state is defined as unitarian. He is the only actor on the international arena, speaks one language and supports one national position. On the other hand, the government conducts negotiations in such a way as to meet the needs of internal social groups, thus strengthening its position (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 334).

European integration strengthens the power of the state towards internal interest groups by influencing the redistribution of sources of power to governments, and at the expense of non-governmental elements. It is the governments of states that can effectively control the „transition” between the center and the periphery. They decide which sub-national groups can be represented in the political process as *„carriers of clearly legitimate interests”*. Also, national governments have the ability to control access to the society of the state (through the preservation of competences to separate and prioritize social demands in the „national interest”) (Ruszkowski, 2011: s. 18). They can also clearly demarcate the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy (besides, foreign policy can form the basis legitimacy of

representatives of internal interests at any international level) (Ruszkowski, 2011: s. 18-19).

In the European Communities, A. Moravcsik sees a kind of international regime, in which governments are primarily tasked with negotiating ways of realizing the interests of national (social and political) actors. However, he does not exclude the possibility of delegating competences to supranational institutions, but in order to ensure mutual obligations and cooperative solutions strengthening the preference and strength of the state (Ruszkowski, 2011: s. 19). Nevertheless, it is the governments of the Member States that are the main actor in the EU's political system. In turn, institutional reforms as well as political results that concern everyday affairs are the result of hard work in the process of political negotiations and the development of compromises taking into account the interests of the Member States (Hix, 2010: s. 44).

States through Moravcsik are considered as rational actors. At the international level, they make decisions based on the analysis of benefits and costs, i.e. on the basis of whether the agreement with other states is in their interest. Therefore, at the time of collective bargaining, the state is considered a rational unit that, according to the preferences of national policy towards other countries (which may also have alternative political preferences), seeks to maximize profits and minimize losses. The final outcome of the negotiations is therefore determined by the relative strength of each party: *„Here the more a state has to lose from not securing what it needs from a negotiation (i.e. staying with the status quo), the more it will have to concede to get an agreement reached”* (LI, 2013: s. 2). (The more the state has to lose without securing what it needs from negotiating (ie staying with the status quo), the more it will have to agree to reach an agreement). In other words, the less the state must lose before leaving the negotiations, the stronger its bargaining power and the more likely it will achieve its overall goals.

The liberal intergovernmental approach implies that when deciding on the posting or joint exercise of sovereignty, by increasing the costs associated with non-compliance with the negotiated arrangements, Member States want to encourage each other to further cooperation. The governments of the member states accept the negotiated legislation and the rules of its enforcement, in order to signal their credibility, and to secure their future decisions against the internal opposition. The

delegation also weakens the negotiating position of potential opponents of a given solution and encourages a more bold compromise to be agreed (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 37).

In the case of weaker countries in integration, they see an opportunity to create institutional procedures to report their fears, realize their interests and counteract the domination of stronger states (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 336). Chances are that those in the victorious coalition are more likely to have more voting power, but whose preferences deviate significantly from the average, but those whose preferences lie between extreme positions. As a result, not so much the voice, but the place in the spectrum of preferences of all countries - decides about the possibility of implementing a given state policy (Czaputowicz, 2007: s. 336). In practice, the attributes of liberal intergovernmentalism are: negotiation, coalition of states, and the use of the right of veto (Ruszkowski, 2011: s. 43).

**TABLE 5:** Practical final solutions in integration theory propositions

<b>Theories</b>	<b>Final solution</b>
Neofunctionalism Federalism	Federation
Neo-neofunctionalism  Theory of multi-level management  Theory of a polycentric management system	Consortium
Intergovernmentalism	Confederation

Source: (Ruszkowski, 2011: s. 43).

Analyzing the process of Europeanization, Stanisław Sulowski sees premises that speak for good prospects for the development of the nation state:

- Decline in public support for further integration (especially its deepening). The societies of the Member States are more skeptical about this process;
- Limited financial resources affect the lack of attractive and attractive solutions offered by the European Union;
- The thesis about a gradual, diverse, in terms of speed and opportunity, building of the European Union (kernurope) is still valid, which means that the role of nation states will be important;



- Some of the areas of activity and functions of the nation-state for many reasons have been considered difficult to communitize. They were therefore excluded from the process of Europeanization. In these areas, the role of the nation state will probably continue to be maintained;

- The nation state is still an attractive entity in negotiations (it is easier to reach an agreement with the state than with the system of social or transnational organizations). In many matters, the nation state continues to make decisions in its sovereign way (these are the most important steps in the process of European integration);

- With the existing structure of the European Union, the nation state is still the most important entity required to implement what is decided by the EU institutions.

The issue of shaping national preferences, in the context of international negotiations, is explained through three concepts. The first concept is based on the assumption that there is no fixed or fully developed view of the government for the goals that it wants to achieve in the negotiations. The preferences of a given country are only formed as a result of a qualitative improvement in access to information during negotiations. Government positions are not stable. The second concept is that governments define their preferences based on ideological and geopolitical interests. Preferences appear independently of the negotiated area. In turn, the third concept assumes that preferences are a reflection of the substantive patterns of interdependence in a specific area. The government position therefore depends on the subject of the negotiations. This concept is considered the most accurate (Laursen, 2007: s. 3-4).

#### **1.3.4. International Negotiable Theory (exerting influence through asymmetrical interdependence)**

The assumption of a supranational (functionalist) theory of negotiation says that in connection with the asymmetry in access to information, supranational authorities are privileged in negotiations and are able to push their own preferences. Only those with more technical knowledge and a central position in transnational connections, representatives of supranational bodies, because of being more neutral and politically fit, are able to act as initiators of a specific policy (Policy entrepreneur).

According to neo-functionalists, changing access to information causes instability of national positions. Member States are not able to show a political initiative because of lack of information. They must, therefore, rely on supranational bodies, playing the role of full-fledged actors in the negotiation process. The intervention of supranational bodies is indeed necessary, so that the compromise concluded by the Member States could be as effective as possible (beneficial to all participants rather than maintaining the status quo). The result of negotiations is therefore the most common reflection of the preferences of supranational bodies (this must be checked).

With the assumption of neofunctionalists, the representatives of the liberal intergovernmental approach disagree. According to them, access to information is not asymmetrical, while national preferences are stable. Political activities can be initiated successfully by Member States or pressure groups. In this respect, supranational bodies have no advantage over them. Negotiations are a process of distributing benefits between Member States and it is carried out without any intervention of supranational authorities. Transnational bodies are not able to push their preferences at all if they are not in line with the preferences of the Member States (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 35).

The intergovernmental theory of negotiation is based on three main assumptions:

(1) Negotiations are conducted under conditions of unanimous decision-making, in a system free from coercion. These conditions allow Member States to reject those agreements that would be less advantageous to them than to pursue unilateral policies (thus states behave in a rational way);

(2) The costs of obtaining information are low in relation to the benefits that result from inter-state cooperation;

(3) The costs resulting from cooperation are low (due to the possibility of combining different issues - issue-linkage - to facilitate the conclusion of a compromise).

(4) The distribution of benefits reflects the relative strength of the Member States in the negotiations (Moravcsik, 1998 (a): s. 60-61).

In an environment that is even the most conducive to a compromise, the relative strength of the member states is of great importance in negotiations. It

depends mainly on the negotiation context (and not on the realists only and exclusively on objective factors, such as the potential of a given state). According to the Nasha negotiating model, the more the government is concerned about cooperation in a given field, the higher the costs are willing to incur and the bigger concessions (its negotiating position is therefore weaker? Something wrong here).

In negotiations, the relative strength of the Member States depends on three factors:

- First, whether the given government has the real possibility of conducting unilateral policy in a given area, and therefore whether the potential threat of vetoing cooperation in a given field is reliable?

- Secondly, whether a given government may attempt to build an alternative coalition in a credible manner threatens the remaining member states with exemption from a given undertaking;

- Thirdly, whether there are opportunities to combine different issues with each other, in such a way that the concessions of a given government in one area can be rewarded by providing benefits in another (Moravcsik, 1998 (a): s. 63).

### **1.3.5. Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

In theories of integration, the theoretical dispute between the neoliberal and neorealist position takes the form of a dispute between neofunctionalism and intergovernmental liberalism. Both these trends are based on other assumptions. Intergovernmental liberalism recognizes that the purpose of jointly exercising sovereignty and delegating powers to non-governmental bodies is to demonstrate the credibility of engagement by increasing the costs associated with non-compliance. In this way, states demonstrate their credibility and protect themselves against internal political changes and attacks by the opposition. Neo-functionalists, on the other hand, maintain that the complexity and complexity of various aspects of the integration process requires specialist knowledge, which forces independent experts to entrust tasks.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism focuses on the creation of a coalition, the importance of relative strength and the autonomy of national leaders. Neofunctionalism emphasizes the importance of the internal technocratic consensus, the possibility of a common interest as well as the active role of supranational

institutions in shaping the course of negotiations. He maintains that after initiating the integration process and launching the spillover mechanism, the states lose control over the possibility of their independent acting on the international scene. In turn, intergovernmental liberalism recognizes that these countries exercise full control over it. In theories of integration, the theoretical dispute between the neoliberal and neorealist position takes the form of a dispute between neofunctionalism and intergovernmental liberalism. Both these trends are based on other premises. Intergovernmental liberalism recognizes that the purpose of jointly exercising sovereignty and delegating powers to non-governmental bodies is to demonstrate the credibility of engagement by increasing the costs associated with non-compliance. In this way, states demonstrate their credibility and protect themselves against internal political changes and attacks by the opposition. Neo-functionalists, on the other hand, maintain that the complexity and complexity of various aspects of the integration process requires specialist knowledge, which forces independent experts to entrust tasks.

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Intergovernmental liberalism only ascribes to states the ability to initiate integration activities. Transnational institutions can only play such a role in exceptional cases (weakness of states, or of three kinds of interest: organizational - inability to organize pressure groups, representative - when the representation of groups advocating cooperation is weak, aggregation - when there are difficulties in defining a common position). In turn, neo-functionalists believe that supranational institutions are in a better position than states, because they have easier access to information. They pursue their own interests, which are not always in line with the interests of the Member States.

Representatives of the intergovernmental approach argue that agencies pursue the interests of the Member States. However, it is possible that the EU institutions using their advantage in accessing information will pursue their own interests at the expense of the interests of the entities that set them up (or act in a manner contrary to the objectives of these entities) (Haas, 2004: s. 16).

However, Member States may put in place procedures that make it possible to control the agencies they set up. In turn, advocates of the supranational approach argue that the EU institutions (above all the European Commission and the Court of Justice) are not agencies of the Member States. They are, in their opinion, separate actors, acting independently in the interest of the entire transnational community. Transnational institutions such as the European Commission are "dependent agents". They have competences that have been previously delegated to them by the state. However, they do not implement the preferences of the states that established them earlier. Their goal is to increase their competences and deepen integration.

Intergovernmental liberalism recognizes the indivisibility of sovereignty and staying with the state. National officials according to the representatives of this trend, remain completely loyal to their state. In turn, according to neo-functionalists, sovereignty is subdivided. It gradually goes to the supranational level, which in turn leads to the replacement of national identities by European identity.

The liberal intergovernmental approach rejects the neo-functionalist thesis that integration is driven primarily through a technocratic process that reflects economic planning, as well as exceptional management skills that characterize transnational actors.

Intergovernmental liberalism stands in opposition to the view of neo-functionalists, according to which unequal, asymmetric access to information gives a negotiating advantage to supranational bodies. According to them, countries have equal access to negotiations, while the aim of negotiations, which take place without the participation of supranational institutions, is the distribution of benefits from cooperation between states (with the relatively stronger countries gaining a greater advantage).

In turn, Milward rejected strongly the assumption of neo-functionalists, according to which European integration was a kind of response to the growing inability to solve functional problems by nation states within their borders, and who

thus announced the transfer of loyalty of European citizens towards a more effective, new decision-making center. Milward also criticized the supporters of the so-called the theory of interdependence and federalists, according to which integration was to be „*a higher stage of the political organization of the world towards which humanity is following a wave of historical Progress*” (Trzaskowski, 2005: s. 30).

### **1.3.6. Criticism of the Liberal Intergovernmental Approach**

The liberal intergovernmental approach has led to the creation of an extremely unambiguous and in many respects even undecidable model. Nevertheless, according to many researchers, it did not correspond to facts, which prevented criticism (Nugent, 2012: s. 553-554).

1. It is believed that Moravcsik, in order to confirm the validity of his model in the context of the EU, has very selectively treated empirical evidence. Critics accuse him of skipping routine and routine decisions, and paying too much attention to „historical” decisions. This is, in their opinion, a distortion of the image, not only because of the exceptional nature of historical decisions, but also because of the special role of state governments (through the European Council) in their making.

2. In the liberal intergovernmental approach, excessive attention is focused on the formal and final stages of decision-making. On the other hand, it neglects informal integration and the constraints it imposes on formal decision-makers.

3. Too little attention devoted to the „black box” of the state, and, above all, disaggregation of various parts of the government. As Forster (quoted by Nugent) points out – „*The liberal intergovernmental approach does not correctly show the choice of political options by state governments*” (Nugent, 2012: s. 554).

4. The most common accusation both for the liberal intergovernmental approach and for all other intergovernmental forms is underestimation of the influence of transnational entities on the European integration process - the role of the European Commission (in intergovernmental negotiations and compromise) and the Court of Justice and direct contacts of sub-state actors with European level (Czaputowicz, 2012: s. 346-347).

5. The state is too narrowly understood, it focuses too much on the balance of economic interests and does not sufficiently take into account the influence of national policy.

6. When intergovernmental conferences were often held in the 1990s, the period between them was far too short to consolidate the agreements.

#### **1.4. THE STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH AND CONSOCIATIONALISM**

In the traditional central state, the model of international relations assumes the advantage of state structures over other decision-making centers (Czaputowicz, 2012: s. 342). This model was adopted by realists, according to which European integration is the result of the action of sovereign states, not of non-government actors or federalist movements. It therefore applies to policy areas that are not national sovereignty issues. According to Jacek Czaputowicz, the European Union does not have its own separate sovereignty. It uses the sovereignty of the main member states, namely France and Germany, thus constituting a form of domination of strong states over the weaker ones (Czaputowicz, 2012: s. 342). Integration can therefore be justified, because a more integrated EU (in the sense of an international organization) better serves the interests of the Member States. The territorial nature of sovereignty therefore does not change as a result of European integration.

State-centric EU models developed by authors who recognize that the integration process is of an intergovernmental nature describe the European Union by means of the following features:

- „The system consists of countries that „would be associated with each other to cooperate for specific purposes”;
- „The main communication channels between EU Member States are national governments”;
- „National governments set the general direction and speed of decisions made in the EU”;
- „No government, and therefore no state has an obligation to accept decisions on important matters, in which it has a different opinion”;
- „Transnational entities like the European Commission and the European Union Tribunal do not themselves have significant independent powers, but above all facilitate the shaping and expression of the collective will of national governments” (Nugent, 2012: s. 542-543).

The state-centric models branch out in different directions. Differences relate to such issues as: the importance of national policies, the dynamics of interstate

relations, the political role and the contribution of non-state actors. The significance of national policies is the basis for conceptualization, which, through the inclusion of the dynamics of EU policy as a two-level game, combines state-centricity with the approach of national policy. The first attempt to explain the integration process precisely through the analysis of domestic policy was taken by Simon Bulmer. He was the first to put forward the thesis that the governments of the Member States are key actors in the community system, but only the domestic process of creating preferences and interaction between them can contribute to a fuller understanding of the integration dynamics (Blumer, 1983: s. 68).

Bulmer's reasoning was developed by Robert Putman in the theory of two-level games. According to Putman, the governments of the Member States operate in parallel on two national and international arenas. At the national level, they are trying to strengthen their position by building support for their policies among national interest groups. However, at the international level, the same actors negotiate with other Member States to strengthen their position on the national arena, because in negotiations they defend a position supported by the most important interest groups (Putman, 1998: s. 46).

The most known variation of the basic model of the central state is, however, consiliarism. As its founders (mainly Arend Lijphart) assumed, it was supposed to explain how some democratic states with sharp internal divisions can function in a relatively stable and smooth manner (Nugent, 2012: s. 543). Over time, this approach has proved valuable in describing the main aspects of the functioning of the EU.

Consociationalism means a decision-making system based on consensus. Konsessionism assumes the division of power between the elites, in proportion to the number of people they represent and its implementation in accordance with the principle of liberum veto (and not majority voting). This trend refers to Althusius, who maintains that *contractus societatis* (consociationalism of the contractual community) is a system in which the constituent parts of the state „*retain not only the right to resist authority which broke the contract [...] but also the right to separate from one state and entering into a contract with another*” (Chrysochoou, 2001: s. 134).



Consociationalism has its beginnings in the interest of stability in a deeply divided society (eg Belgium). The main features of the consular political systems are (Nugent, 2012: s. 554):

1. Occurrence of social segmentation (which does not always coincide with the geographical area) and several important lines of political division;

2. Different segments are represented on decision-making forums in accordance with the principle of proportionality (although minority over-representation often occurs);

3. Political elites representing individual segments play a dominant role in decision-making processes (interactions between elites are intense and almost permanent);

4. Decisions are made on the basis of a compromise and agreement (usually on important or sensitive issues, the majority voting principle is not applied, which says that the majority position should be adopted despite minority opposition). Negotiations and mutual concessions are characteristic in the decision-making process, and their result is a result of a compromise, which is often more than just the smallest common denominator.

5. Interactions between segments (especially between segments' elites) can be both negative and positive. Negative impact is the result of the very concept of consociate, ie maintaining autonomous segments in the community system (segments may tend to over-emphasize their separateness, and steps towards greater centralization may be caused by reluctance and grievances.) The positive influence consists in creating relationships between segments and urging them to adopt attitudes that serve the whole community (Nugent, 2012: s. 554).

Integration rather exacerbates rather than weakens tensions in the existing community of nations, therefore, societies that maintain only a minimum level of mutual relationship should be separated from each other (Rosamond, 2000: s. 149).

The conciliatory nature of relations between states is best carried out in a confederation, i.e. a voluntary association of states that have a common interest in building a common market. It seems that from the point of view of organizational forms, the European Union system most closely resembles a confederation, which combines the principles of consensus, majority and legal sovereignty of member states in external relations. Authority in the European concession system can take

several forms - from the ultimate responsibility of supranational institutions, through the participation of states in defining a common interest up to the power of the Member States (Chrysochoou, 2001: s. 140).




## CHAPTER 2

### 2. THE OUTLINE OF POLISH HISTORY

#### 2. 1. HISTORY OF THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC

The formation of the Second Polish Republic as a vast state was the result of more than four years of armed struggle and diplomatic efforts. However, it occupied only 52% territory, which was Poland before partitions (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 483). The territorial shape of Poland was established in principle only in the middle of 1922. In those days, on the basis of the Allies' decision, its composition included the eastern part of Upper Silesia (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 40). At that time, the territory of the country had 388 600 km<sup>2</sup> and made the Republic of Poland the sixth largest country in the terms of size in Europe (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 483). The country was divided into sixteen provinces, out of 277 poviats (a separate administrative unit was the capital city of Warsaw). Special status and autonomy was obtained by the Silesia voivodship with its own parliament, treasury and police (Gałęzowski, 2014: s. 43).

**DIAGRAM 1:** Sectors of employment in Poland in 1931



Source: (Żarnowski, 1986: s. 290).

Peasants (55% of the total Polish population) were the largest social group in the Second Republic of Poland, next were workers (around 27,5%), petty bourgeoisie (11%), intelligence and free professions (about 5%), larger entrepreneurs (1,5%), landed aristocracy (0,4%) (who occupying a much more important position in social life than indicated by numbers). The last one, played a major socio-political role,

which was much larger than in the other region's countries (excluding Hungary). Another feature that characterizes the social structure in the Second Polish Republic was the very high prestige of the intelligentsia. Important was its connections with the nobility culture and wide social range of this group. It was the group of mainly white-collar workers that belonged to it. Polish society was also characterized (discussed in more detail later in this chapter) by the overlap of the social and national structure (however, it was not an exception within Central Europe) (Żarnowski, 1986: s. 300). The number of Polish people living outside their homeland was estimated at 8 million, of which about 2 million emigrated from Poland in the interwar period. Polish emigrants lived mainly in the United States (4 million), Germany (about 1,3 million<sup>1</sup>), the USSR (about 1 million) and France (600 thousand).

The formation of Poland's borders as a result of arbitrary decisions of the great powers and armed conflicts caused that a large number of national minorities were in the territory of the country, and some Polish people were outside the territory of the Republic (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 55). This phenomenon, however, was not specific just in Poland. Other factors also influenced the complex nationality structure of the most Central and South-Eastern European countries. These include even the process of shaping national consciousness in the conditions of „foreign domination”, where the power usually sought to assimilate the population speaking a language different from the language of the nation prevailing in a given territory (often with violence, which can be described by the term of denationalization) (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 55).

There was no possibility of such a border crossing in Central and Eastern Europe, that it could separate several nations and it would not allow the problem of national minorities. This contributed to the fact that all countries of this part of the continent, in various forms and sizes, knew the nationality issue closely related to social problems. A characteristic phenomenon (being also a heritage of the past) was the specific social structure of nations that belonged to the minority (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 56-57).


Nevertheless, all data on the population's ethnic structure are of an approximate character. Political conflicts on the national background caused that the results of

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<sup>1</sup> Both economic emigrants and indigenous people of Poland, among others in Silesia.

censuses were an important argument in discussions and disputes, and even in competitions on the international forum. The influence of the declarations submitted during the filling out of the questionnaires was attempted by both the state administration as well as social and political organizations. Particular emphasis was directed to those environments whose national consciousness was not specified, because they were more inclined to declare the nationality desired by the authorities. In some cases, the authorities and organizations of the majority nation used the economic weakness of some social groups and associated their nationality declaration with retaining or getting a job. In extreme cases, the result of the census was even falsified by the administrative authorities (According to Zbigniew Landau and Jerzy Tomaszewski, there is quite accurate evidence in this regard in the case of the census of 1931 in south-eastern Poland) (Tomaszewski 1 et al, 2005: s. 55).

**DIAGRAM 2:** The National Structure in the Second Polish Republic



Source: own work: (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 85).

The Second Polish Republic, beyond being a multinational, was also a multi-faith state. The dominant position had Roman Catholic Church, which was guaranteed by the Constitution of 1921. It was a religion professed by the majority of Polish society. Nevertheless, within the Roman Catholic Church there were several rites (Latin, Armenian, East Slavic, Greek Catholic - clearly national). From other Christian faiths, Orthodoxy had the greatest importance.

Taking into account the national-ethnic structure of Poland (in the times of the Second Polish Republic), Andrzej Chojanowski states that *„the national problem was one of the greatest internal issues of this period. The fate of the Polish state, the maintenance of its integrity and political independence depends on its solution. The*

*matter of policy towards minorities [...] was not only the domain of successive governments, much depended on the attitude of the Polish society itself [...]. However, it did not stand up to the task, succumbing in a serious part, especially in the 1930s, to the influence of nationalist ideology” (Chojnowski, 1986: s. 119).*

Political tensions that arose around the nationality issue were difficult to avoid, primarily due to the collision of political and sometimes even independence aspirations of non-Polish groups with the territorial aspirations of Polish society. The Poles wanted an independent state in the borders close to the pre-partition. They could not imagine the possibility of giving up places like Vilnius or Lviv. Therefore, the conflict between Polish society and other nationalities within the country was of an objective nature (Chojnowski, 1986: s. 194).

Moreover, in many cases national divisions and social divisions intersected, which exacerbated the conflict. For example, in eastern Poland, great landowners, administrators and intelligentsia were usually Poles, while peasant masses were ethnic Ukrainians or Belarusians. This situation was aggravated by the hostility between these groups, because Poles were often perceived as exploiters (in the social sense) and oppressors (in the national-political sense), especially in view of the national aspirations of the Ukrainian population (Żarnowski, 1986: s. 299).

### **2.1.1. Differences and Problems in the Second Polish Republic (Resulting from the Policy of the Invaders)**

The reborn states consisted of three parts: the Russian Partition (260,000 km<sup>2</sup>), the Austrian Partition (80,000 km<sup>2</sup>) and the Prussian Partition (48 600 km<sup>2</sup>), which differed significantly from each other due to their functioning in three different state organisms. Each of them had a different political system, economic structure, legislation, currency, social and political systems, other traditions, habits and lifestyle of the inhabitants (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 483-485).

Richard M. Watt in his book „Gorzka Chwała. Polska i jej los 1918-1939”, writes about the Second Polish Republic after Poland regained its independence:

*„All „new” states, born or revived after the First World War, experienced serious labor pains, but none of the so-called succession states had such diverse and serious problems as Poland in the first few months of independence. It was a state with no boundaries - even with Germany. The Treaty of Versailles was signed only*

*eight months after it regained its freedom. In areas that eventually became part of Poland, at least seven different currencies were used. There were four legal orders. The first Polish national budget [...] predicted that the treasury income would amount to 600 million Polish marks, and spending 1 billion 700 million marks [...] the deficit had to be covered by printing money and accepting inflation. Polish factories were plundered or destroyed during the war [...]. The railway network - [ie] three different networks, built by the invaders - did not provide connections between different regions of the new state, and half of the wagons, locomotives of bridges and workshops was devastated” (Watt, 2005: s. 72).*

The attempt to unify the country was made in a very difficult situation, which was caused by the war damages and economic policy of the occupiers who consciously devastated the Polish economy (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 485). The military operations that have been taking place since 1914 covered almost 90% of the area of the state. 55% of bridges, 63% of railway stations and 18% of residential buildings were destroyed (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 485). The industry in the Kingdom in 1919 employed only 14% of the number of workers from 1913.

Agriculture was also destroyed. Wheat harvest reached only 35% of pre-war yields, 60% of rye harvest, and 67% of potatoes. Only 1/3 of sugar was produced in comparison with 1913. The land was sterilized. There was also no hope of rapid production of artificial fertilizers. The situation of livestock was also fatal. Kine losses were 37,5%, horses 47%, pigs 52% and sheeps 60%. The area of fallow land in 1919 was estimated at 4,6 million hectares, and a year later on 3,5 million hectares (which accounted for almost 20% of the agricultural area of the country) (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 485).

In the nineteenth century, or in the period of the shaping of modern forms of state organizations and economic systems, as well as during the most intense economic development of European countries, Poland was „*artificially detained in economic development*” (Rogucki, 2012: s. 315) because of the lack of its own statehood. The areas of the new state were particularly different in economic terms because (despite attempts by the governments of the partitioning powers and activities related to economic, agrarian and local government development), the breakdown of the uniform social system caused economic backwardness, and the

areas of trade and economy, which were the most active, were related with specific markets of partitioning states.

After Poland regained its independence, the economic ties of the three partitions, with the states from which they were torn away, weakened or even broke off. It was also difficult to see the disappearance of many credit sources from outsiders of Poland that were so important in the economic life of Warsaw, Poznan and Krakau before regaining independence.

### **2.1.2. Social Structure of the Second Polish Republic**

According to the first census of 1921, Poland was inhabited by over 27 million citizens, 75% of whom were rural residents (73% in 1931) (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 40). 65% of the population lived on farm work (61% in 1931), and the percentage of farm workers (12%) almost matched industrial workers (15%). In Europe, the peasant character of the country was already obsolete, and therefore Poland remained far behind in the economically developed countries, in which the percentage of the agricultural population varied between 20-40% (in England even 5%). Poland was ahead of, among others Czechoslovakia (where the agricultural population accounted for 35% of which Czech lands - 26%, Slovakia - 59%) and Hungary (25%) (Tomaszewski and Landau, 2005: s. 40) Romania (72%) and Bulgaria (73%) were slightly worse (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 485).

This most synthetic indicator of social and economic relations, or a division between the population living on agriculture and the other branches of the economy, placed Poland among the less developed countries of Europe and the world. However, it overtook all the colonial territories and the poorest European countries. Although over time, the percentage of population deriving their living maintenance resources decreased, in the entire interwar period no significant changes occurred in this respect (Samsonowicz 1 et al, 2003: s. 485).

### **2.1.3. Political Life in Poland in the First Years of Independence**

As Marek Gałęzowski notes, the party system was *„one of the few elements of social life that did not have to be built in Poland from base”* (Gałęzowski, 2014: s. 53). Already before, in all three partitions, individual ideological trends formed their



political groupings. Initially, without complexes, they conducted their activities during the war, and from 1918 they were mostly associated in nationwide groups.

It is difficult to apply the typical division of the left, right and center to the Polish political scene of the interwar period. Pilsudski-ites tried to combine in their circle various ideological currents. Very diverse programs and numerous parties existed among national minorities. A separate position was taken by communists, who sought to introduce in Poland a system of Bolshevik rule.

The right wing was dominated by national democracy, which at the beginning of 1919, under the authority of the secret National League, joined the parties operating in the three partitions in the People's National Union. Besides Roman Dmowski, enjoying the highest authority, among the national activists were also Stanisław Grabski, Stanisław Głabinski, Marian Seyda, and Stanisław Stronski. Nationalists gained the greatest influence among the Polish petty bourgeoisie, merchants, craftsmen, intelligentsia (including academic youth), as well as in some rural areas. Despite the availability of considerable financial resources, strong intellectual background and opinion-forming press, the conservatives had marginal political resources in Poland (although sometimes, thanks to their resources, they could influence the current political life).

The Center wing was made up of PSL „Piast” led by Wincenty Witos, as well as several Christian-Democratic groups (including the National Workers' Party, the Polish Christian Democracy Party). PSL „Piast”, which had the strongest influence in the lands formerly located within the Austrian Partition, was a party represented by wealthier peasants. The main program goal of this party was, however, to implement the land reform. On the other hand, Christian Democratic groups enjoyed support primarily from the western part of the country. During this period the leading representative of the Polish Christian Democrats was Wojciech Korfanty.

In the Second Polish Republic, the left wing was represented by the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the other peasant party of the PSL „Wyzwolenie”. The PPS was established as a result of the merger of socialist parties from three partitions in the spring of 1919. It operated in an urban and industrial environment, among the intelligentsia and workers, with significant influence in the professional movement. The leading politicians of the party were Ignacy Daszynski, Kazimierz Puzak or Mieczysław Niedziałkowski (editor of the PPS press body – „Robotnik”). In turn, the

PSL „Wyzwolenie” established peasant activists from the Kingdom of Poland in 1915 (including Kazimierz Baginski, Irena Kosmowska and Stanisław Thugutt). In contrast to „Piast”, most of their supporters represented poorer peasants, farm workers and agricultural workers (mainly in the territories of the former Russian partition) (Gałęzowski, 2014: s. 54).

## **2.2. POLAND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

The signing of the act of unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945 by the Nazi command, ended the war in Europe. As historians recognize, *„despite the joy of the finale of the most barbaric of wars in history, Poland did not experience the freedom and fruit of peace”* (Roszkowski, 2003: s. 151), because its territory and internal system were to be defined by the USSR (Minik, 2017: s. 212).

Since 1945, as a result of World War II, the process of sovietization has covered all the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The USSR extended its sovereignty (which symbolized the coat of arms of the state, in which there was a sickle and a hammer on the background of the whole earth). Western Europe was „paralyzed” by the destruction and influence of communist ideology, which was expressed, among others, the extent of pro-Soviet propaganda in the British press or the rise of the Communist Party's influence in France and Italy.

According to some authors, from the end of the war until 1948, it can be considered as a transitional period in which the mechanisms of Soviet domination were restrained. In 1945, Stalin's intentions for the states of Central and Eastern Europe were not known yet (Mink, 2017: s. 212). At that time it was not known whether they would be included in the USSR or would be covered by some other form of autonomy. On the one hand, the Kremlin sought to completely subjugate the states and societies of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the goal was to proceed in a careful and patient manner. A step forward was always made where there was a condition for it (Albert, 1991: s. 480).

At the time of the victory over Germany, the Soviet Union did not have to reckon with the Western allies. However, there were social, economic, political and cultural structures on the territory occupied by the Red Army, which transformation in a communist way required time. For this purpose, the transitional form of the state, which was „People's democracy”, was to be used.

Leading to socialism a people's democracy, was a kind of „screen to allow oneself to prepare for fuller sovietization and to create a police-bureaucratic state. Along with the elimination of alternative parties and their leaders, the merger of traditional workers' parties around pro-Soviet communists (totally devoted to Stalin), and internal purge in the communist parties (aimed at eliminating potential opponents of the Stalinist line), the construction of the repression apparatus continued. At the beginning of the 1950s, it employed, in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one percent of the population and military personnel under the total control of „Soviet advisers” (Mink, 2017: s. 212).

The Communists, thanks to the political and bureaucratic state, wanted to „desensitize” the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. A new ideology based on power and lies, created an artificial world. In this world, „democracy” meant an absolute dictatorship, „progress” was the destruction of values and the absolutization of power, while „science” was a primitive belief in „spells of ideologues”. In fact, the exchanges were to contribute to social change and the introduction of „socialism” in the Soviet version (Albert, 1991: s. 480). The requirement of introducing a new regime was the absolute obedience of various factions of society. To this end, it was necessary to disintegrate and collapse the traditional ties created in the „pre-Soviet past” (Mink, 2017: s. 214-215).

### **2.2.1. Period of „Polska Lubelska” (08.1944-06.1945)**

The term „Polska Lubelska” is used to determine socio-political and military relations in the area of liberated Polish territories from the Bug to Vistula and Bialystok during the period from August 1944 to January 1945. However, in practice, taking into account the activities of Polish authorities and the Soviet military administration, it covers the period until the end of hostilities and the establishment of the Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN) on June 28, 1945 (Toporek, 1996: s. 326).

On July 22, 1944, in a radio program of the „Union of Polish Patriots” broadcast from Moscow, was read a message about the establishment of the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) and taking over its power<sup>2</sup>. The

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<sup>2</sup> Its name was modeled on the French National Liberation Committee, established in June in Algiers by Charles de Gaulle and preparing to take power in France.

creator of the Committee was to be the Internal National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa – KRD) operating in Warsaw. It was described as a temporary parliament of the Polish nation. To the surprise of the Western diplomacy, the KRD started its activity in January 1944 and was (as Marian Toporek calls it) „*something like an underground parliament [...] under the auspices of the Polish left wing and the USSR*” (Toporek, 1996: s. 297). The PKWN, established in Moscow, but based in Lublin, was in fact a joint creation of Stalin, the Central Office of Polish Communists (CBKP) and the KRN delegation (but not authorized to create this type of institution) (Sowa, 2001: s. 9). As Jerzy Topolski notes, the creation of the Polish National Liberation Committee meant „*constitution of an illegal government, opposing the government of Mikolajczyk*” (Topolski, 2004: s. 268).

In the Moscow radio station was also transmitted the text of the Manifesto to the Polish Nation. PKWN presented itself as a „legal temporary” executive power, tasked with reconstruction of Polish statehood. It thus acknowledged that the government in exile and the Government Delegation is a „self-declared and illegal power” which activity is based on the unlawful and fascist Constitution of April 1935. The PKWN in its Manifesto also directed the accusation towards the government in exile accusation of the alleged „inhibition of the fight against the Nazi occupant, and described its policy as „adventurous” and pushing „*Poland towards a New catastrophe*” (Sierpowski and Żerko, 2002: s. 368).

The Manifesto announced immediate implementation of a wide agricultural reform and the overtaking of all former German property (the goods seized by the Germans were to be returned to the owners, among others, to merchants, entrepreneurs and the Church) (Toporek, 1996: s. 326). There was also declared respect for all private property, but not to mention the nationalization of industry. Quite the opposite, declared that huge „*industrial, commercial, banking, transport and forest [...] enterprises as they regulate economic relations*”, they were to return to the owners (Sowa, 2001: s. 10).

On the other hand, in the area of foreign policy the emphasis was placed on „a lasting alliance and neighborly cooperation” with the USSR. It was to be the basis of security for Poland and a guarantor of durability of border solutions. It was also declared that the alliance (directed against German imperialism) would be extended to Czechoslovakia. However, the next step was an aspiration for friendship and

consolidation of allied relations with Great Britain, the USA and France (Sowa, 2001: s. 10).

The effective takeover of power by the PKWN was possible due to the strong support of over 2 million Soviet soldiers and 100,000 soldiers of the Polish Army (Sierpowski and Żerko, 2002: s. 369) (Wojciech Roszkowski gives a total of 2,5 million). This is an extremely meaningful figure considering the high proportion of 6,5 million people living at that time in the area of „Polska Lubelska” (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 157).

One of the most important tasks of the PKWN was the creation of a post-war administration and organization of the army. According to some authors, the administrative foundations of the PKWN were „created with great difficulty”, which was partly due to the lack of qualified staff and distrustful or even hostile attitude of the majority of society towards the new government. The decisions of the PKWN contributed naturally to the complete liquidation of the administration created by the occupant. In its place, local national councils and public administration were established. In this way, a kind of dual power system was created. In this specific system, the decisive vote always had Soviet military committees, and next to them worked civil authorities established of PKWN (Toporek, 1996: s. 326).

Another important task was to create a security structure and militia on the liberated territory. They facilitated the activities of the NKVD services. NKVD specialists assisted in the creation of voivodeship and powiat security offices. In accordance with the directives flowing from Moscow, the Lublin authorities exacerbated military and civil penal legislation (Toporek, 1996: s. 270). However, according to some authors, „lawlessness prevailed” (Toporek, 1996: s. 327). This is confirmed by the mass arrests of members of the Home Army (AK) and the Polish underground. The arrested people were detained at the Castle in Lublin, in the former concentration camp at Majdanek, and some were deported to the USSR. These events were accompanied by intrusive propaganda of cooperation between the Home Army and the Nazis (Toporek, 1996: s. 326-328).

On September 6, 1944, the first agricultural reform decree was issued. Its aim was to complete farms with an area of less than five hectares and create farms for non-farming. The peasants had to pay the equivalent of one-year harvest for 10-20 years. The reform in this shape was aimed at attracting as many supporters of the

new power as possible, at the expense of creating a modern agricultural structure (based on medium-sized farms producing for the market) (Sowa, 2001: s. 15). Implementation of the reform, however, was slow, because many activists (including Andrzej Witos, the head of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms) realized that its aim is only to implement the political goals of the communists (and not to improve the structure of Polish agriculture).

### **2.3. POLAND AFTER YALTA AND POTSDAM CONFERENCES**

The process of „matching” to the Soviet pattern the political, social and economic systems of states of people's democracy was long and complicated. In relation to Poland, it has never been practically completed. Stalin's plans were not intended to include Poland in the USSR, but its total subordination to the Soviet power. While in 1945-1948, largely due to the will of the Western countries, Poland remained in the Soviet sphere of influence and decisions, since 1949 steps were taken to transform it into a Stalinist type of the state. For the first four years after the end of the war, all decisions concerning Poland were made in the Kremlin. However, the margin of independence of the state remained quite wide. There were spheres of life that were not subjected to political control, and even unmanageable, such as the Catholic Church. However, after 1948 freedom in all areas of life began to decrease gradually (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 102).

The Soviet goals and their time horizon were understood differently in Poland. The Polish society (above all its most active circles) was characterized by a contradiction. On the one hand, the public did not want the governments imposed by the communists, but on the other hand, it had to be reconciled with it. People wanted to strive for social reforms that were partly due to the war, but they did not want these aspirations to be used by the communists in Moscow's interests. At the moment of the cessation of hostilities, active non-communist groups (constituting a significant majority before) disintegrated and three groups within society emerged instead.

One part recognized that cooperation with communists was something justified because they were the guarantee of socio-economic reforms and would not allow old governments to return. They believed that in the face of disappointment with the attitude of the West, they must come to terms with the triumph of the USSR, and at

most they can soften the brutality of communists by operating in governments under their banner (Roszkowski, 2004: s. 152). This direction was followed by leftist socialist and peasant radicals (whose numbers were supported by „politically naïve youth”) (Albert, 1991: s. 482).

The second and the largest group decided to create democratic parties, which thanks to the United Kingdom and the United States were to win the elections and take power friendly towards the USSR, but independent of it.

The last group were those who did not believe in agreement with the communists, and they maintained underground activities. They hoped that there would be a new war between the West and the USSR. But in the situation of „tiredness” of the Polish population by war, as well as the lack of interest from the West, this group slowly weakened, being systematically dispersed by the new „people's power”.

### **2.3.1. Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN)**

In February 1945, the Big Three Powers Conference took place in Yalta. Its results should be considered as a defeat of Poland and the total success of Stalin. As a result of decisions taken in Yalta, the Soviet occupation of the eastern territories and postponement of decisions regarding compensation for Poland in the West was finally approved. In turn, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland, appointed by Stalin's will, was adopted as the basis for the creation of a new government in the state. It had the task of organizing free parliamentary elections in the state, for which (due to the rejection of the possibility of international control) there were no guarantees that they would not be faked (Sowa, 2001: s. 19).

On 17-21 June 1945, in Moscow, there were deliberations on the creation of a government in Poland, that could be recognized by the United Kingdom and the United States. These meetings were attended by representatives of the „Polska Lubelska”, or the president of KRN - Bierut, the prime minister of the Provisional Government - Osobka-Morawski, and the deputy prime minister of the Government and the secretary general of the PPR - Gomułka. The former Prime Minister of the government in exile (the government in London) - Mikołajczyk and several other activists from abroad also took part in the negotiations. Support for activists from the London's government through the United States and Great Britain was only formal,

while the Communists gave way only when the Soviets were ordered. This can be seen in the words of Gomułka, addressed to independent activists. He said: „*We will never give power once gained*” (Roszkowski, 2004: s. 152).

Negotiations from Moscow turned out difficult and they ended only in June. As a result of the solutions elaborated during the talks, the Provisional Government of National Unity (on June 28, 1945) was created. Its deputy prime minister and at the same time Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reforms became Mikołajczyk. It was his declaration of readiness to recognize both the Yalta arrangements and the Curzon line (along with leaving Lviv on the Soviet side), which was so important in the state's history. Finally, therefore, the Russians pushed through their position, and according to it, the emerging TRJN turned out to be only „*enlarged the current Provisional Government*” (Grodzki, 2009: s. 94).

The government was recognized by the United Kingdom and the United States on 5th July. This meant the withdrawal of recognition for the Polish government in exile under the leadership of Arciszewski. Protests of Arciszewski's cabinet were ignored by the superpowers. Arciszewski stressed that „*TRJN is illegal and can not be recognized freely by the Polish people*” (Grodzki, 2009: s. 94-95). His stand was supported by the Vatican, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Lebanon, Cuba and El Salvador, which did not recognize the new government.

Part of the society, as well as democratic politicians (with Mikołajczyk in the foreground) hoped that even limited independence would be preserved and that the new system would have the characteristics of a parliamentary-democratic system (an unequal political struggle between communists and democratic groupings was supposed to take place in time). For many, however, liberation meant only changing one occupation to another. As Radosław Grodzki remarks: „*It was difficult to come to terms with the thought that, contrary to the beautiful slogans of the Atlantic Charter proclaimed in the summer of 1941 by Roosevelt and Churchill - the fate of the Polish nation had to be subordinated to the calculations of great powers*” (Grodzki, 2009: s. 94-95).

### **2.3.2. Decisions regarding Poland in Potsdam**

On July 17, 1945 in Potsdam the third conference of the Big Three began. The American delegation was then headed by Harry Truman, the Soviet by Joseph Stalin,



and the British by the time of the election of Winston Churchill, and shortly after their termination new Prime Minister Clement Attlee. The most important goal of the conference was to develop the conditions for a future peace treaty and also to decide on the fate of the defeated Germany (until the peaceful conference was called).

The standpoint of the Great Powers in the case of Poland was formulated in Chapter IX of the Agreement. The establishment of the Provisional Government of National Unity was recognized with approval. It was also stated that the consequence of the British Government and the US government establishing of diplomatic relations with the TRJN is the withdrawal of recognition of the former Polish Government in London, which ceased to exist. TRJN was obliged to conduct free elections as soon as possible, and the representatives of the allies should inform about their progress and preparation.

*„Three Powers acknowledge that the Polish Provisional Government, applying to the decisions of the Crimean Conference, agreed to conduct, as soon as possible, free and unrestricted elections, based on universal and secret electoral law, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties are elected and they will have the right to participate and put up candidates” (J. Karpiński, 1989: s. 20).*

As Wojciech Roszkowski reminds, the contradictions contained in the decisions of Potsdam were not just a compromise between the divergent positions of the USSR and the West. In this way, both sides left an „open door” for themselves in the issue of Germany, but at the expense of Poland. Support for Poland's interests and the demand for its borders on the Oder and Neisse by the USSR, made the new Polish state dependent on it. Receiving of the Northern and Western Lands became a kind of „pledge” for the new authorities for loyalty to the Soviets. The agreement expressed by the United Kingdom and the United States on the Potsdam decisions resulted from the fact that they did not want to strengthen Poland territorially, because anyway it was „condemned” to Communism (Roszkowski, 2004: s. 155).

In Potsdam, the tender position of the United States was strengthened by the first atomic bomb. However, despite this, they have not attempted to enforce solutions that are fairer for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

### **2.3.3. Legislative Elections (1947)**

The elections to the Legislative Sejm were finally held on 19 January 1947 under enormous pressure from the authorities. The polling stations were besieged by the Citizens' Militia (MO), Volunteer Reserve of Citizens' Militia, soldiers of the Security Corps (KBW) and civilian officers of the Security Service (UB). According to the official announcement, 89,9% of eligible voters took part in the voting, of which 80,1% were to vote for „Block” (communists), 10,3% for PSL, 4,7% for residual SP, and 3,5% for PSL „Nowe Wyzwolenie”.

In general opinion, these elections were falsified, and these falsifications took on a variety of forms. In the ten districts of central and southern Poland, where 25% of the country's population lived, the PSL lists were annulled. Manipulation of the size of districts led to the increase of the number of voters per 1 seat, up to 120,000 people in districts with significant PSL influence. In many circuits, organized groups voted publicly on the block list. Only officers with cards from the block list were admitted to the polling stations by MO and UB officers. The men of trust of the unblocked parties were also not admitted to the polls. During the transport of urns and results to higher-level commissions the falsities were widespread. According to the residual data from the circuits, where managed to keep urns in the intact state (eg Gniezno), it was estimated that the PSL list was able to pass around 74% of the voices in the whole country. Meanwhile, according to official data in the Legislative Sejm, the parties of the block together received 394 seats, and the PSL was only 28. In this way *„through the bright falsities, the system of 'people's democracy' was consolidated in Poland”* (Roszkowski, 2004: s. 168).

### **2.3.4. The Small Constitution (1947)**

Elected for a five-year term of office, the Legislative Sejm enacted on February 19, 1947, the „Constitutional Act on the system and scope of operation of the highest organs of the Republic of Poland” (so-called. Small Constitution). Its basic task was to resolve a new fundamental law. As Marian Toporek acknowledges: *„it was a step back from the existing legislation, and even to the principles proclaimed by the KRN and the PKWN”* (Toporek, 1996: s. 338).

Theoretically, the Small Constitution retained the principle that the nation is the source of power and maintained the Montesquieu's tri-division of power. In fact,

the legislative power was exercised by the Sejm (laws) and the government (directives), while the judiciary was to be exercised by independent courts (however, as W. Roszkowski assesses: „*this power was effectively limited by various supplementary provisions*”) (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 199). The executive branch belonged to the president, the State Council and the government. Also, the existence of the Council of State violated the rule of the tri-division of power, because the collegial body (previously unknown to Polish legal practice) included the president of state, marshal and vice-marshals of the Sejm, the president of the Supreme Audit Office (NIK), and the Supreme Commander of the Polish Army during the war (Sowa, 2001: s. 55-56). The competences of this body were to approve the decree-law issued by the government, to adopting resolutions on the introduction of martial law and exceptional law, to exercising supervision over NIK, and (above all) to coordinating the activities of national councils at various levels.

According to the Small Constitution in Poland, the parliamentary-cabinet system was in force. Presidential executive acts in the laws required the countersignature of the prime minister and the competent minister. In practice, the role of the president was greater and resulted from beyond the regime’s reasons. According to Andrzej Sowa: “*The Small Constitution was deliberately created as a framework document and in many cases it referred to ordinary acts, which gave the possibility of relatively free interpretation and supplementing its regulations*” (Sowa, 2001: s. 56). W. Roszkowski, on the other hand, assesses this document as follows: “*With the pretense of democracy, the small constitution provided favorable conditions for take away from the Sejm it’s power, [Small Constitution] complicated the division of legislative and executive functions, and through the Council of State, its president and the system of national councils, created competitive organs for the Sejm and the government, which were not subject to social control. It was supposed to facilitate the behind-the-scenes Communists governments on the model of the USSR*” (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 199).

### **2.3.5. The Stalinist System in Poland (1949-1954)**

Poland was a state dependent on the Soviet Union from 1944 to 1989. However, this dependence has never been as pronounced as in period 1949-1954. “*It manifested itself in the universally perceived physical presence [not only] an army*

*with its own bases, airports and training grounds, but also through thousands of Soviet officers in the Polish Army or hundreds of 'advisers' in the security structures and business administration; in the intrusive propaganda of the mass influx of ideologized films, arts and books, the introduction of compulsory learning of the Russian language; in the constant repetition of slogans about 'help' and 'example'”* (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 102).

The creation of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and the total subordination to its all public life in Poland, has not completed the stage of subordination to its the political scene. In the countries of Eastern block, the Soviets strived to build a one-party system, or otherwise a system with a dominant communist party and fully subordinate to its satellite parties (Musiał, 2014: s. 252). One of the main elements of the Stalinist system in Poland was therefore the principles of the supremacy of the communist party over the state authorities (introduced already in 1944). Its application was initially necessarily limited and was done mainly by the nomenclature. This meant appointing people to various managerial positions by a decision taken by a party leadership. The principle of nomenclature primarily concerned mainly the army and security structure, but also spheres such as diplomacy, censorship, radio, and the governmental information agency. With time, however, its scope expanded and thanks to it the party gained influence on all areas of life outside of religion.

### **2.3.6 The Constitution of the Polish People's Republic**

After more than a year of work under the direction of President Bierut, on July 22, 1952, the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic was adopted. It defined the constitutional principles of the people's state (Toporek, 1996: s. 339). In accordance with Stalin's recommendations, the constitution was treated as a balance of political, social and economic transformations already made. In the regulations of the new Basic Law (similarly as in the case of a small constitution) there was a framelessness that allows for the free interpretation of its regulations by the authorities and the control of constitutional matters by means of ordinary statutes. Many regulations of the Constitution have never been implemented, therefore it can be considered that in reality it was a “fiction” (Sowa, 2001: s. 87).

The Constitution introduced a new name and character of the state. Poland became the People's Republic of Poland (PRL) and the state of “people's democracy and the republic of the working people” (Toporek, 1996: s. 339). Under the new rules, the Montesquieu division of power was rejected. Instead of it, the principle of unification of state authorities was adopted. The authorities were divided into groups of organs: state authority (primate and field), state administration of courts and prosecutors, and state control. The wording “organs of state power” had reference to elected representative institutions with legislative competence, or the Sejm, the Council of State and national councils. The competence of the executive authority was the domain of state administration bodies. The courts, on the other hand, acted theoretically on the principle of independence. The prosecutor's office constituted a separate body (Sowa, 2001: s. 87).

As Lech Mażewski remarks about the People's Republic of Poland, “*strict understanding of the term 'government system' is completely useless, because [...] the level of division of powers (legislative, executive and judiciary) was rejected in favor of the vertical structure of state organs with the Sejm and the councils national as leaders (which together formed a system of state authorities)*” (Mażewski, 2011: s. 11). The institutions subordinate to the Sejm were: the Council of State (a separate and the next alongside the parliament the supreme organ of state power, which was entitled to replace the Sejm at the moment when it did not meet on session or when its term expired), the Council of Ministers (the executive and management institution of state authority ) and through it, administration bodies. Similar relations existed between national councils (to the reform of 1972-1975) as territorial organs of state power, and their executive and management bodies (presidencies) (Mażewski, 2011: s. 11).

#### **2.4. CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF POLAND**

An important role in Poland's social and political life was played by the Catholic Church (working under specific conditions). As a result of the war, the church suffered huge losses: over 18% of diocesan priests died and over 900 sacral buildings were destroyed. In 1945, there were in Poland around 8,8 thousand diocesan priests and about 1,5 thousand religious priests (Sowa, 2001: s. 46). At the beginning of the Stalinist period, the state authorities did not endeavor to an open

conflict with the Church. At that time there were workend in Poland spiritual seminaries, the Catholic University of Lublin was active, and the Theological Departments existed at the universities in Krakow and Warsaw. In the schools there were religious lessons, and on the radio until 1948 the Holy Mass was broadcast. In addition, the state has earmarked funds for the reconstruction of temples destroyed during the war (in 1945-1950, 551 sacral buildings were rebuilt). Also the church land was excluded from the Act on land reform, the Marianists (Catholic Youth Associations) were allowed to work, and Caritas was reactivated. By time also the Catholic intelligentsia became active.

In March 1945, "Tygodnik Powszechny" started publishing on the initiative of the metropolitan of Krakow, Adam Sapieha. As Andrzej Sowa remarks: "*the publication of this magazine pointed to the fact that the church hierarchy is looking for forms of activity possible in the new political situation*" (Sowa, 2001: s. 47). The state authorities also agreed to publish other magazines ("Rycerz Niepokalanej" or "Tygodnik Warszawski").

In Church-State relations, however, the first tensions began to appear. On June 12, 1945, the Provisional Government introduced the principle of unification of law. It concerned, inter alia, universal obligation to enter into civil marriages (next to church ones), thus sanctioning the possibility of civil divorces. The program of Stalinization of the state was on the one hand a continuation of the activities already begun in "Polska Lubelska", and on the other hand it intensified indoctrination in the spirit of Marxism interpreted by Stalin (Marxism-Leninism), connected in part with the fight against the influence of religion and the Church (Topolski, 2004: s. 280).

## **2.5. "POLISH" FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PERIOD OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND**

The shape and structure of the Polish state, imposed by the Soviet Union, was a dependent entity, above all in foreign policy. There is no doubt that the communist power were imposed by the USSR, and Poland was in the "claws" of it rule. This what was guarded by Soviet troops stationed in Polish territory.

Among experts there is a dispute as to whether Poland was completely deprived of independence or was only a dependent state of the Soviet Union (the so-called satellite state). At the same time, however, People's Poland had been

practically a subject of international law since the beginning of its existence and a state recognized almost by all countries of the world. The legal authorities in exile supported the thesis that they represent Poland, but external entities recognized the communist government in Warsaw. The extent of dependence of People's Poland on the USSR was diversified in individual periods. More or less until 1956 (in Stalinist times, when Władysław Gomułka was elected head of the party, against the will of Khrushchev), this dependence was very strict. Over time, it was somewhat “relaxed”.

Poland, however, remained a dependent state of the USSR, and its exit from the Soviet block (or “community of socialist states”) was not possible. The Soviet Union also had no plans (at least until the end of the 1980s) to tolerate any attempts to limit or even overthrow the power of the Communist Party in Poland. However, taking into account the realities of the bloc of socialist countries, the activities of Polish diplomacy in many areas were at least partially independent. In many cases, the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic served to defend the real interests of Poland (the German issue and the inviolability of the border on the Odra and Neisse rivers, as well as the problem of German revisionism). The PZPR authorities very often, however, abused the argument that they represent the true interests of Poland. This is particularly about the German issue, which was treated in an instrumental way. According to propaganda, only so-called Alliances with the Soviet Union were to guarantee of Polish rule in the Western and Northern Territories and protect Poland against “German revisionism”. It was considered that the national interest justified the domination of communists in Poland.

Poland's foreign policy represented mainly (with a few exceptions, such as the Hungarian uprising of 1956) a position similar to that represented by Moscow, both in relation to the West and NATO, as well as in the matter of disarmament, policy towards the Middle East, or even third countries World (where pro-Moscow leftist dictatorships and nationalist liberation movements maintained by Moscow were also supported by Poland) (Grodzki, 2009: s. 110-111). Relations between the USSR and the Western powers became worse and worse. The world entered the Cold War between the building blocks. Apart from Churchill's words about the “Iron Curtain” that covered the part of the continent controlled by Moscow, the British Prime Minister also publicly questioned the legitimacy of transferring the territories east of the Odra and Neissa to the Polish government, which was under the rule of soviets.

The support given by the West to Mikołajczyk was used in the next wave of propaganda campaigns of the communists, which was aimed at the opposition. The direct pretext was the speech, which on 6 September 1946 in Stuttgart, was delivered by James Byrnes, secretary of state of the USA. He stated then that the border on the Odra and Neissa is not final and it will have to settle by the next agreement. He also announced that the United States would not support Poland's demands for a future peace conference. Thus, it was clear that the Americans had come to terms with the real loss of independence by Poland, and they began to seek for Germany. The US and British governments, however, protested when the election was rigged in 1947. However, this protest was ineffective. The Secretary General of the Polish Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka, announced that the Yalta decisions regarding the holding of free elections in Poland were fulfilled. But the Americans were of a different opinion. They believed that the elections in Poland did not meet the requirements set at the Conferences in Yalta and Potsdam (Grodzki, 2009: s. 114-115).

Exept the document regarding the covenant signed with the Soviet Union on April 21, 1945, Poland also signed a whole series of allied documents with other states that the Communists had taken under control. They were bilateral agreements On the other hand, the multilateral nature was concluded by the Agreements on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact (UW).

### **2.5.1. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance**

The COMECON, as an international economic organization of socialist states, was created on 25 January 1949 in Moscow, on the basis of a convention signed by: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the USSR. The establishment of the organization began the stage of multilateral economic cooperation of the communist block.

The activities of the COMECON were supposed to be based on a sovereign balance (or equal rights of all states, respect for national interests), mutual benefits, and fraternal assistance on the principles of socialist internationalism. In fact, from the beginning, the unilateral interests of the Soviet Union were dominant. According to the researchers, until 1989 this settlement can be described as monocentric, in which the role of the economic and decision-making center was fulfilled by the



USSR (Szatlach, 2013: s. 366). In this arrangement, the international division of labor was reduced to the supply of fuels, raw materials and the so-called heavy technologies to other alligned states (which economies had a complementary structure to the center).

Due to the fact that the initiative referred a socialist model of a centrally planned economy, the functioning of market laws was not included in it. The COMECON's states also did not have any agreements between themselves providing for customs concessions or any other privileges than those provided to countries that did not belong to the Council.

Membership in the COMECON was primarily a political, social and ideological nature. Decisions that concerned economic cooperation were made in national centers, ignoring the importance of the supranational center. Also the cooperation was lacking of free market character (Szatlach, 2013: s. 355). However, as part of the agreement, new forms of cooperation have been occurred and developed. There were: coordination of economic plans, as the basic method of the organization's activity, specialization and cooperation of production (among others, domain of the Polish industry was to be the production of a certain type of ships, electric locomotives and electrical devices) (Grodzki, 2009: s. 114-115). Nevertheless, Member States within the Council invested in all areas of capital goods production, neglecting the development of specialization and production of consumer goods. Imports were limited only to the necessary goods, while exports by members of the COMECON were treated as a source of foreign currency to pay foreign exchange imports from Western countries (Szatlach, 2013: s. 356).

The relations between the Polish People's Republic and the Council were implemented mainly through the permanent representation of the PPR, accredited to the Secretariat of the COMECON. Its task was to supervise the cooperation of the state with this organization. As part of the coordination of production plans, Poland specialized mainly in the production of machinery and equipment. On the basis of agreements signed in the 1970s, the specialization of Poland was the production of some ships and ship equipment, as well as the construction of instalations and machinery for the chemical industry. The main recipient of the products covered by the specialization was the USSR. About 90% of goods were exported there (and 40% were imported to Poland from USSR) (Starzyk, 2002: s. 42).

### 2.5.2. The Warsaw Pact

Agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, in other words, the Warsaw Pact was established as an organization of a political-military alliance (in other words, the military pact). It was signed on May 14, 1955 in Warsaw, through Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. As it was officially stated, it was created in response to the inclusion of Germany into NATO structures.

One of the most important provisions of the agreement was a collective commitment to self-defense, as well as providing assistance to each victim. In accordance with Article 3: *“The Contracting Parties shall consult with one another on all important international issues affecting their common interests, guided by the desire to strengthen international peace and security. They shall immediately consult with one another whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of peace and security”*.

The Warsaw Pact has been signed for twenty years, with the possibility of extending it by a further ten years, if the parties announce to the government of the Polish People's Republic one year before the deadline expires. In accordance with the provisions of the document, a unified command was established, headed by the marshal of the Soviet Union (Grodzki, 2009: s. 114-115).

In the provisions of the Pact was nothing about the issue of stationing foreign troops in the territories of the members of the Pact. Originally created the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact had 200 divisions of the Soviet Army and 80 divisions of other members. The agreement became an element of the new policy of the USSR towards the states of the socialist block in which direct supervision (or the functioning of the so-called Soviet advisers in governments up to 1956) was replaced by indirect control (with the dominant position of the USSR).

Grzegorz Mink assesses the Agreement in the following words: *“The Warsaw Pact was an instrument necessary to keep the nations absorbed by the Soviet block in check and to stop their possible aspirations for change and independence. The functions of commanders and chiefs of the staffs of the armed forces were carried out exclusively by the Soviets who occupied all important positions”* (Mink, 2017: s. 226).

For states which were part of the Pact, participation in it was extremely onerous financially and to a large extent burdened their national budgets (after the dissolution of the WP in 1991 there were serious perturbations in the functioning of heavy industry- mainly defense - primarily in Poland and Slovakia) (Grodzki, 2009: s. 116).

## **2.6. THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND – “THE SIX-YEAR PLAN”**

From 1953 or from the time of Józef Stalin's death, in the USSR, but also in the PPR, appeared and strengthened the climate of so-called “Thaw”. Under the pressure of many social groups (mainly the intelligentsia, part of the PZPR leadership and lower level activists), after 1954, the political regime was gradually relaxed, but the economic situation got worse (Grodzki, 2009: s. 116).

After 1945, serious economic transformations took place in Poland. Not only the mining and energy industries have been nationalized, but also numerous processing industries and banks (Marczakowska-Proczka, 2010: s. 304). The system introduced in Poland was supposed to prove its superiority due to the rapid industrialization of the country and “catching up” highly developed states, with the simultaneous increase in the standard of living. These changes were to enable by “Six-Year Plan” prepared for the years 1950-1955. Its goals were presented in December 1948 during the Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party. The main of them was the industrialization of the country, aiming (among others) to solve the problem of overpopulation of the village. The collectivization of agriculture was also planned by it. The plan assumed an increase in industrial production by about 90%, agricultural production by 40%, national income by 70-80%, and the standard of living by 60% (Friszke, 2003: s. 182). Jerzy Topolski assesses: “*in the [...] assumptions of the [Plan] there have been cardinal errors, as above all [...] underestimation of the light industry and agriculture and the superiority of politics over economics*” (Topolski, 2004: s. 282).

The tasks of the Six-Year Plan were to be implemented on the basis of the central planning and management system developed in the USSR (Marczakowska-

Proczka, 2010: s. 304)<sup>3</sup>. In addition to the mechanisms of economic management from the USSR, the development model was also copied through the rapid expansion of heavy industry (Friszke, 2003: s. 183). The inclusion of the central management in the economy allowed for any manipulation of prices (reduction of electricity prices, transport, escape from world prices, also in other fields, etc.). It was possible only in the conditions of the actual isolation of the country from world markets.

## **2.7. HISTORY OF POLAND FROM 1956 TO 1970**

On March 12, 1956, Bolesław Bierut, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, died and his place was taken by Edward Ochab. The new Secretary, however, did not have sufficient authority in Polish society. He also did not have a sufficiently strong base in the party, so he could not cope with the tasks assigned to him.

There was a division in the party. The first group were so-called "Pulawianie" (name due to the place of residence of many members of this fraction, Puławska street, in Warsaw), declaring themselves as advocates of democratization. The second group of "Natolinczycy" (their meetings were held in the palace in Natolin), were accused by the 'Pulawianie' of Stalinist dogmatism (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 121). It is widely believed that the two fractions differed in their attitude towards the USSR (critical for 'Pulawianie' and faithful followers of 'Natolinczycy'). However, in fact the only (as Barbara Fijałkowska and Tadeusz Godlewski acknowledge) a significant difference between these fractions was that "*whose cost they wanted to rehabilitate for their own infamous past*". Pulawianie were accused Stalin and his people of all crimes and perversions, while Natolinczycy found culprits closer, on the Polish political scene, among the representatives of the Polish establishment of the first half of the 1950s (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 121).

In 1956, in Poland, less and less depended on the will and views of the PZPR leadership. The increasingly numerous centers of resistance movement and opposition, both organized (like the Catholic Church) and disorganized, have begun to reveal their existence and influences. The most visible activated group was the

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<sup>3</sup> As Walter Eucken notes, the essence of a centralized economy [which he describes as a centrally administered economy rather than planned] is not planning but the concentration of power and allocative and management decisions in the hands of central party's and state's organs.

creative intelligentsia, however, the peasants, the veterans and the working class also expressed a strong resistance, as evidenced by the events that took place in Poznan on June 28-29, 1956 (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 123). Workers' strikes at the W3 faculty in the Stalin's Factory (Zakłady Cegielskiego) in Poznan quickly expanded on other enterprises and turned into a huge manifestation<sup>4</sup>, followed by street fighting with the army and militia (Lenart and Wywiół, 2000: s. 499).

The June events sharpened the split in the leadership of the PZPR and “*raised the temperature of social moods*” (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 263). Between July 18 and July 28, the Seventeenth Plenum of the Central Committee of PZPR met. During the debate there was a violent discussion. Differently assessed the political and economic situation in the state, the genesis of Poznan events, the results of the six-year plan, as well as ways to deal with the deepening crisis (Sowa, 2001: s. 136). As a result of the internal disintegration in the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and as a result of Soviet warnings, the resolution of the Seventh Plenary of the Central Committee of the PZPR had a general and partial character. They rejected, among other things, the decisive methods of individual worship, referring to Leninist inner-party life norms. In turn, the expansion of workers' self-government and various investment shifts were announced.

In 1956, communists did not seek to overthrow the system, but wanted to repair it. There was an increase in social unrest in the country, which started great press discussions about the Home Army, the ZHP youth, extravagance, waste and the privileges of the party's nomenclature. In all this confusion and chaos imperceptibly Władysław Gomułka grew up on the national leader (whose name appeared from the July plenum) (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 618). The number of supporters of Gomułka increased. It was believed that only he could restore sovereignty to Poland and control its internal anxieties. People have forgotten about his communist views and party activities. He was supposed to be a politician capable of repairing socialism, giving it “*some human face*” (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 124) and Polish national character. Despite co-creating the Stalinist system in the 1940s, it was widely believed that Gomułka would liberalize Poland and make it independent of the USSR.

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<sup>4</sup> As a result, about 75 people died and over 800 were injured.

In Gomulka, hopes were primarily placed on 'Pulawianie', leading to a political breakthrough at the Eighteenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR (Kaczmarek,2014: s. 618). In a secret ballot that took place on October 21, Gomulka was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, despite the resistance of the 'Natolinczycy' who contradicted his candidacy. The VIII plenum was accompanied by enormous activity and social mobilization of supporters of the democratization of the system.

The workers and students tried to oppose the threats of the coup d'état from the 'Natolinczycy'. Large numbers of people were gathered in factories and at universities. Such a mass movement of society was perceived by the PZPR leaders as a threat of destabilization of the country (Friszke, 2003: s. 225). The starting point for the discussion at the 8th Plenum was Gomulka's extensive speech (and not as it was previously accepted by the Political Bureau), in which he assessed the past as a "closed historical period". During the plenum, a critical evaluation of the system of government and the existing methods of exercising political power was made.

In the opinion of Eugeniusz Zielinski: *"the party at that time made an attempt to reorient of the elements of political power, the essence of which amounted to the transition from a totalitarian to authoritarian system. Since the most spectacular manifestation of totalitarian rule is the ubiquitous and unlimited powers of the political police, it was considered particularly important to condemn the lawlessness and abuse of power by law enforcement bodies and state administration in the past period"* (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 125). The changes were to be made in accordance with the concept of socialist democracy, which allowed participation in governments, through various organizations and associations of broad representation of working classes. In comparison with the Stalinist period, this meant the necessity to modify the rules of the state's functioning and to create its organization and structures on other than yet more democratic foundations (but not pluralistic ones) (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 125).

After the end of the plenum, the joy of its results was expressed in many Polish cities on many thousands of manifestations. People declared support for democratization, demanding at the same time to deepen and draw further consequences, among others prime minister Wyszynski returning to Warsaw, or depriving

positions and influences of opponents of democratization in central and local authorities.

On October 24, at the grand rally in Warsaw, the new Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party Władysław Gomułka was greeted by the large number of Polish people (Friszke, 2003: s. 225). He delivered a famous speech that day, in which he admitted that the communist policy had so far been against the law and at least partially wrong” (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 618).

The announcement of changes in the functioning of the political system was to be confirmed in the third elections to the Sejm after the war. On November 29, 1956, the National Unity Front decided to issue one common list. The date of the election was initially set for the middle of December 1956. However, due to the tense public mood, it was postponed to the beginning of 1957. Gomułka promised that the elections will be conducted by a new electoral law, which “*allows people to choose and not just vote*” (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 127). Nevertheless, according to many researchers, including Adam Dziurok, they tried to show the public that the mechanisms of democracy are taken seriously and the appearance of a real election campaign was created (Dziurok, 2014: s. 302).

After the elections, the communists felt more confident again. The social pressure on power decreased along with the progress of democratization, and the Stalinist mid-level party apparatus began to recover again. The pressure of the communist leaders in the Soviet Union, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, reluctant towards Polish separateness, also grew (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 273).

Gomułka and the party declared victory in the election for the end of “changes”. As Hanna Dylągowska admits, “*they exceeded the expectations of his and the group of party reformers*” (Dylągowska, 2000: s. 215). The society supported Gomułka and saw in him “a dear providential statesman”, who would contribute to changing the situation in Poland. Meanwhile, the activities of the First Secretary went in the direction of restoring the “orderliness and order” in the country. Besides, they became the slogan of the next communist teams in Poland. They meant the withdrawal of power from the promises given to the society. Gomułka restored the sharp censorship, which in the previous few months clearly weakened.

In November 1968, during the Fifth Plenum of the PZPR Gomułka was elected as a first secretary for the last time. After choosing Gomułka could not hide his

emotions “*unless he knew that his time was going irrevocably*”. As the researchers of Polish history note: “*This fact was not able to overshadow the large propaganda campaigns organized in recent years by the 25th anniversary of People's Poland in the summer of 1969 and the centenary of the birth of Wladimir Lenin in the spring of 1970. The October “small stabilization” has virtually gone down in history, and its place was more and more marked by autarkic “radical socialism” - how contemptuously this period was called by the opponents of Gomulka*” (Eisler, 1997: s. 199).

The internal crisis in the state, which is a certain paradox, was accompanied by Gomulka's greatest success in his foreign policy (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 136). On December 7, 1970, German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz signed a treaty on the basis of normalization of mutual relations (Agreement between the Polish People's Republic and Germany on the basics of normalization of their relations). It stated, among others, that the existing border, which course was determined in Chapter IV of the Potsdam Decisions, is the western border of Poland. Both states have confirmed the inviolability of their existing borders now and in the future (Krasuski, 2003: s. 313).

However, this international success could not save Gomulka. In the country, the economic crisis was visible in all production sectors (mainly in industry). Workers worked beyond their capabilities, but it however, did not provide them a decent standard of living. Authorities of party were not able to remedy this problem in any way, and on December 12, 1970 they announced the need to raise prices (most for agricultural and industrial goods) (Dybkowska 1 et al, 1994: s. 330). It provoked mass protests of the working class, especially in port cities, or Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin. The economic demand was mainly put forward by workers. However, it was then that independent trade unions were awaited. An Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee was also established, indicating the development of the self-organization process of workers in the fight against the prevailing system (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 136). Party leaders made the decision to use a weapon against the demonstrators. In the officially reported statistics, 45 workers were killed from shots, 1165 were injured, and 2898 were arrested (data were most probably undervalued, there are presumptions that there were 147 fatalities just in Szczecin) (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 345). The tension in the country increased, and the Political



Bureau of the Central Committee of PZPR decided to remove Gomułka from the office of the First Secretary. In his place, Edward Gierek, the former secretary of the provincial party in Katowice, was elected (Dylańska, 2000: s. 218).

Analyzing the evolution of the concept of the power model in Poland in 1956-1970, in the second half of the 1960s (according to Eugeniusz Zieliński), the concepts and ideas that were developed during the “democratic renewal” of the second half of the 50s and at the beginning of the next decade were lost (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 135). The most negative phenomena include: an excessively centralized system of managing the state, replacing the state apparatus with a party apparatus, failure to fulfill its role by the constitutional organs of the state, elitist personnel policy and undemocratic style and methods of managing the state. According to Zieliński, the postulated power model had been deformed in a confrontation with political life. Thus, leading to another crisis of power and the need to depart from its exercise, creators and implementers of this system of government. The author of post-October democratic renewal and the originator of a liberalized system of government, Władysław Gomułka, “*became the mainstay of the authoritarian system of government and the lost hope for the democratization of political life in the country*” (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 135).

## **2.8. THE DECADE OF EDWARD GIEREK (1970-1980)**

Edward Gierek, who took over the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of PZPR, was in a much worse starting position than his predecessor Władysław Gomułka. First of all, the reason was the lack of public confidence and the need to control the crisis situation in the country (Sowa, 2001: s. 233). Gierek began his rule with rather unconventional methods in the light of the party's current practice. These were personal meetings and discussions with striking shipyard workers in Szczecin and Gdansk (Dylańska, 2000: s. 218). During the stormy meeting with shipyard workers, which took place on January 24 in Szczecin, Gierek was able to convince the striking shipyard workers that he is able to lead the country out of crisis. The same mechanism was also repeated in Gdańsk, where he pronounced his famous query “And what?, will you help?”, and the shipyard workers applauded him (Kamiński, 2014(b): s. 368-369).

In overcoming the distrust of society, the personal features of Gierek and his life experience played a significant role. Under almost every respect he differed from his predecessor and, what is important, he clearly wanted to emphasize these differences. *“After Gomulka, [who] practically [did not care] about his own image in the mass media, Gierek was quite shocked. He was well dressed, and the golden glasses gave his face seriousness and gave him an 'intellectual look'. Propaganda emphasized almost at every step that the new leader of the party grew up in the West and is fluent in French”* (Eisler, 1997: s. 205). Gomulka traveled a lot around the country and he did not avoid conversations with “working people”. On the occasion of these trips, he often made short, improvised conversations with ordinary people. This situation *“in democratic countries belongs [...] to the norm of public life, but in real socialism was a complete novelty”* (Eisler, 1997: s. 205).

At the beginning of the 1970s, *“even people far away from sympathy for communism admitted that [...] in Poland a lot has changed”* (Eisler, 1997: s. 206). Above all, regarding the issue of mitigate in censorship. Some films which emission was blocked in the 1960s, appeared in cinemas. There were also books that significantly expanded social knowledge about history. The authorities also decided to rebuild the Royal Castle in Warsaw. The new leadership of the PZPR appealed to catchy social slogans such as: *“Let Poland grow in strength and people life will be better”* (Eisler, 1997: s. 206-207).

The well-presented First Secretary of the Central Committee of PZPR presented to the nation a vision of universal well-being. Visible effects were brought by the initial slogan of building the so-called “Second Poland”. The state began to incur enormous foreign loans. The stream of the western currency (because loans were taken from there) was so huge that large-scale investments were started. Construction of large (but sometimes economically unnecessary) factories and steel mills was started. Wages increased rapidly, which resulted in a rapid demand for consumer goods. These phenomena, however, were not the result of a better organization of work or increased production. The investments were to be paid back only years later and then the loans were planned to be returned (Dybkowska 1 et al, 1994: s. 334). The economic situation based on foreign loans ended at the turn of 1974/1975, because the number of investments was growing disproportionately to the possibilities. In addition, some public goods and funds were directed to the

pockets of policy makers from the highest to the municipal level: *“The villas of prominents grew in various parts of the country as quickly, or even faster than other public buildings”* (Dyłałowska, 2000: s. 219).

From the each side, tried to show the image of the country as developing dynamically. Gierek traveled the world as a European leader, and propaganda of succes dominated in the mass media. He also received Moscow's consent to strengthen foreign contacts with capitalist countries, both economic and political. Presidents and prime ministers from Western countries, NATO and EEC members have visited Poland. An agreement with Vatican was also signed (Dybkowska 1 et al,1994: s. 334).

The first signs of crisis began to be noticed in 1975. After several years of relative abundance of consumer goods, the situation in the country was getting worse. Widespread gaps have become widespread. Access to deficit goods, such as butter, meat, medicines, sugar, refrigerators, washing machines, cars or even toilet paper, became a privilege distributed to citizens at their discretion, through special stores and so-called. vouchers that began to differentiate and upset the public (Dyłałowska, 2000: s. 219).

The authorities reacted to this situation by preparing an “economic maneuver”, the key element of which was a drastic increase in prices. Under the influence of social protests, they began to withdraw from this idea, but the economy “began to roll down an inclined plane” (Kamiński, 2014(b): s. 398). To improve the economy of state, various ideas were captured. Food exports have been increased, but this has exacerbated supply problems. Hidden price increases were also introduced. For this purpose, the Commercial Store was used, in which products available for a higher price were not available on the market. There were also changes in the names of products, thanks to which the new product could receive a new price. These activities, however, were no longer able to save the economy.

### **2.8.1. The Election of Karol Wojtyła for the Pope (1978)**

After the sudden death of Pope John Paul I, on October 16, 1978, cardinals from around the world chose as a Pope, the Polish Archbishop of Kraków, Karol Wojtyła, who assumed the name of John Paul II (Dybkowska 1 et al,1994: s. 336). In Poland, there was a state of shock, as well as a great joy. In Krakow streets were

filled with people, and the youth organized marches. People at that time carrying flags and singing religious songs. The authorities were surprised and terrified, but on the other hand, Polish society felt valued like never before. It was difficult to predict which consequences this choice would have on Poland's internal situation (Sowa, 2001: s. 261).

W. Roszkowski writes that: *“news about the election of Cardinal Wojtyła had become a global sensation. All the world’s news agents said how a great religious event it is, but also a political one. It was emphasized that John Paul II became the first in 455 years non-Italian on the Holy See, that he came from a communist country, in which despite the 35 years of struggle between the authorities and religion, faith remained the inspiration of the majority of society”* (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 395). Due to the election of a Polish Pope, the entire attention of international public opinion was focused on Poland. It was reminded about the history of a country which, against its will, was put under the influence of the communist authorities. It was noted that this choice evokes the idea of the unity of European culture, which was artificially divided in Yalta, and that the Pope from Poland *“can confirm the end of illusions about the possibility of progress realized by force”* (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 395).

The solemn inauguration of the pontificate of John Paul II, which took place on October 22, 1978, was attended by diplomats of several dozen countries, as well as many heads of state. Poland was represented by the chairman of the Council of State, Henryk Jablonski, who met with the Pope on the next day. The Pope expressed his will to visit his homeland, which after long discussions between the state authorities and the episcopate took place in June the following year.

Pope John Paul II was greeted by numerous crowds of pilgrims on the entire route of his pilgrimage to Poland. They listened to his words: *“It is impossible to understand this Nation that had such a wonderful past - but at the same time so terribly difficult [...] Europe can not exist without an independent Poland on its map [...] And I am calling from the depths of this millennium: Let your Spirit descend and renew the face of the earth. This earth!”* (Dybkowska 1 et al, 1994: s. 336). In his homilies, the Pope remembered patriotic content and referred to it many times (Sowa, 2001: s. 262).

Although the authorities tried to minimize the effects of the pilgrimage, (among others by showing during the television broadcasts selected from the crowd of faithful clergy and the elderly), these efforts were in vain. The full effects of the Holy Father's visit appeared in the summer of the following year (Kamiński, 2014(b): s. 398). As noted by Polish historians: *“The Pope has released the suppressed for years aspirations of polish people about independence and he restored the original meaning to concepts, abused by state propaganda, such as patriotism, independence, democracy”* (Dybkowska 1 et al,1994: s. 336).

## **2.9 THE CREATION OF “SOLIDARNOŚĆ” IN 1980, END OF THE POLISH PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, MARTIAL LAW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES**

### **2.9.1. August Agreements**

At the beginning of July 1980, the authorities introduced another price increase. Initially, it was meant to cover only commercial stores, as well as products in factory kiosks and canteens. This case (seemingly small) has become an impulse for the outbreak of the greatest wave of strikes in the history of the PPR (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 410). At some workplaces, the work was stopped in July. The authorities quickly gave way to salary demands, which resulted in further protests (Dybkowska 1 et al,1994: s. 337).

Events that in their consequences led to the fall of communism, not only in Poland but throughout Central and Eastern Europe, began in August in Gdansk (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 410). At the beginning of the month, the authorities decided to fire from job Anna Walentynowicz, an activist of Free Trade Unions, shortly before her retirement. In response to these events, a strike was planned. The shipyard crew was picked up to protest, and Lech Wałęsa headed the strike committee. The strikers' demands included the reinstatement of Walentynowicz and Wałęsa, commemoration of the shipyard workers who died in December 70, as well as the salary rise. The shipyard workers from other coastal cities also joined the protest. On August 16, the shipyard's management declared to meet the demands of the protesters, to which Wałęsa responded by ending the strike.

As Łukasz Kaminski acknowledges, *“Poland's history could have been moving in a different direction at this time. However, a group of women [...] prompted the strike leader to resume it. They argued that without the support of the shipyard, in*

*other workplaces, the protests would be suppressed*” (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 410-411). Despite the fact that most of the workers left the factory, the protest was continued.

The shipyard workers in Gdansk benefiting from the help of opposition activists in the night from the 16th to the 17th August 1980 formed the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS), headed by Lech Walesa (Dybkowska 1 et al, 1994: s. 337). In the same day, the MKS in Gdansk formulated 21 strike demands, containing, apart from “ontic” demands, also political postulates. The most important of them concerned obtaining consent for the creation of free trade unions and guaranteeing the right to strike, as well as the freedom of press and publishing (Sowa, 2001: s. 282). A similar Committee was also established in Szczecin (and its head Marian Jurczyk). It also formulated a list of similar 36 postulates. MKS's political demands were rejected by Gierek during the TV broadcast. However, to Gdansk and to Szczecin he sent government delegations. After difficult discussions, an agreement between the government and Inter-Enterprise Strike Committees was signed on 30 August in Szczecin and 31 in Gdansk (Dyłałowska, 2000: s. 222).

However, the signed agreements did not mean the end of the wave of strikes. Although the Gdansk and Szczecin Agreements were announced both in the local and nationwide press. However, it was not immediately obvious whether they would apply throughout the country. This insinuation was explained in the agreement ending the strike in Huta Katowice on September 11th. It confirmed that independent self-governing trade unions can be created wherever the employees wish it (Friszke, 2003: s. 373). It was the most important result of the August strikes and signed agreements. As it turned out later, the trade unions created in this way were the basis of the movement, which, despite the martial law introduced in 1981, survived until the end of the 80s. And in the new international conditions it could bring Poland back to independence and sovereignty (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 740).

The crisis and the signing of August agreements determined the fate of Edward Gierek. On the night of 5 to 6 September, the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party met in Warsaw removed Gierek from the function of the First Secretary, choosing Stanisław Kania in his place (Eisler, 1997: s. 224).

### **2.9.2. Establishment of “Solidarność”**

The newly emerging leaders were faced with the problem of choosing the formula of action. The key decisions were taken in Gdańsk on September 17, 1980, during the gathering of delegations from all over the country. It was established that there will be one strong union, which will be based on an atypical regional organization (however parallel sections of the industry have started to be created). The name “Solidarność” proposed by Karol Modzelewski was also accepted. The temporary central authorities of the association were also appointed (the National Communication Commission - KKP), with Lech Walesa as a chairman.

In connection with the difficulties encountered in many places of creating the “Solidarnosc” structures, which were still used by the authorities, the KKP announced a warning strike on October 3. Despite the fact that only selected workplaces took part in it, it showed the strength of the new union. The authorities, however, did not give way. On October 24, the Supreme Court in Warsaw registered the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarnosc”, but at the same time it changed its statute. It added in it that “Solidarnosc” recognized the leading role of the Communist Party and limited the right to strike. The “Solidarnosc” leadership, however, did not accept these changes and demanded that the status be restored and registered in its original form. A general strike was also announced if these demands are not met (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 416). On November 10, a compromise was finally reached. The Supreme Court changed the decision of the Provincial Court and restored the record regarding strikes. In turn, the issues of recognition of the constitutional order of the Polish People's Republic and the record on the leading role of the party were transferred to the status annex.

The rise of “Solidarnosc” brought a great hopes of polish people. The organization has quickly become the driving force behind the democratic renewal of the whole society. Within its framework it managed to include all social groups: workers, small peasants, artisans, intellectuals and students. Each of these groups created, as a trade union model, its own organization that combined the functions of social movement and employee trade union. This dual role made it possible to determine the organization program. Its aim was also to care for the everyday life of employees, that is, activities aimed at improving working conditions and living conditions (housing, health) (Mink, 2017: s. 350).

“Solidarność” turned out to be not only a mass trade union movement, but also a dynamic social movement, which was strongly directed towards the fundamental changes of the political system. The management of the organization initially denied this kind of opinions formulated by the authorities. However, the rapid (as Barbara Fijałkowska and Tadeusz Godlewski evaluate) radicalization of the relationship (especially since 1981) left less and less doubt. In the program, approved on 7 October by the First National Congress of NSZZ “S” delegates, this formula has been confirmed: *“We are an organization that combines the features of a trade union and a great social movement. The combination of these features determines the strength of our organization and our role in the life of the nation”* (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 172-173). Requests of political significance have already been included in the August demands, which, once agreed with the authorities, were accepted for implementation. They concerned, apart from the right to strike, or the restriction of censorship, also the plurality of the mass media, the release of political prisoners, and the expansion of the Catholic Church's presence in political life (Jagusiak, 2004: s. 37). In the reform programs, the oppositional character of the organization towards the party's authorities and the government, was more and more distinct. From the very beginning “Solidarnosc” appeared with their harsh criticism, questioning at the same time the legitimacy of the system and the leading role of PZPR. Extensive changes under the control of the union were demanded. Initially, they concerned social and economic policy (including the project of establishing a Social Council of National Economy), and later also state reforms and the creation of the Self-Governing Republic (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 173).

According to Alain Touraine, “Solidarnosc” was not a homogeneous political camp. Within its framework, we can distinguish at least three trends of thinking, valuation and motivation, or trade union, democratic-civic and national-Christian<sup>5</sup>. There were also various constellations of these trends in individual regions. However, in the 1980s “Solidarnosc” was bonded through the communist system, and resistance to this system was motivated by different ideologies, individual attitudes and expectations. At that time “Solidarność” had *“one centralized enemy [by what] it was acting really solidarity. [In connection with this], neither in nor*

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<sup>5</sup> From the perspective of Alain Touraine, therefore, the current shape of the Polish political scene can not be surprising



*outside of it, was aware that it is not a monolithic unity*” (Grabowska and Szawiel, 2001: s. 17).

### **2.9.3. The Matirial Law**

The year 1981 started again with strikes across the country. It was a reaction to the deteriorating economic situation and the expression of expectations for its rapid improvement. While the changes taking place in the political sphere and trade union activity were noticed, the economic situation deteriorated steadily. And it lead in the spring and summer of 1981 to the disappearance of goods from the shops and the more acutely perceptible inflation. The situation was also not good in the countryside (Kaczmarek,2014: s. 746-747). In February there were important personnel changes in the government. The prime minister was General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was also the head of the armed forces. The number of provocations on the part of the authorities towards “Solidarnosc” increased. “Solidarnosc” reacted on it with further strikes. At the same time, pressure from the USSR was increasing. The USSR was worrying due to the development of the situation in Poland and the possibility of similar events in other Central and Eastern European countries (as evidenced by exercises of the Warsaw Pact troops, which in spring 1981 took place in Poland) (Dybkowska 1 et al, 2002: s. 340).

In connection with the unresolved issue of the legalization of “Solidarnosc” of farmers, on March 19, 1981, a group of its representatives took part in the meeting of the Provincial National Council (WNR) in Bydgoszcz. Unexpectedly, they were denied the right to vote and the WRN session was interrupted. Union activists decided, however, to stay in the hall, where the militia soon entered and trow out activists from the building. This event was widely received as an attack on “Solidarnosc”. It demanded an explanation and punishment of those who committed it. In response to the minimize of the whole case by the authorities, a 24-hour warning strike was announced on 27 March. And if it would not bring the effects there was announced general strike on March 31. The warning strike engulfed the all country, thus showing the strength of “Solidarnosc”. The negotiations of the “last chance” with the government continued on the eve of the general strike. According to Łukasz Kamiński, *“Walesa, without consulting with the rest of the delegation, after a face-to-face discussion with the deputy prime minister [...] Rakowski decided*

to cancel the strike” (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 420-421). The settlement (so-called the Warsaw agreement) has been concluded. Thanks to it the authorities undertook to explain the backstage events taking place in Bydgoszcz and to registry the “Solidarnosc” of farmers.

As W. Roszkowski observes: “Warsaw agreement was generally taken away in society as a step back and unsatisfactory. The dynamism of “Solidarnosc” has weakened somewhat” (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 419). The cancellation of a general strike intensified the conflict within the organization. Some of the activists and members were disappointed that the final clash with the communists (general strike) was abandoned. Others, however, “breathed a sigh of relief”. In turn, Wałęsa was accused of “authoritarianism and disrespect for democracy, as well as breaking the provisions of the KKP” (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 421). In the following months, the union (but also the PZPR) devoted more attention to internal affairs and it was preparing for the delegates' congress.

From the spring (which seemed impossible) the supply in stores was rapidly deteriorating. In April cards for meat and sausages were introduced, followed by butter, rice, flour and groats. There was no alcohol or cigarettes. To realize the card compartments, people had to spend a lot of time in queues (Sowa, 2001: s. 291-292). Initial talks between the government and “Solidarnosc” have begun. On some issues, similar positions were found, while in others it was impossible. The actions of the authorities against the expectations of “Solidarnosc” were influenced by constant pressure from Moscow. Although the possibility of direct intervention of the Soviet troops was averted, the authorities continued to be in a situation of blackmail and lack of acceptance for the “Solidarnosc” by the Kremlin. The threat of split between supporters of the agreement with the organization in some of the factories, and the party organs and authorities, oriented to the “crackdown with Solidarnosc” (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 421), was becoming more and more distinct.

With the beginning of the summer of 1981, it became increasingly difficult to see the possibility of Polish authorities agreeing with trade unionists. The Soviet side has increasingly pressed Polish leaders to finally “choke” the other side (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 748). In mid July 1981, the 9th Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party took place. The hope that the congress will gain popularity and initiative in society has failed.

On the other hand, the First National Congress of Delegates of NSZZ Solidarność (which numbered around 8 million members) met with great enthusiasm. During the congress, an offensive and confrontational course was adopted. Leaders of “Solidarnosc” had significant influences in Polish society and stopped counting on the existing balance of power in the international arena. However, what had consequences in later events in Poland: *“they neglected the dependence of Poland on the USSR and its unfavorable geographic location”* (Czubiński, 2000: s. 313).

From the Kremlin's point of view, after the July meeting of the Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, the situation in Poland has not changed in any way. In turn, the course of the NSZZ “Solidarnosc” congress and its conviction about “unlimited possibilities” (including the demand to write free elections to the Sejm) contributed to the change of the party's tactics (Dybkowska 1 et al, 2002: s. 340). The position of the first secretary Kania, who resisted the use of force in the country, clearly weakened. As a result, in autumn he was replaced by General Jaruzelski, who was determined to introduce martial law in Poland. Jaruzelski stated that he agreed to take over the function of the First Secretary, *“as a communist and a soldier, because the Soviet leader [Brezhnev] wished so it”* (Sowa, 2001: s. 296).

What is underlined by Polish historians, probably then the Soviet authorities decided that they would not bring their troops to Poland. However, in secret from the public, preparations for the liquidation of “Solidarnosc” were being prepared. Before Christmas, the card system covered another group of goods. The propaganda of the PZPR began to warn against economic catastrophe, thus provoking strikes. The appearance of the goodwill of the authorities was made to resolve any socio-political conflicts (Dybkowska 1 et al, 2002: s. 341).

On December 11-12, the last meeting of the NSZZ Solidarnosc authorities took place in a tense atmosphere. The police headquarters in Gdansk received alarming information about the movements of the troops, which, however, were ignored. On the night of December 12-13, without the decision of any constitutional body, arrests of “Solidarność” activists began (on the basis of long-standing lists of persons intended for internment). In the morning (December 13), tanks and armored vehicles appeared behind the windows of the houses. In a TV interview, General Jaruzelski

announced the imposition of martial law and the creation of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON) (Dybkowska 1 et al, 2002: s. 341).

Today, all details of the decision-making process concerning the imposition of martial law are not fully known. However, there are many reasons that led to such a solution. These were mainly: fear of losing power and destabilization of the political situation, very bad economic situation, inability to obtain a compromise with NSZZ “Solidarność”, pressure from the USSR on the Polish party leadership, threat of the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 749).

As Andrzej Leon Sowa acknowledges, probably the introduction of martial law in Poland, will always be a controversial fact. Part of experts will think that in this way the country was saved from the Soviet military intervention and further “unpredictable” developments that could lead to “massive bloodshed”. In turn, according to others, the USSR only threatened Poland and in reality it would never have been able to enter to the country. However, the further development of “Solidarnosc” would lead to “*an earlier erosion of the Soviet system*” (Sowa, 2001: s. 297).

Martial law in Poland was in force from 13 December 1981 to the end of 1982. In accordance with the provisions of the relevant decrees of the Council of State, a ban was imposed on assemblies and manifestations, as well as publications without the consent of the state administration. The activities of organizations, social associations and local governments have been suspended (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 153). By virtue of the new resolutions, the entire trade union movement was liquidated, and new trade unions were established on the initiative of the authorities (which remained under the strong dependence of the PZPR). In the consequence of martial law was therefore restored of trade union monism and the principle of one union in the workplace. This contributed to the creation of the underground structure of “Solidarnosc”. In this organization, therefore, the concept of a general strike was strengthened, understood as a means to fight with the authorities (Jagusiak, 2004: s. 37).

As a result of martial law, some sectors of the economy and enterprises were subject to militarization. Many opposition or trade union activists associated with “Solidarnosc”, were interned, as well as some members of the former party and state leadership from the 1970s. In total, in the period 13.12.1981-31.12.1982, about

10,000 people were interned. There were also numerous restrictions on civil rights and freedoms manifested: in strong censorship of correspondence, control of telephone conversations, a police hour from 22:00 to 6:00, restrictions on changing the place of stay, as well as foreign journeys (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 154). The administration also had the option of appointing citizens to a place of residence and moving them through an official order.

The decree on Martial Law also specifies the provisions of the new criminal law in force during martial law. The active participation in an organization which activity was suspended, threatened a penalty of 3 years imprisonment. In turn, the organization of the strike was punishable by imprisonment for five years, and the participation in it was punished with 3 months in prison. The propagation of false messages, the effect of which could be a public order violation, was punishable by 6 months to 5 years imprisonment, and their dissemination in print could have increased the sentence to 10 years of imprisonment (Buhler, 1999: s. 606).

Responsibility for martial law rested in WRON, which created 21 people (other sources give 22 people), under the leadership of General Jaruzelski. It called the officers of the Polish Army to the functions of commissars of the National Defense Committee. They were directed to civil institutions and workplaces in order to force the administration to obedience. Formally, there was a kind of a dual-power system - military and civilian. Nevertheless, although the role of the army actually increased, its task was basically to be a "brand" of martial law. Despite the announcements of the formal functioning of state organs included in the WRON proclamation, in reality the role of the dispositive center was taken over by the so-called Directorate. It was a collective description of a group of people (Jaruzelski's closest collaborators from the ministry of the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the party and the government) who, due to their functions in the power structure, met every day and managed the affairs of the state on an ongoing basis. It was an informal body that no one, especially WRON, called for (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 154).

The general reaction of Polish people to the introduction of martial law was shock, resentment and anger. Despite the presence of army units and special militia units (ZOMO), on the day after December 13th, strikes began in many factories (Dybowska 1 et al, 2002: s. 342). The vast majority of protests were liquidated by the authorities already in the first days of martial law. As noted by Ryszard Michalak

and Andrzej Piasecki: *“Society has calmed down due to general fatigue, permanent political tension and problems in supply. Passive resistance was also due to the Church and the tradition of "Solidarity", which consisted of fighting without violence. This probably surprised the initiators of martial law, who were also prepared to fight on the basis of party activism [...] However, there was no need to resort to the help of party militias, because the situation in the country was under WRON's full control“* (Michalak and Piasecki, 2003: s. 141).

On January 25, 1982, the State Council decrees were approved by the Sejm and the authorities began long-term methods of repression, such as firing activists of “Solidarnosc”, forcing them to emigrate, verifying workers' backgrounds (including journalists), submitting to police supervision, dismissing from leadership positions people who were critical of the imposition of martial law (for example at universities) (Michalak and Piasecki, 2003: s. 141). Martial law regulations have eased over time. The internees were freed or directed to holiday, the telephone communication was restored and people were able to move around the country (Dylągowska, 2000: s. 225).

In spite of the constantly submitted declarations, no necessary economic and political changes were made. And although the martial law ended in 1983, the repressive system that was created as a result of its introduction, was active until the end of the communist era. Most of the criminal law provisions still worked, thanks to which the Ministry of the Interior was able to continue to apply measures of repression against the opposition (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 762). Repressed opposition activists were not able to overcome the monopoly of political communist power. They only succeeded in upholding the will to resist, which was particularly evident during the illegal demonstrations organized on the occasion of national holidays and anniversaries, the Pope's visits, and in the continuing outrage to the crimes of the system (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 763-764). However, this did not give the possibility to reestablish a broad social movement, which, like in the years 1980-1981, was able to break the monopoly of the communist authorities.

#### **2.9.4. Second Half of the 80s**

In the second half of the 1980s, the situation in the country was gradually affected by the effects of changes in the Soviet Union. A conference (April 1985)

convened in Warsaw on the occasion of the next anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Pact brought the new secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev. He made suggestions to the Polish authorities that they themselves have to take responsibility for the internal situation in the country. The economic difficulties of the USSR prevented him from active political involvement in Central and Eastern Europe (Kaczmarek,2014: s. 774-775).

As Jerzy Wiatr notes, *“it seems that from 1986 [or] since the Soviet authorities [...] of Gorbachev stabilized, the Polish political leadership [...] initiated a conscious policy of democratization of the reconstruction of the system. However, it was supposed to be a democratization from above, more like a Brazilian aperture than the Spanish negotiated reform”*(Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 43). The elements of this policy were: amnesty of political prisoners, combined with the announcement of abandoning criminal reprisals against the political opposition, appointment of a Consultative Council to the Chairman of the Council of State, extending the scope of freedom of expression in mass media controlled by the authorities (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 43). However, this policy did not bring any increase in support for the authorities. A visible manifestation of this state of affairs were the results of the November 1987 referendum regarding political and economic reforms. As noted by Ryszard Kaczmarek, *„both questions were edited [...] so that they could not be answered negatively”* (Kaczmarek,2014: s. 777), as a result, the majority of Polish people who took part in the referendum answered it in the affirmative (1 question 66%, 2 question 69%). Nevertheless, although 67,8% of those entitled took part in the vote, the recalculated percentage of 44,28% (1 question) and 46,29% (2 question) advocating reforms did not give the government enough support (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 42) and consent to their implementation.

In Polish society there was a lack of trust in the intentions of the PZPR and lack of faith in its ability and determination to reform the state. There was a growing sense of hopelessness caused by the lack of a perspective of changing the social, political and economic situation (Dylągowska, 2000: s. 226). A significant percentage of young people decided to pursue their aspirations outside the country, and so in 1985-1988 over 1,2 million people went to highly developed countries from Poland (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 185). In 1988, the state of the economy was even worse than eight years earlier. Lack of reforms led to galloping

inflation, the economy was uncompetitive and based on obsolete technology. The basic goods were still lacking in a limited network of state-owned stores, and interest on non-paid foreign debts continued to grow (Popławski, 2014(b): s. 46). Poland's economic slowdown can depict a comparison of income per capita in Spain. In 1950 it amounted to USD 775 in Poland and USD 561 in Spain. In turn, in 1988, it was 1860 and 7740 dollars (Gulczyński, 2000: s. 80). The development of the economic situation criticized economists with a focus on „Solidarnosc” and the Polish Episcopate. They more and more often called for dialogue between the authorities and the opposition and society (Osękowski, 2000: s. 364). Polish workers once again began to strike. Not only economic reforms but also re-registration of NSZZ “Solidarnosc” were demanded.

In August 1988, Minister (Ministry of the Interior) General Czeslaw Kiszczak, made a public offer to meet “*representatives of various social and legal backgrounds*” at the “round table” (Dybkowska 1 et al, 2002: s. 343). As Łukasz Kamiński observes: “*this was in fact an offer for the part of the opposition centered around Walesa*” (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 454). A few days later (31/08), General Kiszczak met with Lech Walesa, with the participation of a representative of the Church, Bishop Jerzy Dabrowski. It was agreed that future talks will concern significant topics. In return, Walesa agreed to end the strikes. However, it was not easy to implement these promises. Fearing the next ‘run forward’ of the authorities, the protesters demanded more specific declarations from them. The protests ended after three days, and under pressure were both authorities, “*afraid of social revolts*”, and Walesa's camp “*who were threatened to move sideways by a new generation of radical activists*” (Kamiński, 2014(a): s. 454).

Since September 1988, regular meetings of Kiszczak and Walesa have taken place in Magdalenka (next to Warsaw). Both sides sought a compromise, but each of them was guided by different motives. The government side was no longer able to maintain the activities of the basic structures of the state and its economy, without resorting to violence and even more impoverished society. In turn, activists (still illegally operating) of “Solidarnosc”, who, on supported by the Catholic Church's (as mediators), saw the possibility of using the moments of unexpected weakness of the communist authorities, which this time could not appeal to the Soviet ally (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 778).



In January 1989 at the X Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR, the reform group forced the remaining members of the party to agree to legalize “Solidarnosc”, which already works openly in many regions (though informally) (Dylągowska, 2000: s. 227). In the resolution of the Central Committee of PZPR, the government party supported the political and trade union pluralism, thanks to which it was possible to set the date of the Round Table’s discussions (Kaczmarek, 2014: s. 780).

The failure of the top-down reform, as well as opposition pressures and the democratization-friendly situation in the USSR contributed to a change in the system that was made through a negotiated compromise between authorities and the opposition.

## **2.10. „THE ROUND TABLE” AND ITS DECISIONS**

The end of the period of the Polish People's Republic (the last years of the 1980s) was marked by transformations of relations between power and citizens and a broad debate on the future of the state. Their culmination were discussions at the Round Table dominated by political and constitutional issues (Grzelak, 2014: s. 196). They lasted from February 6 (Kasińska-Metryka, 2004: s. 52) until April 5, 1989, and their basic decisions concerned on: organizing of contractual elections in which 65% of seats in the Sejm would be guaranteed for the ruling camp (parties - PZPR, ZSL, SD) and for non-governmental organizations (PAX, PZKS, UchS), creating of the Senate and organizing of completely free elections to this chamber, equipping for the Senate with a right of veto, which the Sejm could reject with a two-thirds majority, union pluralism and legalization of NSZZ „Solidarnosc”, as well as the adoption of a new law on associations, reinstating the President's institution, elected for 6 years by National Assembly (merger of both chambers), the right of the opposition to broadcast in television (half-hour) and broadcast on the radio (one hour) once a week, permission to publish „Tygodnik Solidarność”, establishing of the National Council of the Judiciary, adopting a new constitution until 1991, completely free elections in 1993 (Popławski, 2014(a): s. 61).

According to P. Hayden, the factor allowing the compromise of dismantling of the system in Poland was a bad perception of the actual political situation by both parties. According to the researcher, the government side overestimated its own

power, while the opposition underestimated its own (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 53). However, as Jerzy Wiatr observes when we analyzing the whole package of arrangements, the ruling camp realized that it was dealing with the opposition that was supported by the majority of citizens. That is why a decision about the construction of the contracted Sejm was made and gave it much more powers than the democratically elected Senate (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 53).

According to a survey conducted by CBOS, the meeting of the Round Table from the beginning enjoyed temperate interest of the society (and it fell over time). While in February about 35,5% of respondents discussed the Round Table, in April this percentage dropped to 17,5%. Only 33,8% of respondents were convinced that the contract concluded, would solve the most important problems in their country. To the question „which party would receive greater public support as a result of the meeting”, 58,7% supported Solidarnosc, while 2,5% were convinced that the popularity of the authorities would growing, and 18% believed that the Round Table discussions would bring popularity of both parties (the remaining 20,8% of respondents did not have an opinion on this matter) (Popławski, 2014(a): s. 61).

The first direct consequence of the Round Table discussions were parliamentary elections held on 4 June 1989. They were not fully democratic elections, because the ruling camp had 65% of seats in the Sejm (which means that these elections can be called contractual elections). Contrary to expectations, the most democratic elections in Poland since the Second Republic of Poland did not enjoy as much interest as expected. The turnout was 62,32 (Jedynaka, 2002: s. 76) % (J. Wiatr reports that it was 52,11%) what was a huge surprise for many observers. As Miroslaw Grzelak notes: *„it seems that in 1989 polish people ceased to be interested in politics as such, and they focused more on economic matters - if they could already use their capacities and skills in the economic sphere, politics would went to the background. For them, political and regime changes, including the Round Table discussions, did not matter much”* (Grzelak, 2014: s. 196).

Almost all opposition candidates won in the first round of the election (to the Sejm 160 out of 161, which gave 35% of the places covered by the contract, and 92 from all 100 to the Senate). In turn, the candidates from the government block gained only 5 seats in the Sejm and none in the Senate. It was a meaningful discredit of power. A second round of elections was necessary, and it was held on 18 June with

the changed electoral law (Topolski, 2004: s. 211). These elections were much less popular because only 25% of voters took part in them (Michalak and Piasecki, 2003: s. 185), however, on their basis, it was possible to fill 65% of the places predetermined for the government camp. The final result of the June elections was as follows: the candidates of the Citizens' Committee won 99 seats in the Senate and 161 in the Sejm, one seat in the Senate was won by an independent entrepreneur and 299 seats in the Sejm was allocated to political organizations (according to the parity at Round Table) (Michalak and Piasecki, 2003: s. 185).

As Andrzej Sowa writes: *„the crushing parliamentary victory of the opposition was a shock for those in power, but such an outcome was also not expected by the greatest optimists from the Solidarnosc. Another thing is that the winning of Solidarnosc in the country was only 40-42% of the total vote. Already at that time a large social group was formed, which later was referred to as a „silent minority” (which soon was turn into a „silent majoraty”), and this group consequently did not participating in the next elections”* (Sowa, 2001: s. 329).

On July 19, 1989, the National Assembly chose the head of state. General Jaruzelski was the only candidate for this function. He became the new president with 270 votes in favor, 233 against and 34 abstentions. Some deputies and senators of the opposition did not take part in the vote or their vote was invalid. In this way, they wanted to allow the choice according to the *„unwritten agreement at the Round Table”* (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 55-56). After the election of the president, work began on the construction of the government. The appointed Prime Minister, General Kiszczak, was unable to build a sufficient parliamentary majority. As a result, he made the decision to resign from forming the government. Tadeusz Mazowiecki was appointed the new prime minister, whose government was mainly composed of ministers from the parliamentary opposition. For the first time in the history of the communist system, the ruling party lost its power. The government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki was the first government since the end of the war, in which the former democratic opposition constituted a definite advantage.

## **2. 11. THE FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND**

The Round Table talks led to a number of agreements concluded between the government and the opposition. The most important findings were in matters

concerning the political system of the Polish People's Republic. They resulted in seven amendments to the Constitution in 1989-1992. On April 7, 1989, the new electoral law and the institution of the Senate and the Function of President introduced into the constitution, were passed by the Sejm. The President replaced then the collegial head of state in the form of the Council of State (Lisicka, 2002: s. 39).

In December (December 29, 1989), in turn, there was a „qualitative change in the content” of the provisions of the Basic Law, under which the name of the state was changed to the Republic of Poland. The concept of the nation as a sovereign in the state and the principle of a democratic state of law were also introduced. The provisions referring to the leading role of PZPR and those defining the party system of the Polish People's Republic were deleted. The new entries also restored the crowned eagle as a state emblem (Chudy and Kaleńczuk, 2014: s. 148).

A very important change from the point of view of the functioning of the political system in Poland was the constitutional amendment of March 8, 1990. As a result, the existing system of national councils, which are an integral part of the centralized socialist system, was abolished. In their place municipal local self-governments (gminy) were created (Gulczyński, 2000: s. 81). In this way, the first step was taken towards a new system of public administration and empowerment of citizens, through enabling local communities to express preferences and direction of development. On the same day, enacted a new electoral law to municipal councils, thanks to which it was possible to conduct elections for local self-government on new rules.

On the basis of the amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the law on the election of the President of the Republic of Poland passed on September 27, 1990, the principle of selecting the president by universal and direct elections was introduced. In this way, on the basis of the new electoral procedure on December 9, 1990, in the second round, Polish people, as a result of direct election, elected the first president, who became Lech Wałęsa (74,25% of votes) (Malendowicz and Chudy, 2014: s. 132).

As Mariusz Gulczyński remarks: „these changes were introduced as a result of pressure and deepening political dissonance between the systemic changes and the person of the then president (who was associated with the Material Law). At the

same time, obtaining the social legitimacy by the head of the state strengthened his position towards the parliament (which was still contractual). It also provided for the president, a decisive influence on the formation of the government. [Nevertheless] this had led to many conflicts between the executive and the legislature legislature” (Gulczyński, 2000: s. 81).

The Act of 28 July 1990, in turn, ensured the institutionalization of political parties. Article 1 defines a political party as „*a social organization appearing under a specific name, which is aiming to participate in public life, in particular by influencing the shaping of state policy and the exercise of Power*” (Fijałkowska and Godlewski, 1996: s. 202).

Under the conditions of the not yet fully formed multi-party system and on the basis of the electoral law of 28 June 1991, on 27 October 1991 the first completely free parliamentary elections took place in Poland. These were proportional elections without a percentage barrier (Lewandowska-Malec, 2013: s. 270). As Andrzej Antoszewski notes, the decision on the selection of the proportional system was influenced, among others, by fragmentation of the parliamentary scene: „*The bipolar arrangement born as a result of the Round Table Agreements did not last long. Two largest clubs have been segmented: the PZPR - as a result of the party's dissolution, and OKP - as a result of the internal break*” (Antoszewski, 2002: s. 62). As a result of the election, representatives of 29 political groups obtained mandates (of which 11 parties won 1 mandate) (Lewandowska-Malec, 2013: s. 270). The newly elected Parliament adopted a provisional act that regulated mutual relations between the state's most important organs, in accordance with the principle of tripartition of power. This law is commonly referred to as „the Small Constitution”, and its duration can be defined as the second stage of transformation (Lisicka, 2002: s. 48).

The Small Constitution of October 17, 1992 consisted of 78 articles in six chapters (Chudy and Kaleńczuk, 2014: s. 149). Its content did not include provisions regarding the mode of its change, as well as information about the judiciary and the legal position of the individual. In turn, it introduced the principle of the division of powers „*without prejudice to its content, as the basis of the political regime*”, which meant giving up of the conception of the National Assembly” (Lisicka, 2002: s. 48). The provision that the Sejm is the supreme organ of power in the Republic was deleted and the classical division into legislative and executive power was

introduced. The President's role in the matter of forming a government, dissolving the Sejm or watching over foreign policy and state security has been increased. Under this act, the important prerogatives were obtained by the Council of Ministers (even the possibility of issuing decrees with the force of the Act). As the researchers point out: *„this law has consolidated the republican form of government, the democratic state of law, the sovereignty of the Nation, the rule of law, political pluralism, territorial self-government, freedom of economic activity, protection of property, judge independence, bicameral parliament, five principles of electoral law”* (Chudy and Kaleńczuk, 2014: s. 149). The systemic changes introduced by the Small Constitution were not too deep, but they contained elements of the functioning of a political system based on the tripartition of power, thanks to which it is possible to define it as a democratic (Gulczyński, 2000: s. 84).

The phase of stabilization of shaping the democratic system in Poland was initiated by the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland on 2 April 1997. It contains a catalog of the basic constitutional principles of the Republic of Poland (compatible with democratic canons), or: the principle of the sovereignty of the Nation, the principle of representation, the rule of law, the rule of law, the principle of division of power, the principle of political pluralism, the principle of freedom of thought of conscience and religion, the principle of economic freedom and protection of property, the principle of decentralization of power, the principle of self-government, the principle of respecting international law.

The most important change in the form of government in accordance with the provisions of the Polish Constitution is the regulation of mutual relations between the supreme state organs (Gulczyński, 2000: s. 84-85). As Mariusz Gulczyński remarks: *„experiences acquired in previous stages of transformation have prompted the legislator to adopt a system of rationalized parliamentarism, which involves weakening the position of the president with simultaneous strengthening of the government's position, and the prime minister in particular. The spectrum of features related to the parliamentary-cabinet system was thus enriched”* (Gulczyński, 2000: s. 85). According to Ryszard Herbut, the pattern of organization of the political regime in Poland does not meet the conditions for qualifying it to a parliamentary or presidential type (Herbut, 1999, s: 11). In Poland, we are dealing with a

constitutional model of a mixed system<sup>6</sup> that uses features typical of the parliamentary system (the parliament comes from general elections, the government is a subject to parliament, which may express a vote of no confidence, ministers may be parliamentarians) and of the presidential system (the president appoints the government, separate elections of the president and parliament). In the literature, this type of model is referred as a semipresidential, or a divided (dualistic) executive (Lisicka, 2002: s. 49).



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<sup>6</sup>The political regime and the system of government are used interchangeably by some Polish political scientists

## CHAPTER 3

### 3. POLISH PATH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

#### 3.1. TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND

In the scientific literature, the processes initially launched in Poland (and later also in other Central and Eastern European countries) have been described as “transformation”, “regime transformation”, “systemic transformation” (Szafraniec, 2012: s. 6), “transition”, “refolution”, “substitution” or “displacement” (Wallas, 2004: s. 39). The most frequently appearing concepts in the scientific space are (undoubtedly) “transformation” and “transition”, therefore, the definition of these two categories seems to be the most important from the point of view of this work. Karol Janowski defines the transformation as: *“a long-lasting process, being an object reflecting in the most general terms of the ideal image of the society of the developed, market and democracy”*. Transformation is characterized by *“spontaneity of changes and indefiniteness of the final effect”*, and it is composed of the following surfaces: *“doctrinal, structural and pragmatic, or economic, social and political”* (Wallas, 2004: s. 40). In turn, the transition is *“a transitional period between the deconstruction of the current political regime and the consolidation of the new one. This process is created by a sequence of political events and is characterized by uncertainty of the shape of the final structure”* (Kasińska-Metryka, 2004: s. 57).

Lack of consent among researchers and politicians regarding the adoption of a unique name was caused by the complexity of the phenomenon occurring in Poland, as well as difficulties in comparing it with other political transformations that took place in the history of the world. These transformations were revolutionary in nature, but they took place through peaceful methods. Moreover, it has never been necessary to replace an economy based on central planning by a market economy.

In Poland, changes in the political and economic systems began basically at the same time (Wallas, 2004: s. 39) and their direction can be considered as a completely clear (Miszczyk, 2011: s. 78). In the case of the political sphere, the reforms were based on the model of a democratic state of law. On the other hand, in the economic sphere, attention was focused on transformations leading to the free market.

Poland has begun transformation of the economy: in which the state sector dominated, which was burdened with foreign debts, with high inflation, where was



significant market imbalance and low level of satisfaction of the inhabitants' needs (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 57). In turn, there was a kind of sense of social security, which consisted of job security and the right to a specific social protection package. This is reflected in the data from December 1988, which shows that 5,000 jobseekers were registered at employment offices in a situation where 430,000 vacancies in state-owned enterprises were registered (Wiatr 1 et al, 2003: s. 57).

**TABLE 6.** Increase in the number of unemployed in Poland (compared to 1988) (in thousands of people)

<b>1989</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>
21	750	1714	2124

Source, own work: (Grzelak, 2014: s. 198).

As Mirosław Grzelak points out, "the demanding repairs" in Poland were: inefficient, often outdated state enterprises, underfunding of agriculture, excessive of employment, hidden employment in the countryside, rapidly rising inflation, unchangeable and worthless zloty (currency), technological backwardness, lack of capital, a weak group of domestic entrepreneurs (Grzelak, 2014: s. 197).

In turn, Michał Gabriel Wozniak, for the post-socialist heritage of the economy, recognizes: (1) the general shortage of raw materials, materials, machinery and equipment, labor force, foreign currency and consumer goods; (2) a depreciated production apparatus with outdated technologies (according to calculations by CUP, the average degree of consumption of productive assets in 1990 was 70%) and 2-3 times higher energy intensity per capita than in OECD countries; (3) an economy unable to service foreign debt at the end of 1989, 42.3 billion. dollars, which were completely settled in 2012; (4) hyperinflation that paralyzes the economy (10.1989 - the price increase was 55%); (5) payment difficulties of enterprises due to the underdevelopment of the money market and communications; (6) microeconomic inefficiency and production growth based on the growth of labor inputs and physical capital, not on the resource productivity; (7) a tendency for the GDP growth rate per capita to decline as the domestic production resources of the closed economy run out; (8) development economically, socially and ecologically unbalanced; (9) an unfair division into the cost of more effective entities; (10) loss of competitive ability of

enterprises and the national economy as well as opportunities to make up the development gap and overcome the technological gap (Woźniak, 2017: s. 15).

In the post-communist countries, various transformation models have been used. This resulted from conditions, in other words, the possibilities that accompanied the transformation, the will of political change, and their dynamics. Considering the vast majority of criteria differentiating transformational models, which Katarzyna Żurkowska recalls, Poland's transformation was guided by separate rules of change than it was in other countries (Żukrowska, 2010, s. 180-193).

**TABLE 7.** Models of transformation, their types, effectiveness and countries of use

Criteria	Type	Place of adoption	Effectiveness
The dynamics of changes and the duration of the process	Shock therapy	<b>Poland</b>	High efficiency and dynamics of changes
	Gradualist approach	Czech Republic, Hungary	Spasmodic changes. The shock was postponed after accession to the EU
The scope of application of reforms	Orthodox	Israel, <b>Poland</b>	Fast stabilization. No return of increased price dynamics
	Heterodox	Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia	Slow stabilization, achieved in spasms with returns to increased price dynamics
Intensity of competition	Opening of the economy	<b>Poland</b> , GDR	Good export results after becoming a member
	Protection or delaying opening	Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania	Deterioration of export results after obtaining membership
The type of solutions used	The imitative model	Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania	The effects are based on postponing real-time decisions about changes, which are already introduced in countries that are imitated in their behavior
	Anticipation model	<b>Poland</b>	Acceleration in making changes, consisting in

			introducing them, or in advance than in countries with which the economy integrates, or parallel to them
Structural changes	Before the opening of the economy	Bulgaria, Romania	It slows down the process of change, meaning based on manual control of structural changes. Such solutions may prove to be ineffective when they confronted with market practice.
	As a result of opening up of the economy	<b>Poland</b>	Inclusion of a market economy in to the main market provides impulses which determining the shape of structural changes, matching them both to the possibilities and to the needs
A pro-integration model	Focus of integration with equals	Czech Republic, Hungary	Integration with equals facilitates exports and a method that allows to maintain the current structure of the economy
	Focus on integration with more developed countries	<b>Poland</b>	Both liberalization of trade, as well as integration and the moment of price release were focused on integrating with market economies highly developed
Degree of utilization of institutional links with foreign countries	The model of using institutional links with foreign countries	<b>Poland</b>	Concluding contracts with international organizations such as the IMF, WB and the EU affects the dynamics of structural, macroeconomic and

			reforming changes in the economy
	A model based on the passivity of institutional links with foreign countries	Czech Republic, Hungary	Lack of total or limited use of contracts within international organizations to accelerate transformation

Source: (Żukrowska, 2010: s. 290-291).

The economic program developed by Leszek Balcerowicz, deputy prime minister and minister of finance in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki should be considered the beginning of the transformation of the economic system in Poland. His adviser was, inter alia, Jeffrey Sachs American economist specializing in the transformation of the economies of countries in transition (Grzelak, 2014: s. 197). The program was adopted by the government on October 9, 1989 and contained a set of market economy principles, with simultaneous indication of the objectives of the Polish economy, which was subject to transformation (Kundera, 1999: s. 24).

Taking the effort to transform the Polish economy, one had to undertake radical actions aimed at stopping negative phenomena in current economic processes. The main one was mastering hyperinflation (Małeck-Tepicht, 2010: s. 279).

**TABLE 8.** Inflation, falling value of money and devaluation of zloty in 1981-1988

<b>Specification</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1983</b>	<b>1984</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1986</b>	<b>1987</b>	<b>1988</b>
	in% of the previous year							
Inflation*	26,9	99,1	20,7	14,6	14,0	17,2	25,1	62,2
Falling value of money**	17,5	51,1	17,6	12,9	13,1	15,0	20,5	37,5
Devaluation of zloty***	23,7	55,0	13,8	28,3	17,2	33,6	59,7	61,6

Source: (Kołodko, 1999: s. 42).

\* Inflation measured by the rise in consumer prices (PCI)

\*\* A drop in purchasing power

\*\*\* Decrease in the value of the zloty versus the dollar

Leszek Balcerowicz was convinced that inflation which was inherited from a centrally planned economy, have to be fought from the very beginning of

transformation. And its rate have to be reduced in the shortest possible time. Rapid reduction of inflation was to take place thanks to the simultaneous use of tools of various types of policies: monetary policy, budget policy, exchange rate policy, wage and commercial policy. The comprehensive application of many instruments was supposed to affect a significant reduction in the real size of global demand, and consequently to the surplus of the real size of global demand over the real volume of production. When deciding on the degree of restrictiveness of the anti-inflation policy, the occurrence of the recession in the initial stage of the transformation of the economy was taken into account. From the very beginning, it was known that the economy would be eliminated this production, which could only be maintained in the event of receiving various forms of state support (so-called "pure socialist production"). As economists note, if not the fall in real production volume in the first phase of transformation, a much less strong reduction in the real size of global demand would be needed to lower the inflation rate) (Malinowski, 2010: s. 296).

The macro-stabilization package has been launched since the beginning of 1990. Its two most important elements are the so-called "Anchors", meaning payroll control and fixed exchange rate (fixed exchange rate of the zloty against the US dollar). The exchange rate on January 1, 1990 was set at PLN 9,500 at the time. It was to contribute to the reduction of inflation mainly by overcoming inflation expectations.

The second anchor of the Balcerowicz program was wage control. It concerned state-owned enterprises, because, as recognized in private companies, there is a natural tendency to reduce costs, determined by the owner's interest. A special restrictive remuneration policy was applied in the first half of 1990. In January, state-owned enterprises could raise wages by only 20% increase in the average price level of consumer products, and for the next three months the indexation index was 0.3 (in May and June 0.6) (Malinowski, 2010: s. 296-297). The introduction of the norm of permissible wage increase was accompanied by the establishment of a penalty for exceeding this norm, i.e. the burden of the enterprise on the tax on excessive wages. Through the presented mechanism, the variability of employees' wages and the volatility of pensions and disability was also indirectly controlled. They were indexed in relation to wages in the sphere of enterprises. Ultimately, the descent from

high double-digit inflation to one-digit inflation was achieved after ten years (Małecko-Tepicht, 2010: s. 279).

**TABLE 9.** Inflation rate in Poland (increase in consumer prices - annual average)

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
585,8	70,3	43,0	35,3	32,2	27,8	19,8	14,5	12,2

Source: own work, (Kołodko, 1999: s. 42).

**TABLE 10.** Inflation in Poland in 1988-1998 (changes in the price level of consumer goods in% to the previous year)

1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
62,2	640	249	60,4	44,3	37,6	29,4	21,6	18,5	13,2	10,0

Source: own work, (Kołodko, 1999: s. 42), (Grzelak, 2014: s. 198).

At the beginning of 1990, the “*space for unhampered choice and operation of market mechanisms*” was opened in Poland (Woźniak, 2017: s. 16). It was thanks to it that the general process of adjusting the production structure to the requirements of competition and effective demand could begin. The controlled and spontaneous privatization also works with delays, adopted in 1989 as one of the main strategic goals of the economic policy. It is a natural element of the market economy and consists in the creation of new private enterprises and existing ones. The following objectives were adopted in the privatization program published by the Ministry of Property Transformation in 1990: (1) ensuring the dynamic development of a competitive private sector; (2) improving the efficiency of enterprises; (3) preventing the sale of public property at unjustified, low prices; (4) reducing the size of the public sector; (5) ensuring an increase in budget revenues; (6) ensuring the broad dissemination of property rights; (7) ensuring effective supervision of state-owned enterprises; (8) initiating the process of changing corporate debt for shares (Ptaszyńska, 2005: s. 212-213).

The privatization process in the years 1990-2002 covered 6982 state-owned companies (of which 1535 were commercialized, 1998 included direct privatization, 1795 was liquidated for economic reasons, and 1654 was liquidated). Most enterprises were privatized in the first years of transformation. Their number has been systematically decreasing since 1994, so that in 2002 ownership transformations covered 97 companies that were previously owned by the state (Ptaszyńska, 2005: s. 216).

The linking of systemic transformation with the stabilization program, based on the Washington consensus rules, meant subjecting business entities to „a double shock experiment - transformational and stabilizing” (Woźniak,2017: s. 16) and, as Michał Gabriel Woźniak notes: “in view of the fact that the contextual parameters are not respected by the rules, and the erroneous determination of the numerical values of the stabilization program, the public finance crisis has deepened and financial problems have been created [...] However, the reforms could not simultaneously and immediately change the cultural and technological context of the economy and the characteristics of human capital and, consequently, they brought losses due to adaptation difficulties of business entities and high social costs of this program” (Woźniak,2017: s. 16).

The systemic reforms and standard neoliberal stabilization policy implemented in Poland: a deep supply-demand shock and the resulting rapid population depletion, collapse of exports to the markets of the former Comecon countries, expectation attitudes, defensive strategies, as well as passive adjustments of business entities. Consequently, the possibilities of maneuver in terms of the policy of supply adjustment (taken in 1992-1993) were also limited, as well as the intensified process of selling off national assets. In this way, processes of modernization of the productive apparatus were blocked for a few years, resulting in an explosion of unemployment, low professional activity of Poles, developmental decline in rural areas, expansion of the poverty sphere, and growing disproportions between the increase in labor productivity and remuneration (Woźniak,2017: s. 18).

**TABLE 11.** Dynamics of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in Poland in 1994-2004

Selected indicator	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
GDP growth (in%) (forecast)	5,2	7,0	6,0	6,8	6,5	(5,9)	(5,8)	(5,8)	(6,1)		
Unemployment rate	16,0	14,9	13,2	10,3	10,4	13,1	16,1	17,5	18,0	20,0	19,0
Unemployment rate (forecast)	...	...	...	...	...	9,0	8,5	8,0	7,1	...	...
Stopa ubóstwa relatywnego	13,5	12,8	14,0	15,3							

Imports (in% of GDP)	19,7	21	23,7	27,3	26,0	24,2	27,1	27,1	28,6	33,3	37,5
Export (in% of GDP)	21,6	23,2	22,3	23,4	30,8	30,1	33,5	30,7	32,1	35,9	39,5

Source: own work, (Woźniak,2017: s. 25, 28), (Kołodko, 1999: s. 357).

### 3.2. THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS ON TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND

According to Henryk Cholaj, in Poland we are dealing with a “triple transition”, which is expressed in the simultaneous occurrence of many transformations (resulting both from constitutional and civilization challenges).

**TABLE 12.** The Transition Process in Poland

First transition	from a centralized command economy (socialist type) to a market economy (capitalist);
Second transition	to an economy compatible with the economies of European Union states;
Third transition (taking place in the field of modernization)	One differentiated double transition: (1) First, the completion of modernization through industrialization, by crossing its borders towards a developed industrial society; (2) and then the transition to a post-industrial society.  In this way, industrialization gives way to the problems of the scientific and technical revolution (industrialization is integrally incorporated into it) <sup>1</sup> .

Source: own work

<sup>1</sup> The multi-element nature of the Polish transformation was also expressed in the fourth approach, taking into account agriculture (from the private system of peasant economy, existing until 1989 to the legal-capitalist farming economy).



Taking into account the example of Poland, it is difficult to imagine that the processes of transformation and integration could be carried out in isolation from each other. The integration of Poland with the European Union was taking place in the conditions of political transformation and, as the researchers point out, these were “two parallel processes taking place at the same time” and mutually interacting with each other (Bajan, 2005: s. 91). Regime transformation and changes resulting from the need to comply with EU recommendations have therefore become one of the factors influencing the acceleration of integration within the European Union.

In turn, the impact of integration on transformation can be analyzed by identifying factors on the side of integration, affecting the activating or inhibiting the course of transformation. Next, the actual effects of the mentioned factors can be determined. In the case of Poland (as well as other countries of Central and Eastern Europe), activating and inhibiting factors of the European Union's influence and integration into transformation can be divided into political, social and economic.

**TABLE 13.** Activating and inhibiting factors of the European Union's influence on the transformation of Poland

<b>Type of factors</b>	<b>Factors that active transformation processes</b>	<b>Factors that inhibit transformation processes</b>
Political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• construction of a great united Europe;</li> <li>•• a clear will to expand the EU;</li> <li>•• partnership position in negotiations;</li> <li>•• help in creating transformation programs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• tendencies to relax integration unions and fears of further enlargement;</li> <li>•• no partner position;</li> <li>•• showing delays and no help in creating transformation programs.</li> </ul>
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• elimination of social barriers and differences;</li> <li>•• information about Polish society and culture;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• searching for differences and negative traits in Eastern societies (including Poland);</li> <li>•• lack of</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• emphasizing the values of other cultures.</li> </ul>	<p>information about Polish society and culture;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• consolidation of the post-socialist image of an inhabitant of Central and Eastern Europe.</li> </ul>
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• preservation or creation of barriers to market access;</li> <li>•• tendency to talk about the scope of necessary adjustment of legal regulations;</li> <li>•• pointing to own mistakes and nonsense of integration policy in order to avoid them in the CEE countries;</li> <li>•• financial support for transformation processes;</li> <li>•• advisory assistance in solving problems and avoiding transformation errors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•• gradual removal of barriers to market access;</li> <li>•• automatic treatment of the <i>acquis communautaire</i> as an obligatory canon of regulation;</li> <li>•• failure to perceive one's mistakes and nonsense of integration policy;</li> <li>•• lack of financial assistance;</li> <li>•• lack of understanding of errors and problems of transformation policy.</li> </ul>

Source: (Bağ, 2006: s. 337).

The economic, political and social changes taking place since the 1990s were largely subordinated to the prospect of joining the European Communities. This goal mobilized reforms and set the pace of change. A number of changes that took place in the Polish economy resulted from preparations for accession and were directly related to the process of European integration. One can therefore agree with the thesis that *“without a clear reference point, which was integration with the Communities, it would be more difficult to carry out system reforms in Poland, and*

*the time of their implementation would be significantly extended*” (Grącik, 2010: s. 592).

### **3.3. THE CHANGE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF POLAND AND THE MAIN MOTIVES FOR INTEGRATION WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES**

The end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s of XX century was a period of 'stormy' political, economic and social changes in Poland. The collapsed of the dichotomous system on the continent made that the integration with Western Europe, probably did not have any rational alternative (Stańczyk, 2001: s. 58). Therefore, the fact of Poland's accession to the European Communities (the European Union) became almost a necessity. It was also inevitable to transform Polish foreign policy, set new priorities and find alliances that would protect the Polish national interest (Marszałek-Kawa and Kawa, 2007, s. 4).

The pro-Western direction of Polish foreign policy was related to the conviction that only cooperation and participation in European integration structures can guarantee the implementation of the basic goals and needs of the state. They had at least a twofold character. First of all, they resulted from the need for security (natural for each state and society, and rooted in a broad community of a civilizational nature). Secondly, they provided an opportunity to ensure prosperity and development for society in the context of a difficult transformation process (Domagała, 2008: s. 48).

The main motives for Poland's participation in the European Communities can be:

- European integration was the way to the final of historical divisions that took place in Europe. It was also an opportunity to create a qualitatively new type of relations that guaranteed all development opportunities to all countries concerned and gave them a sense of security. From the beginning of its existence, Poland belongs to Europe, in cultural and geopolitical space, and shares its values (Domagała, 2008: s. 39-40). Emphasizing of Europeanness of Poland, or of the fact that it was and is the part of Europe, and that in the future it should shape in the fullest possible way the fate of the Old Continent, was in the 1990s an immanent feature of public discourse in the country (Dyduch, 2016: s. 69).

- Poland shares the ideas and beliefs that for many years have guided European integration, that is stable development, democratic order, principles of the rule of law, respect for human rights and minority rights, peace on the continent and guaranteeing a market economy. Entering the Community is for the Polish society to realize basic aspirations and consolidate those values that connect Poland with the West.

- Poland's goal at the beginning of the 90s was to take such a place in Europe that would guarantee security and a chance for free development. Being outside the European Communities could constitute a political marginalization (just like after 1945) and a decrease in the sense of security. Integration was perceived as an entering the security sphere and leaving the „gray zone of security” between between the West and the East (uncertain about the directions of development). It would be particularly significant at the time of a possible attempt to return the USSR (later Russia), to a power-making policy aimed at rebuilding its sphere of influence (Domagała, 2008: s. 38). It was expected that the Communities would constitute an additional security guarantee next to NATO (Fiszer, 2003: s. 82).

- Active participation in building the structures of united Europe through the integration with the Communities, was also to ensure participation in decisions which are shaping the principles and directions of European policy development. Thanks to membership, Poland had the chance to participate in the Community/Union decision-making process and co-decide on the future of Europe (Fiszer, 2003: s. 125). Being outside integration structures would limit the possibility of participating in international politics and effective protection of national interests. It would also reduce the Polish bargaining position and increase the risk of influence of partners with greater potential (stronger).

- The integration of Poland with the European Community was a striving to create conditions that would quickly overcome economic and technological backwardness. The economic benefits resulted from the opening of the EU market to the products of Polish producers. They were also supposed to gain a comparative advantage in specific economic activities and deepening the specialization of production, which increases the complementarity of economic structures. It was expected that participation in a barrier-free single market would provide access to production factors for Polish entrepreneur. Together with the transformation efforts,

this should provide the best possible place in the global economy and in the international division of labor for the state (Domagała, 2008: s. 38).

- The membership was seen as a factor supporting development processes and modernizing the Polish economy. It was also supposed to increase political and economic stability and positively influence the credibility of the state. Access to structural funds, foreign investment and technology gave a chance to become a driving force of the growth of the economy. Functioning in the single market allowed to reduce company costs and improve the competitiveness of products in the Community's market.

- The rapid perspective of membership was an important stimulus for the continuation of political and economic transformation. In the accession of the Community, a factor that accelerated the necessary transformations and mitigated their negative effects was seen. As Domagała points out, *„the costs associated with transformation are independent of integration costs related to integration, in the sense that they should be incurred anyway. The adoption of mechanisms that are identical to the European Communities [would] discipline the Polish government and reduce their susceptibility to political pressure, thus could increasing the chance of faster completion of reforms. Full membership [was supposed] to anchor Poland permanently in the system of market economy and democratic institutions”* (Domagała, 2008: s. 39).

- The membership in the structures of integration of Western Europe meant the adoption of European standards in the field of internal security, health, education, the environment or working conditions, and thus increased the society's chance for development and a higher quality of life.

The potential benefits resulting from Poland's full membership in the European Union were considered on several areas:

- Political - due to membership Poland will move from the periphery to the center of Europe, that is, to zone of political and military influence of the West European. The result of it will be the end of the „suspension” between East and West and the disappearance of the so-called *„safety vacuum, or gray zone”*.

- Economic - the possibility of direct participation in the developing and largest of the global internal markets gives the opportunity to create conditions for full use of economies of scale and improving economic efficiency. The opening of the market

to competitive goods from the Union will require structural changes in the economy. On the other hand, participation in the single market, and in the future also in the Economic and Monetary Union, may affect macroeconomic stability. Poland (like other countries in Central and Eastern Europe) can also count on help from the structural funds.

- Technological – the inflow of capital from the other EU's states and foreign investments will contribute to the increase in the level of technological advancement (which will also have a positive effect on the restructuring of the economy).

- Social - common historical, cultural and civilizational heritage, but also current social and cultural links between countries throughout Europe, give a chance of deepening interpersonal, cultural and tourist contacts (Gorzela, 1997: s. 82-83).

Also, the benefits and opportunities that were perceived in membership in the European Union can be divided into individual spheres:

1) Political:

- participation in building the united Europe;
- full membership gives the opportunity to increase the stability of the democratic system in Poland and the security of the state and its citizens;
- bringing Poland closer to European standards in the field of internal security.

2) Economic:

- thanks to the participation in the European Union's internal market, the free movement of goods, services, capital and people is possible;
- access to structural funds;
- inflow of foreign investments and modern technologies.

3) Social:

- the possibility of free movement, settlement and employment in other Member States;
- bringing Poland closer to European standards in terms of work, health, education, information;
- a higher quality of life (also by implementing European environmental standards).

Andrzej Karpiński lists the following benefits of Poland's accession to the European Union in the economic sphere:

- forcing deep adaptation processes in Polish society (it is difficult to stimulate

them based only on internal/endogenous factors);

- creating a chance to overcome the civilization delay of Poland (lasting for several centuries). The experiences of the first few decades after the war show that even with the maximum mobilization of strength, own potential is not enough for this;

- integration gives the opportunity to provide development funds for the economy. The world experience so far has shown in an undeniable way that the most effective source of inflow capital (which countries with developmental delays do not have) and new technologies is the expansion of foreign capital. Therefore, this capital is a great importance for the development of Poland.

- private foreign capital investments - joining the EU creates a much greater safeguard for foreign investors' interests and may stimulate the inflow of investment capitals on a larger scale than until accession. It was estimated that potential foreign investments could grow to 10-12 billion dollars a year (all investments, not just the EU capital);

- chance of getting foreign assistance from various international funds (for example the structural funds). The inflow of foreign capital is to be mainly determined by their size (in accordance with EU policy, it is rapidly increased).

**TABLE 14.** The Size of Potential Funds Planned by the EU for the Period Up to 2005 (Economist, July 1997, s. 36).

Specification	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Funds of Community - together in billion ECU	90,0	92,7	97,5	97,8	99,8	105,1	107,1	109,5	112,0
-for agriculture	41,8	42,8	43,3	44,1	45,0	46,1	47,0	48,0	49,0
-for structural funds	31,5	32,5	36,1	35,2	36,0	38,8	39,8	40,7	41,7

Source: (A. Karpiński, 1998: s. 46).

- for the period 2000-2006, an amount of ECU 45 billion has been provided for assistance for new members;

- after joining the EU, Poland would obtain about 6-8 billion ECU per year from these funds (it is 1/2 of what in the Polish economy was implemented up to 1995) – it is depending on the ability to absorb the inflow of this capital by the Polish economy.

- the entry into the EU opens up opportunities for access to a broad market (370 million people), which in particular for the industry can become a great stimulus for development. The condition for this, however, is the reorientation of the Polish economy to pro-exports;

- Poland is also expected to benefit greatly from the introduction of usable and qualitative standards that facilitate the export of almost all products and services and at the same time impose a high level of technology;

- it is anticipated that the common currency of the „euro” will strengthen the competitiveness of the European Union, including individual states of the euro area (in relation to other partners);

- the expansion of foreign capital across national borders accelerates human development (A. Karpiński, 1998: s. 45-47).

### **3.4. THE HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION BEFORE THE ACCESSION**

#### **3.4.1 Relations with the European Communities in the late 1980s and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement**

Before 1988 political relations between Poland and the EEC were still very weak. From the part of the Communities, they were mainly limited to the debate on the situation in Poland. In January 1982, the EC Council of Ministers decided to continue humanitarian aid for Poland started in December 1980, and after the imposition of martial law in the PPR, decided to apply economic sanctions against the state (February 1982). An important issue was the resolution on the murder of priest Jerzy Popieluszko, issued by the European Parliament on November 15, 1983 (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 24).

In February 1986, the commissioner of the European Community responsible for external economic relations, Willy de Clercq, sent a letter to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the COMECON with the proposal to establish relations with the Community. The position of Poland can be described as



positive, but nevertheless Poland was in favor of a dialogue between the EC and COMECON rather than a bilateral agreement (Duda, 2004: s. 14). Despite the fact that countries of the Eastern Europe have concluded bilateral trade agreements with the countries of Western Europe, and talks on the normalization of relations between the representatives of the COMECON and EEC were made, both of them did not recognize each other until 1988 (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 25).

Already since the 1970s attempts to reach an agreement and establish official relations between COMECON and EEC were taken. However, it was only possible on June 25 (1988), when both sides signed the Joint Declaration on mutual recognition. The Declaration opened a new chapter in the mutual relations between these organizations, but they were typically of a political nature (because no mentions on economic cooperation were included in the declaration). The EEC was also in the position that the COMECON could not have competences that would allow it to conclude trade and business contracts on behalf of its member states (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1997: s. 5). Although, according to the assumptions, the Declaration did not contain any trade agreements, it allowed for the contain of bilateral agreements between the EEC and the COMECON's member states (Bachorz, 1998: s. 50). The same year Poland took advantage of this possibility. On August 22, 1988 Poland made an official application In the case of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the EEC. The official relationship with the Community was established less than a month later (September 20, 1988) (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 25).

The Polish intention to officially recognize the EEC, however, was expressed earlier, as already on May 6, 1986. Shortly thereafter, the position towards the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the Community was also changed. In 1987, Polish negotiators proposed an agreement of regulating commercial matters and economic cooperation. Initially, however, the Commission proposed only a trade agreement to regulate the flow of agricultural and industrial products (Duda, 2004: s. 14). Due to the diversity of position, the Commission delayed the request to the Council for a negotiating mandate. Finally, it happened in December 1988. Two months later (February 1989) the Council agreed that the Commission would start negotiations with Poland.

On September 19, 1989, an Agreement between Poland and the EEC on trade

and commercial and economic cooperation was signed (Marszałek-Kawa and Kawa, 2007: s. 10) Agreement on Trade and Cooperation), and a month later an additional protocol in this matter (regarding to the relationship with the ECSC). The Trade and Cooperation Agreement ended a long period of non-contractual trade relations and gave the opportunity to create a formal and legal framework for further cooperation between Poland and the Communities (Walkiewicz, 2002: s. 29). It was expected that it would be valid for 5 years with the possibility of automatic extension for further one-year periods, if neither of parties „denies it in a written notification six months before the end of the given period”<sup>2</sup>. The purpose of the Poland-EEC Agreement was to create conditions that would make the existing exchange problems to be overcome and to facilitate further mutually beneficial development of trade and other areas of economic relations (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1997: s. 6).

The agreement entered into force on December 1, 1989 and took the form of a non-preferential trade agreement in which both parties granted the most-favored-nation treatment in accordance with the GATT arrangements. It included agricultural and industrial products with the exception of coal and steel, and provided for the abolition of all quantitative restrictions in trade between Poland and the Community (in three stages until the end of 1994). In the agricultural sector, a list of 10 products of particular importance for Poland was prepared, and for which the Community was to reduce customs duties or charges, as early as January 1990. The Community also enjoyed similar privileges (Duda, 2004: s. 15).

The document includes the following objectives of economic cooperation:

- strengthening and diversifying economic ties between contracting parties;
- contributing to the development of their economies and living standards of the population;
- opening up new sources of supply and new markets;
- encouraging cooperation between economic units to promote mixed enterprises, licensing agreements and other forms of industrial cooperation that will foster the development of the industry of both Parties;
- promotion of scientific and technical progress;
- support for structural changes in the Polish economy in order to increase and

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<sup>2</sup>Art. 18 Umowy w sprawie handlu i współpracy handlowej i gospodarczej między PRL i EWG, Dziennik Ustaw z dnia 9 czerwca 1990, Dz. U. 90.38.214.

diversify of the exchange of goods and services with the Community<sup>3</sup>.

The EEC-Poland Agreement was to facilitate the implementation of the following tasks:

- eliminating the existing discrimination against Polish goods on the EEC market (within 5 years the EEC was obligated to end discriminatory quantitative restrictions;

- creating conditions for facilitating the further development of trade (for example through information exchange, promotional activities of both parties, or through adopting regulations of regarding dispute resolution);

- strengthening the economic cooperation (for example by obliging both parties to create facilities for joint ventures, by developing scientific and technical cooperation, or by training human resources) (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1997: s. 6-7).

Areas that were to be particularly favored in cooperation were: industry (including petrochemicals, bulding and ship repair services), agriculture and agri-food industry, as well as agricultural machinery production, mining, energy, transport, tourism and other services, telecommunication, security environment and management of natural resources, health and medical equipment sector, research in selected fields, vocational education and training of managment team (in the fields of banking, insurance, standards and statistics, etc.) (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 27).

In comparison with the earlier agreement with Hungary, the cooperation with Poland was extended, among others by the area of communication, health care, vocational training. It was supposet the transformation of the Polish economy, to increase and diversify exports of Polish goods and services to the Community. According to agreement, a Joint Committee was established, which task was to introduce the provisions of the Agreement into the legal order of each of the States (Duda, 2004: s. 15).

The agreement between Poland and the EEC was a breakthrough in their mutual relations. Thanks to it, mutual contacts were institutionalized. The wide range of regulations contained in it, gave the opportunity to strengthen cooperation. This document created favorable conditions for the growth of trade and economic cooperation between Poland and the Member States of the Communities (Tendera-Właszczuk, 2001: s. 36).

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<sup>3</sup>Dziennik Ustaw z dnia 9 czerwca 1990, Dz. U. 90.38.214.

Already at the end of 1989, it turned out that the cooperation mechanisms defined in the Agreement are insufficient. Under the influence of political, economic and social reforms that took place in Poland, among the political elite of the state, the idea of association with the EEC began to appear (Duda, 2004: s. 15).

### **3.4.2. The Association of Poland with the European Communities**

In July 1989, the Representation of the Republic of Poland was established at the European Communities in Brussels. It was an important political step that indicated the intention to institutionalize the relations between Poland and the European Communities. Three months later (October 1989) the Polish delegation came to Brussels to conduct unofficial talks regarding negotiations on Poland's association with the EC. At that time, however, the Communities took the position that they would not conduct separate negotiations with Poland, only parallel with Czechoslovakia and Hungary. An appropriate position regarding negotiations between the Community and Czechoslovakia and Hungary was taken in the spring of 1990 (Doliwa-Klepcki, 2003: s. 10).

On May 25, 1990, Poland submitted an official request to Brussels to open negotiations on the association agreement with the European Communities. The European Commission was able to negotiate with the Central and Eastern European countries only at the time of its special authorization by the Council of Ministers, which took place on December 18, 1990. Four days later, official negotiations with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary began and lasted almost the whole of 1991. The head of the Polish delegation was Minister Jacek Saryusz Wolski, who was appointed the Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration and Foreign Assistance. On January 26, 1991, on the side of the Communities, the negotiations were conducted by a team of the European Commission, headed by the responsible for relations with the rest of the world Pablo Benavides Salas (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 28).

In total, ten rounds of negotiation talks took place in Brussels and one unofficial meeting in Warsaw. Negotiations, lasting until November 22, 1991, have been described by the Commission as very quick and unprecedented, because usually such arrangements are negotiated for about 3 years (Duda, 2004: s. 19). This does not mean, however, that no controversy arose during the negotiations. Due to lack of

agreement in the case of the access to the EC's market of Polish agricultural commodities and textiles, after the sixth round negotiations were suspended.

The European Agreement on the Association of Poland and the Communities was finally signed on December 16, 1991. It was concluded for an indefinite period, but it was assumed that each party may terminate it by notification to the other party. It then loses its effect six months after the date of notification. The Agreement was to enter into force on the first day of the month following the month in which the parties of the agreement notify each other that it was adopted in accordance with internal procedures and was assumed to come into force on 1 January 1993. However, there was a significant delay in its ratification. By June 1993, only six countries of the community (Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom) ratified this agreement (and the European Parliament). In Poland, the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland in July 1992 agreed to the ratification of the Treaty by the President of the Republic of Poland (Doliwa-Klepacki, 2003: s. 10).

Political crises in the EU, and the controversies that emerged in connection with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, have delayed the ratification of the Polish association's document. Ultimately, however, the European Agreement entered into force on February 1, 1994. In parallel with the association agreement (European Agreement) an interim agreement has been concluded. It entered into force on February 1, 1992, thereby beginning the implementation of some of the provisions of the European Agreement, mainly those relating to the trade and trade-related matters. This document was supposed to apply until December 31, 1992, but in practice it was extended until 1993 (Doliwa-Klepacki, 2003: s. 10).

### **3.4.3. The European Agreement**

The aim of the European Agreement (signed on 16 December 1991) was to establish an appropriate framework for political dialogue, enabling the harmonious development of political and economic relations between the parties<sup>4</sup>, and to create the basis for the gradual integration of the Polish state with the Community. The document consisted of a preamble, 122 articles included in 9 parts, as well as a dozen of attachments, protocols and joint and unilateral declarations. The structure of its

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<sup>4</sup> Art. 1, paragraph 2.

content was modeled in large part on the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, while taking into account the changes that have taken place in the Communities (including the creation of the single market) (Płowiec, 2000: s. 54).

From the moment of formal negotiations on the European Agreement, Poland sought to obtain a record that the association is not an end in itself, but is only a transitional stage, which should lead to full membership in the Community (such a provision was previously included in the Association Agreements with Turkey and Greece). Despite the EEC's initial non-acceptance of the proposal, a compromise was finally reached. The preamble to the Treaty includes a provision stating that „*the ultimate goal of Poland is membership in the Communities, and the Association with them will help [...] achieve this goal*”. As Wiesław Walkiewicz notes, however, there was not in this record „*a clear obligation of accept Poland as a member of [...] the community*” (Walkiewicz, 2002: s. 30-31).

Part I of the Treaty includes a framework of establishment of political dialogue that „*will [...] accompany and strengthen the rapprochement [between the parties], support the political and economic changes taking place in Poland and contribute to the establishment of solidarity*”<sup>5</sup>. As the researchers point out, „*it was a kind of novelty in comparison to the existing agreements on association with the European Communities*” (Doliwa-Klepacki, 2003: s. 11). Also new was the provision on the approximation of the legal system of an associated country, to which one established in the Communities (Article 68)<sup>6</sup>, and also provisions on cultural cooperation (Article 95)<sup>7</sup>.

**TABLE 15.** Table of contents of the Interim Agreement and the European Treaty

<b>Interim Document</b>	<b>European Agreement (Poland)</b>
The Preamble	Preamble
Part I: Free movement of goods	Part I: Political Dialogue
Chapter 1: Industrial products	Part II: General principles
	Part III: Free movement of goods
	Chapter 1: Industrial products

<sup>5</sup> Art. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Art. 68.

<sup>7</sup> Art. 95.



as the Czech Republic and Hungary), the document did not affect a greater degree of integration with the Communities. The Association Agreement with Poland created a free trade zone and in consequences of it the abolition of customs tariffs. However, it did not lead to a uniform customs tariff for third countries, as it was in the case of arrangements previously concluded with Greece and Turkey<sup>8</sup>.

The liberalization of mutual trade in goods began in March 1992. As the competitiveness of Polish industry was much lower than that of the Community, and Polish producers were afraid of opening the market for imports from Western Europe, the principle of asymmetry of concessions was adopted in the provisions of the Agreement. According to this principle, Poland, as a weaker partner, later began to open its market for goods from the Community. However, as Urszula Płowiec remarks, from a formal legal point of view, Poland has been treated in a preferential way, because in the relations between equal partners the principle of full reciprocity is applied (effective reciprocity) (Płowiec, 2000: s. 55).

The Community has made the first reduction of agreed tariff reductions on industrial goods from Poland on the date of entry into force of the Interim Agreement. This reduction covered 45,6% of the value of exports of Polish industrial products. In Poland, the process of ending obstacles to industrial goods from the EC began basically on January 1, 1995. However, it should be mentioned that on 1/3 of imports, primarily on investment equipment and raw materials, duties were completely reduced or abolished as early as March 1, 1992. The reason for such a liberalization of this group of products was the desire to facilitate and accelerate the Polish economy (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1999: s. 28). Other duties on articles deemed more sensitive were reduced successively (Dyrek, 1999: s. 165). The Polish side reduced the duties in a progressive manner, in five installments of 20% in relation to the base rates in force in 1992 (Boryczka, 2001: s. 215).

In accordance with the decision of the European Council from Copenhagen (June 1993), the EU side unilaterally accelerated the process of liberalizing access to its market for goods from Poland. As a result, most of Polish industrial products gained access to the community's market on January 1, 1996 (except textiles - January 1, 1997, and quantitative restrictions - from 1998). At the time of accession of new members (Austria, Finland and Sweden), trade agreements which Poland



concluded with them as EFTA members ceased to apply to these countries. In 1996, there were further negotiations and consultations regarding the amendment of the European Agreement. It was enforced by the entry into force on July 1, 1995 of the provisions of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. As a result, part of the trade arrangements included in the European Agreement lost its validity. Finally, the Polish export of industrial goods obtained completely free access to the EU market on January 1, 1998.

As Sebastian Kaniewski notes, for a full view of the principles of the Association Agreement, one more issue should be noted. This applies to the question of which goods are goods of Polish origin, because only those could have easier access to market of the Community (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 37). This issue was regulated by the so-called „The principle of cumulation of origin of goods”. According to it, the final product was a product of Polish origin, when the raw materials or components used for its production came from Poland, countries belonging to the Visegrad Group or the European Communities. The Central and Eastern European countries began to demand, over time, to extend the principle of cumulation, also to other countries (in particular those from which they drew the most raw materials or semi-products, mainly the former Soviet republics). It was until 1997 that the European Union agreed on the principle of cumulation also in relation to the countries with which the associated countries had signed trade agreements.

The creation of a zone of free trade in industrial products between Poland and the European Union took place finally at the beginning of 2002. At that time, in accordance with the provisions of the Europe Agreement, Poland abolished customs duties on the import of cars from the Community (Boryczka, 2001: s. 214-215). The schedule of mutual liberalization of trade in industrial goods between Poland and the Community has been presented below.

**TABLE 16.** Schedule for the liberalization of access of Polish industrial products to the EC market

<b>Groups of goods</b>	<b>The Share in industrial exports from Poland to EC in 1992 (in%)</b>	<b>The period of liberalization</b>
Annex IIa: mineral and	0,3	1992-1993

chemical products		
Annex IIb: non-ferrous metals	0,7	1992-1993
Annex III: among others iron and steel products not covered by the ECSC Treaty, chemical products, pharmaceuticals, cement, casein, tires, leather and leather products, footwear, glass and porcelain products, some copper products, radio and TV receivers, lamps and some furniture	22,9	1992-1994
Protocol 1: textiles and clothing	18,5	1992-1996 (quantitative quotas were abolished at the beginning of 1998)
Protocol 2: steel products from the ECSC	4,9	1992-1995
Protocol 2: steel products from the ECSC	7,1	Customs and quantitative restrictions abolished in 1992 except Germany and Spain, for which this occurred at the end of 1995.
Other industrial products	45,6	Liberalization of the duty (completely) 1.03.1992

Source: (Kawecka-Wrzykowska, 1999: s. 28).

**TABLE 17.** The schedule of liberalization of access of industrial products from the Community to the Polish market

<b>Groups of goods</b>	<b>Share in Polish industrial EC imports in 1992 (in%)</b>	<b>The period of liberalization</b>
Annex IVa: 1365 products, mainly investment equipment	28,7	Liberalized completely on February 1, 1992.

and raw materials		
Annex IVb: passenger cars and utility vehicles	5,5	1994-2002; from 1992, duty-free contingent for 25,000 units of passenger cars increasing by 5% per year and for 100 commercial vehicles and 5,000 units of cars with catalytic converters increasing by 10% per year *
Protocol 1: textiles and clothing 1) 43 eight-digit CN positions 2) 24 six-digit positions 3) other products of Section XI of the CN	13,3	1) duty abolished on 1.03.1992. 2) 1995-1998 ** 3) 1995-1999
Protocol 2: steel products of the ECSC 1) 8 eight-digit CN positions 2) other products	2,3	1) duty abolished on 1.03.1992. 2) 1995-1999
Protocol 2: ECSC carbon products 1) 7 eight-digit CN positions 2) other products ***	12,0	1) duty abolished on 1.03.1992. 2) 1995-1999
Other industrial products	38,2	1995-1999

\* in accordance with the agreement of June 21, 1994, amendments to Annex IVb were introduced. They consisted in the fact that from 1 January 1994, the duty-free amount of PLN 25,000 cars will get a fixed amount; the tariff amount (zero duty) was opened, covering 8.5 thousand. units of cars with catalytic converters, which since January 1, 1995 has been increased by 1750 units of vehicles per year. If the quota for cars with catalytic converters was used, the vehicles covered by it could use the first of these amounts. In 2002, the ban on imports of ten-year old and older cars and two-stroke engines was lifted.

\*\* on the acceleration of tariff liberalization for a year was decided on the basis of an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters, amending "Additional protocol to the Europe Agreement on trade in textile products between the EC and Poland" of 1995.

\*\*\* Import licenses for certain petroleum oils and gases, coal and coke as well as petroleum oils were abolished at the end of 1996.

Source: (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 1999: s. 29).

The European Agreement did not provide for the creation of a free trade zone for agricultural products, and the liberalization of trade in these articles is insignificant. In contrast to industrial goods, the principle of freezing standstill restrictions did not apply to the group of agricultural goods, according to which „*no new import or export duties or other charges with similar effects shall be introduced or applied anymore*” (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 34). Both sides of the Agreement have thus retained the right to autonomously shape their agricultural policy (Kawecka-

Wyrzykowska, 1999: s. 32). In turn, the similarity in the trade of industrial and agricultural products is the principle of asymmetry, which also in this case meant a faster introduction by the Communities facilitating access to their markets for products origin form Poland.

In order to be able to restore some of the restrictions or introduce new protection measures against the import of agricultural products under certain conditions, the Agreement gave the possibility for the parties to choose several safeguard clauses. The European Agreement included a safeguard clause in agricultural trade (Article 21), an anti-dumping clause (Article 29), a general safeguard clause, modeled on Art. XIX GATT 1994 (Article 30), a clause to prevent shortages on the domestic market (or the threat of such shortages) and re-export to third countries (Article 31), the "general exceptions" clause concerning the application of bans or restrictions on imports, exports or to goods in transit (art. 35), anti-interference clause in the balance of payments (Article 64). In addition to the bilateral clauses mentioned above, the European Agreement also provided for one unilateral clause, which Poland could have used as a weaker partner (restructuring clause Article 28) (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1999: s. 32-34).

In the years 1991-1993, the Community's share in Polish trade increased by 5% annually. However, trade relations between the parties were marked by a significant asymmetry (Dyrek, 1999: s. 168). At about 65% of Polish foreign trade from the EC, Poland accounted for only 2,5% of total EC turnover with external partners. Nevertheless, Poland's share systematically increased from 1,1% in 1990 to 2,5% in 1996. In turn, the total value of trade in 1996 amounted to 39,9 billion dollars. However, despite the huge asymmetry, Poland has had a negative trade balance since 1991. Its value was systematically growing, reaching the level of 7,5 billion dollars in 1996.

**TABLE 18.** Polish trade with the EU in 1993-1996 (in USD million)

<b>Specification</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>
Exports	9 794	11 929	16 036	16 196
Imports	12 203	14 087	18 781	23 738
Balance	- 2 409	-2 158	-2 744	-7 542
Export	80,3	84,7	85,4	68,2

coverage rate (%)				
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Source: (Dyrek, 1999: s. 168).

In addition to the provisions concerning the exchange of products, the Europe Agreement also regulated the principles of cooperation in other areas, namely the movement of employees, the provision of services and establishment of companies, the sphere of capital, approximation of laws and the protection of competition.

In reference to the movement of employees, during the negotiations, the Polish side sought to ensure full freedom in employing of Poles in the Communities. In return, she proposed a commitment to the labor of workers from member countries in Poland. However, the Polish side has failed to succeed in this matter. The document has changed the situation to a small extent in this respect in relation to the period before its negotiation. Only Poles already legally employed in the countries of the Communities or undertaking employment on the basis of self-employment in the EC (and their families) were to be treated in the same way as nationals of a given country (national rule, national clause, national treatment principle). The access of employees from Poland and their contingent was decided by individual member states, and the regulations in this matter were included in bilateral agreements. In the 1990s, Poland concluded such agreements with Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg. According to the estimates of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, thanks to these agreements in 1997, over 220,000 jobs were fund by Polish citizens (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 38).

As Elzbieta Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska observes, „*The European Agreement was the most far-reaching agreement among all contracts concluded by Poland after 1989 with its economic partners, both due to the scope of regulations and the expected consequences for the Polish economy*” (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1999: s. 51). Despite the recognition of the document as beneficial, from the beginning it was considered in Poland as not completely satisfying (Dyrek, 1999: s. 169). The main accusations against the Agreement of 16 December 1991 between Poland and the European Communities were as follows:

- Poland has gained too slow a rate of duty-free access to the European Communities market for its goods;
- Poland abolished tariffs for industrial goods from the European Community

too quickly;

- it was not possible to agree on a more serious concession in trade in agricultural products, what resulted from the strong protectionist attitude of the Community authorities, towards domestic agriculture (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1997: s. 316-317);

- Poland has too early agreed to abolish import amounts for agricultural commodities from the EC. Therefore, it was forced to introduce additional duties on some of these goods (until these issues were settled in the agreement between Poland and the EC on liberalization in trade in unprocessed agricultural products from 27.09.2000);

- the conditions accepted by Poland regarding the provision of 60% local contribution in Polish export goods to the Communities were not an incentive for potential foreign investors to invest in the country;

- the Agreement contained only a general declaration of financial aid for Poland, without specifying sums for subsequent years;

- no liberalization in the scope of the flow of labor from Poland to the Community (as envisaged in the agreements concluded with Turkey and Greece);

- the problem of cooperation in the field of security between Poland and the European Communities was omitted at all (Heller, 2003: s. 102);

- it did not contain the EC's obligation to accept Poland as a member (despite the efforts of Polish negotiators), nor the provisions on the further actions of the partners after the end of the transitional phase foreseen for the association stage (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1997: s. 316-317).

Janusz Heller also mentions several reasons for the conclusion of the Agreement on such and not more favorable terms. First of all, Poland negotiated the Agreement with a much stronger partner than itself. Secondly, the negotiations started without proper legal, organizational and human resources. Thirdly, in contrast to the European Communities, Poland entered negotiations with one of the most liberal customs systems in the world. This situation prevented the Polish negotiators from making concessions to the Communities without prejudice to the Polish economy. Fourthly, the earlier liberalization of the customs system in Poland was necessary due to the maladjustment of the level of domestic production to market expectations and the resulting inflation (which at the turn of the 80's and 90's

assumed huge<sup>9</sup>). Fifth, the Agreement was negotiated in record time (less than a year), while previous association agreements or the creation of a customs union were negotiated in a period of 3 to 5 years (Greece, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus) (Heller, 2003: s. 103-104).

#### **3.4.4. From the Association to the Beginning of Accession Negotiations**

The position of the Community towards Poland has clearly been evaluated, from the initial „euphoria” after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the surprise caused by this event, through gradual awareness of the Community’s role in the transformations taking place in Europe and the consent to institutional approximation (but only in the form of an association), until the political decision to expand the EU by the East (Kawęcka-Wyrzykowska, 1999: s. 116).

In the period from January 1992 to May 1993, there was a relative stagnation in relations between Poland and the European Communities. The European Agreement did not guarantee membership, but only defined the framework of economic and political cooperation, the prospect of gradual integration and the opening of access to the EC's internal market. The breakthrough took place at the Copenhagen summit (June 21-22, 1993) when the European Union made a significant change in the course of its policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. During the summit, the European Council decided to propose the membership for several countries of Central and Eastern Europe (including Poland). The change in the direction of EU's policy was linked to the problem of European security of community members and the need to move the legal and institutional framework of the organization further east (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 75-76).

The final document of the Summit established that admission to the membership of the European Union may take place when the associated country will be able to assume the obligations arising from membership and meet the required political and economic conditions, or (Dyńia, 2010: s. 188-189): ensuring the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and respect for and protection of the rights of national minorities; introduces a market economy; it will have the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; it will have the ability to take on the obligations of EU

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<sup>9</sup> The opponents of the Pact don't mention this argument because it spoke more to their advantage.

membership, including adaptation to the requirements of economic, political and monetary union. It was established that the candidate's admission, in accordance with the provisions of the summit, could take place without losing the previously achieved level of EU integration.

**TABLE 19.** Accession criteria for the European Union

<b>Copenhagen criteria:</b>
1. Stable democracy, respect for human rights and protection of minority rights
2. Functioning of the market economy
3. Ability to cope with competition and market forces of the Union
4. Ability to assume the obligations arising from membership (implementation of the <i>acquis communautaire</i> )
5. The EU's ability to accept new members
<b>Madrid's „criterion”:</b>
Conclusions of the Council in Madrid included a reference to the „adaptation of administrative structures”, which, although important for preparations for membership, are not a condition <i>sensu stricto</i>

Source: (Mayhew, 2002: s. 16).

On November 1, 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht came into force. The article 49 on this document contains the legal basis for the accession of new countries to the European Union. According to this provision, „*Any European state may apply to become a member of the Union [...]*”<sup>10</sup>. However, in order to achieve this goal, the candidate was obliged to submit a formal application. On behalf of Poland, such a document („Request of the Polish government for membership of the European Union”) was submitted on 8 April 1994 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrzej Olechowski.

A consequence of the Copenhagen arrangements was the adoption of the pre-accession strategy at the European Council meeting in Essen on December 8-10, 1994. In this strategy, the European Union expressed its will to intensify and seek new forms of cooperation with associated countries as part of a structured dialogue (Pełnomocnik Rządu do Spraw Negocjacji (PRdSN), 1999: s. 12). The dialogue was

<sup>10</sup> Art. O, Traktat o Unii Europejskiej (Traktat z Maastricht).



aimed at supporting adjustment processes in the associated countries to EU standards. The European Commission has been obliged to prepare annual reports on the implementation of the pre-accession strategy and analyzes on EU enlargement.

As a result of these activities, a White Paper was prepared on the integration of associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the internal market of the European Union. It was adopted on 26-27 June 1995 at the European Council in Cannes. The White Paper, which is one of the elements of the pre-accession strategy, was based on two main instruments: European Agreements and relations between EU institutions and associated countries. Both of these elements were to make it easier for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to achieve the final goal (that is membership in the EU). However, despite the negotiation nature, the White Paper was not part of the accession negotiations and did not contain any decisions on this aspect (such as possible transitional arrangements, calendar of membership or the date of commencement of negotiations) (Duda, 2004: s. 65).

On the basis of the White Paper and the analyzes of the achieved degree of law harmonization, the „Schedule of adaptation measures the Polish legal system to the recommendations of the White Paper of the European Commission on integration with the single European Union, which the Polish Council of Ministers approved on July 15, 1997. It has become a governmental act serving to organize and monitor the course of adaptation activities in the field of the internal market (PRdSN, 1999: s. 12).

During the summit of the European Council in Madrid, held on December 15-16, 1995, the decision on the will to expand the Union was confirmed. Enlargement was considered to be „political” and „historical opportunity” for Europe (Fiszer, 2003: s. 95). It was recognized that it would ensure stability and security on the continent, and at the same time give new opportunities for economic growth and overall well-being to both future and current members. The European Commission was obliged to develop a new financing system already in the context of enlargement and the opinion on the submitted applications for admission. During the meeting, a decision was also made to start accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta, after the end of the Turin Intergovernmental Conference (which beginning was scheduled for March 29, 1996). The European Council also expressed the hope that parallel to the opening of official negotiations with Cyprus and Malta, an initial phase of talks with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would coincide.

The opinion (avis) of the European Commission on Poland's application was presented as one of the parts of Agenda 2000 during the summit in Luxembourg (16 July 1997). It included an assessment of the political situation in Poland, an assessment of the fulfillment of the free market criteria by the Polish economy, a description of the country's readiness to adopt the *acquis communautaire* and the principles of operation of all three pillars. The European Commission positively assessed Poland's efforts to carry out economic, political and social reforms that brought the country closer to EU standards. It stated in the conclusions avis that the state *„has the features of democracy with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for national minorities; [...] The Polish economy can be considered as a functioning market economy and should be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the Union in the medium term”* (Kaniewski, 1998: s. 48).

As in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia, the Commission recommended the Council to open accession negotiations with Poland. Although it was not binding, in the case of a negative opinion, the beginning of negotiations and their efficient conduct could be significantly hampered (Duda, 2004: s. 85). This opinion was important not only for the process of Poland's accession to the European Union, but also for the related internal transformation process. Guidelines provided by the Commission largely coincided with the actions taken by Polish governments. In some cases, however, the need to modify the adjustment processes and change priorities (especially in the field of legal solutions and the internal market) was important.

The opinion of the European Commission on the applications of Central and Eastern European countries was, as the authors recognize, *„unique in the history of enlargement of the European Union, because it not only judged the state of candidates 'preparations, but also included a medium-term prospect of these states' readiness to fulfill the conditions of membership”* (Duda, 2004: s. 79). A positive recommendation of the Commission and the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference meeting at the European Council in Amsterdam (June 16-17, 1997) meant that negotiations with Poland could begin in 1998. The final decision in this matter was taken during the Luxembourg European Council summit which took place on December 12-13, 1997. The Council decided that the EU enlargement

process would start on 30 March 1998 and would cover all the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus (11 countries in total). It also decided to convene bilateral Intergovernmental Accession Conferences (March 31, 1998) with the countries with which negotiations will be held in the first place, or Poland, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary.

In March 1998, in response to the readiness of the European Union to extend, the Prime Minister appointed the Government Plenipotentiary for Negotiations for Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union, acting as the main negotiator. This position was taken by Jan Kułakowski, who also headed the Negotiation Team on Negotiation for the Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union (PRdSN, 1999: s. 16).

### **3.5. THE CATEGORY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

International/diplomatic negotiations can be described as „*the process of communication between states (or non-state entities of international relations) striving to achieve mutually acceptable result in a common subject interest*” (Bryła, 1999: s. 21). In different viewpoint, this term can be defined as the transition from one shape of mutual relations to another. Regardless of the form of this process, it aims to agree changes or improvements of future or past elements of mutual relations.

Considering the different approaches and definitions of the „negotiations” category, all of them contain common elements (Roszkowska, 2011: s. 66): the involvement of at least two parties that have both common and contradictory interests; each side needs other side to achieve own goal; the actions of the parties concern the division or exchange of goods, resources and the resolution of problems regarding the involvement of both parties; the parties are convinced that negotiations are the best way to reach a satisfactory agreement.

Both trade negotiations and diplomatic negotiations follow certain schemes, which can be defined as the negotiation phase. Each phase has its own dynamics and problems. They appear during this phase go on and require special skills from negotiators: (1) preliminary negotiations; (2) start of negotiations and present the

initial views; (3) proper negotiations, or presentation of further proposals; (4) completion of negotiations and reaching an agreement.

Phase 1. Initial negotiations are largely about gathering information and evaluating them. In this phase, the ability to ask the negotiator the right questions is important (Podobas, 2011: s. 23).

Phase 2. The phase of agreeing on the general formula, concept or contract. During it, propositions and counterproposals are set. The creativity of negotiators is important. They are trying to present their own interests and formulate a general concept of the contract, which will be beneficial for both parties.

Phase 3. It is dedicated to determining the details, by examining the consequences, technical analysis, considering implementation and our proposals and proposals of opponents, documentation of arrangements and drawing up a contract.

Phase 4. The final phase, covering mainly technical issues. During its duration, detailed issues are analyzed. They are the result of adopting a specific transaction concept and problems that may arise during its implementation. At the conclusion in a clear and unambiguous way, parties of negotiations must prepare a contract in writing (Podobas, 2011: s. 24-25).

In the area of studying the issues of negotiations, there are several different orientations („case study”, contextual approach, structural approach, participant personality characteristics, socio-technical approach, process approach, procedural approach, strategic analysis) that have either a specific level of interest or a method (or compilation of both aspects). Three of them, which have been fully or partially used at work, require a broader discussion.

„Case study” is based on a historical and mainly factual description of unit negotiations. The results of negotiations are made by reconstructing a particular combination of circumstances that condition them or indicating one distinguished factor. According to I. W. Zartman, in the case of this orientation, it is impossible to reconstruct causal relationships that have actually occurred without full knowledge of the actual course of the negotiation process (especially without reproducing the content of dialogues and their consequences). This approach focuses on key or critical moments during negotiations (mainly verbal moves), therefore, it is only partially useful in the case of this analysis.

Another consensual approach treats the results of negotiations as determined both by the various stages of the negotiations themselves as well as the phase of shaping the environment (the context of the negotiations). When this approach is used, the research is not aimed at answering the question of which result from the set of alternatives will be chosen, but how the concrete choice has been made. This approach has a limited explanatory value, because it fails in the case of examining the course or outcome of similar negotiations, taking place in similar conditions, but ended with a different result.

The „structural approach” tries to explain the results of negotiations through relatively constant, longer-term relations between the parties, their interests and objectives. Negotiation results are treated with this approach as determinants of the relation of power. In this case bargaining power is treated a priori and usually as a derivative of the resources held by the parties. Structural analysis refers to the level of strength that is necessary for a given party to cause a change in the opponent's position. The advantage of this approach is that it does not treat negotiations as a homogeneous and monolithic whole. The researcher takes into account issues such as the number of parties, their internal organization or non-formal arrangements (such as factions). This approach seems to best reflect the essence of Poland's accession negotiations with the European Union, therefore it will also be used to conduct this analysis.

### **3.5.1. Characteristics of Accession Negotiations**

The head of state, the head of government, the minister of foreign affairs or another entity specifically authorized to do so may negotiate on behalf of the candidate state (Bryła, 1999: s. 26). A special body, or the Government Plenipotentiary for Negotiation for the Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union, was appointed to conduct negotiations on behalf of Poland, however, preparation and conduct of negotiations by Poland took place by (Podsiadło, 2001: s. 265):

1. General management over the negotiation process, held by the Prime Minister, with the support of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (who was also the chairman of the Polish delegation during membership negotiations) and the Government Plenipotentiary for negotiations on Poland's membership in the EU.

Undertaking the main decisions related to the integration process was the responsibility of the prime minister in consultation with the other bodies. However, the negotiating positions prepared by the negotiating team and recommended by the Committee for European Integration were to be approved by the Council of Ministers;

2. Negotiation team, which numbered 18 persons in the rank of secretaries and undersecretaries of state from ministries deemed important in the integration process;

3. Interministerial Team for Accession Negotiations for EU membership, which task was to lead the work of task components preparing documents and draft positions for all negotiation areas.

**TABLE 20.** Institutional negotiation structure in Poland

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prime Minister - Request: (1) to exercise political leadership in negotiations (2) and in agreement with: - Minister of Foreign Affairs; - Government Plenipotentiary for Accession Negotiations for the Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union; -Secretary of the Committee for European Integration making directional decisions related to the negotiation process.</li> </ul>	<p>The Parliament of the Republic of Poland - exercising political control over the process of accession negotiations and implementing the negotiation commitments</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Council of Ministers &gt; approving the negotiation strategy, negotiating position and changes in negotiating positions.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• European Integration Committee &gt; recommending negotiating positions (as part of the programming and policy coordination on matters related to Poland's integration with the European Union).</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiation Team on Accession Negotiations for Membership of the Republic of Poland in the European Union &gt; responsibility for developing and implementing a negotiation strategy, &gt; preparation of negotiating positions, &gt; development of other negotiation documents.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interministerial Team for the Preparation of Accession</li> </ul>	

Negotiations with the European Union (composed of 37 task components) > preparation of draft negotiating positions.	
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Source: (Kepowicz and Wołczak, 2002: s. 78).

On the European Union side, accession negotiations are of an intergovernmental nature. The governments of the Member States of the European Union (and not the European Commission) play the main role in this process. During the Intergovernmental Accession Conference, the negotiators are all member states that make up the so-called European Union. collective negotiator (PRdSN, 1999: s. 27) (Intergovernmental Accession Conference) (Podsiadło, 2001: s. 266), they are party to the negotiations and are involved in the elaboration and approval of the Union's negotiating position. Also, Member States are finally adopting the Accession Treaty (PRdSN, 1999: s. 29). Formally, negotiations with the candidate country were conducted under the presidency, which chairs the work of the EU Council. Meetings of the Intergovernmental Accession Conference were held at the level of heads of delegations (foreign ministers of a candidate and member state), or at the level of deputy heads of delegations (or the main negotiator and the Permanent Representatives Committee at the EU) (Podsiadło, 2001: s. 266).

Accession negotiations differ from traditional trade negotiations due to the specificity and objectives they serve. First of all, both parties involved in the negotiations share a common goal, or the accession of a candidate country to the EU. Negotiations are designed to strengthen the accession of the EU, so that it can exercise the rights to the fullest extent possible and fulfill obligations that result from membership in the Community.

Secondly, the candidate country for the European Union (in this case Poland) is negotiating with fifteen Member States, and the intermediary between the parties is the European Commission. Of great importance, therefore, is the „diplomatic action” and lobbying run by the candidate (not only in Brussels, but also in the capitals of the member states) because they ultimately determine the course of negotiations.

In the case of Poland, with the intensification of political contacts with the EU, the country's diplomacy has been developing lobbying for aspirations for membership in the Community. The methods of operation were based on building permanent contacts with pressure groups and providing information about the state

position on specific matters. The main purpose of Poland's promotion in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg was to receive reliable information about the country to representations, trade federations or pan-European associations defending the interests of particular social groups. In turn, the plan for the promotion of the country in the Member States of the Union was adopted in June 2000 (Framework Program for the Promotion of the Foreign Accession Process of the Republic of Poland to the EU). Its main goal was to create the image of Poland and to oppose the stereotypes functioning on it (Maćkowska, 2001: s. 146). In 2000, this activity focused primarily on the Germans as a key country from the point of view of enlargement to the East, then Belgium, as well as Spain, Austria and France.

Thirdly, the state that wants to join the European Union declares its will to accept the entire *acquis* of the EU. The implementation of EU law and the need to adapt to Community standards in some areas, is associated with large financial outlays. Therefore, it is often necessary to gradually introduce standards, which may lead the candidate to apply for a transitional period. Negotiated transitional periods enable the full implementation of standards within a time frame that goes beyond the date of the country's accession to the European Union. The preparatory periods allow both parties to fully adapt to the situation arising from the enlargement. Therefore, they can be reported both by the candidate state and the European Union (PRdSN, 1999: s. 35-38).

### **3.6. ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS**

When negotiations started to get closer, The Union stiffened its position towards Poland. As Elżbieta Kawęcka-Wyżykowska writes: *„this was evident, for example, in the statements of high officials, in the Association Council's position [in the „unprecedented” criticism of Polish protectionism in 1996, which seems disproportionate to the steps taken by the Polish authorities], and in subsequent documents (for example the principle of conditionality included in the „Accession Partnership”)*” (Kawęcka-Wyżykowska, 1999: s. 117). These were probably tactical actions which aim was to strengthen the position of the European Union before the negotiations. To some extent, the „stiffening” of the EU position was also the result of the reluctance of some member states' politicians to expand the Community.



Accession negotiations began on March 31, 1998. In his speech, on the occasion of the inauguration of negotiations, Foreign Minister Bronisław Gieremek said that *„Poland begins negotiations with the conviction that membership in the European Union is the most favorable choice from the point of view of state security, stability of democratic order, consolidation of fast and balanced economic development and building a modern civil society. The Membership in the European Union is an opportunity and a challenge for Poland”* (Podsiadło, 2001: s. 264-265). He also added that Poland is aware of the enormity of the tasks that await it. However, it will strive for rapid membership in the Union, knowing that this is a key element of accelerated development. In addition, the state's goal will be to participate in all areas of integration together with the whole range of membership rights and obligations.

From the very beginning of the negotiations, the basic principle, which was guided by Poland, was to finalize the easier areas as soon as possible, postponing the most difficult issues for later. By the end of 1998, two areas were temporarily closed, namely 'science and research' and 'education, training and youth'. In the following year (1999), talks were held in seven more areas, and in the space of 2000 four more. In 2001, seven subsequent negotiation chapters were closed.

**TABLE 21.** The course of negotiations between Poland and the European Union

<b>Specification - negotiation chapter (area)</b>	<b>Presentation of the position</b>	<b>Opening of negotiations</b>	<b>Temporary closure</b>
1. Science and research	1 IX 1998	10 XI 1998	10 XI 1998
2. Education and youth	1 IX 1998	10 IX 1998	10 IX 1998
3. Statistics	11 XI 1998	19 IV 1999	19 IV 1999
4. Telecommunication and information technology	1 IX 1998	10 XI 1998	19 V 1999
5. Industrial policy	1 IX 1998	10 XI 1998	19 V 1999
6. Health protection	11 XI 1998	19 IV 1999	19 V 1999
7. Small and medium enterprises	1 IX 1998	10 XI 1998	10 XI 1999
8. Foreign relations	11 XI 1998	19 V 1999	12 XI 1999
9. Economic and monetary union	29 I 1999	30 IX 1999	7 XII 1999
10. Common foreign and	1 XI 1998	10 XI 1998	6 IV 2000

security policy			
11. Financial control	6 VIII 1999	6 IV 2000	14 VI 2000
12. Freedom of movement of services	15 VII 1999	12 XI 1999	14 XI 2000
13. Cultural and audiovisual policy	1 IX 1998	10 XI 1998	4 XII 2000
14. Free Movement of Goods	29 I 1999	22 V 1999	29 III 2001
15. Customs union	11 XI 1998	19 V 1999	29 III 2001
16. Social policy and employment	31 V 1999	30 IX 1999	1 VI 2001
17. Energy	31 V 1999	12 XI 1999	27 VII 2001
18. Environment	8 X 1999	7 XII 1999	26 X 2001
19. Company law	11 XI 1998	19 V 1999	28 XI 2001
20. Free movement of people	30 VII 1999	26 V 2000	21 XII 2001
21. Taxes	22 X 1999	7 XII 1999	21 III 2002
22. Free Movement of Capital	15 VII 1999	30 IX 1999	21 III 2002
23. Institutions	16 IV 2002	22 IV 2002	22 IV 2002
24. Transport policy	15 VII 1998	12 XI 1999	10 IV 2002
25. Fisheries	12 II 1999	19 V 1999	10 VI 2002
26. Justice and home affairs	8 X 1999	26 V 2000	30 VII 2002
27. Regional and structural policy	30 XI 1999	6 IV 2000	1 X 2002
28. Competition policy	29 I 1999	19 V 1999	20 XI 2002
29. Budget and finances Budget and finances	30 XI 1999	26 V 2000	13 XII 2002
30. Agriculture	16 XII 1999	14 VI 2000	13 XII 2002
31. Others			13 XII 2002

Source: (Heller, 2003: s. 110-111).

As Andrzej Limański and Mieczysław Syrek note at the beginning of 2001, the opinion about Poland deteriorated. In the EU, the question arose, "whether the Community can expand to include Poland or limit its extension only to small countries of Central and Eastern Europe" Poland's negotiations began to take unfavorable turnover, which was perceived as the possibility of delaying the country's accession to the EU in the first place. According to the Polish negotiator,

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, it was mainly about extorting Poland's subsidies for farmers (3-4 billion euros per year), agreeing to establish a less-favorable system of paying structural funds for new members and granting Polish citizens a 7-year transition period in the right to work and provide services in the Member States of the European Union (Limański and Syrek, 2001: s. 197). The delay in talks was also due to the upcoming elections in Poland.

After the parliamentary election in October 2001, the new coalition government SLD / PSL came to power (Heller, 2003: s. 110-111). The new government considered Poland's strategic goal to complete negotiations in 2002 so that it could join the European Union in 2004. Leszek Miller's government softened Poland's position even on the most contentious issues and adopted a new, more flexible negotiation strategy on November 15, 2001. As Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz pointed out: *„the adoption of a more flexible approach to the stand in other matters was necessary for Poland to be able to close the negotiations before the end of 2002”* (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 123). However, as he pointed out, despite some Polish concessions, some of the most difficult problems were agriculture, together with regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments as well as financial and budgetary provisions.

The government also formulated a new negotiating position, making serious concessions regarding the purchase of land by foreigners. A decision was made to resign from the transitional period in the case of purchase of land for investment purposes and to shorten this period to 12 years in other cases. This situation caused a scandal in Poland, because it turned out that the position was first presented to the EU negotiators, and only later to the relevant Sejm committee (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 543). In December, the parliamentary opposition even filed a motion of censure against Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, responsible for this situation, but due to the lack of a proper majority, he was rejected. As W. Roszkowski assesses: *„the energy with which Miller's cabinet applied for admission to the EU raised the fear that he did not pay too much attention to the price Poland could pay for this accession”* (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 543).

### **3.6.1. The Attitude of the European Union Member States to Poland's Membership**

The aspirations of Poland as the largest candidate from Central and Eastern European countries did not give rise to an unequivocal assessment among the EU's member states. As Erhard Czoimer observes, „*publicly presented assessments and assurances of the heads of states, governments, diplomacy and other official representatives of the „fifteen” „regarding [...] support for EU enlargement with new CEE members were not accompanied by behavior during the accession talks”* (Cziomer, 2001: s. 124-125). Based on the analysis of various assessments and information (often) of an unofficial nature, the position of individual EU countries regarding Poland's membership can be synthetically summarized as follows:

1) Group of advocates of enlargement by as many CEE countries as possible without precise criteria:

- Great Britain and Ireland, countries with no explicit preferences for individual candidates;

- Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) preferring especially the Baltic States' membership.

2) Germany, France and Italy, as big countries that play an important role in pushing through EU reforms. They supported the membership of Poland and other CEE countries, taking into account their own political and strategic interests and economic benefits.

3) Small pro-European countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Austria), countries supporting selectively Polish membership, based on their own political and economic interests.

4) Southern countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal), on the one hand they saw in Poland a future partner, but on the other hand rival in the division of EU funds (structural funds, cohesion funds).

From the mid-1990s, Germany advocated simultaneous enlargement and deepening of EU integration. Taking advantage of their strong economic position, as well as the growing political significance after enlargement, together with France they were aiming to push the concept of Europe at different speeds. This concept does not exclude any EU member from the integration process, but introduces different categories of membership, depending on the level of commitment and

responsibility in the implementation of specific tasks. Germany and France have been the actual leaders since the beginning of integration (Sielski, 2011: s. 284).


However, despite the support of EU politicians and governments for Poland's membership, surveys from 1999-2000 did not confirm a similar approach on the part of their societies, which resulted, among others, from the fear of high costs, loss of jobs or increase in organized crime (Cziomer, 2001: s. 126). In the case of France, only 39% of the population was in favor of Poland joining the EU in 2000 and 46% was against this decision. The situation was similar in Germany, where 34% of the population was in favor of Poland's membership in the EU, and 49% expressed a different opinion.

**TABLE 22.** Support for Poland's accession to the EU in the EU-15 countries in 1999 and 2000

State	„Yes”		„No”	
	July 1999	May 2000	July 1999	May 2000
Austria	17	23	64	59
Germany	33	39	49	49
Belgium	37	39	47	45
France	37	39	43	46
Portugal	38	39	30	27
United Kingdom	43	43	26	25
Luxembourg	45	42	41	42
Ireland	47	51	19	17
Italy	48	53	32	25
Finland	51	50	34	34
Spain	51	50	19	14
Greece	59	56	24	25
Sweden	61	68	16	17
Netherlands	63	64	23	21
Denmark	71	70	35	20
The average of EU	43	44	35	34

Source: own work

**DIAGRAM 3:** Social support for Poland's membership in the European Union In 2000 in individual Member State



Source: own work, (Sielski, 2011: s. 284-285).

As Jerzy Sielski notes, „because of the conflicting interests of society and political elites, member states [such as France] retain full restraint in favor of total support”, and their actions have often been of a seeming nature (Sielski, 2011: s. 285) (like the promises of Jacques Chirac, who during his visit In Poland, said that the country would be accessed to the EU in 2000).

### 3.6.2. The Course of Accession Negotiations

According to the decision of the Prime Minister on February 15, 2000, negotiating positions were declassified and were submitted to the public in an integral version. As Elzbieta Dynia notes, this decision was dictated by the fact that until December 16, 1999, 29 negotiating positions were submitted to the EU Council and it was possible to collect and prepare them in the official version. Thus, the postulate of conducting negotiations in a possible transparent and open manner was fulfilled. For many observers, the no disclosure of the length of the transitional periods (from 1998 to 1999) was evidence of the confidentiality of the negotiations (Dynia, 2010: s. 214).

In the opinion of observers, from the very beginning, accession negotiations between the European Union and individual candidates were conducted under

conditions of economic and political asymmetry. This thesis seems to be well illustrated by the case of Poland, whose economy and prospects were to a large extent dependent on access to European markets and financial aid (Chruściel and Kloc, 2013: s. 95). The Polish market was exposed to competitive pressure from foreign companies, which it was not able to cope with in many sectors. In such conditions, the priority of the Polish side was to obtain quick access to political and economic benefits that resulted from full membership, with parallel negotiation of transition periods in areas that were not prepared for competitive forces within the internal market. The priority in the negotiations was also the establishment of a derogation, that is, exclusion from the operation of EU law of areas that were of negligible importance for integration, but caused social tensions in the country. The argument for introducing transitional periods raised by the Polish side was the low level of economic development and GDP in relation to the EU average, as well as the necessity to bear high costs of restructuring the economy and adapting it to EU standards. They were also striving to secure the position of the net beneficiary, that is, the state which receives more funds from the EU net budget than it pays into it. It should be noted that Poland was the largest economy among the EU candidate countries and comparable in size to the markets of large Member States. Thus, the country's financial needs and production capacity raised legitimate concerns of Western states about the possibility of losing economic stability. In addition, the prospect of the accession of a state with such a large population (38 million people) also meant a change in the balance of political forces in the European Union (especially after the adoption of the arrangements resulting from the Treaty of Nice).

Poland's accession negotiations were closely monitored by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government agencies. It was assumed that only at the final stage of talks with the first group of countries concrete arrangements will be made as to transition periods in difficult areas. In the case of Poland, it was considered as: protection of the natural environment, CAP, free purchase of land (especially its purchase of land by foreigners, where Poland's negotiating position postulated an 18-year transition period) (Cziomer, 2001: s. 133).

**TABLE 23.** The Way of European States (of „fifteen”) to the European Communities

<b>The Way of European States to the Communities (ECSC, EUROATOM, EEC)</b>		
<b>The Candidate State</b>	<b>Date of Accession</b>	<b>The Maximum Length of the Transitional Period</b>
Austria	January 1, 1995	5 years
Belgium	January 1, 1958	5 years
Denmark	January 1, 1973	5 years
Finland	January 1, 1995	4 years
France	January 1, 1958	4 years
Greece	January 1, 1981	7 years
Spain	January 1, 1986	10 years
Netherlands	January 1, 1958	10 years
Ireland	January 1, 1973	5 years
Luxembourg	January 1, 1958	5 years
Germany	January 1, 1958	5 years
Portugal	January 1, 1986	5 years
Sweden	January 1, 1995	5 years
United Kingdom	January 1, 1973	5 years
Italy	January 1, 1958	5 years

Source: (Walkiewicz, 2002: s. 28). Form: eurostat yearbook 2001. The statistical guide to Europe, data 1989-1999.

### **3.6.3. The Results of Accession Negotiations**

As a result of accession negotiations with the European Union, Poland obtained transition periods in 12 out of 31 areas. In other cases, the adoption of the EU acquis without a transitional period has been declared.

**TABLE 24.** The Results of Accession Negotiations

Field	
Free Movement of Goods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the legal acquis of the EU has been adopted since the accession, with the exception of the transitional arrangements applied to the pharmaceutical sector;</li> <li>- until December 31, 2008, certificates for medical products issued on the basis of the current Polish law were valid;</li> <li>- this was the longest transitional period obtained from among all candidate countries;</li> <li>- the lack of a transitional period threatened to withdraw from circulation large quantities of medicines produced in Poland and replacing them with more expensive imported products;</li> <li>- The European Union, however, has made such a long transition period dependent on several conditions: (a) to abolish the provisions introducing the obligation to obtain admission to trading of products for which such an</li> </ul>



	<p>obligation is not applied in the EU;</p> <p>(b) the application from the date of entry into the Union of a centralized marketing authorization procedure and mutual recognition procedures for pharmaceutical products available on Member States' markets;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the adoption of Community law in the field of „Free Movement of Goods” required the implementation by Poland of approximately 500 acts of EU law.</li> </ul>
Freedom to provide services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- it included legal regulations that created the basis for unlimited possibilities to provide services in all Member States;</li> <li>- in this area, Poland obtained a transition period until December 31, 2007;</li> <li>- during this period was to implement a directive setting the minimum level of own funds of cooperative banks in the amount of EUR 1 million, and regulations in line with EU law regarding the system ensuring protection for investors on the capital market;</li> <li>- the rest of the EU acquis in the provision of services was adopted without transitional periods.</li> </ul>
Free movement of capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the area covered the free movement of capital and payments as well as money laundering;</li> <li>- The main provisions concerned: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) abolition of restrictions on taking up a business;</li> <li>(b) abolition of restrictions on the conduct of capital operations on the domestic market;</li> <li>(c) the abolition of restrictions on the money market and other short-term operations;</li> <li>(d) the implementation of the Directive relating to payment systems and the settlement of transactions in securities;</li> <li>(e) the adoption of appropriate prudential instruments for the supervision of financial institutions;</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Poland has obtained two different transition periods for the acquisition of real estate in Poland: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) For the first twelve years of membership (that is until 2016), Poland could apply to citizens of EU Member States and EEA citizens the provisions on the acquisition of agricultural and forestry property by foreigners.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>The transitional period did not include individual farmers</p>

	<p>settling in Poland and operating as self-employed, provided that they lease and cultivate land for a period of at least three years or for a period of at least seven years before the purchase of real estate (In case of voivodships warmińsko-mazurskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, pomorskie, zachodniopomorskie, lubuskie, wielkopolskie, śląskie, dolnośląskie, opolskie).</p> <p>(2) Until 2009, Poland obtained a five-year transition period for the acquisition of the so-called second homes. It included people who have lived legally and uninterruptedly in Poland for at least four years before the acquisition of real estate. This group excluded recreational properties that were purchased for the purpose of conducting business.</p>
<p>Competition policy</p>	<p>- in this field, negotiations concerned competition protection with regard to undertakings and relations between entrepreneurs and public authorities;</p> <p>-compliance with the EU requirements of the competition rules, which concerned the behavior of enterprises, have already been fully regulated in Polish legislation, therefore there were no transitional periods in this respect.</p> <p>- Poland has, however, obtained transitional periods in the scope of granting public aid in special economic spheres, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• for small enterprises (up to 2011);</li> <li>• for medium-sized enterprises (up to 2010).</li> </ul> <p>- Exceptions to the rules (prohibition) of granting public aid (first of all the permissible level of aid related to investments), which were agreed as a result of negotiations, meant that investment conditions in Poland in terms of the possibility of obtaining state aid were the most advantageous in the entire European Union.</p> <p>- Poland also obtained a permit for public aid in the restructuring of the steel industry.</p>
<p>Agriculture</p>	<p>- area of negotiations, which regulated the inclusion of the Polish agri-food market in the area of the Single Internal Market, as well as covering Polish agriculture with instruments and mechanisms of the common agricultural policy in the regulation of production markets and rural</p>

	<p>development. It also covers veterinary and phytosanitary issues.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Poland has obtained several transitional periods from three to ten years to adjust its legislation to the requirements of the common agricultural policy and veterinary phytosanitary.</li> <li>- the transitional period covered, among others, structural adjustments for 113 milk processing plants and 40 fish processing plants (until the end of 2006) and 332 meat processing plants (until the end of 2007). Until the end of the transition periods, products from these categories of plants were admitted only on the Polish market.</li> <li>- the transition period also covered regulations on the fat content in drinking milk and the minimum volume of produced raw tobacco (5-year transitional periods).</li> <li>- the result of negotiations in this respect concerned the acceptance of the introduction of direct payments by Polish farmers.</li> </ul>
Taxes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- issues related to the use of indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties) are regulated in detail by EU law;</li> <li>- Poland, due to social and economic reasons, applied for transitional periods with regard to increasing the rates of these taxes on goods and services in sensitive market segments.</li> <li>- the transitional periods concerned, among others catering services (until December 31, 2007 it was possible to apply a reduced VAT rate, but at least up to 7%), excise tax on cigarettes (until 2008), zero VAT rate on books and specialist magazines (until December 2007).</li> </ul>
Social policy and employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- this area concerned regulations regarding labor law, equal opportunities for women and men, fight against racism, xenophobia, social dialogue and health and safety at work regulations.</li> <li>- in this area, transitional solutions were only negotiated in the case of the directive on minimum health and safety requirements for the use of equipment by employees (until December 31, 2005).</li> </ul>
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Poland has committed to implement the entire EU acquis in this area, in addition to the provisions on mandatory stocks of fuels (crude oil and liquid fuels).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in accordance with Community law, the Member State is required to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil/liquid fuels for a period of 90 days.</li> <li>- Poland has undertaken to create legal and economic conditions that allowed for the expansion of sufficient storage capacity and storage of required stocks of liquid fuels by the end of 2008.</li> </ul>
Telecommunications and information technologies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- transitional periods in this field were obtained in the field of, among others the so-called. the Postal Directive, which dealt with common regulations for the development of the internal market for postal services and improve the quality of these services.</li> <li>- a reduction in the weight limit of postal services from 350 grams to 100 grams in the first period (January 1, 2003) and then up to 50 grams (until January 1, 2006).</li> <li>- Poland, however, obtained an extension of the first of these periods until the end of 2005.</li> </ul>
Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- negotiations in this area concerned the adjustment and implementation of law in the fields of nature protection, water and air quality, industrial pollution, waste management, nuclear safety and radiation protection, chemicals and genetically modified organisms, noise caused by machinery and equipment.</li> <li>- in this area, a dozen or so transitional areas of varying length have been negotiated (from several to several years);</li> <li>- the transitional period covered, among others emissions of dusts and nitrogen oxides from power plants and combined heat and power plants (by the end of 2017);</li> <li>- a transitional period covered the implementation of the Directive imposing on the member states a requirement to recover at least 50% of the weight of packaging waste (a minimum recovery level of 25%);</li> <li>- until 2007, Poland was able to adapt the standards applicable to the transfer of waste to and from the Community, and by 2006 standards for the protection of ionizing radiation coming from medical sources.</li> </ul>
Free movement of people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- this area covers all issues related to mutual recognition of professional qualifications, free movement of employees, retention of their right to supplementary pensions, issues of</li> </ul>

	<p>coordination of social security and employee rights (including the right to stay and electoral rights).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in this area, the transition period was obtained by the European Union. Similarly to the candidate countries, the EU party could apply for it at the moment when the candidate's full application of the law could result in a sectoral or regional disorder in one of the old EU's Member States.</li> <li>- Thus, at the request of the Union, a transitional period was established as regards the access of the EU market for Poles, according to the formula 2 + 3 + 2. This meant that after the first two years of the transitional period, the old EU's states (15) could abolish existing restrictions on access to the labor market, or in the event of disruptions in their labor markets, extend the restrictions by another 3 years, and then by 2 more. Member States could also establish restrictions on the Member States.</li> <li>- Transitional arrangements, however, were not adopted by all of the EU-15 states. Already at the time of Poland's entry into the EU, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden opened their labor markets. After the first two years after accession, their markets opened, among others Italy.</li> </ul>
Transport policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Generally, road transport between Poland and the European Union has been liberalized since 2004.</li> <li>- However, transport within Poland (as well as other states) was available only to carriers from other Member States after three or a maximum of five years (from May 1, 2009)</li> <li>- It was like in the case of freedom on the labor market, a transitional period not only for Poland, but for all new states.</li> <li>- In return, the network of Polish roads gradually became available for the heaviest vehicles (over 44 tons of payload) by 2010.</li> <li>- Three years (until the end of 2006) Poland's opening to competition for Polish State Railways was also postponed, and therefore the railway network until that time was not available for enterprises from other Member States.</li> </ul>

Source: (Muszyńska and Gruchman, 2006: s. 271-276).

### 3.7. THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN AREAS OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL NATURE

#### 3.7.1 Agriculture

The adaptation of Polish agriculture to EU standards seemed one of the most difficult „operations” for adapting the Polish economy to EU requirements. It was the most backward branch of the Polish economy, which at the end of the 1980s employed about 25% of the total working population, generating only 7% (compared to 3% in the EU) and its situation did not change significantly over the next years (Pioskowik, 2001: s. 38). A large group of villagers worked in industrial plants and other enterprises in nearby cities.


It was difficult in a short time, with the existing market economy, to offset the civilization regress of 1989-1993. In 1997, the income parity reached 70%, and the material situation of the post-Soviet community and other rural residents was dramatic. In connection with this election, which took place in the same year, the village supported the AWS offer. However, just after a year of governance by this group, profitability rates and prices returned to the level of 1992. This state of affairs caused dissatisfaction and mass social protests in Warsaw and the unknown form of demonstration through roadblocks, organized by a new political force (Samoobrona) supporting farmers.

The support of the village for this group was high in the next elections in 2001, similarly for the SLD and PSL, which the coalition government (SLD, UP, PSL) treated the affairs of the village as a priority. Nevertheless, a small amount of financial resources for agriculture in the first year of government did not allow for the implementation of the plans. The social situation in the Polish countryside became more tense and, as Jan Andrykiewicz notes: *„high unemployment and low income of residents [were] the cause of protests and demonstrations [and] the main reason for the coalition break down”* on the eve of Poland's accession to the European Union (Andrykiewicz, 2003: s. 59).

In the rural environment there were strong fears of the effects of adapting Polish agriculture to the EU food policy. They mainly concerned the possibility of liquidation of unprofitable farms and overly stringent sanitary and veterinary rules, excluding Polish agricultural products from the EU market. This, in consequence, could lead to a „Flood” of Polish stores by cheaper and EU-compliant food products

(from other Member States). This could have weakened Polish agriculture and pushed them to the margins of the food economy of the European Single Market.

**DIAGRAM 4:** Farmers' fears related to Poland's integration with the European Union (in%)



Source: own work, (Głowacki, 2002: s. 145-146).

Other fears include the opening of Polish land trade to foreign investors. It was connected with the growth of prices of agricultural land and repression of Polish farmers from the market, because they would not be able to buy new land and maybe they would face sales in foreign hands, the one that they had in their possession so far (Pioskownik, 2001: s. 310).

**TABLE 25:** Average Prices of Arable Lands in Selected European Countries (in 1997-1999)

State	Year	Price in EUR per one hectare
Netherlands	1998	24 869
Italy	1998	12 806

Germany	1998	9 436
United Kingdom	1998	9 081
Spain	1998	3 972
France	1999	3 436
Czech Republic	1999	1 282
Poland	1999	874
Slovakia	1999	865
Hungary	1997	395
Romania	1999	345

Source: (Ruszkowski, 2002(a): s. 113).

For the EU negotiators, the main problem of Polish agriculture was its low productivity and high hidden unemployment. The problem was also the duality of farms in the country. On the one hand, large and medium-sized farms functioned on the market. On the other hand, small and micro-farms, which to a large extent produced only for their own needs. Thus, they constituted a „safety net” detaining labor force and generating unemployment. The European Union also demanded that Poland (before accession) should adopt all provisions in the field of veterinary and phytosanitary standards, along with a subsequent monitoring system for the application of these standards. Moreover, in order to launch the SAPARD fund and subsequently the structural funds, it was recommended to introduce the IACS system.

Negotiations on agricultural issues should be considered as one of the most difficult and impossible to agree on the expert level. They required political decisions at the level of prime ministers of states. They started on June 14, 2000 and lasted two and a half years, practically until the last hours of the Copenhagen summit. In the course of negotiations, Poland sought to find solutions allowing for the use of the full instruments of the common agricultural policy, in other words price, income and structural support (also direct payments). Two issues for negotiation were the most



important for Polish agriculture (Plewa, 2003: s. 9): (1) production limits at a level that creates an opportunity for the development of Polish agriculture after joining the EU, and (2) financial support for Polish farmers at the same level as EU farmers, so that they can compete on the free market.

In accordance with the negotiation position of Poland in the area of „Agriculture” (Ruszkowski, 2002(a): s. 109):

(1) It was argued for the full inclusion of Polish agriculture in the common agricultural policy, including direct subsidies for Polish farmers; (2) It was applied for granting production limits on a level that takes into account the production potential of domestic agriculture. Agricultural production in the country was to be environmentally friendly and give opportunities for people who care for it; (3) Efforts have been made for a four-year transitional period to adapt to the meat sector; (4) Efforts have been made for a three-year transitional period for full adaptation to the dairy sector; (5) Efforts were made to provide financial assistance from the EU budget amounting to 50% of the costs incurred for the implementation of the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS); (6) Guaranteed prices for the purchase of food were demanded.

The main negotiation problems were the production limits for milk, sugar and isoglucose, potato starch, dried fodder and raw tobacco. The amount of granted limits determined the scale of using the existing production potential in the country and maintaining jobs and sources of income in Polish agriculture (Wysokińska and Witkowska, 2004: s. 115). An important goal in accession negotiations was to provide Polish farmers with equal conditions of competition and to obtain mechanisms guaranteeing full use of EU funds allocated to Poland for the years 2004-2006.

The most controversial issue arose due to the incomplete dimension of direct payments for farmers from newly admitted countries, which in the first years of membership were to receive only 25% of subsidies due to farmers from the old Member States. Despite the fact that in the following years this disproportion was to decrease, it was difficult to convince farmers that in the European Union they will not be second-class citizens, and accession will positively affect their competitiveness on the European market (Dyduch, 2016: s. 98). Most of the old EU Member States excluded the possibility of direct subsidies to former countries of the

Eastern bloc, arguing for too high costs. The Polish side argued with this argument, claiming that agriculture can not be reformed without additional financial resources. In this matter, a strategy was used in the negotiations to refer to previous decisions (dead-weight catching strategy). In connection with this, Poland underlined the fact that EU countries (such as Greece or Spain) acceded to the Union on more favorable terms (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 114-115) and reminded the EU side about applying concessions to them in previous activities. As Sergiusz Trzeciak observes, *„such an argument is, however, weaker in the case of a significant asymmetry between the parties to the negotiations”*, and it can not be concealed that this has occurred between Poland and the European Union. Poland's negotiating power was undoubtedly much weaker compared to the strength of the European Union, therefore its effectiveness was difficult (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 141).


Poland also sought to obtain more time for the necessary adjustment of domestic agricultural production to the quality standards that resulted from EU law within the transitional periods. However, the EU party was not in this case willing to make any significant concessions, even at the moment when substantive arguments spoke in favor of the Polish position. As Jerzy Plewa notes, the position of Poland in negotiations was also weakened by the fact that *„there is no decisive and common attitude of all candidate countries on issues important for agriculture”* (Plewa, 2003: s. 9).

In October 2002, the Polish government adopted a change in the negotiating position in the field of agriculture, making a statement that Poland was ready to accept the EU offer concerning lower subsidies (however, depending on several conditions). In the negotiations, it was not possible to obtain financial support, which was used by farmers from the EU-15 countries. This meant worse conditions of competition for Polish farmers, and the need for Poland to apply for subsidies provided for the old fifteen in subsequent years after becoming a member.

In the first years of membership, the direct subsidies offered for agricultural production had a level of 25% of the rate paid to EU farmers. This level significantly differed from the expectations of Polish society. The polls published in May 2002 showed that 56% of respondents supported requests for subsidies for Polish farmers in the same amount as in the case of old EU countries, even if it was related to the risk of blocking negotiations and leaving Poland outside the EU. Such an opinion

was particularly popular in rural (68%) circles, mainly among farmers (86%). Only 29% of rural residents and 14% of farmers believed that Polish negotiators should accept partial payments in the first years of membership. The minimum accepted level of direct payments in the first years of membership was on average 66% of subsidies received by farmers of the EU-15 countries (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 136).

**DIAGRAM 5.** Attitudes towards direct subsidies to agriculture among the electorates of political parties



Source: (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 45).

Poland, however, obtained permission to shift part of the funds allocated to programs supporting rural changes and thus to pay them directly to farmers (which gave the opportunity to increase income). The EU's consent to relocate for this purpose a maximum of 20% of commitment appropriations envisaged in the annual 2004-2006, or 25% in 2004, 20% in 2005 and 15% in 2006 (Wysokińska and Witkowska, 2004: s. 115). In addition, Poland could also co-finance direct subsidies from the national budget to the level of 55% in the EU in 2004, 60% in 2005 and 65% in 2006. Thus enabling the improvement of the situation of agriculture (but with the requirement to use it for own purposes) (Plewa, 2003: s. 10).

At the end of November 2002, there was a change in the negotiation priorities of the Polish side. The fight for full subsidies for Polish farmers from the beginning of its membership has been replaced with the issue of increasing the limits of production quotas, mainly of milk and grain (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 146). After intense negotiations, the final stage of the change of the European Union's position with regard to several issues took place. The base area proposed by the community was increased from 9 217 667 hectares to 9 454 277 hectares, and the reference yield

from 1,5 million tonnes to the wholesale amount, which not only guaranteed individual producers milk, but also met the raw materials needs of processing plants the level taking into account the development of this sector in the following years. Poland also managed to negotiate an additional production quota of 416 0000 tonnes as a structuring reserve, which was not anticipated by the EU's starting position (Wysokińska and Witkowska, 2004: s. 116), and the basic milk quota has been agreed at 8 964 020 tonnes.

Poland has also negotiated safeguard clauses for agricultural products, thanks to which it was possible to monitor the inflow of products from the European Union to the Polish market and undertake preventive actions. Poland has obtained an annual transitional period to determine individual dairy raw materials for producers. The initially postulated post-transition of the transitional period until March 31, 2005 regarding compliance with the milk quota management mechanisms was finally accepted by the Union. It meant, at the same time, not applying penalties to producers exceeding the milk quotas granted during this period. Poland also obtained acceptance for a three-year transitional period for determining the minimum lot of goods subject to intervention. And also a five-year transition period to the minimum volume of manufactured raw tobacco required to recognize producer groups. And also a five-year transition period to meet the requirements for recognition of producer groups. The EU also granted Poland a three-year transition period for the qualification of breeds that are entitled to suckler cow premiums (Wysokińska and Witkowska, 2004: s. 116). An important negotiation outcome was also acceptance (despite the previously expressed objection) of making wine from imported grape juice and must under the name „Polish wine”, as well as ensuring legal protection of the name of several types of vodka produced in Poland.

The Polish government has promoted in the country the image of successful accession negotiations and the fact that Poland will receive additional money under the CAP. Polish media and the public opinion about success were convinced. The image of Prime Minister Miller was also created as a relentless negotiator. In fact, as Sergiusz Trzeciak writes, „*Miller realized that Polish public opinion wanted to enter the EU quickly [...] but on good terms. The Polish negotiation strategy was defined through the lack of a credible best alternative to negotiators of the agreement [...] which entailed a major asymmetry in negotiations between the parties*” (Trzeciak,

2010: s. 156-160). The cost of not obtaining membership by Poland, however, would be too high. It forced both sides to reach a compromise.

#### **3.7.1.1. Polish Agriculture After the Accession to the European Union**

Since the beginning of the regime change in Poland, there has been a shortage of financial resources for the needs of the reconstruction of the economy. The adoption of the document „Consistent structural policy for rural development and agriculture” in 1999 provided the basis for building legal and institutional infrastructure for the adoption of the EU assistance for structural changes of rural areas mainly from the SAPARD program. The funds of this program were directed at four activities: (1) improving the processing and marketing of agricultural and fish products; (2) investments in agricultural holdings; (3) development and improvement of rural infrastructure; (4) diversification of economic activity in rural areas. Also funds from other assistance programs, namely PHARE and ISPA, were allocated to the countryside and Polish agriculture.

The inflow of more funds for the development of agriculture and processing, as well as the opening of the EU market to Polish products, already in 2001 brought an increase in exports of agricultural products and the food industry. This led to obtaining, for the first time in 2003 (and growth in subsequent years) a positive balance of trade in these goods (Kapusta, 2017: s. 86-87).

Through Poland's accession to the European Union, Polish agriculture and rural areas were included in the support system under the common agricultural policy (Żmija, 2017: s. 241). At present, farms in Poland produce production, whose global value (in current prices) places Polish agriculture at the 7th position in the European Union (behind France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). Poland is a leader on the EU market in the production of apples, triticale and blackcurrant, and the second producer of rye, mushrooms, potatoes and blueberries (Krzyżanowski, 2015: s. 10).

In the post-accession period, the increase in agricultural production was accompanied by a marked increase in investment outlays and an increase in the value of fixed assets owned by farmers. The changes in technologies used in agricultural production and transfer of knowledge turned out to be beneficial.

### **3.7.2. Free Movement of Capital**

Negotiations in the area of „Free Movement of Capital” began on July 15, 1999, and were completed on March 22, 2002. The EU law in this area establishes the free movement of capital between Member States, as well as the prohibition of new barriers to capital movements with third countries after December 31, 1993. This means freedom of investment in all areas, but also the freedom to make payments in trade between Member States (including investments involving the purchase of real estate). This area also covers the prevention of money laundering and electronic payments.

In its original negotiation position, Poland declared full alignment with the EU acquis as of the day of accession to the European Union. The exceptions were the provisions regarding the acquisition of real estate by foreigners and investments in the air transport sector. This problem was subject to negotiations in the area of „Transport Policy”.

The Polish side has applied for a transitional period regarding the acquisition of real estate, which would allow the national rules for the acquisition of real estate by foreigners (EU citizens), while maintaining the requirement to obtain a permit to purchase real estate. Applications for transitional periods concerned the purchase of real estate for investment purposes, as well as agricultural and forestry real estate and so-called second homes. The postulates were argued by Poland in two ways. In the first place, these were economic arguments. There was a fear of a sharp rise in property prices after Poland's accession to the EU and the availability of real estate for Polish citizens. The second (legal) argument concerned the threat of speculated increase in property prices. In addition, Poland pointed to public fears and emotions that aroused by the acquisition of real estate in the country by foreigners, having not only economic but also historical significance. The additional argument was the problem of the lack of order in the matter of ownership of agricultural real estate, mainly in the so-called of the old Regained Territories.

The EU party was not against the Polish demands, but nevertheless it questioned their scope. The inclusion of real estate for investment purposes in the transitional period was unacceptable to the EU. This would go too far in the functioning of the single market, in all basic freedoms (movement of goods, people, capital, services). Initially, transition periods of the same length have been proposed

for all candidate countries (5 years for so-called second homes and 7 years for agricultural and forestry properties). However, the consent was granted to the transition periods only in the event of the exclusion from their operation of individual farmers who settle and engage in agricultural activity on the principles of self-employment in the new Member States. Extremely difficult negotiations (compared to other candidates) have brought Poland a longer transition period in the case of agricultural and forestry properties.

### **3.7.2.1. The Course of Negotiations in the Area of Free Movement of Capital**

One of the most controversial issues in the area of „Free Movement of Capital” that prevented its closure was the problem of selling Polish land. The position of Poland in this matter was dictated by specific historical, social and economic determinants (Synowiec, 2001: s. 69). The issue of the possibility of buying land by foreigners was therefore a particularly sensitive topic for the public opinion.

During the government of Jerzy Buzek (AWS-UW), the Polish side argued that the integration process in Western Europe was parallel to the period of historical reconciliation, which only began in Poland a few years earlier. The aim was to provide citizens with equal access to real estate. It was considered that the financial capacity of entities from 15 Member States gives them a better chance of buying compared to Polish citizens. In addition, the prices of Polish real estate were much lower than in the EU Member States. The length of the transition periods required by Poland resulted from the assumption that after their expiry, together with the development of the country's economy and the increase in purchasing power by Poles, the said opportunities would be evened out, and the fears of Poles in this matter would disappear.

Taking into account the aforementioned social issues, the position of the AWS-UW government in the field of property acquisition was quite strong. A request was made to establish two transitional periods: (1) a 5-year transition period for the acquisition of real estate intended for investment purposes; and (2) an 18-year transition period for the acquisition of agricultural and forestry property (Kołodziej, 2002: s. 20-21).

In the modified negotiating position, the European Union proposed a 7-year transition period for agricultural and forestry properties and a 5-year period for second homes. However, this situation did not concern farmers from Member States who want to settle permanently in the territory of the new EU Member States. These conditions have been adopted by Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The new Polish government of Leszek Miller, shortly before the presentation of the next Regular Report by the European Commission, decided on the possibility of a compromise in negotiations and informed that Poland had changed the request regarding the size of the transition period for the purchase of land. The change of position resulted from the determination to speed up talks, even at the price of concessions (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 164).

In the circles of EU negotiators, new proposals were assessed (as Janusz Roszkowski writes) as acceptable. It was considered that the 18-year transition period for the purchase of agricultural and forestry property for large EU companies should be reduced to 12 years. On the other hand, land for investments, companies and EU citizens would be able to buy from the moment of Poland's accession to the EU (and not as the Buzek government suggested earlier after 5 years of accession) (Ruszkowski, 2002(b): s. 72-73). Poland has also proposed a five-year period to purchase the so-called second homes and decided that the prior sale of agricultural land (based on the right of first refusal) will be possible only for farmers from the Union, who leased land in Poland for a minimum of 7 years, in the case of the voivodships of *warمیńsko-mazurskie*, *pomorskie*, *kujawsko-pomorskie*, *lubuskie zachodniopomorskie*, *dolnośląskie*, *opolskie* and *wielkopolskie*, or 3 years for other parts of the country.

The extension of the buy-back period in the above-mentioned 8 Polish voivodships was caused by the concentration of ownership transformation problems within them. It was mainly about the sale and lease of agricultural real estate to foreigners, who from the date of Poland's accession to the EU, will cultivate and lease land on their own. Such a situation would make it possible to bypass restrictions on speculative purposes and would be inconsistent with the Polish interest (Kapała, 2002: s. 35).

Particular emphasis was put on introducing short transitional periods in this matter by the Netherlands, which in addition to the lease period also wanted to



include the period that was still before Poland's accession to EU structures. Thus, the period of calculating this period was the main issue in this case. The Polish government believed that the calculation of the period should take place after joining the EU, while according to the Dutch (and also the British) the duration of the lease should start as soon as it started, even if it took place a few years before accession. The position of these countries was dictated by the fact that out of several hundred farms in Poland, remaining in 2001 in the hands of foreigners, the largest group were the Dutch, British and Danes (Ruszkowski, 2002(b): s. 72-73).

According to Alan Mayhew, despite the fact that this issue was important for several Member States (mainly the Netherlands), in fact for most of them it was not significant (just like for the Commission). Nevertheless, the position of the Netherlands was used by the Union to block other concessions and demands made by Poland (especially in the area of free movement of workers) (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 75-190).

**TABLE 26.** The Size of the Win-set Collection in Three Main Areas of Negotiations

The size of the win-set collection		
Poland	The EU	The results of negotiations
<b>1. Negotiations in the Field of Agriculture</b>		
Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties	Small within interest groups and political parties. Public opinion less interested in the matter	Reaching a compromise is very difficult but possible, due to the high costs of disagreement. Both sides had to increase their win-set collections by making some concessions.
<b>2. The Acquisition of real estate by foreigners</b>		
Small within public opinion, interest groups and political parties	Rather big: the public did not deal with this matter, the interest groups were rather weak, political parties and politicians treated this matter as part of a tied	The win-set collections overlapped. Poland managed to negotiate a long transition period

	transaction (along with the freedom of movement of workers) to negotiate transitional periods in the area of free movement of workers	
<b>3. The Freedom of movement of employees</b>		
Small for the public opinion, but there was a lack of strong interest groups supporting liberalization. Political parties focused rather on agriculture and land acquisition by foreigners	Small within the public opinion, interest groups and political parties in many strong EU's member states	The EU had a clear negotiating advantage, therefore Poland was forced to agree to transitional periods

Source: (Trzeciak, 2010: s.161, 198, 233).

A compromise solution regarding the possibility of foreigners acquiring real estate after 12 years of accession was finally adopted. The free distribution of negotiations was temporarily closed in March 2002, giving Poland the option of applying to the citizens of other EU Member States the provisions of the Act on the acquisition of real estate by foreigners, thereby limiting the scope of free movement of capital until 2016. For many observers, Poland's 12-year adaptation period was the best of all candidate countries in this area. The EU side was even afraid that its achievement could encourage other candidates to re-open the chapters on free movement of capital (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 190).

The announcement of official results of negotiations in the area of real estate acquisition has been the subject of internal criticism not only from the political opposition, which even called for holding a referendum in this matter, but even a coalition partner of the PSL. The party took every opportunity to declare to the public that it would protect „Polish interests” in the next months in which negotiations were to be concluded. PSL, as noted by Sergiusz Trzeciak during the accession negotiations, „used [...] the strategy of the threat of abandoning the coalition and blocking the negotiation process, and at times behaved like an opposition party” (Trzeciak, 2010: s. 188). Attitudes of political parties were a

reflection of social moods, and the results of negotiations have influenced the radicalization of public opinion.

### **3.7.3. Free movement of people**

Negotiations in this area began on May 26, 2000, and their temporary closure took place on December 21, 2001. The area covered the following issues: mutual recognition of professional qualifications, free movement of workers, retaining migrant workers' rights to supplementary pensions. In addition, within it there was also coordination of social security systems (within the meaning of Article 51 EC and Regulation 1408/71 EEC) and regulation of some issues in the field of civil rights (mainly concerning the right of residence and electoral rights).

The initial position of Poland was a declaration of acceptance of the entire EU acquis in this area. Therefore, it was committed to fully implementing EU law before becoming a member. The most difficult issue, as expected, was the EU's question of granting Polish citizens the right to work in the Member States since the accession. Despite the divergent views of the Member States on the problem (full freedom of employment was accepted by, among others, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark), and against the opposition of Germany and Austria, which were afraid of destabilization in their labor market, Member States finally adopted a common position and decided on the application of transitional provisions.

At the request of the European Union, a 7-year transitional period was adopted according to the formula 2 + 3 + 2. It meant limiting the freedom to work in the Member States for Polish citizens. During the first two years of the transition period, Member States were given the opportunity to open their labor markets until all restrictions were lifted. On the other hand, citizens of the newly admitted Member States during the transitional period could benefit from a solution giving them priority in accessing the Union's labor markets to third-country nationals. EU Member States had the right to notify the European Commission of their intention to extend the transitional period for another three years during the first two years of Poland's membership. If, after the end of this period, the destabilization of the labor market did not disappear, Member States could apply to the Commission to maintain regulations restricting access to labor markets for another two years. The maximum possible dimension of the duration of the transitional period was therefore 7 years.

Only Germany and Austria accepted such a long period, and most Member States made declarations of readiness to shorten the period or even withdraw from its application.

This approach was not accepted by Poland. This problem was only described as psychological and political. It was called to establish the freedom of movement of persons from the date of accession as one of the basic principles of the functioning of the single market, but to no avail. During the negotiations, only the option of applying the reciprocity clause during the transitional period was obtained, which meant that a citizen of a Member State who would apply restrictive measures to Poland would be able to take similar actions (in accordance with the principle of reciprocity).

During the negotiations, an important issue was the mutual recognition of qualifications and professional titles. The EU acquis in this area has been recognized by Poland. Expressed, among others consent to change the professional title „lekarz stomatolog” (dentist) to „lekarz dentysta” (dentist). Poland undertook numerous activities at the expert level, which were then continued in political talks with representatives of the European Commission and the Presidency, and in particular of intensive negotiations at the Copenhagen European Council. As a result, confirmation of pre-established recognition in the European Union Member States of Polish nursing diplomas (both undergraduate and undergraduate) and solving the problem of education obtained by nurses in secondary schools. Adaptation of Polish legislation to the EU in the field of mutual recognition of professional qualifications required the adoption of, inter alia, The Act on the Principles of Recognition of Qualifications for the Performance of Regulated Professions Acquired in the Member States of the European Union and the Act on the Principles of Recognition of Qualifications for Taking Up or Performing of Certain Activities in the European Union Member States. As regards civil rights, Poland submitted a declaration on the implementation by December 31, 2002 of appropriate regulations regarding electoral law. On the other hand, in the area of coordination of social security systems, it was obliged to improve administrative structures in order to further effectively implement EU law.

### **3.7.3.1. Fears of Member States Regarding the Emergence of Poles in the EU Labor Market**

The longest transition period against free access to the labor market towards Poles was applied by Germany and Austria. Many studies in these countries contained opinions that the acquisition by Poles of rights to free movement of workers on the day of accession to the European Union would cause massive flows of Polish employees on the territory of the community to take up employment. Similar views were expressed by many EU politicians and a large part of the society. Numerous professional publications and the daily press drew attention to the „black scenarios” concerning the labor market of some EU Member States after the admission to the Community of Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The German daily „Berliner Morgenpost” prepared a study entitled „Poland and the European Union - Berlin needs time”, in which it was observed that without a sufficiently long transitional period (until 2015) unemployment in Germany would increase. The problem was particularly to affect Brandenburg, bordering directly with Poland. Competition from the Polish labor force was perceived as one of the greatest threats to the further development of the Eastern Lands.

Also speeches of some German politicians had a similar character. According to the Berlin SPD management, the quick admission of the right to freedom of movement of employees from the CEE countries was the greatest threat to the East German labor market. Herman Borghost, deputy head of the Berlin branch of the party, accused the EU institutions that in the name of higher goals, they disregard the problems of everyday life, which are mainly related to the security of having a permanent job. The CDU also changed its position on the free movement of workers before the parliamentary elections. In July 1998, in the official statement of the CDU/CSU coalition, it was written that *„the full right to free movement of workers for workers from countries applying for accession to the Communities will only be allowed after the average living levels in these countries and the European Union”* (Duszczyk, 1999: s. 94-95).

The statements of Austrian politicians also showed a lack of support for the right of free movement of workers for the new Member States after their accession. A number of expert opinions and reports from European scientific institutions were also prepared. One of them was the study prepared by the German Deutsche Institut

für Wirtschaftsforschung. The conclusions of this report assumed that migration from Poland to Germany would amount to approx. PLN 340-670 thousand. annually.

As the researchers point out, the situation that took place against the candidate countries (later adopted into the EU in 2004) was analogous to those that occurred in the previous period in the case of enlargement to include countries with weaker economic potential. In the early 1980s, the Financial Times published many articles about the dangers of granting the right to freedom of movement to workers from Spain and Portugal.

It was surprising, however, that already in 2006, the Polish workforce enjoyed great interest in the former East Germany, despite the 18% unemployment in this area. For example, in the town of Passetalk, 50 kilometers from the Polish border, many Poles took up legal and "black jobs", and this situation was tolerated by local authorities, thanks to which it operated, among others, Social care. Also 30 km from the Polish border in Schwedt, there was a shortage of specialists from the chemical industry, hairdressers, mechanics and construction workers, and this shortage was supplemented by Polish workers. Some authors, the increase in interest in Polish employees and Polish companies explained that for some time in Germany, the disappearance of traditional character traits associated with the country around the world was felt. Both honesty, sense of order and work ethics started to disappear, and fear of failure appeared. In this situation, especially in the areas of the former East Germany, the Pole has become a symbol of dynamism, entrepreneurship, striving for success and efficient work (Świątkowski, 2006: s. 112).

Shortly before the opening of the German labor market for Poles, the subject of the Polish worker and the economic migration of Poles to Germany dominated the German press. Most of the articles were written in a calming tone. It was emphasized that the "flood" of Germany by the Polish workforce is not expected, and Poles are wanted and needed. In articles describing the image of the Polish worker more broadly, Poles were presented as competent, committed and needed. However, some articles discussed the subject of Poles' employment forms. It was pointed out that „black work” is a common phenomenon, and Polish employees are not interested in changing this situation, even in the face of the possibility of legal employment. The German press indicated the types of work of Poles in Germany. They included care for the elderly and children as well as domestic help, work in agriculture, hotel

industry and renovation and construction work. The topic of demand for highly qualified experts, mainly from the IT industry, was also raised. It was emphasized at the same time that such work in Germany is not much more profitable for Polish IT specialists.

In the opinion of many experts, the postponement of labor market opening by Germany and Austria resulted in the consent for an influx of less qualified („worse”) (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2008) employees, because young and best-educated Poles have previously worked in other Member States (and some of them have already managed to return to their homeland and do not plan to take up work again abroad).

**TABLE 27.** Member States' policy towards employees from 'new' Member States

	<b>Member state</b>	<b>Workers from EU-8 / EU-15</b>	<b>Employees from BG and RO / EU25</b>
EU-15	Belgium	Limitations with simplifications	Limitations with simplifications
	Danmark	Limitations with simplifications	Limitations with simplifications
	Germany	Limitations with simplifications *	Limitations with simplifications
	Ireland	Free access (from May 1, 2004)	Limitations
	Greece	Free access (from May 1, 2006)	Limitations
	Spain	Free access (from May 1, 2006)	Limitations
	France	Free access (from May 1, 2008)	Limitations with simplifications
	Italy	Free access (from July 27, 2008)	Limitations with simplifications
	Luxembourg	Free access (from November 1, 2007)	Limitations with simplifications
	Netherlands	Free access (from May 1, 2007)	Limitations
	Austria	Limitations with simplifications*	Limitations with simplifications
	Portugal	Free access (from May 1, 2006)	Limitations

	Finland	Free access (from May 1, 2006)	Free access and then registration for monitoring
	Sweeden	Free access (from May 1, 2004)	Free access
	United Kingdom	Free access (from May 1, 2004)	Limitations
EU-10	Czech Republic	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access
	Estonia	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access
	Cyprus	-	Free access and then registration for monitoring
	Latvia	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access
	Lithuania	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access
	Hungary	Restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Limitations with simplifications
	Malta	-	Limitations
	Polska	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access
	Slovenia	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access and then registration for monitoring
	Slovakia	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity	Free access
EU-2	Bulgaria	-	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity
	Romania	-	No restrictions on the basis of reciprocity

\* Restrictions also apply to the posting of employees in specific sectors  
Source: (UKIE, 2009: s. 262).

### 3.7.3.2. Polish migrations after joining the European Union

In the era of globalization, economic migrations are a natural and at the same time inevitable phenomenon that brings both positive and negative effects. As noted



in the report „Consequences of opening the German labor market for employees and employers from Lower Silesia” *„The state should manage the migration policy in such a way that its effects are the most beneficial from the point of view of society development”*. A positive factor for the country is the emigration of highly qualified workforce, if after gaining experience abroad and confronting their qualifications with foreign standards, these people return to the country and transmit their experience to colleagues. In turn, the time they spend abroad is also a positive factor for the host country. This may be confirmed by estimates of the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, according to which in 2004-2009 British GDP increased by 0.38% due to immigration from „New” Member States, of which Poland had a significant share.

The years 2004-2007 are a period of unprecedented increase in the mobility scale of Poles. According to the estimates of the Central Statistical Office, the number of migrants increased from around 1 million to 2.3 million, of which 80% left the country for work (other reasons for traveling were family reunification, studies abroad) (Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (UKIE), 2009: s. 263).

The outflow of workers from Poland took the highest level in 2005-2006, when the country left the relevant 450,000. and 500,000 people. In 2007, the emigration wave began to stabilize at the level of 320,000 people a year. In 2008-2009 not only the emigration wave of Poles weakened, but more and more of them decided to return to the country. This applied mainly to Ireland and the United Kingdom, where the global economic crisis was felt particularly severely. In the case of Great Britain, the drop in the pound exchange rate was also significant (UKIE, 2009: s. 263).

After Poland's accession to the European Union, the main wave of migration encompassed those countries that in 2004 decided to fully open their markets. In the years 2002-2007, the number of people leaving for the United Kingdom increased thirty-fold, and to Ireland, a hundredfold. The level of emigration to Germany also increased, but at a much more moderate pace. It is worth noting the role of Spain and the Netherlands as target countries of migration. On the other hand, earnings migration to Italy remained stable. Countries that did not belong to the EU often chose Norway and Iceland as their goal (until the economic collapse in this country in 2008). Poland's membership in the EU also had an impact on the reduction in the


percentage of people leaving for non-European countries (the United States and to a lesser extent Canada) (UKIE, 2009: s. 264).

**TABLE 28.** Citizens of Poland staying temporarily abroad - selected countries (2004-2007)

State	2002 (May) –NSP	2004	2005	2006	2007
Austria	11	15	25	34	39
Belgium	14	13	21	28	31
France	21	30	30	49	55
Germany	294	385	430	450	490
Ireland	2	15	76	120	200
Italy	39	59	70	85	87
Netherlands	10	23	43	55	98
Spain	14	26	37	44	80
Sweden	6	11	17	25	27
United Kingdon	24	150	340	580	690
EU-27	451	750	1170	1550	1860
In all	786	1000	1450	1950	2270

Source: (UKIE, 2009: s. 264).

**DIAGRAM 6.** Emigration from Poland for temporary residence in 2004-2014 (number of people staying abroad at the end of a given year in thousands)



Source: (Roicka, 2015: s. 113).

### **3.8. POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The years 1989-1991 can be described as a transitional period in which Poland developed new directions of political actions in Europe. At that time there was a significant change in orientation, shifted from “the East” to “the West”, which depended on political, economic and military independence from the East and inclusion of the state into Western integration structures. However, internal changes which took place at the beginning of the 90s in Poland did not facilitate integration processes. The state tried to deal with many problems related to the economic crisis, political destabilization and increasing social dissatisfaction (Domagała, 2007: s. 22). However, Western European countries which served as a model of civilizational development for Poland helped to create democratic institutions and restructure the economy, whereas deepening mutual relations with them gave Poland an opportunity to pursue its own interests (Łastawski, 2011: s. 22).

Several years of preparations of the country crowned with its accession to the structures of the European Union in 2004 constituted a turning point in the process of further adjustments to ‘European standards’ (Jańczak, 2001: s. 159) and thus contributed to the increase of safety, improvement of working conditions, quality of life, health, and education of citizens (Czachór, 2009: s. 88), as well as strengthening the prestige of the state on the international stage (Domagała, 2007: s. 232). Initially, issues such as the weakness of Polish economy, the immaturity of the political system and Euroscepticism aroused concerns about the role of Poland in the European Union as a “second category membership” (Jańczak, 2001: s. 88). Poland is the largest of the “new” Member States, both in terms of population and area, and therefore it is perceived as the leader of the “new Union” (Trzpil, 2008: s. 47). It also has a special place among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which can be illustrated by the election of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Donald Tusk, for the President of the European Council in 2014. Choosing a Pole for such a prestigious position is undoubtedly a success for the country, as well as a matter of special significance for the other countries in the region. In the opinion of some researchers, it was a signal of overcoming the invisible barrier that still exists in the organization, between the countries of the old and the new Union.

One of Poland's goals from the beginning of the political transformation was to build the best possible relations with its eastern neighbors. Poland has become the

advocate of these countries on the forum of the European Union and sought to include them in a coordinated EU policy. The final point of the Polish efforts is the Eastern Partnership - an initiative developed jointly with Sweden. In this project, Poland used its own experience, which allowed to pay special attention to the development of civil society and democracy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland [MoFAoRoP], ty: s. 5-7).

An important phenomenon from the Polish point of view is the continuation of processes taking place in the early 90s, which contribute to the change of the population structure of the country. Poland ranks sixth in terms of population among all EU Member States. Its population in June 2018 amounted to 38,4 million people (Dane GUS, 2018), or approximately 8% of the total population of the Community (Główny Urząd Statystyczny [GUS], 2014, s. 14) (of which 23 million are inhabitants of cities, and 15,3 million are inhabitants of rural areas). However, as in the case of other EU countries, a low rate of natural increase can be observed in Poland. In 2004, there was a negative natural increase (-0.2%), which in the following years gradually improved, shaping at the level of 0.0% in 2012 (GUS, 2014, s. 16). From 2012, the “natural loss” of the population has been visible, mainly as a result of the decrease in the number of births, while the number of deaths is increasing (GUS, 2014, s. 15). In addition, the next two years were characterized by an increase in the number of emigrants and a decrease in the number of immigrants (most of whom are Poles returning from abroad).

After 2004, the demographic potential of the country was weakened by the wave of emigration of young people, often with high qualifications (including doctors and IT specialists) (Łastawski, 2011: s. 24), who decided to travel to Western European countries (mainly Great Britain and Ireland) (Bobrowska, 2013: s. 50). According to the 2011 census data, at the moment of the census – 2 million people whose official permanent place of residence was Poland were outside its territory. These data show that, on average, per 1000 inhabitants of Poland, there were 52 people temporarily staying abroad. Over 1,5 million people, or nearly 78% of immigrants are long-term emigrants, staying outside the homeland for 12 or more months; the rest - 453,000 people are short-term emigrants, who stay abroad for 3 months to one year (Główny Urząd Statystyczny [GUS], 2013: s. 49). In comparison, the 2002 census showed that there were around 786.1 thousand people (i.e. 21 per 1000 inhabitants) who spent

over two months abroad. Comparing statistics from 2003, the number of Poles staying outside the country increased after 20 May 2004 by 20%, and in comparison with 2002 by over 50% (Bobrowska, 2013: s. 54-55). Most of the emigrants (around 60-70%) stay in the destination country for no more than 12 months. However, in many cases this stay is prolonged, which is mainly due to: high earnings, conditions and quality of work, acclimatization, and housing standards. Due to the low rate of natural increase and the widespread phenomenon of emigration, Eurostat's forecast for Poland predicts a decline in the number of population in the following years. The data show that in 2030, the population of the country may amount to 37 million people, and in 2040 even 35.2 million (Łastawski, 2011: s. 24).

Mass emigration of Poles to the countries of Western Europe after 2004, undoubtedly also has an impact on reducing the unemployment rate in the country. In 2004, the unemployment rate in Poland was at the level of 19%. This was the worst result among all Member States (the average EU score was 9.2%). In subsequent years, the situation gradually began to improve, so that in 2008 the unemployment rate fell to 7.1%. With the deepening economic crisis in the world, the unemployment rate in Poland began to gradually increase reaching 10.1%. It was better than the EU average at that time, which amounted to 10.5% (GUS, 2013: s. 30-32). At the beginning of 2015, the official unemployment rate in Poland was 12%, whereas 31.6% of the unemployed were people under 30 years of age (Główny Urząd Statystyczny [GUS], 2015: s. 8).

Poland ranks 13th among EU countries in terms of the value of the minimum wage. The minimum wage in Poland in 2018 amounted to 503 euros and was almost 4 times lower than the wage in Luxembourg - the country where the minimum wage is the highest in the entire EU (1 999 euros - 2018). The disparity looks similarly in terms of average salary. In Poland, the average monthly salary in 2018 amounted to 982 euros gross. This is more than 4 times lower than the average Luxembourgian salary (4 654 euros), Danish salary (4 534 euros) or Dutch salary (4167 euros). Therefore, it is not surprising that only less than half of working Poles believe that their work brings good returns (as known from the report by CBOS in 2014) (Jodłowska, 2013).

Despite the difference in earnings, housing conditions, or quality of work (in comparison with the Scandinavian countries, Luxembourg, Belgium or the

Netherlands), most Poles are satisfied with their lives. On a scale of 1-10, Poles with a score of 7.3 were above the European average (7.1) in the Eurostat survey on life satisfaction. The level of people's satisfaction seems to be much worse in Bulgaria (4.8), Croatia, Cyprus, Greece or Portugal (Mb, 2015) . In a survey conducted by Gallup International ("The End of Year 2014"), 63% of Poles declared satisfaction with their lives, while 7% were dissatisfied (the average for Europe is 11%) (Szaniawski, 2008). Compared to previous years, there was an increase in satisfaction with the lives of Poles (a year earlier, 52% of respondents declared satisfaction with life, while the level of dissatisfaction was 12%).



## CHAPTER 4

### 4. EFFECTIVENESS OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU

#### 4.1. PHASES OF SHAPING THE PARTY SYSTEM IN POLAND

On the basis of the analysis of the process of shaping the main parliamentary political parties, various stages of the formation of the Polish party system can be distinguished. Jerzy Sielski in the article „Polski system partyjny” presented the first three phases of the formation of the Polish party system (Sielski, 2004: s. 11-26). The first phase - the quasi consensual system covered the years 1989-1990. In this period, the contractual elections were decided by the shape of the Polish parliament. It was not admitted to direct competition and providing for PZPR 65% of seats in the Sejm (the contractual choices are discussed in more detail in the previous chapter). The unequivocal victory of the opposition gave legitimation to the process of democratization and social reforms. This period can be described as consensual, due to the occurrence of a characteristic phenomenon that did not appear later on the Polish political scene. Namely, it is a matter of cooperation between political organizations (or parties and groups) that originated from the government (former system) and the opposition party (Krawcewicz, 2018: s. 56).

The second phase of multi-party break down covers the years 1990-1993. It began during the presidential campaign in 1990, when the slogan declared by Lech Walesa, „war at the top”, began the breakup of the Movement of Citizens' Committees (Ruch Komitetow Obywatelskich) into particular political groups. In this way, the fragmentation of the parliament and the parliamentary system itself took place. On the left side of the political scene, SLD appeared, and KPN on the right. At both poles, centrifugal tendencies were visible, but they were not strong enough to talk about the polarization of the party system (Sielski, 2004: s. 13). This system was characterized by ideological uniformity of the party (perhaps outside the PSL). Political fragmentation meant for most groups the adoption of a proportional electoral law, which secured the interests of small parties (what also happened in 1991). The first fully democratic elections took place in Poland on 27 October 1997 and (as already mentioned) in their result caused a high level of fragmentation of the party system. There were 29 groups in the parliament, of which 11 had only 1 seat. According to the Rae index, the level of fragmentation was 0.942, which means the

extreme fragmentation of the party system. The indicator of the so-called The effective number of parties (Laakso, Taagepera) was the highest among the European countries and accounted for 13.9 (for comparison in Belgium 8.1, Switzerland 5.8). In this way a party system of small parties was established in Poland. None of the parties managed to exceed 15% (the highest result was obtained by UD -12.23 and SLD-11.99). Marek Tyrała describes the Polish system in 1991 (behind Sartorim) as a multi-party system extremely polarized (Tyrała, 2013: s. 365). In turn, according to Smith's typology, this system would be defined as distracted (Sielski, 2004: s. 14).

In the second phase of the Polish party system, the principle of forming a government was multi-party and minority coalitions (the government of J. Olszewski consisted of 4 parties and had a parliamentary base in the form of 27%, and H. Suchocka's government composed of 7 parties had 30%). It was a permanent element of democratic political mechanisms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the political transformation. As a result of the fragmentation of the former opposition and the organizational and programming evolution of post-communist groups, many parties appeared that were forced to create more or less permanent alliances (Sokół, 2006: s. 33). In Poland, the tender process was of a unipolar nature, but with the dominance of post-Solidarity groups that were located to the right of the center. The Fragmentation and polarization of the post-Solidarity block resulted in prolonging coalition negotiations and the emergence of the bilateral opposition phenomenon. In this way, the parties located on the wings of the party system created a negative majority towards a center-oriented cabinet, which was enough to overthrow it. The second stage of shaping the party system in Poland was therefore characterized by the lack of cooperation and compromises of the post-Solidarity option with the groups originating from the PPS. According to Arkadiusz Krawcewicz, „*the manifestation [of this] was the rejection of cooperation with the SLD by post-Solidarity milieus aiming at full supervision over the processes of political transformation*” (Krawcewicz, 2018: s. 57).

The third phase of shaping the Polish political system in literature is called "two-block" and concerned the period 1993-2005 (Sielski, 2004: s. 16). It is worth first to look at the characteristics of the two-block system and its occurrence in other countries. In the bipolar system of forces, coalitions appear in two-party or bipolar conditions. In a two-party system in Great Britain voters decide not only about the



party's composition of the parliament and the strength of individual factions, but also about the composition of the government and its leader. Only in the years 1977-1979 the Cabinet of J. Callaghan (Labor Party) needed support from the Liberal Party<sup>1</sup>. Also in other systems different from the classic bipartisan, a similar mechanism can be found. In the 70's and 80's of the twentieth century, a system of double-party rivalry between the socialist and non-socialist parties appeared in Norway and Sweden. In turn, the party system of Germany and Austria is sometimes referred to as a modified two-party system. The transformation of France's party system in the 1980s brought it closer to the system of double-party rivalry between a group of left-wing parties (socialists, communists, leftist radicals, Greens) and right-wing parties (RPR, UDF). The systems of Spain and Greece also evolved towards the competition model of two party parties or coalitions (Sokół, 2006: s. 17).

In Poland, in turn, in 1993 the electoral law was changed, thanks to which the party system was consolidated. In this phase, four subsequent parliamentary elections took place in Poland. As a result of legal changes, the left in the form of SLD increased by more than thirty political entities, and the right-wing community united above all in the framework of AWS. Subsequent Polish governments had the majority of the Sejm and were formulated within the coalition with one of the above political options (1993 - SLD-PSL, 1997 - AWS i UW<sup>2</sup>, 2001 - SLD, PSL<sup>3</sup>, UP (Krawcewicz, 2018: s. 57)). According to Sartori's typology, in 1993 a multi-party, moderate polarized system appears in Poland. A similar situation took place after the next election in 1997. According to Marek Tyrała, after 2001, the party system became a predominant party system or a multi-party system with the dominating party (Tyrała, 2013: s. 365).

Researchers consider the breakthrough year 2005, when the two largest right-wing parties fought for power. This is the beginning of the fourth phase of shaping the party system in Poland, which can be described by the system of the winning party, replacing the two-block system. After the elections in 2005, PiS (155) and PO (132) and four smaller groups got the most seats in the Parliament. The political rivalry has moved to two ideological areas (between Polish conservative-liberal and national) and socio-political (between Polish social and liberal). In turn, SLD and

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<sup>1</sup>Period after the II World War

<sup>2</sup> From 2000 without UW

<sup>3</sup> From 2003 without PSL

left-wing groups were in isolation. This meant a decline in the importance of the political origin of political parties in Poland (Krawcewicz, 2018: s. 58).

The next elections in 2007 and 2011 showed that the dominant role still belongs to PO and PiS, which despite the common post-Solidarity lineage could not form a coalition. This results from deep divisions on the social, economic and axiological background. In the 2007 election, both parties won a total of almost three-fourths of the votes, and in 2011 their joint score fluctuated at almost 70%. A similar result (72%) of the year for the two parties in the European Parliament elections confirmed the tendency which Andrzej Antoszewski defines as the right-wing bipolarity (Antoszewski, 2012: s. 265). The elections of 2007 and 2011 for the first time in the history of the Republic of Poland contributed to the exercise of power by the PO with the „rotary” PSL (terms 2007-2011 and 2011-2015) (Krawcewicz, 2018: s. 58).

The victory of the PiS in the parliamentary (and presidential) elections in 2015 opened a new phase of development in the history of the Polish party and political system of Poland. For the first time in history, the winning party does not have to share power with any other coalition group. Although the PiS does not have a constitutional majority, it does not have to cooperate with the parliamentary opposition in shaping the internal and foreign policy of the state. The first months of the PiS government showed that the party decided to use its advantage over the opposition, strengthening its influence on the functioning of the state. Although the new balance of power in the state ensures harmonious cooperation between the legislative and executive powers, at the same time there has been a conflict between the legislature and the executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. The relations between the ruling party and the opposition also deteriorated, mainly due to the approach of both sides to the issue of democracy.

However, the still high level of PiS support proves that the polarization of Polish politics does not currently cause mass disapproval. The basic demands of PiS (law and order, the fight against corruption, the accounts of those responsible for all negligence and development delays, as well as a strong centralized and poorly limited state power) are firmly rooted in Polish society.

## **4.2 CONDITIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM ON THE PATH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (against the background of Western European States)**

The emergence of a pluralist and competitive party system in Poland was a consequence of the beginning of the political transformation process and the emergence of new political parties (Siekłucki, 2010: s. 259). By overcoming the monopoly of one option in public life, it became possible to reveal their views and programs through numerous environments that could eventually take legal political activity. However, despite the lapse of time, the process of evolution of the party system in Poland is still characterized by very high dynamics and lack of stability. This state of affairs (according to Polish political scientists) confirms the thesis about non-linear development of party systems of most Central and Eastern European countries (Siekłucki, 2010: s. 259).

The research on political systems is deeply rooted in European experiences, with an emphasis on behavioral patterns, socio-political divisions and civil society, constituting a relatively stable, institutionalized system thanks to mutual interactions. However, attention should be drawn to the fact that although parties forming in post-communist countries in Poland can be included in the category of electoral groups, their organizational evolution was decided by completely different factors than in the case of Western Europe.

The democratization of the post-communist states (unlike in Western European countries) was multidimensional and much more complicated. The scope of the state's monopoly was much larger in the pre-transition period, which meant that the transformation process concerned not only the political sphere but also the economic sphere and the construction of the nation-state. The situation in the post-communist countries was also much more unpredictable and fluid, and the behavior of political actors and institutional conditions constituted a response to this unpredictability and uncertainty. Thus, the party system was not only an effect of structural constraints or strategic behavior of political actors, but also a process of learning by trial and error (Lipiński, 2016: s. 16).

Uncertainty of the political, economic and institutional system, understood as the limited ability of political actors to predict future interactions, could also lead to the use of state resources and the building of an organic and flexible organization.

This situation contradicts the behavioral pattern of parties in Western systems, where specific arrangements of social divisions and electoral rights led to the emergence of predictable party constellations (Lipiński, 2016: s. 16).

In Western Europe, as a result of two (national and industrial) revolutions, four major categories of socio-political divisions have evolved. The first of them, the center versus the periphery, was connected with the construction of a modern nation state and the growing resistance of groups subjected to homogenisation (different ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious) living in the center or periphery of the country. The second conflict between the state and the church originated between a culturally homogeneous and centralizing nation state, and historically shaped influences and privileges of the Church. In turn, the conflict between landowners versus industrialists was a consequence of the industrial revolution and concerned the conflict of interests of landowners and the newly emerging middle class (bourgeoisie). Finally, the employer's conflict versus the employee concerned, on the one hand, owners and employers, and on the other, tenants, agricultural workers and workers.

In this way, national and liberal parties emerged on the basis of the center-periphery conflict. Religious parties crystallized around the religious conflict; on the basis of the conflict between industry and agriculture, conservative, liberal and agrarian parties have grown up. On the other hand, the dispute between employers and employees was the reason for the emergence of socialist and later communist parties (Michalak, 2010: s. 193).

The process of forming political parties in the Republic of Poland has a decidedly shorter history. Sharon Rivera notes that the political parties emerging in Poland have crystallized around specific political groups rather than clearly conscious and objective social interests. Even if the ideological parties referred to traditional values (and even socio-political divisions), the source of this situation was not the real divisions existing in Polish society. The ideological identity of Polish parties did not develop in interaction with specific social groups. It was more external and, what is important, its source was indirectly conditioned by its attitude to European integration (Zuba, 2006: s. 125-126). The majority of authors see the genesis of Polish political parties in the division: a post-communist block versus a

post-Solidarity block, which testifies to a political rather than a socio-political division.

In Poland, the creation of governments for many years was a consequence of both the result of the election and the coalition policy within the fragmented party system (Sokół, 2006: s. 17). Only the elections in 2005 introduced the Polish party system into a new stage, which was determined primarily by transforming the structure of competition into a confrontation of two parties with a similar, „solidarity” (from Solidarnosc) genesis (Siekłucki, 2010: s. 267) and a new pattern for the formation of cabinet coalitions.

In Poland, since 1993, the principle of establishing the government was the formation of a majority coalition with the character of a minimally victorious coalition, comprising two or three parties that are close to each other in terms of program. The creation of the coalition was determined by the division of historical character, and the governments formed either the SLD with the PSL or post-Solidarnosc groups. The situation changed in 2007 when the coalition was formed by two parties with different genesis, namely PO and PSL. This confirmed, in the opinion of the researchers, the departure from the division into post-Solidarnosc and post-communist groups and the recognition of the party's origins as the most important factor determining its position on the Polish political scene (Siekłucki, 2010: s. 267).

Peter Mair (apart from democratization, context and pattern of rivalry) sees between the party systems of the Western European countries and the systems of post-communist countries, the difference also in the area of the electorate (Lipiński, 2016: s. 16-18). In the western countries it is characterized by a relative closure based on specific party preferences and high predictability. Electorates in new democracies are characterized by greater openness and availability and, as a result, by greater unpredictability. Political parties in Poland also moved „*in the 'flattened' social structure with the 'missing center' in the form of a network of associations and organizations (party associations, interest groups, trade unions, etc.) that were destroyed or banned [in the previous system]*” (Lipiński, 2016: s. 17). The lack of a clear diversity of society made it more difficult to create a structure of socio-political divisions, being the effect of constructing and developing by the parties the identity of collective distinct groups. As a result, there was a large electoral lability resulting

from the lack of permanent relationships between individual segments of the electorate and specific parties.

**TABLE 29:** Election Instability (net) (Between 2001 and 2005)

<b>The Political Party</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>The Difference</b>
PiS	9,50	26,99	+17,49
PO	12,68	24,14	+11,46
Samoobrona	10,20	11,41	+1,21
SLD	41,04	11,31	-29,73
LPR	7,87	7,97	+0,10
PSL	8,98	6,96	-2,02
Political parties that have not passed the electoral threshold	9,73	11,22	-1,49
Electoral instability (net)			31,75

Source: (Antoszewski, 2006: s. 78).

The construction of the Polish party system in 2005 even more clearly confirmed Peter Mai's thesis that during its development, the newly emerging party system may prove to be a denial of the term „system”. The data referred to in Table 1, including the electoral volatility index, show how far the situation in Poland after 1989 deviated from the processes taking place in Western European countries<sup>4</sup>.

**TABLE 30:** Elections with a high level of electoral instability in Denmark, France and Germany \*\* and in Poland \*

Poland	<i>Year</i>	<i>1991-1993</i>	<i>1993-1997</i>	<i>1997-2001</i>	<i>2001-2005</i>
	<b>Instability (in %)</b>	34,78	19,19	49,30	38,39
Denmark	<i>Year</i>	<i>1945</i>	<i>1973</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1977</i>
	<b>Instability (in %)</b>	18,4	21,2	17,8	18,3

<sup>4</sup> The indicator obtained by Poland was comparable to the Latin American political system (such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru or Brazil) considered unstable in their early post-authoritarian period. In: (Markowski, 2006: s. 10).

France	<i>Year</i>	<i>1906</i>	<i>1910</i>	<i>1956</i>	<i>1958</i>
	<b>Instability (in %)</b>	31,1	30,5	20,2	26,7
Germany	<i>Year</i>	<i>1920</i>	<i>1924</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1953</i>
	<b>Instability (in %)</b>	32,1	27,1	22,0	21,2

\* In subsequent electoral years after systemic transformation (instability aggregated in% of global value)

\*\* Level of instability > 17.2 (double average value)

Source: own work: (Mair, 2006: s. 136), (Markowski, 2006: s.20).

Despite the passage of time, the level of electoral instability continues, which indicates a significant flow of the electorate between the parties. Although in 2007 its decline was noticeable, still every fourth voter voted for a different party than in the previous elections.

**TABLE 31:** Electoral instability in the elections to the Sejm 1993-2007

	1991-1993	1993-1997	1997-2001	2001-2005	2005-2007	2007-2011
Inter-party instability	34,78	19,19	49,30	38,89	24,60	9,26
Inter-block instability	18,90	7,58	18,72	26,16	15,36	2,92

Source: (Antoszewski, 2012: s. 193).

The elections of 2007 proved in turn that both main political (PO and PiS) with relatively equal „iron electorates” (people voting in previous elections in the same way), have different ability to win voters of other groups. For example, from PiS to PO four times more votes flowed than in the opposite direction. The PiS, however, took over the majority of the electorate of its government coalition partners (2005-2007), or LPR and Samoobrona (the share of these electorates in the overall result was 15%). PO, however, gained some SLD voters (their share in the overall result of the PO is 12%) (Antoszewski, 2012: s. 269-270).

However, despite many differences in the process of shaping the party systems of Western European countries, and the systems of post-communist countries (including Poland), researchers note one caveat. It is so-called the „external” factor,

or organizational and program tradition of Western Europe, affecting the development of parties in post-communist Europe, especially in the context of the attractiveness of the European Union.

### **4.3 POLISH GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR POLICIES TOWARDS THE UNION**

#### **4.3.1 Civic Platform (PO) and its policy towards the European Union**

The political party Civic Platform was established on January 24, 2001. The main founders of the party were Andrzej Olechowski, Maciej Płażyński and Donald Tusk. The PO declares membership in the family of liberal-conservative political parties, and its members identify with the center of the political scene and supporters of the cabinet and parliamentary system, with enhanced decentralization of the state and devotion of a considerable scope of competence to local self-government. The PO advocates liberalism in the economic sphere. However, despite the declaration of expanding economic freedom, the actions of two subsequent governments of this party have denied (including raising VAT, freezing tax thresholds, and significantly reducing the activity of Open Pension Funds).

Platforma Obywatelska is a supporter of close cooperation with the European Union. Before accession, being the main opposition party, it tried to emphasize the benefits of integration (Piasecki, 2012: s. 184). Despite its conservative axiological layer (the PO defines itself as a center turned to the right), it can be defined as a party belonging to a group of parties noticing the strengthening of sovereignty and identity as part of the process of European integration. In 2001, in support of its creation, the Platform stated that *„it was born with a common dream of a united Europe”* (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 95). One of the main principles of the European Policy of PO is to strive for the creation of a politically united Europe with strong institutions, a Europe that is not based on the alliance of states, but on the actual integration of states and nations (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 124).

One of the priorities of membership in the European Union is the „solidarity principle” understood in two ways. First, „solidarity” in political terms, allowing the creation of a political directorate. Secondly, solidarity understood in a civilizational and economic manner, according to which the European continent will become a



place where the chances of individual nations and regions will always be balanced without the domination of national egoisms (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 124).

#### **4.3.2 Law and Justice (PiS) and its policy towards the European Union**

Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc is a party formed on the initiative of the brothers Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski and Ludwik Dorn (author of the party's name) and officially registered in June 2001. The main reason for the new party was a progressive disintegration and the upcoming electoral defeat of the Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc in 1997-2001 (the possibility of developing its place on the right side of the political scene was noticed) and the popularity of Lech Kaczynski appointed as Minister of Justice in Jerzy Buzek's government became popular (Lech Kaczynski's popularity stemmed from his uncompromising attitude while in office.) He fought against corruption and crime under the slogan „*purity of public life*” (Paszkievicz, 2000: s.12). As Rafał Matyja notes, „*the appointment of Lech Kaczynski as the Minister of Justice (12 June 2000) [...] was quite sensational. However, the effects of this action on the formation of Polish policy after 2001 - exceeded the forecasts of all observers. More - exceeded the expectations of politicians who perceived the initiative of creating new parties rather as a rescue against marginalization within AWS or UW than a bold undertaking reconfiguring the political system*” (Matyja, 2010: s. 25).

The disintegration of the AWS led to the crystallization of new political parties, of which the Platforma Obywatelska and Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc were the most durable. However, the direct predecessor of the PiS was the Porozumienie Centrum (PC) created by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, which in the 1997 election took part in the AWS list and remained until the end of the term of office. The creation of the PiS was synonymous with the end of the PC's activity, and its leading activists (similarly to representatives of other right-wing parties operating in the AWS) moved to the new formation. The formation of PiS was the same beginning of integration of this part of the Polish right, which represented the conservative-national trend.

The analysis of the organizational structure and the functioning of the party leads to the conclusion that it combines the features of a mass party, a professional-electoral party and a cartel party. A strictly defined hierarchy and method of acquiring party members (or requirements for candidates and the procedure for their

adoption) were taken from the mass party model. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość as compared to other parties is distinguished by the normative and actual position of the president (Jarosław Kaczyński) as the highest executive power of the group. The features of the professional and electoral party are visible in the way of acting, which is subordinated to the main political goal of effective participation in elections. The elite of PiS is made up of politicians with many years of experience, having a long parliamentary career. An important role is also played by experts in political marketing and communication with the electorate, thanks to which the level of professionalism of the electoral campaigns of this party is significantly increased. On the other hand, the similarity to the cartel, in the case of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, results from its close connection with the state, the method of financing and the use of political communication channels under the control of the state. Unambiguous attribution of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość to one of the families of political parties may be difficult, among others due to the program evolution that has passed this grouping.

The basic diagnosis made during its creation was a statement about the state's crisis, wasting development opportunities, not exploiting the social potential of Poles and the deepening division of the nation. The 2001 program combined conservative elements (the need to build a new moral order based on community values, fight against pathologies, development of law enforcement apparatus), egalitarian (necessity to stop the growing diversity of society resulting from the reception of market economy principles) and populist (taking away the state from the elites who have taken it over).

In turn, in 2005, the party joined the parliamentary elections with a dense program proposal in the form of the concept of the Fourth Polish Republic. It announced a thorough multidimensional repair of the economic, social and political spheres, through fight against the agreement covering all those who acted to the detriment of the nation after 1989. An important role of this program was the postulate of de-communization and lustration.

In 2007-2015, the party focused on criticizing the actions of the ruling coalition PO-PSL. The hostility towards liberalism, the necessity to change the current Constitution (a new basic law), strengthening the position of the state towards the citizen and reducing the possibility of anti-majority institutions limiting legislative and executive power (the draft was prepared in 2010) were clearly emphasized.

The party on the left-right axis is itself referred to as the center-right. However, many of the elements postulated and then implemented by this party as part of social policy have leftist roots (this is a 500 + program, a flat +, a reduction of many retirement benefits). The program of the party from 2014 also includes postulates characteristic of the ideology of conservatism (respect for tradition, the idea of a „strong state”), social church science (the idea of social market economy, the need to expand social assistance, the role of religion and the Church in public life) and nationalism (making the nation the most important sovereign political community).

For most experts, however, the party is described as populist because of the anti-liberal orientation in the economic, political and moral spheres. The program documents stress the necessity of satisfying the material needs of society (well-being, internal and external security), while taking into account to a minimum the so-called postmaterial needs (opposition to gender, opposition to secular tendencies, aversion towards LGBT communities).

#### **4.3.2.1. PiS and the European Union**

By many commentators, PiS was referred to as a group opposing Poland's membership of the European Union. It resulted from the fact that many program documents of the party or statements of its leaders in the press conditioned the country's accession to the EU with many reservations and doubts. The characteristic of this party, duality, ambivalence and incoherence, allows it to qualify according to Marek Migalski as a typical Eurorealist formation. It is therefore a party that sees Poland's membership of the EU in terms of both pros and cons, as well as opportunities and threats (Migalski, 2010: s. 75). Similarly, PiS is defined by Andrzej Konrad Piasecki, according to whom PiS are conservative Eurorealists (Piasecki, 2012: s. 185). In turn, Anna Paczeński notes that the party perceived as eurosceptic, and itself described as the Eurorealist, from the beginning presents the ambivalent attitude towards the European Union (Paczeński, 2013: s. 128).

The Eurosceptic characterizing PiS in the final phase of the accession process distinguished these parties significantly from pro-EU SLD's and PO's politicians. The party did not want to be simultaneously associated with the radically anti-EU environment of Samoobrona or LPR, and in its 2001 program accession to the Union

was defined as an important issue, but it should be more important to preserve its own national identity in a united Europe.

Before the end of the final phase of negotiations (end of 2002), the party declared its own negotiating conditions: the government's commitment to substantially improve the country's entry into the EU, guaranteeing the superiority of constitutional law over treaty law, guaranteeing state sovereignty in the sphere of morality and culture, passing the land trade act . It can be assumed that stiffening the party's position on integration in the pre-accession period was due to several reasons. Firstly, with the desire to take away the competitive votes of the LPR, which increased its voting capital on the anti-European fears of the electorate. Secondly, they wanted to avoid the impression that PiS could support the European policy of the SLD government criticized by it (Paszkiwicz, 2000: s.115). Thirdly, the PiS wanted to mark its position as different from the PO, which attitude towards the European Union was assessed as the euro-enthusiastic (Piasecki, 2012: s. 185). PiS was an advocate of the "English-Danish" approach to EU affairs, that is, the concept of looser integration, within which national sovereignty should be protected (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 136).

To the surprise of the observers, after the Copenhagen summit that ended Poland's negotiations with the European Union, the party adopted a resolution at its congress calling for a referendum vote for integration with the EU<sup>5</sup>. In the electoral program, the issue of Poland's entry into the European Union was the main direction of Polish foreign policy. However, the prerequisite for presence in an integrated Europe is the behavior of the nation state, because *„only a strong, unitary national state will enable the realization of one's own interests and instilling in the future generations the values of the existence of a nation and its development”* (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 136).

According to PiS, when Poland joins the European Union, the Polish road within its structures is not yet completed. The next stages are meant to contribute to the promotion of Polish interests and implement the principles of sovereignty. According to the PiS, European politics must become a fully state, not a party. Hence it is to stand for the interpretation of state interests, not of party particularisms

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<sup>5</sup> Only former members of the ZChN were against the resolution, headed by Marek Jurek (representing 14% of all delegates)

(Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 101). The party is in favor of a Europe based on tradition, irrelevant to social institutions that have been established over the years, and a Europe of nation states that are strongly connected with the principle of solidarity. According to PiS, this dimension was not reflected in the Accession Treaty, that is why Poland should strive even for such a Europe.

PiS proposes, therefore, the concept of a new European policy, in which the postulate of „*breaking with vicious Euro-enthusiasm and politics devoid of the spirit of solidarity was included*” (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 101). In line with the PiS's party demands, the new European policy is a condition for the development of Poland's potential and for strengthening Poland in the international arena. The renewed policy aims to use Poland's membership in the European Union to promote Polish entrepreneurship, increase economic potential, repair state institutions and increase civilization. It is also intended to activate Poland's role in defining the ideological and political shape of the Community. According to PiS, the European Union is to be an institution serving Poland. The reverse is unacceptable for the party, as is the compromise of reconciling national interests with European interests.

The basic prerequisite for Poland's presence in an integrated Europe is, however, the PiS's behavior of the nation-state. Only a strong and unitary nation-state „*will enable the realization of one's own interests and instilling in the future generations the values of the existence and development of the nation* [they are, moreover] *the basic condition for the functioning of democracy*” (Grzesik-Robak, 2008: s. 136). The postulate of the Union as a union of sovereign nation states is strongly visible in the party's program. It also influences the assessment of other aspects that are related to its functioning. PiS opposed, among others the draft EU Constitution, adopted by the European Convention, because in its assessment it compromised the interests of Poland and limited its sovereignty. They demanded, among others that the Poles would decide about the acceptance of the Constitution through a referendum (Paszkiwicz, 2000: s.115). After the French and the Dutch rejected in a referendum, the new treaty by the prime minister and the president was described as „dead”, that is why in the circle of federalists, PiS earned the reputation of eurosceptics (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 567). Although the party was in favor of joining the EU, its Euroscepticism became visible over time (refugee crisis, treatment of disputes with the European commission on the Constitutional Tribunal).

#### 4.4. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE „FORCE OF POLAND'S VOICE” IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

##### 4.4.1. The European Constitution and Poland

During the Intergovernmental Conference, which started its work on October 4, 2003, Poland (as a candidate) indicated some issues that should have been taken in reference to the draft Constitutional Treaty submitted by the Convention. On the Polish side, a few basic problems were pointed out, which concerned: the composition of the European Commission and the proposal of the Convention to diversify the status of its members; the mechanism for qualified majority decision-making in the Council; formulas for managing the works of the European Council and the Council of Ministers; the inclusion of the Christian religion as part of the formation of Europe in the preamble of the Treaty and the shaping of the Common Foreign and Security Policy so as not to weaken NATO and transatlantic relations (Barcz, 2007: s. 14). In the Resolution of the National Councils of the SLD and the UP, these parties unanimously supported the government's stance, stating that *„Polish demands are based on the principles and values of the future community, and the Poles expressed in June [...] (2003 reminds D.L.) consent to join the Union under conditions contained in the Treaty of Nice. [therefore, regarding the system of counting votes in the Council] 'Respect for the fundamental principles of democracy requires serious consideration of previously adopted arrangements'”* (PAP, 2003).

The most controversial issue for Poland was therefore the formula for making decisions in the Council by a qualified majority. The draft Nice Treaty, which guaranteed Poland a strong position in the decision-making process, was replaced by the formula of the so-called double majority. The new formula could have contributed to giving the decision process considerable flexibility, but at the expense of mainly „medium-large” member states, that is Poland and Spain and strengthening the position of „big” states (mainly Germany, France and Italy, which supported the Treaty). Such a radical change in the proportion of votes was unacceptable to Poland. Prime Minister Leszek Miller, aware of the alliance with Spain and support of the entire Polish opposition, conducted a tough campaign for the Nice system during the negotiations.

Even before the Conference, the issue of the distribution of votes in the Council caused strong emotions in the country. The most meaningful proof of this

was the statement of Jan M. Rokita from the Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform), who in September from the parliamentary rostrum exclaimed the words ‘Nice or Heath’, thus presenting the position of his party. Behind Rokita, representatives of other opposition groups also gave to it solid support. The Leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS, Law and Justice) Jaroslaw Kaczynski demanded a national referendum on behalf of his party regarding a possible resignation of the Nice system (PAP, 2004).

The draft Treaty and new proposals differentiated not only the Polish political scene, but also the EU Member States. The lack of communication between them led, among others, to break the deliberations of the Intergovernmental Conference during a meeting in Brussels on December 12-13, 2003, and forced the necessity of finding a compromise. In the meantime, the Spanish government has changed. The new prime minister of this state, Jose L. R. Zapatero, Said that he would not continue to support Poland in the fight of „Nice” (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 55). In this situation, the Polish government changed its negotiating position and abandoned the struggle for the Nice system, in exchange for recourse to Christian values in the preamble (which was also not won in the end because of France's opposition). During the meeting of the Conference on 17-18 June 2004, an agreement was finally reached and 25 member states accepted all controversial problems, including the decision-making framework by a qualified majority in the EU Council.

The adopted provisions of the Constitutional Treaty were generally assessed negatively in Poland. Jaroslaw Kaczynski acknowledged that the Constitutional Treaty is leading the Union towards the creation of a state. In his opinion, the provisions of the new document contradicted Polish tradition, including due to the lack of reference to the Christian tradition and the approach to the issue of family, culture and education. Kaczynski also warned against the domination of Germany and France and the fact that no one would count with the voice of Poland in the Union. In his opinion, changing the rules in the voting system was synonymous with the weakening of the position of the Polish state in Europe. PO politicians spoke in a similar tone. Jan M. Rokita recognized that *„from the state playing the European policy [Poland] it would become a played state”*. He noted that the new voting system in the Council breaks the principle of solidarity and weakens Poland's negotiating position in the fight to improve financial conditions. One of its leaders,

Andrzej Olechowski, did not agree with the official PO's position. In his view, the Polish stand was impossible to defend in the long run, due to the lack of allies, and the Nicene formula itself was a defective construction that would collapse over time, and therefore it is not worth defending it (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 56).

As Wojciech Słomczyński and Karol Życzkowski note, „*the source of Poland's weaker position in the EU Council of Ministers' voting system adopted in the European Constitution is the very principle of a double majority, in which the volume of votes is proportional to the population*” (Słomczyński and Życzkowski, ty: s. 43-55). Irrespective of the adopted value of the decision thresholds, under this system, it was even almost impossible to maintain the position which the Nicaean system gave to Poland. The voting mechanism adopted in the European Constitution left Poland outside the circle of „large” EU member states. Politically, this meant replacing the principle of balance between states (based on a parity between the „large” EU Member States: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom - from 1973, Spain - from 1986, Poland - from 2004 ) and degressive weight distribution (weights depend on the population size, but not in a directly proportional manner), by the principle of dominance of the four largest countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, where Germany's influence in this system is more important than the others).

The constitutional treaty was signed in Rome on October 29, 2004 by the representatives of the Member States. Prime Minister Marek Belka and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD) signed on behalf of Poland (Barcz, 2007: s. 14). Cimoszewicz stated in an interview that the achieved Treaty arrangements „*are the best possible solutions*”. His enthusiasm was only understood by members of the SLD and UP parliamentary clubs and SdPL. Political opposition (PO, PiS, PSL and LPR) was not so favorable in their assessments. Jan Rokita said that the government has achieved nothing, and the Constitutional Treaty is in fact a failure of Polish diplomacy.

The signing of the Constitutional Treaty began the two-year period of its ratification. However, already in the first half of 2005, it was rejected by French and Dutch referendums and thus blocked the ratification process. This situation was so significant that the founding countries of the European Communities decided on the impasse of the reform (including France, considered traditional as one of the



„motors” of European integration). Also in other Member States (Poland, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom) the attitude to the Treaty was „more than restrained”. However, as the researchers point out, the problems of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty revealed above all a deep general political crisis in the EU (Barcz, 2007: s. 16).

#### **4.4.2. Negotiations on the Treaty of Lisbon**

In connection with the rejection of the constitutional treaty, the member states decided to abandon the form of a major reform treaty and return to the traditional revision treaty. On October 18-19, 2007 in Lisbon, after establishing the mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference (June 2007), which was to develop a new project, representatives of the governments of the Member States met to establish a new treaty for Europe (Ekstowicz, 2011: s.93).

Negotiations of the provisions of the new treaty were conducted by the Law and Justice government and President Lech Kaczyński (deriving from the PiS) (Szpak, 2012: s. 85). As noted by Mikołaj Tomczyk, during the period of rule by Law and Justice (2005-2007), Poland's activity on the European Union forum was a picture of the consistently implemented party philosophy and its image of the Community as an organization that brings together nation-states. This notion is not contrary to views created in other Member States, but belongs to minority trends. Assuming that European integration is a factual situation: *„PiS politicians treat it as a process to be influenced, shaped and drawn from it for Poland as much as possible”* (Tomczyk, 2009: s. 58-59). As is clear from the provisions contained in declarations and party publications, the European Union, in PiS's opinion, retains its meaning only on the condition that its own identity is defined.

After 2005, the tone of Polish diplomacy was picked up differently, but mostly negatively, as was the PiS government. This was undoubtedly influenced by the policy of the PiS government towards Germany. As Bogdan Koszel notes: *„the PiS camp came to power, fueling anti-German resentments still rooted in a large part of mainly older and less educated Polish society [...] Conservative ideologists denied that there is any community of Polish-German interests in the EU”* (Koszel, 2009: s. 79). In turn, the new German government from the very beginning was negatively


oriented towards the Polish counterpart and blamed it on extreme nationalism, parochialism, argumentative and selfish treatment of the entire European Union.

The issue that was the most contentious in the EU policy between Poland and Germany in the years 2005-2007 was the issue of the provisions and ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. The main problem for Poland was the acceptance of the negotiated voting system and the number of votes in the EU Council. The binding provisions of the Treaty of Nice put Poland among the countries with the highest over-representation voice power (29 - Germany, 27 - Poland). In turn, Germany and other large countries have proposed a new system called double majority, based on the number of votes for each country that would reflect its real population potential. In this way, the difference in votes in the Council would be 82 votes for Germany and 38 votes for Poland (Hajduk, 2012: s. 201).

On February 18-20, 2007, President Lech Kaczyński stayed in Dublin. During the lecture he gave in the National European Center, he demanded significant changes in the new treaty, because in his opinion the form of voting in the Council is damaging to some states in this Poland. He also stressed that Polish authorities are enthusiastic about the Union, but Europe is still Europe of nations and could function well without a treaty. A different view in an interview for one of the Polish newspapers was expressed by the German diplomat Reinhard Schweppe. According to him, the Union needs a new reforming treaty, and the Polish postulates regarding the need to change the voting system in the Council have put in doubt (T. Hoffmann, 2009: s. 258-259).

At the end of March 2007, the Polish negotiators officially presented their counterproposition to the double majority system. It was decided that the system of counting votes would be better based not on the number of inhabitants, but on the square root of this number. They wanted the voice of each country to be counted by the square root of the number of its population, thanks to which the disproportion of votes would be smaller.

**DIAGRAM 7:** The power of voting of selected member states depending on the voting system adopted [in%]



Source: (Lesiewicz, 2009: s.59).

The main idea of this concept concerned the conversion of the voting power per one citizen of a smaller member state in a way that would appreciate it, but at the same time weaken the voice of the largest countries. As one of the politicians of the government camp stated, „*PiS wanted to strengthen the Union in such a way that - respecting the differences between the size and demographic potential - everyone felt [in the EU] like at home. That everyone would feel like a co-owner of the project, which is the EU. Hence [...] treatments in negotiations for such a voting system that should enforce a compromise also with medium-sized countries*” (Tomczyk, 2009: s. 58-59).

The square root system would give Poland and the smaller EU countries a better bargaining position. However, the actions against the pushing through of the new concept were accompanied by an „*anti-German struggle that did not take in words and criticism, which only aggravated Poland's position*” (Koszel, 2009: s. 80). In addition, the intensive actions undertaken to support the system and find allies, especially among the Visegrad Group countries, were finally met only with conditional support from the Czech Republic (PrezydentPL, 2007).

The first Western politician who commented on the system proposed by Poland was the French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges. In June 2007, he assessed the proposal as „*very interesting and inteligent*”. However, in his opinion it was too late to discuss this matter (Lubelski, 2010: s. 2). The proposal to change the method of counting votes for the square root system and the threat of breaking the EU summit (about which Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski recalled a few days before its start) (PAP,

2007) in the absence of consent for the change was received without understanding on the EU forum, as a kind of novelty and the invention of the Polish delegation (Tomczyk, 2009: s. 58-59).

However, PiS proposals found supporters in all political parties in the Sejm. Initially, the opposition PO was very critical about the possible changes in the voting system in the EU Council, but this position evolved over time. The party even adopted a resolution supporting Poland's negotiating position, for which 377 deputies from PiS, PO, Samoobrona, LPR and other parties supported it. Only 43 SLD deputies, and one non-member MP, opposed the governmental position (in turn, the following members abstained from voting: 1 MP from PO, 1 from SLD, 1 from LPR and two non-attached MPs) (T. Hoffmann, 2009: s. 262).

Opposition politicians supported the government's position in numerous interviews. Donald Tusk stated that *„although he does not like the [...] government, it is up to him that Poland <would win as much as possible> during the European Union summit”*. Another well-known PO politician, Bogdan Klich, remarked that in the case of a voting system *„the idea is to have a Community Europe, not the Europe of the directorate of three or four countries. This is not only the interest of Poland or Spain. It is also the interest of other countries that would benefit from the element. [Poland has] the right to shape the Union's structure, which [is] a full member, and not just accept what the old EU [members] say”* (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 60).

The SLD politics were the most compromising attitude towards the proposals of the double majority system. In one of the interviews, former Prime Minister Leszek Miller assessed that the proposal of the square root system is for Poland a compromise between the most favorable system of Nice and the least favorable rule of the double majority. In his opinion, the government's proposal made sense and *„in this context Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński [was] right”*. However, the problem of the lack of understanding of the Polish proposal among other countries was caused in his opinion in that they did not see any benefits for themselves. At the same time, he pointed out that during the negotiations of 2003, his government had the support of Spain and a broader coalition that could not be disregarded gathered around these two countries. *„On the other hand, the government of J. Kaczyński did not have such an ally, what made his situation much more difficult”* (Puls Biznesu, 2007). Miller said that the Polish government should try to find the support of other EU countries

instead of „hooting, haunting and shaking the saber”. „It is not enough to be right. You still have to be able to convince others of these reasons. Difficulties in finding allies result from the conviction that Poland is ruled by an anti-European coalition from which you must stay afar off” (PAP, 2007), and the lack of allies in the European Union threatens Poland with isolation.

Although the PiS government during the negotiations was not a leader in the rankings of support for political parties<sup>6</sup>, in the issue of counting votes in the EU Council, as many as 49% of Poles surveyed voted for vetoing the summit in Brussels by Poland, if the Member States could not find a compromise on the voting system (against was 28% of the respondents). The majority of Poles (43%) also recognized that Prime Minister Kaczynski was right to push through the square root system (29% of respondents were opposed), and that the opposition should support the government's position (56%) (against support was 22% of respondents) (TVN, 2007).

According to the Polish political scientist Bogdan Koszel, the concept of the elemental system was more just and better reflected the spirit of EU solidarity between the stronger and the weaker. Therefore, the system proposed by Poland corrected some imbalance in the European Union, which was introduced by the Treaty of Nice „favoring Poland and Spain at the expense of Germany” and principles proposed by the Constitutional Treaty, which in turn gave a privileged position to the four largest countries, but at the expense of Poland and Spain. The German political scientist Klaus Bachmann agreed with the opinion of the Polish researcher that the square root system is not bad, but in his opinion it received a large number of votes for the largest states (Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain). This could lead to a situation in which „the application of the veto by Poland [the European Union] would cause many problems”. Bachmann also put forward a thesis based on the theory of weakness paradox, according to which, the weaker government, the more countries are ready to take its postulates into account. On the other hand, Kaczynski's government was strong during the negotiations. He had both political and social support, and therefore the treaty containing the double majority would be accepted by both - the Polish opposition and society. In this situation, the

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<sup>6</sup> In the OBOP survey of June 2007, 33% of Poles supported the PO, and 26% of PiS, source: tnsOBOP, Polish party preferences at the beginning of June 2007, Warsaw, June 2007.

resistance of the Polish government to change the principle of voting on the square root system did not give anything, because Kaczynski's strong government could not take advantage of the "paradox of weakness" and thus push through its proposals (T. Hoffmann, 2009: s. 260-261).

The summit in Brussels began on June 21, 2007. The lack of interest in the square root system from other countries and the negative attitude towards it prompted the PiS government to talk about a possible compromise (which in the opinion of the researchers weakened the bargaining position of the state). After the meeting of L. Kaczynski with A. Merkel, N. Sarkozy and V. Adamus during the first day of the summit, there was a preliminary agreement on the future of the treaty. The Polish side proposed the renouncement of the elemental formula and the extension of the Nice system by 2020, which, however, did not please the Belgians. As a result, on the second day of the summit, Luxembourg's Prime Minister Juncker proposed to maintain the Nice system until 2014, with the possibility of a transitional period until 2017. Due to the lack of acceptance of such a solution by Poland, Chancellor Merkel announced that she will start the Intergovernmental Conference without Poland, what, however, the Czech Republic and Lithuania did not express their consent.

After another series of talks between the President of France, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Belgium and Spain with President Kaczynski (who consulted the whole situation with his brother by phone), the proposals were accepted (T. Hoffmann, 2009: s. 263). Despite the announcement of the Polish government about the possibility of breaking the summit in the absence of support for the square root system, on June 23, 2007, an agreement was finally reached. As a result, Poland resigned from the previously presented concept in exchange for entering the declaration the so-called „safety brake” based on the compromise of Joannina (Roszkowski, 2017: s. 567).

As noted by Polish researchers who were involved in the development and analysis of the elemental system the „safety brake” mechanism in no way compensates, however, the fundamental defects of the system adopted in the European Constitution from the Polish point of view. First of all, its legal status is lower, because it has not been entered directly in the text of the treaty. Secondly, it is only valid for a specific period of time and is only meant to postpone the decision in an unspecified way, not to block it. In addition, similar to the adopted solution

„Compromise of Joanina”, in practice it was used only once in October 1995 by the United Kingdom without any significant effect. Some experts also noted that this type of record was devoid of real meaning, and more importantly, *„By increasing the potential Polish possibilities of blocking and delaying decisions, [...] and also sometimes more significantly, the similar possibilities of other EU countries are increased”* (Słomczyński and Życzkowski, ty: s. 44-54). Speculations that the Polish delegation was going to Brussels to break the summit did not work. Brothers Kaczyński were even rated as „EU players”. Although the style of negotiation was different in the Polish and foreign press, the prevailing view was that after the summit in Brussels, the Union is strengthened and able to function in the group of 27 countries (Tomaszyk, 2013: s. 10-11).

Despite the confusion that also triggered the Joanina voting mechanism, the Polish government assessed the negotiated provisions as a great success thanks to which Poland can influence the shape of the EU (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 64). In an interview on June 29, 2007, President Kaczyński assessed the results of the arrangements in such a way: (A journalist's question: *„We were going to the top to fight for the square root. We came with Nice, a system that is better for us, but it will only be valid until 2017. Is it actually a success?”*) – *„Yes, and it's big. Our postulate, the square root system, almost no one supported it, except for the conditional support of the Czech Republic. The Nicaean system is better for Poland. The square root would be more beneficial if it were to apply for all time. However, it was completely unrealistic. Let us remember that in the Union, no mechanisms are in force forever”* (Prezydent PL, 2007). In response to a question about the atmosphere of negotiations among the heads of state, the President described them in the following words: - *„The talks were firm but absolutely not hostile. The personality of Chancellor Angela Merkel certainly had a significant positive impact on their course, who under no circumstances is not a person who causes aggression, quite the opposite. President Sarkozy also played a great role, although he is an impulsive man. In turn, Tony Blair, who also had a very positive influence on the course of the negotiations, was at some stage of the summit a kind of mediator. The Spanish Prime Minister Jose Zapatero and the Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker also joined the final stage. The structure of the negotiations was very complicated,*

*but the role of the President of France was very positive, as was the British Prime Minister” (Prezydent PL, 2007).*

The result of negotiations on the voting system was assessed differently by the opposition leader Donald Tusk. He estimated that what Poland achieved in reality could be achieved even before the summit, without the need to build unnecessary tension. Bronisław Komorowski, on the other hand, remarked that *„bragging about the compromise from Joannina is a sign of incomprehension of the Union's mechanisms, and the government's focus is on having a brake, not on running the vehicle” (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 64).*

In the opinion of the researchers, although the authors of the Polish voting proposal in the Council pointed out that the voting model promoted by them ensures equal influence of citizens on EU matters and is more democratic, it was actually articulated only in terms of national interest. According to Marek Orłowski, *„PiS is not against Europe, but it does not trust its positive role today or tomorrow”*. For the party, it is rather an „ephemera” from which Poland can emerge, but it can also go into oblivion. However, becoming a member of the European Union, Poland has set before political groupings the necessity of constructing foreign policy in such a way that the philosophy of integration is included in it. It consists in formulating its national goals with reference to Community values. That is why it was so important to elaborate in the public debate a constitution that was „a testimony” of political unity” (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 67-68).

#### **4.4.3. The Issue of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Ratification**

Not only Poland was a member state which before the summit in Brussels announced the fight for favorable conditions in the provisions of the new treaty. A very strong opposition to the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the treaty provisions was expressed by the United Kingdom. It also demanded the abandonment of the name „constitution” and some passages suggesting that the Union could become a superstate in the future. It was also suggested that the EU should not be granted legal entity and the principle of unanimity should be maintained.

On July 23, 2007, the Intergovernmental Conference began in Brussels. It was intended to establish the full text of the new treaty. During the inaugural ceremony,



Poland's Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga explained that Poland accepts the existing mechanism of blocking laws and resigns (after analyzing experts) from the postulate that the mechanism from Joanina would guarantee the possibility of postponing the decision of two years. The Polish head of diplomacy pointed out that her country expects, in exchange, to refine and enter into the treaty the mechanism from Joanina.

During the Conference, the Portuguese Presidency presented the draft of a new treaty, which was adopted at the summit in June. At the outset, the United Kingdom has announced its exclusion from the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights regarding social issues (mainly workers). Poland also declared that until the end of the work of the Intergovernmental Conference, it will decide whether it will also make such an exclusion (Lesiewicz, 2009: s. 65).

From the very beginning of the establishment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the question of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon has become a contentious issue. Its ratification without the Great Britain itself contributed to the creation of the so-called „British Protocol”. It was consistent with the British law system and the tradition of this country (the cultural distinctness of common law from continental law and the attitude of the so-called opt-out in the field of labor law and social policy). As EP MEP Philip Bradbourn pointed out, an excessively extensive system of social rights and labor rights could be „catastrophic” to the economy of the state. Expressing opposition to the CPP's provisions, the United Kingdom *„did not oppose the general provisions on human dignity, but this one which directly affected its national interest”* (Książkiewicz, 2012: s. 332).

The issue of accepting the Charter of Fundamental Rights has caused strong emotions also in Poland. It caused, like other documents, which arose through a wide compromise numerous problems and criticism of many environments. Charges in their direction concerned too much accumulation of rights, primarily in relation to too extensive (and at the same time vague) number of formulations, not yet creating instruments of law enforcement. Attention was also paid to the issue of, for example, protection of minority rights and duplication of contents contained in the CPP with the rights contained in the ECHR (which could lead to similar cases being handled by the Court in Strasbourg and the Court in Luxembourg on the basis of other documents and issuing as a consequence different judgments). Polish parliamentary deputy to EP Konrad Szymanski also noted that for church circles and political

activists who represent them, in the preamble of the Charter, there are no references to Christian values, and some of its provisions violate the canons of attitudes that the Catholic Church permits (Banaszkiewicz, 2010: s. 189). In connection with this, Poland also joined the British Protocol, stressing at the same time that it did not take the opportunity to develop a similar protocol (which resulted in the lack of possibility to influence the content of this document).

Although during the PiS government, the PO advocated the adoption of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon and the CPP as soon as possible, finally (after it took power), it was decided not to abstain from the British protocol (Protocol 30 to the Treaty of Lisbon) (Szpak, 2012: s. 86). The lack of the Sejm majority required to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon was not without impact. Shortly after Prime Minister Donald Tusk took office, in interviews he informed about support for the CPP *„I do not see any threats in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, her issue is still discussed within the cabinet and it will be during the expose that I will present the government's position on this matter”* (TVN24, 2007 (c)). The new government argued that the rapid adoption of the Treaty would be beneficial for Poland, while the delay in ratification in Europe may be considered as withdrawal from the arrangements. However, PiS politicians warned against the possible blocking of the ratification of the Treaty in the Sejm. As Konrad Szymanski noted: *„one should take into account the scenario in which PiS deputies and senators would not decide to vote in favor of ratifying the treaty. Such a threat would arise when the new minister of foreign affairs and the prime minister decide to seriously undermine the results of the summit”*, or at the moment of withdrawal from the British protocol (TVN24, 2007 (c)).

Part of the compromise in this case, regarding the so-called „The competence act” was developed during President Kaczynski's meetings with Prime Minister Tusk. After the announcement of a compromise by both sides, President Kaczynski noted that *„the Union is and must remain a strong relationship, but only between nation states [...] It is extremely important from the point of view of Polish interests that the country joins the so-called British Protocol [ ...] because it guarantees that Poland would never be forced to adopt norms contrary to national tradition, customs and interest”* (Puls Biznesu, 2008).

On April 1-2, 2008, the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland ratified the Act authorizing the President of the Republic of Poland to ratify the Treaty by majority vote. The Act approving the ratification by the President of the Lisbon Treaty in the Sejm was voted by 384 deputies (56 was against and 12 abstained). The majority of 2/3 of the votes (302) required to pass the law were passed despite the opposition of some of the deputies of PiS (against the ratification of the Treaty were some MPs with more extreme views, among others, Tadeusz Cymanski, Andrzej Dera, Krzysztof Jurgiel, Antoni Macierewicz, Gabriela Masłowska and Anna Sobecka, supported from the circle among the deputies who abstained from voting: Jan Dziędziczak, Elżbieta Kruk, Jacek Kurski, Nelli Arnold-Rokita and Andrzej Sośnierz).

However, it was not clear with the entry into force of the provisions, especially in a situation in which President Kaczyński abstained from signing of it (Kuźlewska, 2011: s. 208). Although the Act, which authorizing the President to ratify the Treaty, was signed by him on 10 April 2008, the ratification act itself still remained without a signature. As the President argued, the proceedings were related to respecting the will of the Irish, who rejected the document in the referendum held on June 12, 2008 and the reluctance to put pressure on this state (Szpak, 2012: s. 86-87). The President repeatedly emphasized that he would sign the document at the time of its acceptance in the referendum in Ireland (Polska Times, 2008). Initially, these activities were criticized by Germany. However, with time, when there were also delays in the country related to the adoption of the Treaty (after the document was appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court), German politicians lost their arguments to criticize Poland (Hajduk, 2012: s. 201).

**TABLE 32:** The path and course of the ratification process in the Member States on November 25, 2008.

<b>State</b>	<b>The method of ratification</b>	<b>The course of ratification</b>
Austria	In the parliament	ratified
Belgium	In the parliament	ratified
Bulgaria	In the parliament	ratified
Cyprus	In the parliament	ratified
Czech Republic	In the parliament	Ratification in progress. On 25 XI

		2008, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic stated that the provisions of the Treaty were consistent with the Constitution of the Czech Republic. For the ratification, the consent of the parliament and the signature of President Klaus are still needed
Denmark	In the parliament	ratified
Estonia	In the parliament	ratified
Finland	In the parliament	ratified
France	In the parliament	ratified
Germany	Approved by the Parliament and the President of Germany	The ratification document will be signed by the President of West Germany after the Constitutional Tribunal determines that the Treaty complies with the German Constitution
Greece	In the parliament	ratified
Hungary	In the parliament	ratified
Ireland	National referendum	Not approved
Italy	In the parliament	ratified
Latvia	In the parliament	ratified
Lithuania	In the parliament	ratified
Luxembourg	In the parliament	ratified
Malta	In the parliament	ratified
Netherlands	In the parliament	ratified
Poland	Approved by the parliament	No signature of the president
Portugal	In the parliament	ratified
Romania	In the parliament	ratified
Slovakia	In the parliament	ratified
Slovenia	In the parliament	ratified
Spain	In the parliament	ratified
Sweeden	In the parliament	Ratification was not applied
United Kingdom	In the parliament	ratified

Source: (Tomaszyk, 2009: s. 283).

The ratification act was finally signed by President Kaczynski on October 10, 2009, and the act itself came into force less than two months later (December 1, 2009).

#### **4.4.4. The Treaty of Lisbon and the position of Poland**

To a large extent, the Treaty of Lisbon reiterated the provisions contained in the rejected constitutional treaty. In its case, however, the introduction of constitutional constructivism, consisting in mapping in the European system of quasi-state symbols (including the idea of constitutionalisation and strong axiological references) was abandoned. The Treaty of Lisbon also did not make the institutional breakthrough of giving one of the logic of integration, or a community logic or intergovernmental logic (Musiałek, 2012: s. 28). In the opinion of the researchers, it strengthened both supranational and intergovernmental institutions, which sustained the philosophy of integration and maintenance of the European Union's hybrid system.

Nevertheless, the provisions of the Treaty have geopolitical consequences. Significant institutional changes appeared in the intergovernmental logic. As Paweł Musiałek remarks: *„The most important institutional changes, including the most important for Poland - provisions regarding the voting system in the Council of the European Union have been preserved. The [...] system of the „double majority” introduced from 2014 from all the Member States has weakened the position of [Poland] to the greatest extent”* (Musiałek, 2012: s. 28). Its introduction eliminates the current „Nice voting system” beneficial for Warsaw, and which was giving Poland a place among the six largest states of the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the voting power of the largest states in comparison to the previous system, creating the „big four” (Italy, Great Britain, France and Germany), and the compromise from Joanina introduced by 2017 is the only security brake that limits the negative consequences for Poland (but it does not balance them). Despite the fact that in the EU Council, due to the consensual nature of the work, formal votes are held relatively rarely, weighted votes are important in the negotiating position of a given country.

The introduction of a voting system unfavorable for Poland was a consequence of the increase in the scope of the welfare being subject to majority voting and the

extension of the scope of matters falling within the competence of the European Union. The Treaty of Lisbon also strengthened the position of the European Parliament and the European Council at the expense of the Commission and the Council. Stronger position of Parliament at the expense of the Commission is not favorable for Poland, because Members from the old Member States have an advantage in the form of greater influence, procedural skill and the ability to use a specific EU discourse. The policy of the EP is intensified by going along with giving this institution more and more powers and increasing its influence through the interpretive gaps in the Treaty (Musiałek, 2012: s. 29).

#### **4.5. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON STABILITY, CONDITION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION**

After two months of negotiations, on March 2, 2012 at the summit in Brussels, the leaders of the 25 European Union member states (including Poland) signed the Treaty on Stability, Condition and Management in the Economic and Monetary Union, commonly called the Fiscal Pact. This document, together with the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, which had been signed by 17 eurozone countries last month, was intended to protect the euro area against a new wave of debt crisis (Kaliszuk, 2012: s. 6).

The initiative of the establishment of the Fiscal Compact at the meeting of the European Council in Brussels on December 8-9, 2011 was proposed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The main advocate of strengthening budgetary discipline, however, should be considered Germany, which incurred the highest costs of saving countries in debt crisis. The proposals of Germany and France were not approved by Great Britain. For fear of decisions that protected the interests of the euro area at the expense of the entire community, it demanded additional safeguards, such as a general clause that guaranteed the integrity of the EU market and the inclusion in the treaty of a protocol that would contain specific clauses securing London's interests and excluding it from certain regulations regarding financial services.

The UK did not obtain the expected guarantees and thus it did not support the pact. As a result, the euro area states have decided to amend the intergovernmental agreement binding only those states that sign it (Lange, 2012: s: 131). The readiness

to participate in the negotiations after a prior consultation in its parliaments was also expressed by nine Member States outside the euro area: Poland, Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania.

After the summit in Brussels (December 2011), Poland's finance minister Jacek Rostkowski announced that Poland wants to sign the pact, but does not plan to adopt fiscal rules negotiated for the economic union before changing the currency to the euro. In answer to the question why his country wants to act in this way, he replied that according to the Polish side *„at the current stage of analysis and negotiations [...] national rules are more flexible and better suited to [...] their own needs”* (TVN24, 2007 (a)). The preliminary provisions stating that non-euro area Member States would not be able to participate in informal meetings of the eurozone countries, were also unsatisfactory for Poland. It was declared to strive to remove from the pact the rules on meetings of the Council of the EU in the group of the Member States owning the euro and the necessity to introduce rules enabling participation in meetings also to the finance ministers of countries outside the zone. As noted by a representative of the government side *„we think that if the euro zone really integrates deeply, [...] and without such deep integration it would continue to threaten its collapse, (...) it must be done without creating divisions between the zone and the rest of the EU. And we think that the most adequate, the best mechanism that would ensure (avoid) this division, is the principle of participation without voting on euro area matters”* (TVN24, 2007 (a)).

Polish negotiators, in the course of their arrangements, have been in charge of the community principle, that is, the decision-making process in the community, in accordance with the transparent rules set out in the EU treaties. Therefore, it was taken care of to ensure the participation of supranational institutions operating in the interest of the entire Union (above all the European Parliament and the Commission) (Kaliszuk, 2012: s. 6-7), so that they could co-decide on the future of the Union together with the Member States (Trzaskowski, 2012).

As it was announced earlier, from the beginning of negotiations, Poland sought to ensure that non-eurozone countries, as observers without the right to vote, could participate in meetings of euro area summits. It was supposed to prevent the deepening of the divisions of the European Union (Forsal 2012) into „equal and more equal” states, which predicted the provisions of the pact. The issue of participation in

some of the summits, including countries outside the euro area, aroused the most disputes between Poland and France. According to France, the need to meet three different groups of European Union countries (27 Member States, countries of the fiscal pact – or euro plus, and euro zone countries) did not testify to the existence of several speeds of Europe, but with different levels of integration. From the very beginning, France has not been a particular advocate of the 2004 enlargement, since the inclusion of Scandinavian countries into the EU has significantly reduced its influence in the Community. There were even opinions saying that *„the most important decisions should be made in the group of euro countries, where there are no free market-oriented supporters of the single market orthodoxy and opponents of manual economic control and limited protectionism, or British, Scandinavian and brazen Poles”* (Trzaskowski, 2012). In turn, the French president asked about the course of negotiations with Poland in the share of non-euro zone countries in some summits on economic cooperation, said that they were very good and the compromise was finally reached (PAP, 2012).

The content of the treaty has been modified several times. After short but turbulent negotiations at the informal meeting of the European Council on 30 January 2012, its final shape was agreed<sup>7</sup>. As a result of pressure from Poland, the Treaty included the provision of art. 12 sec. 6, which allowed the participation of non-euro area countries in some of the eurozone summits (concerning competitiveness and changes in the architecture of the euroland). Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced after the summit that the compromise *„was not fully rewarding”* for his state, *„but it is enough rewarding”* and Poland will sign the Treaty (Deon, 2012). During the debate in the Sejm in November 2012, he stressed that the agreement will be effective in Poland only after the adoption of the euro, but by that time, the country wants to participate in the discussion on the euro *„in the middle of Europe, not outside of it”* (Newsweek, 2012).

The activities of the Polish government in creating a new economic institutional order in the EU can be described as *„adaptation to the initiatives of other countries, especially France and Germany”* (Szpak, 2012: s. 89). However, it should be noted that the Polish side criticized ideas that did not take into account the

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<sup>7</sup> On March 2, 2012, as an intergovernmental agreement, the Treaty was adopted by 25 Member States (except Great Britain and the Czech Republic - officially due to constitutional reasons).



interests of non-euro area Member States. This was related to the fear that closer cooperation within the eurozone could lead to a two-speed Europe and a structural differentiation of the influence and location of two groups of countries. Therefore, the idea of issuing common bonds by the euro zone met with the opposition of Prime Minister Tusk and Minister of Finance Rostowski, because they constituted a significant competition for their Polish counterparts. As Konrad Szpak points out, *„however, it is necessary to take into account the ignoring of the activities of the Polish presidency and the Polish minister of finance, as well as moving outside the treaty framework, especially by Germany, when proposing the so-called the new Stability Pact”* (Szpak, 2012: s. 89-90).

#### **4.5.1. The Procedure for Ratifying the Fiscal Pact**

The process of ratifying the fiscal treaty took place in the atmosphere of strong emotions and ambiguities in the majority of Member States. Also in Poland, its reception was the subject of an acute political dispute between the rulers and the opposition. The pact contributed, among others lack of precision in the application of legal concepts (Kaliszuk, 2012: s. 10-11).

From the beginning, controversy aroused by the way of ratifying the agreement. In March 2012, after the signing of the pact by the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, he announced the possibility of the so-called small ratification of it, in accordance with art. 89 of the Constitution (Newsweek, 2012) in the ordinary course (paragraph 1, if one of the premisses listed in the provision is met) or simplified (paragraph 2, which does not require Parliament's approval, and the Prime Minister merely notifies the Sejm of the intention to submit to the president a request for ratification) allowed by lawyers.

If this option turned out to be impossible, it would be necessary to apply the procedure under art. 90, according to which *„The Republic of Poland may, on the basis of an international agreement, delegate to an international organization or an international authority the competence of state authorities in certain matters”* and the consent to ratify such a contract *„shall be adopted by the Sejm by a majority of 2/3 of votes in the presence of at least half the statutory number of Deputies and by the Senate by a majority of 2/3 of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory*

*number of senators*”<sup>8</sup>. However, this option was not possible to implement without the consent of several MPs from the parliamentary opposition (PiS, SP). The government coalition, along with the SLD and the Palikot Movement, which were favorable to the agreement, did not have a large majority to be able to lead to the adoption of the Fiscal Treaty by this mode. However, this option was not possible to implement without the consent of several MPs from the parliamentary opposition (PiS, SP). The government coalition, along with the SLD and the Ruch Palikota, which were favorable to the agreement, did not have a large majority to be able to lead to the adoption of the Fiscal Treaty by this mode (Newsweek, 2012).

In the parliamentary debate on the fiscal pact, Prime Minister Tusk stressed that Poles feel responsible for the security of the whole of Europe, as evidenced by their nearly 50% support for the Pact. In turn, the minister of finance argued that participation in the pact would strengthen the country's position in the debates on the euro area and the entire Union. On the other hand, the PiS and SP deputies have strongly objected to the agreement from the beginning, accusing it of limiting the sovereignty of the state and the lack of justification for participation in it for Polish interests. It was stipulated that if the Pact is not adopted through the procedure of Article 90, ratification of this act would be treated as „*a decision that has never been taken*” (Gosc, 2012).

Finally, on February 20, 2013, the Sejm agreed to ratify the pact based on the provisions of art. 89 and out of 438 Members participating in the vote 282 were in favor of the Pact, 155 against and one abstained from voting (Cybruch, 2013). According to some lawyers, the Sejm voted on the law on the Pact in breach of the principles of the Constitution. As Andrzej Borodo remarks, there is a legal possibility for Poland to issue a statement (based on Article 14 (5) of the Treaty) regarding the adoption by the country of the fundamental provisions of the Treaty, regarding the budgetary pact (Title III of the Treaty) and economic policy coordination (Title IV) . In connection with this, there may be an element of transfer of powers of the budgetary authorities of the Republic of Poland (Sejm, Senate, President, Council of Ministers) to EU bodies, which in the understanding of the regulations of the fiscal compact and the provisions of the Constitution, was the justification for accepting

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<sup>8</sup> art. 90, Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Dz. U. z 1997 r. Nr 78, poz. 483, z 2001 r. Nr 28, poz. 319, z 2006 r. Nr 200, poz. 1471, z 2009 r., Nr 114, poz. 946.

ratification by the procedure from art. 90 (paragraph 1, 2 of the Polish Constitution) (Borodo, 2013: s. 18-19).

Cezary Mik is of a similar opinion. He notes that the fiscal treaty remains in a strict material and procedural relationship with the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, as evidenced, inter alia, by reference to the formula of compromise from art. 273 TFEU, which requires that the agreement forming the basis for the compromise was essentially related to the „*subject matter of the Treaties*” and without founding treaties could not practically work. Therefore, it can not be perceived as an independent legal instrument, but as an agreement falling within the framework of entrusting the European Union with competence by the Member States, including Poland, within the meaning of art. 90 of the Constitution (Mik, 2012: s. 100-101).

Another opinion is expressed by Mariusz Jabłoński. According to this lawyer, the application of art. 89 paragraph 1 is justified due to the subject of the contract referred to in point 5 „*matters regulated by law or in which the Constitution requires a law*”, and matter regulated in the fiscal treaty is undoubtedly matters that require regulation at the level of the Act. Fulfilling this requirement as one of those listed in art. 89 paragraph 1 of the Constitution entails the necessity to ratify the international agreement with the prior consent expressed in the Act in accordance with the procedure expressed in this provision (Jabłoński, 2012: s. 142-143).

However, according to the PiS, the adoption of the law on ratification by art. 89 was inconsistent with the Constitution, but to accept of the Pact pursuant to art. 90 there was no chance (Money.pl, 2012). The party has announced the submission of a complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal. Its president Jarosław Kaczyński disagreed with the statement of the Minister of Justice Jarosław Gowina (to which PiS filed for a constitutional position) that the adoption of the pact is in accordance with the law of Poland<sup>9</sup> (Gazeta.pl, 2013). After the vote on the ratification of the Pact, Kaczynski stated that: „*more than one-third [deputies] spoke against the [Pact], so from the point of view of the Polish constitution this result is invalid [...] And [...] if it would come to a change of government in Poland, we wouldd treat it non-est, that is, as a decision not taken, because these must be in accordance with the constitution*” (Money.pl, 2013). The PiS argued against the ratification process, that the pact

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<sup>9</sup> However, the minister's position was justified by the lack of legal education.

delegates some state powers (including budget supervision) to the external organization.

Finally, in March 2013, the party appealed to the Constitutional Tribunal both: the content of the fiscal pact and the procedure for the adoption of the ratification of it. It was considered that the provisions of the document break the essential elements of the Constitution, including Art. 219, (which talks about the mode and manner of adoption by the Sejm of the state budget in the form of the budget act) and art. 221 (according to which the legislative initiative regarding the budget act also belongs to the Sejm). The PiS pact unambiguously changes the competences of state authorities, leading to the transfer of these powers to the bodies of the European Union. According to the Polish Constitution, the Sejm is the only authority in Poland that has competences regarding the budget act. On the other hand, the pact transfers these competences to Union bodies, thus the state loses its power over its budget deficit (Radio Maryja, 2013).


In the judgment of June 2013, the Constitutional Tribunal stated that the law on the ratification of the fiscal pact was passed in accordance with the constitution, but the matter of delegation of powers of the authorities to an international organization will need to be examined in detail when Poland will decide to join the monetary union. Representatives of the applicants (Andrzej Duda and Krzysztof Szczerski) indicated that the competence would be transferred under the Pact. They did not, however, specify specifically what competences and for which organizations. On the other hand, representatives of the Sejm, the General Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that this would not happen and they referred to the judgments of constitutional courts of other Member States (Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Austria) in which the equivalents of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal stated that as a result of ratification by The state of the fiscal pact did not transfer the sovereign rights and competences of these states to other entities. The whole matter caused a lot of controversy as evidenced by a dissimilar opinion on the judgment of the 6 judges of the Tribunal.

#### **4.5.2 Opinions of the Polish Society on the Subject of the Fiscal Pact**

The surveyed Poles did not express an unequivocal opinion on the issue of the Pact, but the majority prevailed, which was in favor of signing it - 42%. The opposite

opinion was expressed by 35% of respondents, and almost a quarter (23%) had no opinion on this matter.


**DIAGRAM 8:** Support for the Fiscal Pact among Poles



Source: (CBOS, 2012: s. 7).

The signing of the Fiscal Pact was generally accepted by well-educated people, who were more interested in politics, making it easier for them to understand the essence of the problem. More often they were men (50%) than women (38%), and city dwellers rather than residents of rural and small- and medium-sized towns. Over half of people with leftist political views (53%) and almost half (45%) with right-wing views were in favor of adopting the pact. A clearer differentiation of approach can be seen among the supporters of individual parties. The supporters of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) were most sympathetic to it, while the majority were opposed by PiS and PSL voters. An interesting issue seems to be the approach of supporters of individual coalition government parties, namely PO and PSL, who presented two different positions.

**DIAGRAM 9:** Answer of potential electorates of political parties to the question: Poland intends to sign an agreement on the fiscal pact, but its provisions will apply to our country only after joining the euro area. Do you support the signing of this agreement by Poland, or are you opposed to it?




\* The SLD result should be interpreted with great caution, as only a small number of its supporters participated in the research.  
Source: (CBOS, 2012: s. 8).

Despite the financial crisis, the positive attitude of Poles towards the European Union has not changed. There have even been opinions that deepening integration would be a beneficial factor for the country (62%). Slightly fewer people (58%) agree with the opinion that deepening integration would be even more profitable for the largest countries (Germany, France). This opinion is not synonymous with the statement that Germany would be the dominant country in Europe, although a large part of the respondents (48%) are afraid of such a situation. Many people, therefore, strongly believe that integration is beneficial mainly for large EU Member States. Poles mostly disagree with the argument that integration in Europe has gone too far (51%). Another opinion is one-fourth of respondents (26%). Negative opinion on the excessive deepening of integration goes hand in hand with the level of income achieved (the lower income of respondents and the worse they assess their own material conditions, the stronger the conviction about excessive integration with the EU). Also, lower education of respondents (basic and fundamental) favors the emergence of doubts about the desired level of European


integration. Among the socio-professional groups, farmers, service workers and skilled workers are relatively more convinced of the far-fetched integration.

**DIAGRAM 10:** Deepening integration within the European Union is beneficial for Poland?



Source: own work.

**DIAGRAM 11:** The integration of the European Union has already gone too far ?




Source, own work.

Most Poles also do not share the fear that deepening European integration threatens the sovereignty of the Member States. 48% of respondents do not agree with this thesis. On the other hand, less than one-third (30%) are afraid of excessive delegation of their own state's competence to the EU bodies and thus threats to the independence of nation-states. The voters of the PiS share the strongest fears. The


electorate of this party is formed by identical groups of voters who agree and disagree with this opinion. However, the vast majority of SLD electorates and (to a lesser extent) PO supporters and the Ruch Palikota do not express such votes.

**DIAGRAM 12:** The Deepening of European integration threatens the sovereignty of the Member States of the Union ?



Source: own work, (CBOS, 2012: s. 11).

**DIAGRAM 13:** Opinion of potential electorates of individual parties on this subject, whether deepening European integration threatens the sovereignty of EU member states?



\* The SLD result should be interpreted with great caution, as only a small number of its supporters participated in the reaserch.  
Source: CBOS, 2012: s. 12.



According to CBOS analyzes, the acceptance of the fiscal pact by Poland is most strongly influenced by the conviction about the benefits of Poland's integration with the EU (Pearson's correlation coefficient = 0.50). Poles who agree with Poland's membership in the EU are also more often advocates of participation in the fiscal pact. On the other hand, opposition to joining the pact stems mainly from the conviction that deepening integration is a threat to Poland's sovereignty (-0,319) and that the integration process has gone too far (-0,313). Among the opponents of the pact, the opinion prevails that European integration is beneficial mainly for the largest EU states (Germany or France) and concerns about the domination of Germany in Europe (CBOS, 2012: s. 12).

#### **4.6. THE ATTITUDE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION STATES TOWARDS THE ISSUE OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE**

In the communication of the European Commission of March 2014, a new concept of climate and energy policy was presented. It was referred to as a so-called Project of the second climate and energy package. In line with the first objective of the document, a significant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is proposed (a reduction of 40% by 2030 compared to 1990). This change is therefore significant in relation to the standard currently in force, which set the level of 20% reduction by 2020. Another goal is the postulate to increase energy production from renewable sources to 27% of the total energy consumed by 2030. Also in this case a significant increase compared to the existing obligation reaching 20% of energy in 2020 from renewable sources (Turowski, 2014: s. 84).

The initiative of the Commission from the beginning supported most of the countries of Western Europe and Scandinavia. Justification of their favor may be found in the concepts of economic development adopted by these states and objective premises concerning the specificity of geographical location or access to energy resources. For example, due to windy natural conditions and high insolation, the countries of the Iberian Peninsula and southern Europe prefer solar and wind energy. In turn, being the world leader in nuclear energy France, it is to supplement the energy balance with renewable sources. Due to the specificity of energy supplies, the supporters of the package were also Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Austria.

The new Member States from Central Europe and the Balkans have a different attitude towards climate and energy policies. They did not experience the negative effects of the oil crisis in the 1970s, which was a strong impulse for the development of renewable energy in Western European countries. New EU countries use coal fuel with significant deposits on their territory, as well as nuclear power, to a much greater extent. Therefore, they carefully approached the proposed changes, fearing high potential costs of changing the structure of energy generation sources. A critical position on the European Commission's proposal was again expressed by Poland. The proposals of the second energy package are particularly severe for the national economy, due to the use of coal fuel in the energy sector, which is incomparable with other EU countries (Turowski, 2014: s. 86-87).

#### **4.6.1. Energy and Climate Package and its consequences for Poland**

During the following years of Poland's membership in the EU, the attitude towards the European Commission has been gradually evolving from full (almost unconditional support) to the point of contesting the proposals and activities of this institution. The dispute between the EC and Poland has become more visible since 2008. The EU's climate agenda, the functioning of the emissions trading system and ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets have become the problems of mutual relations. In the initial period, climate policy was supposed to fill the gap after the rejection of the constitutional treaty and define a new mission of the European Union in global politics. This confirmed, among others meeting of J. M. Barroso with the European spiritual leaders in 2009, which was aimed at raising the climate issue.

Initially, Poland adopted the objectives of the energy and climate package. Over time, however, this problem has repeatedly been the subject of an acute domestic political dispute. Poland became the main skeptic in the matter of the legitimacy of achieving the objectives of the Pact, reporting, among others, veto on higher reduction targets. Objections of the Polish side concerned not only the pact itself, but also the objectivity and transparency of the European Commission regarding this problem. In January 2014, after the institution presented the second energy and climate pact, which contained reduction targets until 2030, Poland was unsuccessfully demanding the assessment of implementation costs by country. It was

decided that the anticipated effects of the introduced regulations should not be made at the EU level, and divided into the burden borne by individual countries (so that it would be easier to reach the expected agreement). Previously, the methodology of the econometric model was questioned, based on which the EC based its calculations (Świeboda, 2014: s. 53).

Poland pointed out that the work of the European Commission is being carried out in a hurry, and that a wider discussion on the subject of new EU policy is not welcome (which could have been caused by the EU electoral calendar). There are no compensatory mechanisms for those countries that will have to bear higher costs. Moreover, Polish opposition to the adoption of new emission reduction targets, the position of the industry in this matter and the lack of acceptance for backloading and changes in the allowance trading system have been ignored (Tokarski, 2014: s. 3). Although climate policy for Poland is of particular interest due to its implications for energy prices and energy security, the position convergent with its own economic interest has often been found in many areas, often at the expense of violating Community law.

#### **4.6.2. The results of negotiations in the expert opinion**

Arrangements and objectives regarding the fight against climate change began at the European Council summit in March 2007. The Polish delegation with President Lech Kaczynski accepted the solutions that were the basis for negotiation and development of the climate and energy package by the European Commission. Adopted in 2008 at the EU summit, the energy and climate package is a regional initiative, the essence of which was to quickly take effective action against climate change. The main changes resulting from its adoption concerned the achievement by 2020 by all EU countries of objectives including: reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 20% compared to the level of emissions from 1990; increasing the share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the structure of primary energy sources to 20%; increasing energy efficiency by 20% by 2020.

The adoption of the package by the Community resulted in a number of consequences for the Polish economy, because the energy sector of the state was based mainly on coal-fired power plants emitting the most CO<sub>2</sub> from all types of power plants. In 2006, almost 91% of energy was produced in this type of mines in

Poland, compared to 3,3% obtained from renewed energy sources. Therefore, in order to meet the recommendations of the European Commission, energy companies have been obliged to carry out investments aimed at modernizing the power plant and increasing renewable energy sources in the overall energy balance (Kowalke and Prochownik, 2014: s. 229).

According to the Energy Market Agency (ARE), hard coal and lignite in 2012 accounted for 85,5% of generation sources used in the production of electricity. In 2008, this percentage accounted for 89,5%. Therefore, there has been a decrease of 4% in the significance of these energy sources over 4 years, mainly for the benefit of biomass and biogas as well as renewable energy sources (ie water and wind power). Prepared for the Ministry of Economy as part of the „Poland's Energy Policy until 2030”, the ARE forecast assumes that by 2030 this structure (mainly due to Poland's adaptation to the requirements of the energy and climate package) should change significantly. An increase of 23% in the share of renewable energy was planned (7% in 2011) and a decrease to 35% in the share of hard coal (61% in 2011) as a source of electricity generation (Kowalke and Prochownik, 2014: s. 236).

In line with the provisions of the climate and energy package, all EU countries have committed to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 20% by 2020. Poland agreed to the need to reduce CO<sub>2</sub>, however, a number of detailed provisions were opposed, which, according to government experts, meant a rise in electricity prices (even 50-60%). The European Commission's proposals, according to the Polish side, did not take into account the specifics of individual Member States and pose a threat to less developed economies (TG.pl, 2018).

According to Bolesław Jankowski, in the opinion of representatives of the Polish government, negotiations during the EU summit of December 11-12, 2008 on the Energy and Climate Package brought extraordinary success to the state, and the main elements of this success were: PLN 60 billion negotiated that Poland will receive in under the so-called the solidarity mechanism in the period 2013-2020 and the gradual introduction of the obligation to fully purchase allowances at auctions by professional power plants in the period 2013-2020 (instead of full auctioning from 2013).

The data presented shortly after the negotiations indicated PLN 60 billion of additional revenues for Poland from the solidarity mechanism. The author notes that

during negotiations only a small part of this amount is the real success of the Polish government (supported in this respect by the majority of new member states). In fact, PLN 60 million came from the redistribution mechanism, which was already established in January 2008. In addition, this sum was calculated at a higher price of emission allowances than in previous EC calculations (over 50 euros / tons) and probably with a higher volume of benefits (structure calculations presented by the Ministry of Economy suggests that the benefits of the solidarity mechanism calculated in millions of additional allowances have been overestimated by approx. 25%, among others due to the adoption of issue needs at the level of 164,3 million tonnes in 2020, instead of the emission forecasted by the European Commission 171,4 million tons). The real effect of the negotiations was therefore an additional annual allocation for Poland of about 6 million t, counting for 100% auctioning conditions in 2020. However, the actual increase in allowances in 2013-2020 will be lower. This was due to the partial free allocation, which can actually be estimated at 4-5 million tons / a value of 160 - 200 million euro (at 39 euros / tons adopted for comparability with the results of Report 2030), which over a period of eight years gives 1,2 – 1,6 billion euros (about 620 - 780 million PLN), and in the whole period about 5 – 6,2 billion PLN). The amount of PLN 60 million is also a significant amount in absolute terms, but in reality a small amount compared to the direct costs of the implementation of the Package. Only in the power industry they constitute 8-12 billion zlotys annually in the years 2020-2030. Also in relation to the scale of energy investment needs, this is a small amount. One can build for it about 1000 MW coal-fired power plant, but only about 400 MW in a nuclear power plant. It is extremely important because it was estimated that modernization of the Polish power industry requires building 800-1000 MW annually for many subsequent years (Jankowski, ty: s. 3).

In the proposed solutions of the European Commission, 90% of allowances were to be transferred to individual countries in proportion to emissions from the EU ETS system in 2005 (2005-2007) and 10% separated using criteria taking into account the level of economic development. The change resulting from the negotiations at the EU summit in December 2008 is that the base allocation covers not 90% and 88%. In turn, the released 2% allowances were allocated with regard to earlier emission reductions and Poland received 27% of this additional pool as a

result (Jankowski, ty: s. 1). In the limits of CO2 emission allowances announced by the EC in 2008-2012, Poland obtained 208 million tonnes from 284,6 billion tonnes, which was requested (TG, 2018).

In negotiations with the EC, the Polish postulate of applying the indicator-auction method has also completely disappeared. Because it was not possible to avoid the implementation of full auctioning. In turn the authorized method of its application deprives it of the key advantages resulting from the granting of rights to the actual production. This was not the only point of failure of the Polish negotiators. Also Polish attempts to introduce price control mechanisms for emission rights have not been welcomed (Jankowski, ty: s. 8).

The final content of the Package from the Polish perspective was assessed as a failure. It is mainly about these provisions, which are included in the part concerning the EU ETS system. Potential transfers are uncertain about the real amount and high direct costs of implementation can only partially offset. However, the restrictions imposed on the possibility of applying a free allocation of allowances for existing power plants raise doubts as to the possibility of avoiding a surge in electricity prices after 2013. However, the most likely consequences of actions after 2020 may lead to the deprivation of Poland control over the entire auction revenues (Jankowski, ty: s. 8).

*It seems important to quote Bolesław Jankowski, who „does not negate the efforts of Polish negotiators at the EU summit. [In his view] they may have obtained the maximum of what was obtainable under the adopted negotiating position of the highest state authorities. This position showed the pursuit of political consensus and the lack of readiness to veto the Package, in the case of unfavorable arrangements for Poland. Such a priori assumption, unfortunately, did not translate into an improvement of Poland's negotiating position. However, the overall assessment of the results of the Package for Poland is definitely negative and on this basis it is difficult to positively assess the entirety of Polish actions in this matter. One can have doubts whether the work of Polish government negotiators was sufficiently supported by appropriate teams of technical experts and specialists from EU law at all stages of the talks. The package in the form agreed at the EU summit is a sign of disregarding the long-term view of Poland's development prospects, or the inability to defend our country's interest on the EU forum. The accumulation of threats from*

*the Package after 2020 is clearly visible, and yet a number of social and economic problems, eg the problem of an aging population and increasing pension burdens, will also grow over time. In the author's opinion, the agreed package is also a failure of the entire EU and it is definitely critical to assess the actions of the European Commission and member states that have pushed for its adoption in the form similar to the EC proposal” (Jankowski, ty: s. 8).*

#### **4.6.3. The Assessment of the Effects of the Package and the Dispute over Responsibility for the Adopted Solutions**

In June 2013, the PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński called for the rejection of the climate package during the convention of his party in Sosnowiec (PAP, 2013). In his opinion, *„Polish power industry must be in Polish hands, under Polish control”*. In addition, it must be based on coal, which in reality means rejection of the package. How it assesses *„The EU has not been created to disturb countries that are catching up with historic backwardness, and this pact interferes with”* (PAP, 2013: s. 2).

On the same day at the PO meeting, Donald Tusk argued that Kaczyński's team agreed on a climate-energy package in the most dangerous version for Poland (agreeing with Angela Merkel) in exchange for concessions in the form of a compromise from Joanina (negotiated in new entries) how to make decisions in the Council). Kaczyński once again responded to these words, recognizing that *„Tusk inflicted a terrible blow on [the Polish] economy, agreeing to a climate package”*. This, in turn, stated that for many months his team had to work to repair the mistake made by their predecessors, who agreed to the European legal changes regarding energy and climate. He also quoted a fragment of the statement of President Lech Kaczyński, who in one of the interviews informed that he agreed to a climate policy that is risky from the point of view of Poland, thus making a gesture towards Angela Merkel (Deon, 2013). It was exactly about the quote from *„Dziennik”* from 2008: *„My policy gave results, but many did not like it. [...]what we did it was in our interest. But really, was not it in solidarity of the EU? After all, I agreed, for example, for climate policy from a Poland's point of view, risky. This was my gesture towards Chancellor Angela Merkel. Unfortunately, we could not always expect on similar gestures for us”* (Bielecki, 2013).

Jarosław Kaczyński to the question, whether his brother Lech Kaczyński, being the president, had an influence on the negotiations of the pact, he replied: *„Regarding the phase in which Donald Tusk has inflicted a very heavy blow on the Polish economy without vetoing this package. And what's more, by announcing in advance that he will not veto it, and so take all arguments from the Polish negotiators, this is my [...] brother did not have anything to do with it. [Moreover] the attempt to relinquish responsibility is, besides, completely untrue, it is not very nice”* (Money.pl, 2013). He added: *„the decision was taken by Donald Tusk, who said that the veto is an atomic bomb and he will not use this atomic bomb. Therefore, everything that is happening today in connection with the climate package is the personal responsibility of Donald Tusk”*.

Tusk judged these words as lying and very brutal. In his statements, he stressed that the possibility of vetoing the provisions existed only in March 2007, when the Kaczyński brothers decided at the EU summit. After the parties took over the government, the climate package could no longer be vetoed, which resulted from the decision-making procedure in the Council.

As noted by Krzysztof Szczerski in an interview in 2013, comparing the provisions of the climate and energy package from 2007 (which the Tusk government received for further negotiations) to that adopted in 2008, the former was a „safe package”, flexible, developmental, temporary and conditional. He assumed that each Member State would be able to identify individually for the needs of its own economy the element that it puts into the package. It was to be a transitional package and be in force until a comprehensive agreement on the reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions after 2012 was established (Poland organized a climatic summit in Poznań, which would have an impact on its shape). In the opinion of the PiS deputy, Tusk committed numerous mistakes, including expressed his consent for a bad base year, led to the disaster of the climate conference in Poznań and agreed to the „independence” of climate policy through the creation of a separate climate commissioner (Wp.pl, 2013).

It should be noted that decisions regarding the adoption of the package were made during the PO-PSL rule. The document that set out its framework was the Commission's communication of 23 January 2008 addressed to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the



Committee of the Regions. It was recognized that 2007 was a turning point for the EU in the field of energy policy and the fight against climate change, and the Community has become a global leader in the fight against climate change and the principles of sustainable development. This communication discusses the areas of operation, which are further described in subsequent documents. For almost a year, these documents were analyzed and their final content was discussed. Some provisions have been disadvantageous for individual Member States, which is why they have in the meantime negotiated their change with the European Commission. On December 11-12, 2008, during the EU summit, the negotiations ended finally and a few days later (December 17, 2008). European Parliament<sup>10</sup> approved the climate and energy pact (Milek, 2009: s. 22).

The question remains, however, why the negotiations of the package were negotiated in the following months and after the change of government in Poland, as Prime Minister Tusk claimed, the changes unfavorable for Poland in March 2007 could no longer take place? Tusk blamed political opponents for negotiating unfavorable arrangements for Poland, in exchange for concessions regarding the system of changing the vote in the Council. Is it right? In March 2007, under the PiS, Poland proposed a new solution for voting in the Council, in the form of a square root system. However, the matter was only discussed in the following months, and the compromise and acceptance of the application of the safety brake based on the mechanism from Joannina took place only in June 2007. Such a sequence of events disproves Tusk's argument regarding the PiS government's support for the future package in March 2007. in exchange for a compromise regarding voting in the Council and no possibility of any changes.

Indeed, the findings regarding the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions were taken and adopted by President Kaczyński in March 2007. This is even mentioned in the provisions of the directive of 23 April 2009 amending the improvements and enlargements of the Community greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme. It confirmed that already in March 2007, the European Council committed to reduce, by 2020, total greenhouse gas emissions in the Community by at least 20% below 1990 levels. However, as the favorable government of PO „Gazeta Wyborcza” emphasizes, *„it is clear that there was no way to block the strategy of fighting CO2*

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<sup>10</sup> All EU documents on climate and energy policy were subject to co-decision procedure

*emissions, but it was in Poland's interest to win clauses that would better protect the interests of countries with a lower level of economic development from the West and coal-based energy” (Bielecki, 2013), what during the negotiations in the following months the government of Tusk did not do, or did it to an unsatisfactory extent.*

Some Polish EU experts assessed that in 2007, every authority in Poland would agree to such findings of the climate summit. [Poland was] then a very young member of the EU, unprepared in the EU competition and with a weak position in Brussels, resulting from from a short EU internship. And as one of the Polish diplomats unrelated to the Law and Justice party added: *„Everyone could be dodged [in this situation]. On the other hand, a quick fight against global warming was then the flagship goal of the Union [and] it would be extremely difficult to break out., by one of the Member States (Bielecki, 2013).*

#### **4.7. DISPUTE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

After the PiS government took power in Poland, relations with the European Union were significantly cooled. EU institutions have reported a number of reservations regarding the activities of the Polish government since 2016. The most important conflict concerned the issue of rule of law control in the country. In January 2016, before the Polish Sejm repealed the law on the Supreme Court and the National Council of the Judiciary, the European Commission launched its first activities in this matter. The reason for this was the changes taking place in the Constitutional Tribunal. It was more about amending the law on this body and canceling the selection of five judges of its composition and choosing five new members in their place. The European Commission carried out an assessment of the legal status in Poland, and the Polish government responded to its findings. The unsatisfactory response from the Polish government forced the Commission to take the next steps. The first recommendation regarding the case of the Constitutional Tribunal was sent by the EC in July 2016. The proceedings of this institution were carried out in parallel with the activities of other EU bodies involved in this matter. The position of the European Parliament expressed in the adopted resolutions was identical to the Commission's proceedings<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Own opinions were also formulated by the Venice Commission, which was invited by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Witold Waszczykowski, to the country.

The Polish side partially adapted to the recommendations of the European Commission. For example, PiS proposed decision-making procedures in the Court by a majority of two-thirds of the adjudication panel, or the absolute consideration of cases according to the order of influence. However, the Court's judgments of 2016 have not been published. It happened only after two years, with the annotation that they concerned acts that had lost their legal force. In turn, two judges who, in the opinion of the European Commission (but also the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe) were elected in accordance with the law, were not sworn in (Dziennik.pl, 2018).

In July 2017, i.e. during the dispute between Poland and the EC, the Sejm passed the law on the National Council of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court and the system of common courts. Despite the fact that the first two acts were vetoed by the President of Poland, the EU procedure on the Constitutional Tribunal also included them. The European Commission has issued four recommendations on the rule of law in Poland four times. In two cases, they also contained instructions on court decisions. In December 2017, due to further differences of opinion and disagreement after subsequent talks, for the first time in history the European Commission and the European Parliament decided to initiate the procedure provided for in Art. 7 par. 1 of the Treaty on European Union (the so-called atomic option), the purpose of which is to establish the existence of a clear risk of a serious violation of European values by a Member State (Dziennik.pl, 2018).

It was predicted that the next steps of the European Commission, although precedential and quite spectacular, would not bring a concrete result for two main reasons. First of all, the end of the risk-finding procedure requires the consent of 4/5 Member States at the European Council and 2/3 of votes in the European Parliament. In turn, unanimity is required for possible sanctions (ie depriving Poland of the right to vote). Hungary has already expressed its support for Poland initially, and it is possible that other Member States would also be against suspension, for fear that in the future EU institutions would follow the same procedure against them. Secondly, 2019 are scheduled for next elections to the European Parliament, which would select the new Commission. If predictions of the increase in support for eurosceptic parties and euro-realistic one prove themselves, it is not excluded that they would

cease to be interested in the continuation of activities towards the Polish state (Dziennik.pl 2018).

The rule of law control was not the only instrument used by the European Commission on the reforms of the Polish judiciary. Another procedure was the possibility to initiate infringement proceedings. The Commission first calls on the Member State to address the weaknesses and then, after receiving the answer, may issue a so-called reasoned opinion. After passing these stages, the Commission may refer the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union, which imposes financial penalties or calls for a change of law in the Member State. In this way, actions were taken in July 2017 on the Act on the System of Common Courts. It has gone through all the stages, including the transfer to the CJEU. A year later, similar actions were initiated to the Act on the Supreme Court. Polish judicial decisions have also been the subject of preliminary ruling to the CJEU, which have been submitted by the judges of the Polish Supreme Court. They concerned the retired retirement at the age of 65.

Regarding the assessment of the Polish rule of law by the EU institutions, the judgment of the EU Court of Justice of July 25, 2018 was also relevant. This judgment concerned doubts that were raised by the court in Ireland. The judge of the local court did not want to pass on to the Polish judiciary, a Polish citizen accused of drug trafficking, because of doubts about the independence of Polish judges. In response to an inquiry, the CJEU said that the European Arrest Warrant may not be applied if there is a real threat to the fairness of the trial in the country to which it is sent to be suspected of committing a crime, but on the other hand each case must be considered individually and requires detailed analysis. This ruling was recognized by the Ministry of Justice as the success of the Polish side. However, in the opinion of the opposition, this was another proof that the rule of law in Poland was violated (Dziennik.pl, 2018). As early as in September 2018, PiS politicians assured that the government would not withdraw from the judicial reform – „PiS is determined to bring the reform of the justice system to an end. The justice system needs to be repaired” - assured Krzysztof Szczerski (Polityce.pl (2018).

In November 2018, the Sejm adopted the seventh amendment of the Act on the Supreme Court, through which previously retired judges could return to work. According to PiS politicians, „it was necessary to fulfill the security ordered by the

*Court of Justice of the EU*” and not to pay penalties. The new media law defined the turn in the Polish dispute with the EC, because it resolved the main point of contention. According to RP.pl, the complaint of the European Commission filed against Poland to the Court of Justice was irrelevant. Its withdrawal, however, was not an obvious matter, and one of the reasons for this was the lack of confidence of Timmermans and other EU officials to Poland, which „repeatedly failed the EC” (RP.pl, 2018). PiS politicians accused the CJEU of lacking objectivity. The head of the Standing Committee of the Council of Ministers Jacek Sasin, argued that the decisions of this institution are of a political nature. In his opinion, „the Tribunal, instead of upholding the rule of law in the EU, conducts an open political fight with the Polish government, setting Poland as the „paria of Europe „to which” nothing is allowed” (Majmurek, 2018).

In the matter of the rule of law in Poland, the Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans spoke many times. In February 2019, in his statements, he expressed concern over the disciplinary proceedings that were brought against the judges asking the questions for the EU tribunal in Luxembourg. Information on this subject was provided by to the ministers for European affairs of the Member States as part of the procedure for Poland in the framework of art. 7. He also confirmed the readiness to initiate all possible measures to defend the independence of Polish judges if this is threatened (Osiecki, 2018).

As reported by Polish public media among European Commissioners, there were differences of tasks regarding the problem of the judiciary in Poland. Other opinions on the resolution of the dispute with Poland were expressed by the chairman Jean-Claude Juncker, according to whom it was necessary to seek agreement. On the other hand, the deputy head of the European Commission, Fran Timmermans, wanted to „punish Poland with the withdrawal of a voice or subsidy at all costs” (TVPinfo, 2018).


Timmermans, whose attitude towards Poland raises numerous controversies, also took part in the debate (before the elections to the European Parliament) with the new leftist political force Wiosna of Robert Biedron, and then met with the SLD authorities. In this way, seeking the allies for his own candidacy as the head of the EC, among the parties that are potential members of his political faction in the EP, namely Socialists and Democrats (Nowiński, 2019).

The fact is that no consequences on the part of the European Commission and other EU institutions, or even attention towards Poland were addressed when, after losing the presidential election in 2015 (which was won by the PiS candidate, Andrzej Duda, not the incumbent Bronisław Komorowski) and just before the parliamentary elections, the PO-PSL government in a quick procedure, changed the law regarding the Constitutional Tribunal. The changes assumed, among others the issue of filling posts at the Tribunal, which PiS politicians assessed as „a *political movement that would allow the PO to fill the members of the Tribunal*” (shortly before the end of the term of five of its members) (Majewska, 2019).

#### 4.7.1. Survey among Poles: Who is responsible for the lack of agreement between the Polish government and the European Commission?

After the meeting of the European Commission and the Polish government, IBRIS asked respondents, „who was guilty of disagreement over the rule of law dispute? (study June 20-21, 2018). In the opinion of nearly 48% of respondents, it was the fault of the government, and more than half of the respondents (21%) said that responsible for this situation was the European Commission. According to 24% of Poles surveyed, the responsibility for this state of affairs is shared by the Polish government and the European Commission (IBRIS, 2018).

**DIAGRAM 14:** Who is responsible for the lack of agreement between the Polish government and the European Commission ?



Source: own work.

The Polish government was charged with the greatest responsibility (57%) for the existing situation among the youngest group of respondents aged 18-29. This group has the most unambiguous view in assessing the situation. Also in this group, the highest percentage were respondents who blamed both parties for disagreement (37%). In turn, the largest group burdened for the entire situation of the European Commission were fifty-year-olds (37%). Researchers also checked the opinion on the situation among the beneficiaries of the flagship government program 500+. It turned out that as many as 61% of the surveyed beneficiaries were charged by the government for the whole situation. This was a 16% higher share than in the non-beneficiaries (45%). Therefore, it can be said that government assistance programs do not affect the support of government decisions towards the European Union.

#### 4.8. OPINIONS OF THE POLISH SOCIETY IN THE MATTER OF POLAND'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

According to CBOS surveys, Poles not only generally accept Poland's membership in the European Union, but also more and more often declare their support for deepening European integration. This tendency, according to researchers, can be interpreted a fear resulting from the policy of the PiS government, which is perceived by part of Polish society as a policy of isolation in the EU. Nevertheless, despite the growth of pro-EU moods, the protection of state sovereignty remains a more important value for Poles than ensuring the effectiveness of the Union as a whole.

The attitude of Poles to membership is still very positive. In 2017, as many as 88% of adult Poles were supporters of membership, and just 9% of Poles was opposed to EU membership.

**TABLE 33:** The attitude of Poles to Poland's membership in the EU

The attitude of Poles to Poland's membership in the EU	Indications of respondents according to the study date																		
	2014				2015				2016				2017				2018		
	IV	VI	IX	X	IV	IX	X	XI	II	V	VII	X	II	IV	VI	XII	I	IV	XI
	In %																		
Supporters	86	84	85	84	84	81	86	84	81	83	84	84	85	88	88	85	87	88	87
Opponents	9	10	10	11	10	13	10	10	10	9	11	10	10	8	9	8	10	8	7

Undecideds	4	6	5	5	6	6	4	6	9	8	5	6	5	4	3	7	3	4	6
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Source: (CBOS, 2017).

Proponents of membership dominate in all socio-demographic groups and electorates of all political parties that enjoy the most support.

**TABLE34:** Study from 2017

Potential electorates*	Support of membership in the European Union		
	Supporters	Opponents	Undecideds
	In %		
PO	99	1	0
PiS (with SP and PR)	84	14	2
Kukiz 15	84	14	2

\* Specified on the basis of the voting declaration in possible parliamentary elections

**TABLE 35:** Study from 2018


Potential electorates*	Support of membership in the European Union		
	Supporters	Opponents	Undecideds
	In %		
SLD	100	0	0
PO	97	2	1
PSL	92	8	0
PiS (with SP and PR)	87	9	4
Kukiz 15	87	12	1

Source: (CBOS, 2017).

Poles are also the most pro-European nation among all the Visegrad Group countries. They most often and most strongly support the membership of their country in the European Union (88% in total, 52% definitely), which is a better result than in the case of other member states. Although the majority of the respondents from other countries in the region support the presence in the EU: Hungarians (82%), Slovaks (74%) and Czechs (56%), however, among the Poles, the strongest support is dominating.



**DIAGRAM 15:** Do you personally support the membership of Poland [Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia] in the European Union or are you opposed to it?




Source, own work.

CBOS research, carried out for many years, have shown that the need for Poland's presence in the EU has never been questioned in Polish society. Only the issue of the development of European integration aroused controversy. The crisis in the Eurozone contributed to the decline in favor for deepening integration in 2009-2013. At that time, there were more and more votes that the unification of Europe had gone too far. In 2009, 48% of surveyed Poles were in favor of closer integration, but their percentage decreased in the following years (38% - 2012).

Due to the events that took place in Ukraine in 2014, and with the increase in the security threat from Russia, this trend began to turn back. During the PiS government (from 2015), support for deepening integration is systematically growing. In 2018, almost half of the respondents (45%) believed that Europe should unite even more, and the belief about too far-reaching integration was expressed by slightly more than one-fifth of respondents (21%). Although, since April 2017, the percentage of people convinced that the unification of Europe has already gone too far (by 3%) has decreased and is currently the lowest since 2009, so from the time when CBOS asked about this issue, it also decreased a bit percentage of advocates of


developing integration (by 3%) (in this period, the respondents came, expressing an ambivalent opinion on this issue (by 5%).

**DIAGRAM 16:** Opinions on deepening European integration in 2009-2018



Source: own work, (CBOS, 2018)

**DIAGRAM 17:** Answers of the respondents to the question: „opinions appear about the functioning of Europe of two or even several speeds, about countries that work more closely together and those that are more interconnected. What is in Poland's interest ?:



Source: own work.

The category of socio-demographic, which diversifies the Poles' attitude towards European integration the most is age. The most pro-integration group are people over 55, of whom more than half are in favor of further development of integration. However, opinion on this issue is determined mainly by political orientation. Two-thirds of those surveyed who support integration identify themselves with the left (66%), half (50%) with the center, and almost two-fifths (37%) with the right. Among the right-wing sympathizers, quite a large group (31%) sums up the opinion that integration has gone too far. This view is particularly often accorded to the most religious Poles (practicing several times a week) (35%). In the electorates of particular parties, integration enjoys the greatest support from the declared voters of PO and SLD. In the face of the development of European integration, voters of PiS and Kukiz'15 are the least restrained. However, also in these groups the postulate of further uniting of Europe prevails.

**TABLE 36:** Reaserch from 2018

Potential electorates	Some believe that Europe should unite even more. Others think that the unification of Europe has already gone too far. And what is your opinion?			
	Europe should unite even more	Ambivalent opinion	The unification of Europe has already gone too far	Hard to say
	In %			
SLD	72	4	21	4
PO	65	23	7	5
PSL	44	40	13	3
PiS (with SP and PR)	38	25	27	10
Kukiz 15	45	14	33	8

Source: own work.

Proponents of closer cooperation between Poland and the European Union prevail in almost all socio-demographic categories analyzed by CBOS. Most often,

Poland's affiliation to the so-called Europe's "hard core" is being postulated by people with higher socio-economic status: respondents with higher education (72%), respondents with monthly per capita income 2000 PLN and more (71%), managerial staff and specialists (71%) as well as medium staff and technicians (71%). In turn, the group of the biggest proponents of looser cooperation within the EU is mainly farmers (42%), then the youngest respondents (18-24 years) (36%), respondents with the lowest incomes per family member (PLN 649) (35%) and pensioners (36%).

The conviction that it is in the interest of the state to belong to a group of states that cooperate with each other, rather than remain in the group of states with looser connections, more often express persons identifying themselves with the left (71%) than with the right (55%). The potential PO electorate is in the majority of cases the closest cooperation within the EU. On this issue, voters PiS and Kukiz 15 are less unanimous. However, while the PiS electorate is dominated by advocates of deepening integration, both options have essentially the same support among voters of Kukiz 15.

**TABLE 37:** Research from 2017

Potential electorates	It is often said that there are two or even several speeds in Europe, countries that work more closely together and those that are more interconnected. Is it in Poland's interest to:			
	belonging to a group of states cooperating as closely as possible	belonging to states that cooperate more loosely with each other	leaving the EU	Hard to say
	In %			
PO	82	13	0	5
PiS (with SP and PR)	51	29	8	12
Kukiz 15	40	41	9	10

Source: own work.

Despite the growing support for deepening integration, the majority of Poles still consider it more important to protect the independence of the Member States (43%) than ensuring that the entire Union is capable of operating (34%).

**TABLE 38:** The Reaserch from 2018

	What, in your opinion, is now more important:		
	To protecting the independence of EU Member States, even at the expense of reducing the EU's ability to act as a whole	To ensuring the EU's ability to act, even at the expense of restricting the independence of the Member States of the Union	Hard to say
	In %		
IV 2017	43	31	26
VI 2017	43	34	23

Source: own work.

In this matter, opinions differ mainly in political orientation. While respondents who identify with the right wing more often than average emphasize the importance of state sovereignty (58%), the leftist viewers put the EU's ability to act to protect the independence of the state (49% against 35%). This is a matter clearly dividing the electorates. For PO supporters, the main problem is the efficiency of EU action, the PiS voters and the Kukuz 15 movement, they attach greater importance to the protection of the independence of the Member States.


**TABLE 39:** The Reaserch from 2018 (political partie's electorate)

	What, in your opinion, is now more important:		
	To ensuring the EU's ability to act, even at the expense of restricting the independence of the Member States of the Union	To protecting the independence of EU Member States, even at the expense of reducing the EU's ability to act as a whole	Hard to say
	In %		
PO	64	24	12
PiS	22	57	21
Kukiz'15	16	74	10

Source: own work.

The unsuccessful attempt by the Polish government to block Donald Tusk's reelection to the position of the president of the European Council (in March 2017) intensified the conviction among Poles that their country does not have sufficient influence on the decisions and actions of the European Union. The feeling of insufficient influence of Poland on EU policy weakened in the following months, however, still the majority of respondents still share it (66% of VI 2017, from April a fall of 7 percentage points).

**DIAGRAM 18:** Which statement do you agree with?



Source: own work.

In all socio-demographic groups and electorates, the opinion prevails about too little influence of Poland on EU decisions and actions. The feeling of insufficient influence of Poland on EU affairs is particularly often observed by the most religious people who participate in religious practices several times a week (77%, and only 8% perceive it as sufficient). The respondents identifying themselves with the left (38%) are relatively the most satisfied with the impact of Poland on EU decisions and actions. Fairly clear discrepancies are visible in potential electorates. While the prevailing view among PiS voters and supporters of Kukiz15 that Poland does not have enough influence on EU decisions and activities, a significant part of the PO's electorate is of the opposite opinion.


**TABLE 40:** Which of the statements do you agree with? (electorate of political parties)

	Which of the statements do you agree with?		
	Poland's influence on EU decisions and activities is sufficient	Poland does not have sufficient influence on EU decisions and activities	Hard to say
	In %		
PO	44	49	7
PiS	19	73	8
Kukiz'15	14	86	0

Source: own work.

According to the IBRIS study of 2018, Poles maintain a very positive attitude towards the European Union. The EU assesses definitely well 53% of respondents, and another 32,5% rather good. The opposite sentence declares a total of less than 13 percent of respondents.

**DIAGRAM 19:** What is your attitude to the European Union?



Source: own work.

The SLD voters declare the most positive attitude towards the European Union (88% definitely well-adjusted, 9% rather good). A high level of support for the organization is also declared by PO voters (81% definitely positive, 19% rather positive). Among the elections of the PiS, support for the EU is lower (17% definitely positively evaluates the EU, and almost half rather positive, while 28% of the party's electorate respondents believe that the Union is nothing good). The electorate of the party Wolność is the most unfavorable towards the Union (as many

as 34% consider the EU as no good). On this basis, it can be concluded that the more right-wing views confessed by the respondents, the support for the European Union decreases. According to the IBRIS research, eight out of ten definitely left-wing respondents express a very good opinion about the EU, and only 2% have a negative approach in this regard. On the other hand, in the case of people with definitely right-wing views, this ratio is 57% to 37%. Thus, nearly six out of ten respondents with right-wing views are of the opinion that the European Union is a good creation.

In the study of the attitude to the European Union, the religiousness of the respondents is an important issue. Non-believers and non-practitioners express a positive attitude towards the organization (over 90% of respondents in this group have a positive opinion, of which 76% are definitely positive). In the case of believers and those who do not reduce decent percentage, this is already lower and amounts to 64% (94% in total), as well as among believers and irregularly practicing 51% (82% in total). The smallest level of strong sympathy for the EU is shown by a group of believers and practicing respondents regularly (46%) (in total, 83% of respondents express positive opinions in this group).

**TABLE 41:** Religiosity and a positive attitude towards the EU


The Group	The attitude is definitely positive	The attitude is rather positive	The positive attitude (in Total)
Unbelieving and non-practicing	76%	14%	90%
Believers and non-practicing	64%	30%	94%
Believer and practicing irregularly	51%	31%	82%
Believer and practitioner regularly	46%	37%	83%

Source, own work, (IBRIS, 2018).



Nearly 88% of respondents would be in favor of Poland remaining in the European Union if referendums were organized in this matter, and only 9% of respondents declare that they would like Poland to leave the EU.

**DIAGRAM 20:** If there would be a referendum on the continued presence of Poland in the EU, would you like to vote for?




Source, own work, (IBRIS, 2018)

Considering the division into electorates of individual political parties, again the largest number of respondents in the party Wolnosc believes that Poland's membership in the EU has brought the country more losses rather than benefits (17%). It is interesting, however, that half of the respondents in this group say that they have achieved more benefits, which is the highest result of all electorates taken into account in the IBRIS research. The same benefits as losses were indicated by nearly one-third of the PiS voters, 17% of the voters of the Razem party and the same number of party Wolnosc. Most of the answers emphasizing that Poland gained much more benefits than losses thanks to the European Union found itself in the group of voters of the SLD (84%).

A similar survey was carried out in 2018 by CBOS. It shows that Poles most often declare their willingness to the current state of integration (35%) and its deepening (35%). Only 14% of respondents opt for restricting integration or increasing the role of nation states. The exit from the EU supports only 4% of


respondents, and the creation of a multi-speed Europe only 3%. In the CBOS surveys from 2017 and 2018, the percentage of supporters of closer integration is noticeable (by 6%), at the same time there were people supporting the status quo (by 3%).

**DIAGRAM 21:** Which of the possible visions of the future of Poland and the European Union you most like?



Source, (CBOS, 2018).

**DIAGRAM 22:** Benefits and losses resulting from integration



Source, (CBOS, 2013)

According to the surveys, from 2004 Poland has seen more benefits each year than losses resulting from membership in the European Union. In 2013, a drop was recorded among people noticing more benefits than losses. It may have resulted from the controversy that this year appeared in connection with the Fiscal Pact and the political dispute regarding its provisions and ratification.

## CONCLUSIONS

After 15 years of Poland's presence in the European Union, researchers and analysts once again have to face a challenge of answering the following questions: where has the transformation led Poland? Where is the country today? Has Poland managed to overcome the legacy of communist underdevelopment, or has it already entered the path of civilizational development that leads to full integration with the West? What does the future hold for Poland?

In literature, one can find analyzes assessing this process both positively and negatively. Witold Kieżun takes an approach of detailed criticism regarding the entire process of transformation in Poland and other countries of the region and formulates a thesis about its neo-colonial character. The author recalls the processes that took place in some African and Latin American countries. He believes that the victims of aggressive actions of capital markets, colonial exploitation and drainage of resources in the 1990s, including Central European countries, were exploited in a similar way. The purpose of these activities was to gain total economic control over these countries, maximally exercise it and dominate over them at the time of systemic chaos after the fall of communism. The transformation in Poland (and other countries in the region) dictated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has contributed to remaining in the periphery of the western system of liberal capitalism and total dependence and subordination to it. In this way, Poland has probably gone through an irreversible process of deindustrialization and takeover of the majority of capital and financial market.

In the years 2003 to 2004, the problem of integration and its consequences became one of the main topics of political debates. The referendum on accession, planned for 7<sup>th</sup> and 8th June 2003, was of crucial importance in this respect. It was preceded by an intensive campaign in Poland encouraging citizens to take part in the voting. Both political parties and social organizations such as institutions of power, administration, and authorities of the world of science and culture engaged in the campaign, which underlined the momentous nature of this event. As it turned out, not only the accession to the European Union itself triggered overwhelming emotions in

the country. Even today matters related to the membership in the EU are often the most disputed subjects in Polish politics.

Poland's membership in the EU structures has a very profound impact on the Polish political scene, because it forces political parties to include wider European optics in their programs. Both the nature of the government's work and the rhythm and ways of reaching a decision have changed. The ministers of foreign affairs or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself have a key role in preparing the final shape of Poland's position and representing it at the EU forum. Membership in such a complex integration structure as the European Union, above all requires from the Polish government effective diplomatic efforts, but also costly and complicated preparations and internal actions.

The beginning of integration occurred at the time of economic recovery in Poland. This phenomenon was accompanied by the opening of EU labor markets (first in Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden) and a complex process of modernization of Poland based on the EU funds. The EU funds were distributed specifically to the rural communities and local governments with the purpose of supporting agricultural and regional policy. Such measures influenced the common perception of the process of integration by Poles through the prism of economic progress and the reduction of the distance separating the country from the EU average. The political context of accession, however, did not raise much interest among Poles, although in this area the influence of the European Union on national institutions (including the need to adapt Polish law to EU standards) was significant.

After May 1, 2004, Poland earned more trust in the international arena. It has began to be seen as a state which is stable and predictable (economically). This contributed to the growth of foreign investments and strengthening of the Polish currency. The situation in Polish trade was very favorable (the balance of turnover with EU countries exceeded 1 billion dollars). However, it is difficult to state clearly how much of the economic recovery [Poland] owes to the Union. In the case of Poland, we are dealing with a parallel course of two processes, i.e. transformation and integration, which cannot be considered separately. These were “two parallel processes taking place at the same time” and interacting with each other. Political transformation and changes resulting from the need to comply with EU

recommendations have therefore become one of the factors influencing the acceleration of integration within the European Union.

Poland joined the European structures on May 1, 2004 and in this way it achieved its strategic goal. The next stage was to strengthen its position and skilfully shape the role of the state in the European Union. The interests of Poland (like for other Member States) are not limited to strength and position in the international system, but are defined by taking into account cultural, political and historical factors. All EU Member States have serious ambitions to shape the integration process in a way that it best serves national interests. Many goals and tasks of the Polish integration policy may be considered similar to the policies of other countries. However, due to the size of the territory, population size, geostrategic location, and specific experience and problems, Poland should conduct its own comprehensive and well thought-out integration policy, implemented in accordance with the strategic goals that result from the EU membership.

The case of Poland as a member of the European Union is interesting because during its presence in the Community (since 2004), internal and foreign policy was created practically by the governments of two political parties: Civic Platform (2007-2015)<sup>1</sup> and Law and Justice (2005-2007<sup>2</sup>, 2015-currently). Both parties have a completely different attitude towards integration. Civic Platform (PO) is a party whose actions towards the European Union are based on a community strategy (Euro-enthusiastic/pro-integrationist party). It is also an advocate of broader competences for EU institutions. The government of this party was positively received by the largest states of the community; it belongs to the strongest group in the European Parliament, and its leader Donald Tusk has been the President of the European Council since 2014. On the other hand, Law and Justice (PiS) is a eurorealistic party. For this party, the prerequisite for being a part of integrated Europe is to preserve the nation-state. Therefore, it applies an intergovernmental strategy to the European Union. It is not a party positively received by the countries of Western Europe. Many evaluate it as a eurosceptic, whereas its image has not

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<sup>1</sup> with PSL

<sup>2</sup> with LPR and Samoobrona

been improved by its historical policy and financial claims against Germany related to World War II.

Currently, European integration requires greater adaptability and both political and social will to reconcile interests which are often contradictory. However, in view of the growing pressure of the Union (taking into consideration such a large number of members), there is a tendency to adopt ad hoc solutions and flexibility, because Europe must find common solutions to common problems. It was easier for the Union forum to reach a consensus in the periods in which the Civic Platform ruled in Poland. However, the Law and Justice government despite its distinct and firm position comparing to the other states (for example, in matters such as the lack of agreement on voting system in the Council and the threat of rejection of the Lisbon Treaty), at the time of the possibility of exclusion from the decision-making process and isolation accepts compromising solutions favorable to other countries. Poland is not among the wealthiest EU members who are able to secure the benefits of Community regulations themselves. The issue of allocating EU funds is a matter of such an importance for Poland that due to it, by the use of external pressure, the country can be forced to change its position on the most important issues. According to the liberal intergovernmental approach, “if the threat of blocking the agreement is to be real, the state that uses it must be able to achieve the objectives negotiated at the level of Community regulations alone” and Poland alone is unable to achieve it (and, as Polish researchers point out, in the cases of attempts to block agreements by Poland - especially in the first years of membership – the country could be pushed to deep isolation).

In relation to the above, it is difficult not to agree with the realists' claim that “the stronger the state, the easier it is to push its preferences”. Moravcsik considered this statement to be simplified, because in the government negotiations within the European Union, the most important role is played by national interests, and the position of the government is influenced by three factors which according to him are: (1) intensity of preferences, (2) the possibility of building a coalition and (3) the option of using the package (case) method. This argument can be refuted, taking into account the example of Great Britain, which as a country with a much greater power than Poland, was able to negotiate favorable solutions for itself both in the case of

the Treaty of Lisbon and the Fiscal Pact. This state did not need to build coalitions and find supporters for its own solutions, clearly stating its position. On the other hand, Poland, a smaller country, is forced to adapt to “community” activities even when their collide with its own national interest (for example, voting method in the Council, climate package).

The position and strength of Poland in the European Union was weakened even before the accession as a result of changes introduced in the voting system which were the least beneficial for Poland. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) government (which was characterized by pro-integration approach similarly to PO) gave up the struggle for a better solution at the moment of losing its ally in the form of Spain and accepted “what was the best solution”. At the time of attempting to force its proposal of the form of voting in the Council suggesting the square root system, the Law and Justice government was, in fact, obliged to continue the position of its predecessors. However, as practice shows in the case of the CFR and United Kingdom’s conditions, it seems that also in this case there was a possibility of restarting negotiations because they did not concern entries of the European Constitution but the new Reform Treaty. Therefore, in the case of a country with a strong position in the European Union, it was possible to push through its interests while in the case of Poland, the state with smaller potential, there was no such possibility.

According to Moravcsik and his followers, “the more a country is interested in reaching a new agreement, the more it is willing to accept concessions. The place in the hierarchy of status quo preferences in a given field becomes crucial. If it is only slightly less profitable than the best option, the state will choose a disagreement and not a disadvantageous solution.” In the case of Poland, a transitional (compromising) solution was chosen, but as a consequence, the least favorable solution, i.e. a significant weakening of the voting power in the Council, came into force. The Polish government (mainly PiS) does not have relative strength as a participant in negotiations, because its position is not close to the preferences of other states. As it turned out in the course of the analysis, Poland’s interests (even in the case of the Climate Package), differ significantly from the interests of especially the strongest member states. Support for their proposals on the most important matters regarding



the shape of the community can be found only in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, whose power in the European Union is relatively small. In the matter of the CFR, Poland used the position of Great Britain and only in this case it achieved success in the form of an opt-out clause.

In the case of Poland, the approach to EU institutions also seems to be important. The Law and Justice government, as a supporter of the intergovernmental strategy, is against strengthening their competences (which is clearly visible in the position regarding the process of ratification of the Fiscal Compact). In addition, this government came into conflict with the European Commission regarding changes in the National Court Register and the Constitutional Tribunal. For the first time in history, this institution launched the Article 7 for the Member State. The Polish case is even more controversial taking into consideration the fact that in cases of other Member States, this procedure was not used even though there were serious reasons for such a solution (numerous issues of violation of EU values: murder of journalists (Malta, Slovakia), street clashes between citizens and the police (Spain, France), government corruption scandals (Malta), election controversies (Austria)). A large part of the Polish society, as shown by CBOS research, indicated that the guilt for the conflict with the European Commission is on the side of the Polish government, which most likely due to fear of economic sanctions and lack of support from the public, began to withdraw from some of the adopted solutions.

The Polish government (especially the Civic Platform) in many cases (as Moravcsik described it), striving for economic discipline and necessary economic reforms, used Europe as a mean of strengthening its position and pointed to the commitments and pressures of supranational institutions towards desirable policies (the fiscal package is an example). Consequently, the government argued that it would not be possible to fully engage and play a proper role in Europe without taking such actions and in this way “to cover yourself up with Brussels,” blaming it for unpopular decisions.

It is hard not to agree with Moravcsik's statement that “the elections regarding the delegation of exercising sovereignty can best be explained by efforts in the direction of mutual restraint and control [...] Significant delegating and joint exploitation of sovereignty does not happen due to ideological concepts of European

unification or the need for centralization of policies in the hands of technocrats agreed by governments, but when these governments want to ensure that other partners (or in some cases, future national governments) adhere to their commitments, which they may be tempted to break [the rules].” Poland, through its approach, has repeatedly tried to convince itself that the rules in the Community are the same for all, and not only for those countries that have the potential for effective unilateral actions. Nevertheless, this analysis shows that Poland does not have such potential and must act in accordance with the position of those Member States that are in possession of such potential.



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## **RESUME**

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