T.R. KOCAELI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAMME

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES IN THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME: THE CASE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON, JORDAN, AND TURKEY

PHD THESIS

Hekma WALI

KOCAELI, 2020

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Hekma WALI

Supervisor

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül GÖKALP KUTLU

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ABSTRACT

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is considered to be the global humanitarian agency responsible for the international protection of refugees worldwide. It has been the chief organisation responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in the region, particularly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. This thesis aims to evaluate UNHCR's efficiency in the international protection of Syrian refugees in these countries mainly by dint of investigating its operation only in the Protection Sector. In this context, efficiency is defined as the concentration on the manner of performing rather than the result, that is how the operational model responds to the use of planned response input.

A meticulous research on the Agency's response in this cluster was conducted through examining its planned objectives and activities as well as its achievements in the two introduced response plans, the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) and Regional the Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). The gathered data was transformed into statistics upon which the assessment of UNHCR's operation was based. Analysis of the responses demonstrated that in each plan there are both expected and unexpected results due to the presence of leading factors, namely the volume of the target, the received funding, and the focus shift between sub-clusters of the Protection Sector. The results indicate that UNHCR, in some measure, has been efficient in its operation in accordance with the priority of the sub-clusters in each response and adequate funding in the three concerned countries, respectively. On this basis, it is recommended that the international community develops an effective financial mechanism to support the Agency. Further research is needed to identify other factors behind UNHCR's efficiency or inefficiency in the Protection Sector.

Keywords:

UNHCR, Syrian Refugees, International Refugee Protection Regime, Protection Sector.

ÖZET

Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (BMMYK), dünya çapında mültecilerin uluslararası korunmasından sorumlu küresel insani yardım kuruluşu olarak kabul edilmektedir. Bölgedeki Suriyeli mülteci krizine, özellikle Lübnan, Ürdün ve Türkiye'de müdahale eden baş kuruluş olmuştur. Bu tez, BMMYK'nın bu ülkelerdeki Suriyeli mültecilerin uluslararası korunmasındaki etkinliğini yalnızca Koruma Sektöründeki faaliyetlerini araştırarak değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, etkinlik, sonuçtan ziyade performans biçimine odaklanma olarak tanımlanır, yani işletimsel model müdahale planının kullanımına nasıl yanıt verir.

Kurumun bu kümedeki tepkisi üzerine, Suriye Bölgesel Müdahale Planı (RRP) ve Bölgesel Mülteci ve Dayanıklılık Planı'ndaki (3RP) sunulan iki müdahale planındaki edinimleri, planlanan hedefleri ve faaliyetleri incelenerek titiz bir araştırma yapılmıştır. Toplanan veriler BMMYK'nın operasyonunun değerlendirmesinde dayanak olarak kullanılmak üzere istatistiklere dönüştürülmüştür. Müdahale planlarının analizi, her bir planda, hedefin hacmi, alınan finansman ve Koruma Sektörünün alt kümeleri arasındaki odak kayması gibi önde gelen faktörlerin varlığı nedeniyle hem beklenen hem de beklenmedik sonuçların olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuçlar, BMMYK'nın kısmen, sırasıyla ilgili üç ülkede, her bir müdahale planındaki alt kümelerin önceliğine ve yeterli fonlamaya uygun olarak faaliyetlerinde etkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu temelde, uluslararası toplumun Ajans'ı desteklemek için etkili bir finansal mekanizma geliştirmesi önerilir. BMMYK'nın Koruma Sektöründeki etkinliği veya etkinsizliğinin arkasındaki diğer faktörleri belirlemek için daha fazla araştırmaya ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

BMMYK, Suriyeli Mülteciler, Uluslararası Mülteci Koruma Rejimi, Koruma Sektörü.

ABBREVIATIONS

3RP	:	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
AFAD	:	Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency)
AGD	:	Age, Gender and Diversity
AJEM	:	The Association Justice and Mercy (Association Justice et Miséricorde)
AMEL	:	Amel Association - Lebanese Popular Association for Popular Action
ASCs	:	Asylum Seeker Certificates
BID	:	Best Interest Determination
CBO	:	Community-Based Organisation
CBP	:	Community-Based Protection
CCTE	:	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
CISP/RI	:	Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli
CLMC	:	Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre
CP	:	Child Protection
CPIEWG	:	Child Protection in Emergency Working Group
CRRF	:	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSOs	:	Civil Society Organisations
DGMM	:	Directorate-General for Migration Management (Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü)
DRC	:	Danish Refugee Council
ECOSOC	:	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
ExCom	:	The Executive Committee of the Program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FHH	:	Female-headed household
GBV	:	Gender-based Violence
GBVIMS	:	Gender-based Violence Information Management System

GoJ	:	Government of Jordan
GoL	:	Government of Lebanon
GoT	:	Government of Turkey
GSO	:	General Security Office
HRC	:	High Relief Commission
IASC	:	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICMPD	:	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRC	:	The International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	:	Internally Displaced Persons
IHL	:	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	:	International Human Rights Law
ILO	:	International Labour Organisation
IMC	:	International Medical Corps
IOM	:	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	:	International Rescue Committee
IRD	:	International Relief and Development
IRL	:	International Refugee Law
IRO	:	The International Refugee Organisation
JRP	:	Jordan Response Plan
LCRP	:	Lebanon Crisis Response
LFIP	:	Law on Foreigners and International Protection
LGBTI	:	lesbian, gay bisexual, transgender and intersex persons
LJT	:	Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey
MENA	:	Middle East and North Africa
MHCs	:	Migrant Health Centres (Göçmen Sağlık Merkezleri)
MHH	:	Male headed household
MoE	:	Ministry of Education
MoFSP	:	Ministry of Family and Social Policy
MoH	:	Ministry of Health
MoI	:	the Ministry of Interior
MoL	:	Ministry of Labour

MoSA	:	Ministry of Social Affairs
MoSD	:	Ministry of Social Development
MOU	:	Memorandum of Understanding
NAF	:	National Aid Fund
NGOs	:	Non-Governmental Organisations
NRC	:	Norwegian Refugee Council
OAS	:	Organisation of American States
OAU	:	Organisation of African Unity
OHCHR	:	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OXFAM	:	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PFA	:	Psychological First Aid
POCs	:	Persons of Concern
PRS	:	Palestinian Refugees from Syria
PSEA	:	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PSS	:	Psycho-social Support
PWSN	:	People with Specific Needs
QIP	:	Quick Impact Project
RASAS	:	Refugees and Asylum Seekers Assistance and Solidarity Association
RRP	:	Syria Regional Response Plan
RSD	:	Refugee Status Determination
SDC	:	Social Development Centre
SEA	:	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGBV	:	Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SHAEF	:	The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SHEILD	:	Social, Humanitarian, Economical Intervention for Local Development
SOPs	:	Standard Operating Procedures
TACs	:	Temporary Accommodation Centres
TCN	:	Third country nationals
TDH	:	Terre des Hommes (Land of People)

TECs	:	Temporary Education Centres
TEPAV	:	Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey)
TGNA	:	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TOBB	:	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)
TPR	:	Temporary Protection Regulation
UAC/SC	:	Unaccompanied and separated children
UAM/SC	:	Unaccompanied minors and separated children
UN	:	United Nations
UNDP	:	The United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	:	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	:	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRRA	:	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
UNRWA	:	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
UXO	:	Unexploded Ordnance
VAC	:	Violence Against Children
VOT	:	Victim of Trafficking
WFP	:	World Food Programme
WGBM	:	Women, Girls, Boys and Men

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Refugee Agency, has long been the international organisation responsible for the refugee issue dedicated to protecting rights, saving lives, and securing a better future for refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people. Since its inception, the global agency has been both the spokesperson and trouper on account of the displaced. Currently, it is deemed as the leading operator regarding several refugee situations worldwide, particularly Syria regional refugee response. From the very beginning of the forced displacement engendered by the war in Syria, UNHCR, around the clock, has been delivering lifesaving supplies and support to refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.

This research is, first and foremost, concerned with the operation of the Agency in terms of Syria regional refugee response in three neighbouring countries, namely Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. More specifically, it focuses on UNHCR's operation, along with some national and international development and humanitarian partners and the authorities of hosting countries, on account of international refugee protection of Syrian refugees regarding the Protection Sector through two plans: Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) and Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) between 2013 and 2018. The chief objective of the research then is to assess UNHCR's role in protecting Syrian refugees in regard to the Protection Sector, by dint of scrutinising its planned and conducted activities and purposes since it is the most prominent strategy to determine an effective assessment of the Agency's work.

It should be noted that there is an overall scarcity of research on the evaluation of UNHCR's response to refugee crisis in reference to the Protection Sector, let alone the recent Syrian refugee situation. The majority of the available and reliable review is written by UNHCR's staff, particularly those who had been in the field and then were upgraded for academic status. The available literature corresponds to a general evaluation regarding all sectors concurrently. There are few researches handling the Protection Sector separately. The research hence will contribute to the enhancement of the existing review on the evaluation of UNHCR and bridging the gap pertaining to

its dearth. It will add to the slightly smaller body of research on refugees living in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey.

To be more specific, it is essential to note that this study is concerned only with the response to protection as a sector, not as a broader concept of the international refugee protection regime. It should be mentioned that protection per se is a targeted sector among other seven sectors which are food security, education, health and nutrition, basic needs, shelter, WASH, and livelihoods. As a principal component of those plans -RRPs and 3RPs-, the Protection Sector is considered a priority area of intervention in regard to the other remaining sectors. It mainly consists of maintaining favourable protection environment, fair protection process and documentation, security from violence and exploitation, freedom of movement and access to legal remedies, community empowerment and self-reliance, and durable solutions.

Equally important, it is worth noting that the title of the thesis impressively concentrates on the notion of "efficiency". Alternatively stated, the research focuses on UNHCR's "efficiency" in the international protection regime of refugees more than its "effectiveness". It is crucial, in the first stance, to set the dissimilarity between the two terms. To be "effective" means to be successful in producing a desired or intended result, whereas to be "efficient" means to be successful in achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. Thus, "efficiency" revolves around the concentration on the manner of performing, rather than the result. Accordingly, in the context of this research, UNHCR's efficiency in responding to Syrian refugee situation will be accentuated more than its effectiveness, that is *how* the operational model responds to the use of planned response input.

Building on this, it must be stressed that the term "evaluation" is respectively significant to the research. It is normally defined as an assessment conducted to analyse the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results by examining the outcome and factors using an appropriate criterion. Within the framework of this research, the evaluation of UNHCR's operation will be conducted relying mainly on the criterion of efficiency through the concentration on the nature of the planned and performed activities and the outreach of the response.

Additionally, the term "refugee" in the thesis' title is not attributed to the legally applied frame. The word "refugee" in the context of this research is not referred to those who have obtained the legal status of a refugee. The research focuses on this term as the globally construed meaning of the displaced people who flee to other countries owing to fear of persecution. Thus, the term "Syrian refugees" in the title is ascribed to the displaced Syrians who escaped Syria to neighbouring countries individually or in a mass-influx seeking safety.

Regarding the geographical scope of the research, only three countries out of five handled in the RRPs and 3RPs will be examined, namely Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. As a matter of fact, the choice of these three countries is deliberate because they are the first three countries welcoming Syrian refugees on their territories, being refugees of forced displacement. Equally important, the choice of the case study focuses on three different countries instead of one country. The reason behind such a ground plan for the thesis is that concentrating on refugees in only one state will be an example lacking authenticity and inadequate to assess the actual role and efficiency of UNHCR in the international refugee regime. The Agency's activities differ from one state to another taking into consideration that only one of them is a state party to the 1951 Convention. The government's role consequently is to be emphasised and this is among the pivotal points of the research.

Additionally, the choice of the research population in the case study involves both Syrian refugees living in host communities and those within camps so as to provide a genuine evaluation of UNHCR's role. It is crucial to point out that refugees within camps do not have the same access to services as those living in urban places. Hence, the Agency's response to the needs of refugees then differs according to their situation being sheltered or not.

Every chapter will attempt to answer several questions to be examined during this research. The first chapter sets a background for the topic drawing a brief historical overview of the establishment of the UNHCR and defining some fundamental concepts. Who is a "refugee"? The definition of this concept will be held according to

the international instruments and national legislations mainly the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1976 Protocol, the Refugee Convention of the Organisation of African Union (OAU), the Cartagena Declaration and UNHCR's international protection mandate for refugees. What is "international protection"? Its legal framework will be maintained according to the three intertwined laws: the international refugee law, the international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Added to that, this chapter will settle the theoretical frame of this research. First, it will define the concept of "international regime" as an international government arrangement in a specific issue framed by an international organisation and highlight its correspondence with the topic and the importance of stating an "international refugee regime". The existence of such a regime is germane to the international framework of response to refugee situations and a landmark mechanism to handle worldwide refugee crises as it sets the stage for international organisations and states to act according to specific rules.

Second, it will set the chief theoretical background "liberal internationalism", as one sub-theoretical category of liberalism, and to infer its significance to the research. Liberal internationalism is selected for this research on account of its bedrock concepts of international cooperation, progress, interdependence, multilateralism, diplomacy and assistance to international organisations and structures for their importance regarding how to best arrange relations between states and non-state actors. It is an optimistic theory that considers the power of these concepts and their role in eliminating violence and anarchy in the international system. It is devoted to protecting human rights and combating their violations. Thereby, this theory is strongly connected to the refugee issue as it cannot be resolved without the presence of the aforementioned intertwined elements.

Third, the first chapter is the "background chapter". It underlines another theoretical framework interconnected to liberal internationalism, which is "human security" as a global concept. Along with a much more globalising world, security discourse has been recurrent because of the need to address the global social problems.

Thus, the circle of threats to peoples' lives and well-being has become enlarged from military to economic, social, environmental, and health concerns. Security has moved from the narrowed scope of the state to primacy of human beings. Individuals are the subjects of the human security approach whose objective is to protect people from threats. Non-traditional threats and deprivations such as poverty, ethnic violence, human trafficking, health pandemics and international terrorism lead to instability and absence of peace. Accordingly, this concept is importantly focal to the response to refugee situations for their securitisation.

The second chapter is the "overview chapter". It is a general overview on the refugee laws and policies adopted in the targeted countries of the research. Stating the legal framework of the displaced refugees in these countries facilitates the assessment, in that UNHCR operates according to the existing laws of the state. Each concerned country has its own stipulations pertaining to the issue. More revealingly, responsibilities towards refugees differ between these states in accordance with their adherence to international and national instruments. Additionally, the chapter examines the Syrian refugee influx into these countries from the beginning of the crisis.

The third chapter is the "empirical chapter". It attempts to address UNHCR's role in the international protection of Syrian refugees regarding the Protection Sector. The chapter firstly states the framework of the Protection Sector. Secondly, it respectively considers the whole response activities of the sector through the two fundamental plans, RRPs and 3RPs. This section is also labelled the "table chapter" as it consists mainly of tables of planned objectives and activities on one side and tables of achievements and impact on the other.

The use of tables in this chapter is critical because of their significance as they clearly set the research into arranged actions both planned and achieved by UNHCR in the concerned field. These tables are the result of a concerted research conducted through the scrutinization of some hundred reports and dashboards. The measure used in the research is of central tendency focusing on indicators one by one. The planned response is a cluster of protection indicators with intended specific activities to be

implemented, whereas the achieved response is a cluster of protection indicators achieved according to anticipated targets along with percentages of achievements.

Certainly, each country in this research is designated by its respective tables since UNHCR's operation differs according to the context of needs and situations of Syrian refugees in the concerned country and to the social, economic and political circumstances of each country. Equally important, each plan response has its respective tables pertaining to the planned objectives and activities considering the difference between the RRPs and the 3RPs. The RRP (2012-2014) was an immediate response set in an attempt to urgently respond to the escalating crisis. It is crucial to observe that this plan had repeatedly been updated six times as it was still unshaped. It consisted primarily of main protection elements for maintaining favourable environment and fair protection processes and documentation as well as security from violence and exploitation given that not all of these elements had indicators along with the absence of target figures with the exception of RRP6. The 3RP, however, is a new response system that builds on the refugee component and introduces a new component of resilience as an indispensable element concentrating on empowerment and community mobilisation of both refugees and host communities.

The fourth chapter is the "evaluation chapter" of UNHCR's operation in the Protection Sector in the three countries regarding the RRPs and the 3RPs. It is the section of reordering the results into sub-clusters and figuring indicators into charts. Every country seperately has its respective sub-sector indicators. The analysis is conducted according to the assessed factors, namely the volume of the target, the received funding, and intermittent focus shifts between sub-sectors.

The fifth chapter is the "solution chapter". It is entitled to introduce the durable solutions enhanced by UNHCR, particularly resettlement and local integration. The chapter first considers New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Second, it handles the return of refugees to Syria, which is discouraged by UNHCR. Third, it concentrates on resettlement of Syrians to third countries by the Agency. Fourth, it sets complementary pathways as another solution proposed for resolving a part of the refugee crisis. Finally, it examines the attempts of social inclusion of refugees in the

host countries which seem to be feasible to an extent in Jordan and Turkey, rather than in Lebanon, considering the challenges in these countries and suggesting some policy recommendations for better response to refugee integration.

As a methodology, this research is primarily based on of monthly and annually published reports and dashboards by UNHCR, UNDP, the Inter-Sector Working Groups and the Inter-Agency Coordination in Lebanon in Jordan, and Turkey. All of these document review and research have been meticulously conducted. All indicators of the Protection Sector have carefully been inspected and the missing indicators have been probed through other network sites of sector working groups in cooperation with UNHCR. A multitude of videos on UNHCR's operation, Syrian refugee situations and host communities' response have been watched depending on UNHCR and other humanitarian networks, consolidating thereby the intended approaches to the research. The attendance in Kartepe Summit on Migration, Refugees and Humanity between 26 and 28 October 2018 in Kocaeli, Turkey, has contributed to the enrichment of this research in that it handled the refugee situation in the three targeted countries.

There were nevertheless some difficulties faced throughout the research. The major impediment is concerned with the scarcity of data, in that the available data is patchy and sometimes provided under different naming of indicators. Moreover, some sub-indicators are available for one year and lacking for the other. In some cases, the accessible indicators in one plan become unavailable in the other or having only some sub-indicators or being abbreviated under one comprehensive indicator.

Furthermore, some sector indicators are only available for specific UNHCR humanitarian staff. All of the missing data have been reported by the author and introduced to the concerned parties who promised to provide them; yet, they vainly responded. In such a situation, the resolution to this hurdle was to combine indicators and represent them under a main service of the sub-sector introduced to refugees. Additionally, cost constraints and absence of funding the research limited the conduct of a broader research in that travel to Lebanon and/or Jordan was inconceivable. The final hurdle was the spread of COVID-19 pandemic which impeded some planned interviews with the General Director of DGMM and other staff.

CHAPTER ONE

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF UNHCR AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As this thesis has more than one salient point, it is significant to commence by setting an overview and identifying the background of each point. Initially, it is crucial to set a brief historical background about UNHCR as a global institution: its establishment, structures, relationships, vision and mission, its politics of funding, etc... Equally important, the International Refugee Law (IRL) ought to be crucially considered as it is the pillar of the whole research. Stating a succinct overview of this law's development, doctrines, principles, conventions, and agreements is a cornerstone to state the groundwork of this thesis. Certainly, international refugee protection regime would be deemed the focal point to be dealt with in the IRL. Conspicuously, UNHCR's operation is fundamentally based on this law and it functions according to it. Therefore, the development of both the law and the agency is utterly intertwined; in other words, the consolidation of the IRL respectively engenders the consolidation of UNHCR's authority and activities. Conversely, the former's weakening entails the latter's dilution, too. The development of these two research pillars are to be equally considered along this survey. Similarly, UNHCR's role in the development of the international refugee protection regime is to be handled. The second main part of this chapter will focus on the theoretical framework of this research. It will state initially a brief introduction to the concept of international regime; then, it will set the theoretical background of the research consisting mainly of liberal internationalism and human security.

1.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF UNHCR AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME

1.1.1. Historical Background of UNHCR

The nexus of this research is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It is inevitable then to state a brief history of the Office: the circumstances which entailed its nascence and establishment; its Statute; mandate; structure and staff; operation; scope; approaches and objectives. UNHCR is indeed considered to be the sole international organisation concerned with the refugee issue worldwide. It was established on December 14, 1950, by the United Nations General Assembly. It is mandated to head and organise international action to protect refugees and solve their problems on a global scale. Its main purpose is to ensure that everybody has the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state. It also strives to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. Since its creation, it has faced several crises on different continents, and provided essential assistance to refugees in the first place, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and stateless people. In more than five decades, it has effectively helped an estimated 50 million people save and restart their lives and build better futures. At present, it continues to operate in nearly 124 countries aiding approximately 35.8 million persons (Refworld, 2017).

1.1.1.1. Background of International Concern for Refugees

The term 'refugee' considerably connotes a sense of 'interstatism'. It conspicuously implies an issue beyond the borders of state territories. Accordingly, it is a concern involving themes like centralised states and territorial unity. This significance substantially denotes state's centrality to the background of the term 'refugee'. Its origin is partially traced back to and has strong relation with the emergence of the concept of the 'nation-state' in the seventeenth century. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, having primarily the intention to terminate the bloodiest religious wars in Europe, brought about the affirmation of the right to emigration owing to the difference of religion (particularly from that of the monarch). Yet, this markedly occurred on an ad hoc basis. Not all refugees were warmly welcomed during

that era. For that reason, there had been emigration waves to the new-born haven in the Americas, New England. These initial waves originally occurred owing to religious persecution. Correspondingly, the new milieu represented a refuge for those fleeing repression due to chiefly religious reasons. Similarly, these peace treaties also paved the way for the prospective European state consolidation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This progressive transformation entailed by the European revolutions, such as the French Revolution of 1789 and the 1848 Revolutions, engendered new types of persecution and refugees. Therefore, the United States of America began to offer asylum for those fleeing persecution developing then an open immigration policy.

The break-up of Europe's multinational empires and the Balkan Wars between 1912 and 1913 led to forced displacement, particularly in the aftermath of First World War, producing stateless people and causing insoluble predicaments to refugees. The rise of nationalism and the assertion of national sovereignty respectively generated a sharp increase in the number of refugees worldwide. Bilateral negotiations between states then increased; however, these were ad hoc in character. There was no authentic international mechanism for assistance for refugees. More importantly, the introduction of immigration laws and national passports represented other hurdles in front of refugees. States gradually managed to establish institutional frameworks and began to be thoroughly attentive and regulatory to entries into their territories. Furthermore, European governments sought to erect protective barriers and close borders so as to prevent the entry of huge flows of displaced persons. Consequently, forcibly displaced individuals, having no legal documentation, were incapable of obtaining citizenship or legal residence in another country. These growing challenges enjoined the creation of a refugee regime to protect refugees (Loescher et.al, 2008: 6-7).

Western governments believed that it was obviously essential to placate inter-state tension and to determine an approach to protect refugees. They decided to set the first multilateral system to coordinate the refugee issue in 1921. The League of Nations established the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees on the urgent recommendations of non-governmental organisations, particularly the Red Cross. The

Office was mainly entitled to undertake the responsibility to protect certain groups of refugees. These groups were initially those people fleeing civil war in Russia. Large numbers of refugees reaching about 2 million fled Russian - later Soviet - territories for countries of Asia Minor, Central and East Asia or Europe between 1918 and 1922 and also thereafter. Later, other groups were added, namely Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian, and Armenian refugees due to the Greco-Turkish War between 1919 and 1922 (Jaeger, 2001: 727). In the 1930s, most of the European governments assented to have international agreements to protect refugees fleeing from the collapsing Russian and Ottoman Empires. These agreements later involved people fleeing Germany and Austria.

Despite the fact that the Office functioned under the auspices of the League of Nations, the international attempts to deal with the refugee issue prior to the Second World War were not effective and did not set up a desirable framework for an international refugee protection regime. There was practically no consensus on a definition to the 'refugee' term. Each government had its own designation of the qualifications of a refugee. Certainly, this principally represented an unquestionable adherence to state interests. States feared strains from a super-governmental authority to acknowledge political dissidents of any state as refugees. For that reason, the Western governments denounced the adoption of a universal definition of the term 'refugee'. They, instead, tended to create their own definitions stipulating certain national groups to be refugees and providing them solely with minimal legal rights. Equally important, these governments endeavoured to restrict the efforts of the High Commissioner narrowing both their mandate and budget (Loescher et.al, 2008: 8). Therefore, the absence of any coherently reliable international commitment, along with the anti-immigration bias intensified by the global repercussions of the Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s and the gradual decline of the League of Nations, represented undefeatable impediments to international cooperation concerning the refugee issue.

It is evident that those initial international responses had partially failed to address the refugee issue; yet, it is evenly important to highlight their role in stating the basis for the forthcoming global protection refugee regime. The Second World War

was the subsequent historical disastrous occurrence that produced large flows of refugees on a global scale. Initially, the international pattern approached to handle the refugee crises was essentially that one followed in the inter-war period providing only temporary solutions in response to emergency situations. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) considered refugees as a serious threat to the social and political order in Europe. It, then, concentrated on the coordination of the return of displaced people to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, SHAEF did not take into account the appeal of many people not to return to their Communist countries for fear of persecution. The lack of this consideration raised controversy which led the Allied Powers in 1943 to replace this body with an intergovernmental office, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), whose primary task was to administer and supervise the repatriation of the millions of displaced people solely under Allied control. The agency was not assigned to arrange for the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons to third countries. Therefore, its mission was only confined to repatriation and relief. UNRRA, also referred to as the 'Administration', had repatriated about 7 million people at the end of September 1945 and about 1 million between 1945 and 1947 (Zieck, 1997: 42).

However, the mass repatriations were discontinued because the Western powers became unwilling to return the displaced persons to territories under the Communist rule. The fierce rejection of the return to homelands by the displaced people began to develop into a new issue of debate, particularly with the establishment of the United Nations and the prominent and growing emphasis on human rights. The arising debate revolved around the right of any individual to choose where to live and to flee persecution. This emanated from the escalating East-West ideological conflict. The repatriation of the displaced people to areas under the Communist authorities was no more perceived by Western governments as an appropriate solution to refugee problems, especially when the Communist countries deemed their citizens who opposed repatriation as war criminals or conspirators (Loescher et.al, 2008: 10).

In 1947, the agency was abolished for its repatriation policies. It was replaced with the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) so as to handle primarily the resettlement of the remaining refugees and displaced persons of the Second World

War. It was entitled to assume the responsibility to protect these people and to provide a programme of care and maintenance. This programme comprised the whole field of assistance mainly housing, feeding, clothing, health services, education, employment, child welfare services, etc. The IRO also helped in the establishment of ordinances for the indemnification against the loss of life, health, liberty and property. Moreover, it assisted in the creation of a legal foundation for the integration of refugees. The establishment of this organisation, then, reflected an international commitment to the refugee issue as it was the first refugee organisation established by and directly related to the General Assembly of the United Nations as a "specialized agency" (United Nations, 1950: 982-983). It was extremely significant because it represented the first authentic frame for stating a global organisation devoted for refugees and their problems. The international community sought to stipulate a universal definition of refugee to be fundamentally based on the essential variable of "persecution or fear of persecution" on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. Furthermore, the consideration of refugee eligibility was made on an individual basis; i.e., the group characteristic was no more a compelling element so as to be regarded a refugee. Moreover, the new settled organisation managed to work with the UN Secretariat to prepare a Convention on the Status of Refugees. Therefore, it brought about an overhaul in the international responsibilities towards the refugees. In some respects, the IRO had a disguised trait of supranationalism.

1.1.1.2. The Establishment of UNHCR

It is evident that the IRO succeeded in the resettlement of the refugee caseload it had received from UNRRA in the aftermath of the Second World War. Yet, in spite of all these achievements, there were thousands of displaced people in camps who were not admitted for resettlement due to the selective and restrictive policies. More importantly, with the onset of the Cold War, the catastrophic events in India, Korea, China and Palestine in late 1940s and early 1950s and the growing decolonization process, there emerged new groups of refugees by the millions. This unprecedented rise in global refugee numbers made it obvious that resettlement countries had limited capacity to accept more flows of refugees and that the IRO budget would not suffice to deal with the whole community of refugees and their problems. There was

awareness that a new UN refugee organisation should be established to meet the changing international milieu. Thus, discussions within the United Nations to terminate the IRO and to create a new international refugee agency –UNHCR– were held between 1948 and 1950.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was a continuance of the IRO in another shape. The UN General Assembly made a decision on 3 December 1949 "to establish, as of 1 January 1951, a High Commissioner's Office for Refugees"[1], and it adopted the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on 14 December 1950.[2] A growing number of States had ratified and implemented the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Added to the aforementioned dynamics that led to the creation of a new office for refugees, there was another latent reason which was the need to establish a permanent international mechanism assuming protection responsibilities not only on a temporary basis and not merely according to urgent circumstances. Yet, another time, the permanence element was precluded and the new agency had a restricted temporal mandate which permitted UNHCR to protect only those who were refugees "as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951" (UN General Assembly Resolution 428, 1950).

The Statute of the Office of UNHCR represents the backbone of the agency and its work. It first states the office's responsibility to provide international protection, under the aegis of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the Statute and to seek permanent solutions, mainly voluntary repatriation and assimilation within new national communities. Furthermore, it specifies a definition for the term 'refugee'. It also identifies the functions of the High Commissioner whose work is humanitarian, social and of an entirely non-political character. He is entitled to follow policy directives given to him by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. He shall be also elected for a term of three years. Moreover, concerning the staff of the Office of the High Commissioner, they "shall be appointed by the High

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[1] UN General Assembly, Resolution 319 (IV), Refugees and stateless persons, of December 1949.
[2] UNGA Res. 428 (V), Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, of 14 December 1950.

Commissioner and shall be responsible to him in the exercise of their functions" The Office shall be financed under the budget of the United Nations and "all other expenditures relating to the activities of the High Commissioner shall be financed by voluntary contributions" (UN General Assembly Resolution 428, 1950).

The Statute also affirms the establishment of an advisory committee on refugees consisting of representatives of States Members and States non-members of the United Nations. This committee was later created in 1958 by the General Assembly to be labelled the Executive Committee of the Program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ExCom). The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) selected the member states of the ExCom on the basis of states' interest in the refugee issue and their devotion to resolving the refugee problems. The General Assembly mandated the ExCom to execute actions and perform advisory functions. This executive committee mainly approves UNHCR's budget and program for the following year, makes conclusions on international refugee protection policy issues, and provides guidance on UNHCR's management, objectives and priorities (Loescher et.al, 2008: 76-77).

The Statute of the Office states UNHCR's anticipated mandate. It has considerably two core elements: The first one stands for the provision of international protection to refugees and the second one advocates the provision of durable solutions, i.e. repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a third country. However, this mandate was distinctly restrained. As aforesaid, it had a narrow temporal interval. Thereby, it limited the organisation's engagement in future refugee emergencies. Equally important, it specified a certain term for the office which would be terminated in late 1953. It also restrained the agency's autonomy with obligations to follow policy directives. It is worth mentioning that the office had limited financial autonomy. In other words, UNHCR was made financially dependent on donor governments. All these restrictions were deliberately oriented to debilitate the office's authority and keep it under the control of the more powerful states in the international system at that time, mainly the United States and the United Kingdom. Hence, UNHCR was established with very specific parameters with nearly neither institutional nor material autonomy

so as to avoid its prospective threat to national sovereignty of the states and to dispose of any financial obligations which could be imposed on them.

As a matter of fact, the interests of the framers of UNHCR were not identically parallel. For that reason, governments initially disagreed on the scope of UNHCR and its functions. The United States of America was with the restriction of UNHCR's mandate to only the provision of international protection and was simultaneously against conferring a relief role on the organisation. It advocated the establishment of a temporary refugee agency with limited authority. Concerning the Western European governments, they were still worried and uncertain about the nature of the specialised organisation and its responsibilities. Some of them, such as France, were with the idea of an office having restricted mandate and others were with the establishment of an office having much more authority with a geographically and temporally extended mandate. Other countries like Pakistan and India encouraged an initiative to set a permanent agency with a relief role and global responsibilities. Added to that, Western governments, the United States and France, argued for limiting the responsibilities of states who were signatories to the Convention, too. Thus, the nature of the proposed organisation widely reflected the interests of the United States, particularly as no Soviet country participated except Yugoslavia (Loescher et.al, 2008: 14).

The inception of UNHCR was marked with reluctance and suspicion regarding its relationship with states. The office was meticulously careful while performing its mandate in respect of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. Accordingly, UNHCR was hesitant about being involved in human rights monitoring. This atmosphere of uncertainty led the office to concentrate only on the assistance of refugees in camps and the negotiations with host and donor governments for support. In the first place, it managed to deal with host countries for responsibilities towards refugees, rather than states causing persecution (Loescher et.al, 2008: 18). Along these lines, UNHCR concentrated on predominantly local integration and resettlement, rather than repatriation regarding protection activities.

1.1.1.3. UNHCR Under High Commissioners' Terms

1.1.1.3.1. Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart (1951-1956)

Despite the Statute's restrictions, the High Commissioner apparently could take advantage of his authority so as to extend the Agency's functions and operations in ways congruent with refugee needs and states' provisions. The first High Commissioner, Gerrit van Heuven Goedhart, enlarged the scope of his office by gaining the capacity to autonomously raise funds. For example, with a grant from the Ford Foundation, UNHCR was engaged for the first time in providing assistance so as to enhance the integration of refugees in Western European asylum countries and to respond to the refugee crisis in West Berlin in 1953. Along these lines, the Office succeeded in demonstrating its usefulness to the great powers and uplifting its status. UNHCR then began to gain influential moral authority, particularly being considered as a protector and propagator of IRL. Consecutive High Commissioners described UNHCR as an apolitical and unbiased humanitarian agency. They were intelligently perceptive in the management of the future of the Office's leverage. Accordingly, states began to deem it a unique organisation for having special expertise and experience on refugee law and refugee situations. They became then increasingly dependent on UNHCR for counsel and information. Consequently, UNHCR obtained substantial independence as it had attempted to identify the refugee concern for governments, persuade them that refugee problems were resolvable, to recommend solutions and to supervise their implementation (Loescher, 2001 (b): 33-36). This marked a crucial transition from a weakened international agency to a global organisation with considerable autonomy and authority to shape the behaviour of states and to provide protection to refugees worldwide.

1.1.1.3.2. Auguste Lindt (1956-1960)

The Hungarian crisis of November 1956 was a major illustration for the increasing dependence on UNHCR by some states. When Austria was overwhelmed by the influx of refugees, it formally requested UNHCR to meddle by appealing to governments on its behalf so as to assist the Austrian government in responding to the

emergency. UNHCR instantly established a coordinating group to administer the emergency aid. For that reason, UNHCR was labelled by the General Assembly the "lead agency" to manage the international emergency operation for Hungarian refugees. More importantly, UNHCR had to overcome some legal restrictions so as to be able to extend its aid to fleeing Hungarians. In order to be able to master the temporal hurdle embedded in the refugee definition, the new High Commissioner, Auguste Lindt (1956-1960) proclaimed that the reasons behind the flight of the Hungarians were related to events before January 1951; thus, the situation fell under UNHCR's mandate (Loescher, 2001 (a): 81-87). He also argued that the determination of a refugee status on a case-by-case basis was unfeasible in such an emergency situation. UNHCR then considered these refugees as prima facie refugees and deferred the individual determination process (Loescher, 2001 (b): 37). As a result, UNHCR's success in the Hungarian operation validated the importance of having an international organisation to manage the humanitarian situations engendered by international and regional conflicts.

Along with the decolonization process in the developing world, the General Assembly started to increasingly confer new authority on the High Commissioner to take action. This included the "good offices" approach when the General Assembly granted authority to UNHCR to raise funds or to introduce assistance programmes for operations outside its mandate. Therefore, states began to turn to UNHCR whenever its services could be applied to address the needs of refugees. The Algerian Refugee crisis in May 1957 was a relevant illustration when Tunisia requested material assistance from UNHCR to address the problems of 85.000 Algerian refugees who had fled across the border during the previous two and a half years. This was the first time a Third World country requested emergency assistance from UNHCR. Moreover, the previous case of the Hungarian refugees, who were considered on a prima facie basis, established a precedent for action in the Algerian case. The High Commissioner feared that UNHCR would be designated as a discriminatory agency if the Algerian case was neglected and he avoided being distinguished as the High Commissioner for only European refugees. UNHCR's approach to the return of Algerians turned to be a blueprint for the Agency's future actions and policies, especially the repatriations of the 1960s and 1970s (Loescher et.al, 2008: 23-25).

1.1.1.3.3. Felix Schnyder (1960-1965)

The significant achievement of the Office under Felix Schnyder from 1960 to 1965 was that this High Commissioner was able to obtain state approval to remove many of the restrictions imposed on UNHCR's future work by its mandate. For that reason, the General Assembly, by dint of some resolutions, bestowed an expanded authority on the office to address new situations worldwide and to provide assistance to displaced people who did not strictly qualify as refugees under UNHCR's mandate. Schnyder and UNHCR's Executive Committee managed to delete the geographic and temporal limitations from the 1951 Convention. This contributed to the effective removal of the legal and institutional barriers to subsequent UNHCR action for non-mandate refugees (Loescher, 2001 (a): 105-124).

1.1.1.3.4. Sadruddin Aga Khan (1966-1977)

UNHCR under Sadruddin Aga Khan (1966-1977) rapidly evolved into the most significant global humanitarian organisation. The mass exoduses in East Pakistan, Uganda and Indochina, the refugee crisis in Chile and Argentina, and the repatriation and reintegration of refugees in South Sudan brought about the growing adoption of the "good offices" doctrine. This sustained UNHCR's position as the coordinator of international assistance not only to refugees, but also to other categories such as the internally displaced persons. The General Assembly mentioned refugees and internally displaced persons side by side in a resolution for the first time after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (UN Economic and Social Council, 1972). Furthermore, during the term of Sadruddin Aga Khan's office, there was a renewed interest in resettlement as a durable solution. This was due to increasing military coups d'état and political oppression in many countries which raised much more awareness of human rights violations and stimulated greater advocacy network for human rights. Therefore, resettlement again began to be deemed the optimal alternative so as to protect victims of human rights from persecution. UNHCR's functions expanded and started to be considered standard practice. Accordingly, UNHCR's budget for special operations increased thirty-fold between 1966 and 1975. Hence, by mid 1970s,

UNHCR's transformation into the largest global humanitarian relief organisation was achieved (Loescher et.al, 2008:30-31).

Yet, the 1980s was the decade of challenges to asylum. This period was characterised by economic recession and the rise of conservative governments in many Western states. This resulted in a shift away from the prominent focus on human rights leading to restrictive policies which weakened UNHCR's authority. Moreover, the escalation of the Cold War in Third World countries led tens of thousands of refugees to flee regions of conflict and travel to the West to claim asylum. The Iran-Iraq War, the civil wars in Sri Lanka and the war in Lebanon generated influxes of refugees in Europe. In addition to that, some economic migrants attempted to use the asylum system to enter Europe. There was a new type of asylum seekers who were not in camps under severe conditions. These were either independently managed to pursue safety in the West by air transport or resorted to immigrant-trafficking organisations to secure false documents so as to be able to enter the industrialized countries. Certainly, Western governments criticised these illegal procedures and the European welcome policies had considerably changed. These governments responded by intense controls of borders; however, these measures were not effective. The uncontrollable arrival of large numbers of people to the West having different claims to asylum strained the system of refugee status determination. Yet, applicants who were not granted refugee status decided to remain in Europe.

1.1.1.3.5. Poul Hartling (1978-1985)

UNHCR consequently responded to the severely restrictive measures taken by Western governments and intensified its monitoring of their asylum policies releasing critical reports. Blatantly, Western governments deemed this interference in their domestic affairs. Hence, they managed to preclude the Office's participation in their discussions about asylum policies. UNHCR's authority and expertise did not hold its usual sway in this new environment. The High Commissioners of the period, Poul Hartling (1978-1985), had fairly limited influence and success. It was palpable that convergence between UNHCR and Western governments on the refugee issue had

waned in that decade (Loescher, 2001 (a): 235-239). In direct critique of government policies, the High Commissioner Hartling stated that:

"States which have been the champions of human rights are now finding it difficult to grant some of these basic rights to asylum seekers; peoples who have in the past opened their doors and their hearts to refugees are now showing signs of greater reserve and even intolerance vis-à-vis asylum-seekers and refugees."[3]

The Cold War generated a new type of conflict which developed from an internal to a globalised dispute owing to rivalry between two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This deepened the refugee crises in the developing world and brought about a dramatic rise in the global refugee population from 3 million in 1977 to over 10 million in 1982. The refugee scene had a dominant character of being in camps and being supplied with long-term care. The international community was unsuccessful in stipulating long-term political solutions or offering any other alternative to protracted camp life. This was the case in three different continents simultaneously: Africa, Asia and Central America. Western governments certainly had a geopolitical interest in backing UNHCR camps in these areas containing anti-communist "refugee warriors". Subsequently, they turned to enormously fund UNHCR whose annual budget increased from US$76 million in 1975 to approximately US$500 million in 1980 (Loescher et.al, 2008:35-36).

1.1.1.3.6. Jean-Pierre Hocké (1986-1989)

The refugee crises in the developing world turned to be protracted and nearly insoluble in the 1980s. Indeed, the politicisation of the refugee problems precluded the resolution of many refugee situations. Host governments viewed camps as the most appropriate way to isolate refugees and to prevent their influence on local populations. The High Commissioner Jean-Pierre Hocké then attempted to shape UNHCR focus agenda from international protection to material assistance. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of dealing with not only the country of asylum, but also the country of origin. He also emphasised the necessity to scrutinise the "root causes" behind refugee

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[3] (Consultations on the Arrivals of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees in Europe. Opening Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR/CAE/85/1 (Geneva, 28–31 May 1985): 2)

influxes. Equally important, the High Commissioner highlighted the significance of repatriation as a policy priority arguing that it represents a better solution than remaining in camps and relying on charity. Moreover, as resettlement by Western governments and local integration in the Third World were nearly unfeasible, the High Commissioner Hocké gave precedence to repatriation as the most convenient solution. (Loescher, 2001 (a): 247-249).

1.1.1.3.7. Sadako Ogata (1990-2000)

In the post-Cold War era, there were new crises which engendered large flows of refugees, particularly the collapse of Somalia, the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the Genocide in Rwanda. The 1990s decade was administered under the High Commissioner Sadako Ogata (1990-2000). It was labelled "the decade of repatriation" as about 9 million refugees were repatriated during this period. It should be noted that there was a shift in the rationale of repatriation. It was no longer attached to the "voluntary" character and decision by the refugee to turn back home. Rather, it would be UNHCR who could decide to whether return or not according to the assessment of the conditions and their threat to the refugee's safety (Loescher et.al, 2008:35-36). Along these lines, UNHCR realised that the involvement in countries of origin was indispensable so as to have a more effective repatriation policy. It then began to engage in appendage of reintegration and rehabilitation activities to its customary work. Moreover, it deemed it highly important to monitor the welfare of the returnees. For that reason, it introduced a new strategy of "returnee aid and development" so as to match short-term humanitarian relief with long-term developments (Loescher, 2001 (a): 337-338).

On the whole, the international refugee protection regime had undergone severe restrictions in the 1980s and the 1990s. The substantial changes which engendered exponential growth in the global refugee population surely put fundamental concepts into question and similarly affected the political will of the host communities and their inclination to receive more refugees. Factors of displacement had changed from the usual dynamic of colonialism to the increasing rise in internal interethnic conflicts in the newly independent states. Human rights violations are no

longer by-products of war. They are rather a "conscious objective of military strategy", i.e. even low levels of conflict resulted in high degrees of misery and displacement. In the dawn of the 21st century, states turned to a limited application of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. They adopted policies and laws with weak affinity with the current protection framework and created simultaneously obstacles to impede legal and physical access to territories. Accordingly, alternative protection regimes have been established with limited duration and lesser rights to refugees than the 1951 Convention (Feller, 2001: 134-135).

1.1.1.3.8. Ruud Lubbers (2001-2005)

The early 21st century has marked a new vision towards a "refugee". The horrific terrorist attacks of September 11 have shaped global attitudes to be suspicious and hostile towards refugees and asylum seekers. The line between the term "refugee" and the term "terrorist" has turned blurred (Lubbers, 2002). The War on Terror in both Afganistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) brought about new flows of refugees and led to a further inconsideration of refugee protection by states. UNHCR, by the beginning of the term of the new High Commissioner, Ruud Lubbers (2001-2005), was in a modest status concerning its role in the international security and international politics due to the criticism it faced for "its lack of preparedness and slow response to the 1999 refugee crisis in Kosovo". His term began with a recognised crisis in the international refugee regime because countries continued to place much more restrictions on asylum after their introduction of stringent new anti-terrorist laws, particularly North American and European countries. Furthermore, Western states put pressure on states in the developing world to restrict their asylum policies as an effort to contain refugees in their regions of origin. States in the South responded with tightening their asylum systems. They justified these restrictions by highlighting the fact that the developing world host more than 80 percent of the world's refugees, that their prolonged presence represented a threat to their security concerns and that there was a lack in financial resources so as to continue assuming the responsibility of hosting these refugees, particularly as the donor community had become unwilling to provide financial support. By 2004, about two-thirds of the world's refugee population dramatically was in protracted situations (Loescher et.al, 2008: 59-60).

UNHCR, in late 2000, responded with the adoption of the Global Consultations on International Protection (UNHCR, 2001(b)), which was a process to bring together the Office, Northern and Southern states and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) so as to enhance the international framework of protection in a way respecting the concerns and constraints of states and the other actors. These consultations produced a declaration which reaffirmed the significance of the 1951 Convention and "the fundamental importance of UNHCR as the multilateral institution with the mandate to provide international protection to refugees and to promote durable solutions".[4] This process also engendered the Agenda for Protection, endorsed by the General Assembly in 2002 (UNHCR, 2001(a)). It outlined a series of activities and priorities which had the goal of meeting the concerns of states and strengthening the international refugee protection regime. However, this agenda has been limited in its effect since it was non-binding.

The High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers presented a new set of initiatives referred to as "Convention Plus" in 2001. They were intended to regain the interests of European donor states, develop new agreements to supplement the 1951 Convention, enhance solutions for refugees and increase burden-sharing. More importantly, UNHCR focused on forging new agreements on resettlement arguing that it can play an important role alongside other durable solutions for refugees. So as to accelerate these discussions, UNHCR initiated the High Commissioner's Forum which consisted of a series of multilateral meetings in Geneva between the Office and states instead of the usual meetings of the ExCom. The Convention Plus process, however, failed to meet its goals by the end of its time in November 2005. Yet, despite these limitations, Lubbers' term had a number of strengths, particularly as UNHCR focused on the need to develop a sustainable framework for burden sharing and for building up approaches to overwhelming protracted refugee situations in this period (Loescher et.al, 2008: 63; Colville, 2003).

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[4] Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees'', Geneva, 13 December 2001, HCR/MMSP/2001/09.

1.1.1.3.9. Antonio Guterres (2005-2015)

The beginning of the next High Commissioner's term Antonio Guterres (2005-2015) coincided with the occurrence of extraordinary natural disasters, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake of October 2005 which generated flows of displaced people. These developments resulted in the increasing involvement of UNHCR, "not only in IDP operations but also in international responses to those displaced by natural disasters" (Loescher et.al, 2008: 67) which meant a new expansion in UNHCR's interpretation of its mandate. Guterres launched some initiatives in response to the changing international climate. Furthermore, it should be noted that UNHCR during the term of his office became increasingly involved in IDP issues. It created stand-by arrangements with NGOs, trained special staff in protection and international legal standards and built stores of supplies for new humanitarian emergencies. In 2007, UNHCR performed a variety of protection and assistance activities for IDPs in 24 countries with 18 million IDPs. In mid-2007, there were about 2.2 million Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries and about 2 million Iraqi IDPs. UNHCR arranged an international conference in Geneva in April 2007 so as to draw attention to the ignored humanitarian results of the conflict and to assure donor support for its operations in the region. In July 2007, UNHCR raised its budget for displaced Iraqis to US$123 million and it was unsatisfied with the reluctance of donor states to abide by their financial pledges (Loescher et.al, 2008: 68-69).

Equally important, UNHCR under Guterres' term experienced a period of reassessment. He desirably managed to make UNHCR more effective given the changing nature of displacement. More importantly, Guterres reconsidered UNHCR's management structures and spending priorities. He undertook a management reform process intended to review several structural, staffing, and procedural concerns. This was perceived through a reduction in the size and budget of UNHCR's Geneva headquarters by some 20 percent and the redistribution of these resources to UNHCR's field operations. He pushed for a major reduction in staff and operating expenses. In 2006, the Office had 1,047 staff members in Geneva, but by 2009 the number had been

reduced to 700. This marked a turning point in UNHCR's management of its budget and staff (UN Association of the United States of America, n.d.).

These refugee crises have unprecedentedly been aggravated after the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and the escalation of the revolution in Syria into an atrocious war starting from 2011. All these occurrences, particularly the war in Syria, have created refugees by millions, especially in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. High Commissioner Guterres stated that the staggering escalation of forced displacement in the last few years spawned respectively phenomenal rates of displaced people, i.e. both refugees and internally displaced people. He maintained that "in 2010 there were 11,000 new people displaced by conflict per day; in 2011, 14,000; in 2012, 23,000; in 2013, 32,000; and in 2014, 42,500 people displaced by conflict per day" (Guterres, 2015). The status quo engendered by these circumstances has historically been unique in character and has critically urged international cooperation with UNHCR on the displacement issue more than any other historical period.

1.1.1.3.10. Filippo Grandi (2015-)

UNHCR, as a humanitarian agency, has been facing serious challenges, particularly under the current term of High Commissioner Filippo Grandi, to deal with the critical consequences of these circumstances. Problems of displacement are intensely increasing mainly because of conflict, as well as population growth, climate change, food insecurity and water scarcity.

It is obvious that humanitarian interventions in Syria in the recent years have been apparently based on human rights excuses; yet, it should be argued that this rationale certainly hides agendas of political nature. The agendas of national sovereignty and war on terrorism have overwhelmed the human rights agenda. For that reason, violations of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Refugee Law have quietly been 'legitimized'. This study specifically focuses on displacement caused by the war in Syria and its repercussions concerning the refugee issue, particularly the case of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Accordingly, it is important to consider UNHCR's role in

resolving the problems of these refugees in these countries and to assess its efficiency in the international refugee protection regime after the outbreak of war in Syria. This would be the focus of the forthcoming parts of this thesis.

The recent worldwide sense of crisis owing to mass movements of refugees engendered to an exceptionally remarkable series of international conferences and meetings administered by UNHCR to specifically address issues surrounding forced displacement and refugees' problems. New approaches to protection are greatly needed as the three classic "durable solutions" for protection – repatriation, permanent integration in the country of first asylum, and resettlement – are no longer able to meet the needs of displaced populations. The international summits and conferences held in 2016 have attained consensus for practical and concrete outcomes, such as new funds for humanitarian relief as well as assurance for new resettlement places and development projects (Newland, 2016).

Additionally, under the term of Grandi, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016. It sheds light on the significance of the international refugee regime and involves a wide range of commitments by Member States to consolidate and enhance mechanisms to protect refugees and migrants. It has set the stage for the adoption of two new global compacts in 2018: "a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration". Yet turning these commitments into reality again represents a major challenge for international cooperation.

By and large, from its very inception as a refugee organisation, UNHCR mandate had been in frequent change owing to the continuous shift in the international system and milieu. In other words, it began as a regional organisation with a very restrictive mandate and authority. Yet, later it has expanded to a global humanitarian agency with much more effectiveness and autonomy despite the intermittent episodes of divergence with governments owing to, first and foremost, the change of their geopolitical agendas. Thus, state interests have been the leading factor behind the

precarious status of UNHCR which, in spite of recurring challenges, has been able to enhance refugee situations and develop the international refugee protection regime.

1.2. INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION REGIME

The development of the IRL, particularly the international refugee protection regime, is strongly connected with the development of UNHCR's history as the office widely contributed to the creation of this law. IRL has correspondingly developed according to the advance of historical events worldwide, UNHCR's approaching responses to them and the subsequent creation of new regional instruments sustaining the situations of refugees. Furthermore, along with the galloping rate of globalisation, the refugee issue is undoubtedly influenced by the international system which is in a continuous change owing to the shifting power balances. Historically, UNHCR has attempted to keep refugee law compatible with the changing situations of refugees. It has constantly managed to behave in accordance with both the Statute and Convention of 1951, being the mainstay of its mandate, the universal and regional legal instruments and along with the addenda, omissions, and resolutions of the General Assembly. For that reason, it is preferential to examine the office's history during and after the Cold War in parallel with the examination of the evolution of the international refugee protection regime as it is considered the first contributor to its creation.

1.2.1. International Protection

Protection of citizens is principally the responsibility of States. However, when governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, individuals may be vulnerable to serious abuses of their personal rights. These violations, consequently, lead them to leave their homes, maybe even some their family, to seek safety in another country. Accordingly, as the fundamental rights of individuals are no longer protected by the governments of their home countries, the international community takes charge of these, who become broadly labelled "refugees", so as to ensure that their fundamental rights are respected. The phrase "international protection" exhaustively includes the scope of activities through which refugees' rights are secured (UNHCR, 1999: 4).

There is no universal definition of "protection". Yet, there are approaches to define this term by human rights specialists. The following provided definition is agreed to by a number of key humanitarian and human rights experts who took part in a series of workshops on protection sponsored by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) between 1996-2000. It maintains that:

"The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law. Human rights and humanitarian Organisations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, language or gender." (Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, 2004: 3)

In addition, there is also no uniform description regarding the definition of a protection activity. Yet, it could be defined as any activity which:

"prevents or puts a stop to a specific pattern of abuse and/or alleviates its immediate effects (responsive action); restores people's dignity and ensures adequate living conditions through reparation, restitution and rehabilitation (remedial action); fosters an environment conducive to respect for the rights of individuals in accordance with the relevant bodies of law (environment building)" (Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, 2004: 3).

Consequently, protection activities could be classified according to three patterns. Firstly, a responsive action could manifestly be monitoring, investigation, reporting, evacuation, tracing, etc. Secondly, a remedial action could apparently be resettlement, rehabilitation, family-reunification, promoting transitional justice, including justice for victims, etc. Thirdly, environment building could include the promotion of legislative reform, capacity building, and training. These groups of protection activities are interdependent and are frequently carried out simultaneously.

1.2.2. The Legal Framework of International Protection

It is crucial to stress that the legal framework of international protection is not solely related to the International Refugee Law. Along this law, it is also extremely connected to other two bodies of law: International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. These three bodies of law are complementary sharing a common goal which is the protection of the lives and dignity of persons. They form together a complex network of complementary protections. Thus, it is essential to examine the interaction of these three laws.

1.2.2.1. The International Refugee Law (IRL)

The development of the IRL has been a defining moment in the history of the refugee issue. It intends to provide protection and assistance to individuals who have crossed an international border and are at stake or victims of persecution in their country of origin. IRL, first and foremost, interdicts the forcible return of a refugee to their country of origin (the principle of non-refoulement) and guarantees the respect of their basic human rights during their stay in the country of asylum. The core of IRL is the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol which are the sole universal treaties determining a specific legal regime for refugees. These instruments have been "extremely resilient and adaptable" in the face of the changing movements of refugees during the past half century (UNHCR, 2005: 26).

1.2.2.1.1. Universal Instruments

a. <u>1951 Convention</u>

The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951, has its grounds in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other states. Today, it is considered to be the cornerstone of international refugee protection. The Convention entered into force on 22 April 1954, and it has only one amendment – the 1967 Protocol. The 1951 Convention, as a mechanism to deal with

refugees of the aftermath of Second World War, was originally restrained in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe (UNHCR, 1951). The total number of State parties is 145 to the Convention, 146 to the Protocol, 142 to both the Convention and Protocol and 148 to one or both of these instruments. States Parties only to the 1951 Convention are Madagascar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, whereas States Parties only to the 1967 Protocol only are Cabo Verde, the United States of America, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (UNHCR, "States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol"). Concerning the three countries held in this research, it is noteworthy to mention that only Turkey is a State Party to the Convention and its Protocol. However, neither Lebanon nor Jordan is a state party; both of them are rather signatories to Memoranda of Understanding.

The 1951 Refugee Convention is the fundamental legal document that forms the basis of UNHCR's work. It provides a definition for the term 'refugee' and identifies the rights of the refugees, as well as the legal obligations of States to protect them. The Convention states that the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:

> *"As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*
> *In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national."* (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 1)

As a concise definition, a refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their state of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.

The chief contribution of the Convention lurks in outlining the foundations of refugee protection. These foundations preserve mainly the following rights and provisions:

- Non-discrimination: Protection to all with no discrimination "as to race, religion or country of origin" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 3).
- Freedom of religion: States shall respect freedom of refugees "to practice their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 4).
- Free access to the courts of law on the territory of all States Parties to the convention (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 16).
- The right to "engage in wage-earning employment" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 17).
- The right to housing: The Contracting States "shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 21).
- The right to education with respect to "access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 22).
- The right to public relief and assistance (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 23).
- Freedom of movement: "the Contracting State shall accord to refugees locally in its territory the right to choose their place of residence to move freely within its territory" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 26).
- The right to identity papers (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 27).
- The right to travel documents (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 28).
- Non-penalisation: Persons escaping persecution should not be punished for having illegally entered another country where they seek asylum. (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 31). This admits that the seeking of asylum can require refugees to breach immigration rules. Being charged with immigration or

criminal offences relating to the seeking of asylum or being arbitrarily detained solely for seeking asylum are examples of proscribed penalties.

- The expulsion of refugees should only be adopted in exceptional circumstances which directly impact national security or public order (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 32).

- The principle of non-refoulement which is the most important foundation maintaining that a refugee should not be returned or expelled against their will, in any manner whatsoever, to a country where they could have serious threats to their life or freedom on account of their "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 33). This principle is "so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may be made to it"[5] and it is now deemed first and foremost a rule of customary international law. Therefore, it is binding even on states not party to the Convention.

- Naturalisation: The State Party shall "facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees" (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 34).

- Cooperation of national authorities with the United Nations by undertaking to provide the appropriate information and data as well as the laws and regulations which they may adopt (UNHCR, 1951 Convention: Article 35).

b. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

The Convention is then considered the fundamental instrument of the International Refugee Law. Yet, it contained only the basics. In the 1960s, a growing "mismatch" started to become clear because of the mass numbers of refugees and the generalized conflicts (Feller, 2001: 132). Therefore, there was an urgent need to extend UNHCR's mandate to protect and help refugees falling out of the definition and geographic and temporal scopes of the 1951 Convention. For that reason, UNHCR started the process which engendered the 1967 Protocol. The Protocol was adopted on

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[5] Quoted from the introductory note by the High Commissioner to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol in December 2010.

31 January 1967 and it entered into force on 4 October 1967. It removed both the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention as follows:

- *"[..] The term "refugee" shall [...] mean any person within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and..." and the words "...as a result of such events", in article 1 A (2) were omitted".*
- *"The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to the Convention in accordance with article I B (I) (a) of the Convention, shall, unless extended under article I B (2) thereof, apply also under the present Protocol".* (UNHCR, 1967 Protocol: Article 1)

By removing these limitations, the 1967 Protocol gave the Convention a universal trait. It has since been enhanced by contributory protection regimes in several regions as well as by the progressive development of International Human Rights Law. The Protocol is an independent instrument to which States may have access without the condition of becoming Parties to the 1951 Convention. States Parties to the Protocol accept to apply the provisions of the Convention to refugees who qualify for the Convention's definition but without the Convention's time or geographical restrictions.

1.2.2.1.2. Regional instruments

It is evident that UNHCR contributed to the creation of International Refugee Law also by expanding to major regional conventions concerning refugees or which affect refugees. More importantly, the ExCom and the General Assembly overtly stimulated UNHCR to join efforts in the creation of regional refugee standards. These efforts are particularly obvious from its work in Africa and Europe (Corinne, 2010: 77-78).

a. <u>The African Instrument: The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa</u>

UNHCR was essentially involved in the drafting process of the refugee convention of the Organisation of African Unity OAU (now the African Union), *the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*. UNHCR's involvement then helped guarantee that the convention "complemented rather than conflicted with the 1951 Refugee Convention" (Corinne, 2010: 79). It was successfully effective in attaining this goal as the preamble of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention upholds that the 1951 Refugee Convention, "as modified by the Protocol of 31 January 1967, constitutes the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees and reflects the deep concern of States for refugees and their desire to establish common standards for their treatment" (OAU, 1969).

This Convention, adopted by the member States of OAU, provides a broader refugee definition, a positive duty to make optimum efforts to grant asylum, provisions on durable solutions, and provisions on prohibiting destabilising activities by refugees. The first contribution of this convention then lurks in adding a paragraph identifying the term "refugee" to apply to every person who is obliged to leave their place of residence to seek refuge in another country because of "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part of the whole of their country of origin or nationality". The term consequently is no more restricted to victims of generalised conflict or violence. The convention also provides much more concentration on solutions related to security matters of refugee flows, particularly on voluntary repatriation in contrast to the integration preference of the 1951 convention. Furthermore, it contributed to the stimulation of a burden-sharing approach to refugee protection and assistance (Feller, 2001: 133).

b. <u>The European Instruments</u>

UNHCR has significantly contributed to the creation of European treaties which have supportively influenced the rights of refugees. For example, UNHCR have an effect on the drafting of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition. It crucially

promoted the inclusion of a provision protecting a refugee from being returned to their home country where the home country's request "for extradition for an ordinary criminal offence has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons" (the European Convention on Extradition, 1957: Article 3). Moreover, UNHCR played a role in the codification of a right for refugees to move between Western European countries without visa resulting in the adoption of the 1959 European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees. UNHCR also provided information and resources for the drafting of the 1990 Dublin Convention. The 12 member States of the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union, that drafted this convention agreed to set rules for determining which State assumes responsibility for considering an application for asylum. UNHCR then managed to influence the subject matter of all of the directives including procedural standards for granting and withdrawing refugee status, standards for the determination of refugee status, complementary and temporary protection, and reception procedures (Corinne, 2010: 80-81). Subsequently, UNHCR's involvement in the European settings of asylum legislations has contributed to the congruent correspondence between the European politics of asylum and the 1951 Convention.

During the Cold War, the member States of the European Union (EU) had considerably attempted to regularise their asylum policies and practices. Initially, they coordinated political initiatives which were not legally binding. However, from 1999 onwards, EU governments have managed to establish a Common European Asylum System based on the complete and inclusive application of the 1951 Convention. In May 2004, after the historical extension of the EU from 15 to 25 member States, there was an agreement on the chief elements of the Common European Asylum System. These involved agreements on certain concerns such as:

- Temporary protection;
- Minimum standards for the receiving of asylum-seekers;
- A directive determining the member State responsible for examining asylum requests

- A coordinating system for comparing asylum-seekers' fingerprints (the so-called Eurodac);

- The "Qualification" regulation defining the concept of refugee and subsidiary, or complementary, protection and stipulating minimum standards for those who qualify for international protection;

- The "Procedures" regulation stating common minimum standards for status determination procedures.

These major provisions, influenced by UNHCR's enticement, thus set minimum procedural norms which hereafter took the form of national legislations and congruent practices among member States (UNHCR, 2005: 28).

c. The Latin American Instrument: The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees

This declaration was adopted in the 1980s by government representatives and eminent lawyers and scholars due to the refugee crises engendered by the civil war in Central America. Like the OAU Refugee Convention, it was principally based on the 1951 Convention refugee definition and supplements it with a wider refugee definition including "persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order" (The Cartagena Declaration, 1984).

It also presented recommendations for arranging humanitarian services and providing durable solutions for refugees. The leading humanitarian actors of the time deemed the Declaration as a viable agenda that played a role in making humanitarian action possible on a daily basis, even under adverse conditions, particularly considering the fact that there were more people in need of humanitarian assistance and protection than those covered by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2005: 30).

In addition, the consensus reached in the Colloquium underlined the significance of the prevailing international norms and the necessity to establish a

fundamental agreement backing the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. This consensus was particularly significant because it paved the way for the countries in the region, which were confined to the Inter-American asylum regime, to give a positive response to global legal developments. Thus, the Cartagena Declaration, which had much broader sense as a regional instrument involving the importance of the international norms, became common ground for the countries of this region. Moreover, the Colloquium advocated the vital interaction of IHRL, IHL and IRL concerning displacement. It stressed that the convergence of these three branches of public international law (and their respective protection bodies) presented the best conditions for providing the essential protection. The Declaration also asserted the significance of the principle of non-refoulement as one of the basic protection principles (UNHCR, 2013(a): 10-11).

Despite the fact that the Declaration is legally non-binding, it has been frequently advocated by Central and Latin American States. Its comprehensive refugee definition has been incorporated in the legislations of most of the countries in the Caribbean region, Central America and Latin America (UNHCR, 2005: 30). Indeed, it has considerably contributed to the development of the international refugee protection regime as it has been acknowledged in several resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the Organisation of American States.

1.2.2.2. The International Human Rights Law (IHRL)

Human rights are based on deference for the dignity and well-being of every individual. International human rights law can be identified as a network of international rules, established by treaty or custom, on the strength of which individuals and groups can have expectations and claims for certain actions or benefits from governments. Human rights law consequently sets an obligation on states to behave in a particular way and interdicts their engagement in specific activities. The most important purpose of human rights law is to empower individuals and groups to take positive action to redress abuses against their internationally recognized rights. Human rights treaties have been developed both internationally, generally under the aegis of the United Nations, and regionally (OAU, Organisation of American States

(OAS), and the Council of Europe) (Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, 2004: 10).

IRL is strongly related to IHRL in attempting to safeguard humane treatment for a vulnerable group of people. The two bodies of law are complementary since human rights principles have been applied to sustain refugee protection:

- In terms of the rights that refugees and asylum-seekers enjoy under IHRL in the country of asylum;
- In so far as international mechanisms to supervise the anticipated application of human rights law can be utilised in the best interests of refugee men, women and children;
- In how IHRL inspires UNHCR course of actions, for example, in setting standards of due process, conditions of detention and gender equality.

The whole international protection framework is based on the provisions of human rights law. It aspires to help those who have been obliged to flee their countries because their rights have been violated. Specifically, the notion of persecution, which is at the core of the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, is consistently interpreted in accordance with human rights concepts. A deep insight of IHRL is subsequently necessary for securing international protection for refugees and others of concern.

Human rights law is essentially helpful to assess the quality of the treatment that asylum countries present to refugees and asylum-seekers on their territories, particularly when States are not Parties to any of the refugee treaties (the 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol, or the OAU refugee Convention). Equally important, this law focuses on the momentousness of the principle of non-refoulement. It fundamentally prohibits a person's return to a territory where they are at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as a basic refugee right. Accordingly, it provides a legal way to secure protection for individual refugees by presenting other options to an international complaints machinery which does not exist among the provisions of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.

The assurance of potential solutions to refugee crises is extremely germane to the endorsement of human rights. Sustainable voluntary repatriation and reintegration enjoin the promotion of human rights in a refugee-producing country. Consequently, the principles of human rights are to be implemented in all phases of the cycle of displacement. For example, they are applicable to the stage of determining eligibility for international protection, ensuring satisfactory standards of treatment in the country of asylum and guaranteeing the durability of solutions. UNHCR then highly esteems the cooperation it has built with several human rights actors, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), other international and regional human rights institutions, and non-governmental organisations (UNHCR, 2005: 30-32).

1.2.2.2.1. Universal Instruments

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is the basic instrument of human rights law. This significant initiative, set in the aftermath of the ruinous Second World War, translated the aspiration of the international community to enhance universal respect for the dignity, well-being and basic freedoms of all members of the human race. Although the Declaration was not intended to be a legally binding treaty, it is nonetheless extremely important as the unique statement of the rights to which every individual is entitled. Since the adoption of the Declaration, many of its principles have been restated in legally binding instruments and others have reached the status of customary international law. The following articles are among the most important provisions of the Declaration:

- *"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."* (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: Article 1)
- *"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."* (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: Article 2)

- *"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person."* (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: Article 3)
- Article 14(1) of the Declaration is specifically related to refugees. It asserts that: *"Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."* (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: Article 14)

In 1966, the acceptance of the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as a legal obligation from the part of the States marked a turning point in the history of Human Rights. This obligation was identified in two international Covenants: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In 1976, they entered into force. These instruments, along with the Universal Declaration and the two Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are collectively branded as the International Bill of Human Rights (UNHCR, 2005: 32-33).

Added to the International Bill of Human Rights, there are other significant universal human rights instruments such as:
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965);
- United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979);
- United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984);
- United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989);
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990).

There are certainly particular human rights which may never be legally restricted, such as the right to life or the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. These rights are stated in Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and must be

safeguarded at all times and under all circumstances, even in situations of public emergency. They are universally labelled as non-derogable rights.

1.2.2.2.2. Regional Treaties

Human rights law has been noticeably consolidated by the formation of regional instruments and supervisory machineries. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was adopted in (1950), was the first of these instruments along with its additional protocols. Other important regional instruments include the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981). In addition to these, there are other regional treaties such as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985), the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987), and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) (UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2017).

1.2.2.3. The International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) comprises international regulations settled by treaty or custom, and particularly propounded to limit the repercussions of international or non-international armed conflicts on the humanitarian grounds. This law aims, first and foremost, at protecting persons and property that are, or may be, affected by armed conflicts, such as civilians and prisoners of war and civilian objects. It also intends to regulate the use of methods and means of warfare by the parties to a conflict.

It is principally the duty of states to respect IHL. Added to the states, there are other actors which contribute to the implementation of IHL. The leading global actor in this field is, particularly, the ICRC. It has been mandated by the international community with certain protection and assistance tasks in times of armed conflict. IHL is generally the first law to be relied on from the part of the United Nations and NGOs to promote the situations of civilians affected by armed conflict (Inter-Agency

Standing Committee Task Force on Humanitarian Action and Human Rights, 2004: 5-6).

IHL is significantly relevant to IRL and refugee protection in different ways. It is important in the determination of who is a refugee. It is evident that there are numerous asylum seekers who are persons fleeing armed conflicts and frequently violations of IHL; yet, this does not make them refugees. According to the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which states a specific list of grounds for persecution, not every person fleeing an armed conflict automatically qualifies for the status of a refugee. Indeed, there are conflicts, where persons are fleeing because of a fear of persecution grounded in their "race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group", particularly those with an ethnic dimension; however, this is not always the case. There are thousands of persons who are forced to leave their state of nationality, owing to the arbitrary effect of hostilities and the ensuing disorder such as the destruction of homes and food-stocks which are considered to be violations of IHL, yet with no specific element of persecution. For that reason, regional refugee instruments following the 1951 Convention, such as the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees have extended the scope of refugee definition to include persons fleeing armed conflict. Even states that are not party to these regional instruments have established some legislative and administrative measures so as to offer protection to persons fleeing armed conflict, for example the notion of "temporary protection".

IHL provides refugees facing armed conflict with a two–tiered protection. The first one is general protection which offers protection to refugees as civilians from the effects of hostilities as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities. General protection deals mainly with the prevention of displacement and the assurance of refugee protection during displacement from the effects of hostilities. The second one is additional protection which is granted to refugees since they are considered aliens in the territory of a party to a conflict and consequently vulnerable persons. Therefore, "refugees should not be treated as enemy aliens and thus susceptible to the measures of control - solely on the basis of their nationality" (Gillard, 2005).

1.2.2.3.1. Instruments of International Humanitarian Law

IHL comprises a large number of international treaties that have been developed from the mid-19th century, starting with the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Modern IHL, however, consists mainly of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977:

- Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. (Geneva, 12 August 1949)
- Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. (Geneva, 12 August 1949)
- Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. (Geneva, 12 August 1949)
- Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. (Geneva, 12 August 1949)
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I, 8 June 1977)
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II, 8 June 1977)

There are also instruments establishing international machineries for the enforcement of IHL such as the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court.

1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The whole focus of the research is, first and foremost, humanitarian. The intended target is mainly to evaluate the development of the international refugee protection regime and assess the UNHCR's achievements in the field. Similarly, it also tends to contribute to the enhancement of the refugee status worldwide since the refugee issue has become one of the most important concerns of the United Nations and its member states. In this regard, the theoretical framework of this research will aptly be liberal internationalism and human security. Yet, before stating the core

theoretical approach, it is basically significant to shed light on the concept of international regime as it is the foundation part of the international refugee protection regime.

1.3.1. International Regime

The phrase "international regime" is substantially a concept, not a theory. It labels a specific phenomenon which could be perceived in world politics. The term "concept" generally permits inquiries about the phenomenon. These questions begin with the insight into its emergence, alteration or dissipation. Accordingly, the identification of the dynamics, conditions and choices will denote endorsing or preventing the formation, change, and disappearance of international regimes. In addition, the concept questions the effect of an international regime revolving around first its effectiveness as compliance is required so as expected goals could be attained and second its consideration of pragmatic and moral elements (Peterson, 2012).

The original definition of regimes was stated in 1982 by Stephan Krasner who identified international regimes as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner, 1983: 2). This definition has three fundamental elements. The first element focuses on an interconnected set of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. The second one accentuates the presence of a group of actors wielding that set to manage their expectations according to their own and others' behaviour. States' convergence on shared expectations, which represents the very qualification of an international regime, is then a must because states have to consent to pursue a certain set of normative and procedural guidelines. The third element concentrates on the existence of a certain issue where that set and those expectations will be involved. There is no international regime that can encompass every issue-area of international relations; even the whole array of international regimes cannot cover all issues (Peterson, 2012).

Having the insight into the interaction processes between actors to agree on the need for a certain regime and both the settlement and adoption of its content is equally

substantial for an international regime to be formed, changed or disappeared. However, an international regime is characterised by formality, i.e., even when there is discord between actors, an agreement could exist on paper and an international regime could be subsequently established.

Accordingly, an international regime is generally established when an international organisation frames an "international government order" in a specific issue. The mechanisms of the international organisations have then a significant role during the application of the rules of this order. In the framework of this research, the international organisation referred to is the United Nations and the mechanism focused on then is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; thus, the adopted international regime in this context is the international refugee regime. Subsequently, the application of the rules of the international refugee regime is managed by UNHCR. The United Nations then coordinates, controls and follows the appliance of the regime's rules and imposes sanctions when necessary. This "quasi-hierarchical structure" imposed on states decimates international anarchy in the related field. It is evident that international regimes act with respect to state sovereignty; however, they limit states' behaviours in a non-compulsory manner as they work to satisfy states and get their support. Hence, this "quasi-superstate international order" provides much more effective operation of the international peace, welfare, environment and health (Gözen, 2014: 102).

1.3.2. Liberal Internationalism

Liberal internationalism is a sub-theoretical category of liberalism as one major theory of international relations. The phrase "liberal internationalism" contains two terms joined to bring a specific perception in world politics. This perception, the same way as other theoretical liberal perceptions, intends to pursue a certain objective so as to promote individual freedoms and rights and to endorse international peace. The first term "liberal" clearly pertains to the theoretical liberal account, whereas the second one "internationalism" extends this liberalism to an international stage. It consists of a set of connected concepts on how to best arrange relations between states and non-state actors. The bedrock concepts of liberal internationalism are international

cooperation, progress, interdependence, multilateralism, diplomacy and assistance to international Organisations and structures.

This sub-theory could be traced as far back as Cicero's cosmopolitanism, but most notably to Immanuel Kant's writings on peace when he developed his concept of 'Perpetual Peace' as a perception of how the world ought to be. Kant was arguably promoting a "federation of free states governed by the rule of law" (Steans & Pettiford, 2001: 45). He proclaimed that when republics are established and citizens are entitled to make decisions, states are less likely to choose the war alternative. Consequently, it can be argued that the more states become republics, the more democracy spreads and the likelihood of war reduces until all nations perceive the irrationality of war and the triumph of peace over conflict (Smith, 1903). The pursuit of perpetual peace then appears to be a key aspect of liberal internationalism. Hence, it can be identified as an approach to international relations aspiring to globally promulgate liberal democracy in order to terminate conflicts.

Liberal internationalists generally argue that if all states were liberal democracies, the world would be a better place. They further their supposition with the assumption that states are able to be liberal democracies since human beings are driven by the power of reason to act "justly" toward one another. "To act justly toward others, according to internationalists, is to recognize their status as free and equals and to provide the conditions under which they can live as free and equals." (Fabre, n.d.: 3) Internationalists then state that only in a liberal democracy can those conditions exist because it is only in liberal democracies that individuals can cooperatively shape their collective prospect and that their individual rights are safeguarded (Panke and Risse 2007; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989; Fukuyama 1992; Held 1995).

Liberal internationalism is also associated with former American President Woodrow Wilson and that is why it is sometimes referred to as 'Wilsonianism' (Hoffman, 1995: 159). He deemed the spread of democracy as the key to world peace since democratic states are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states. In his famous Fourteen Points, he envisioned a world in which freedom and self-determination would reign and remove wars, imperialism and colonialism. The last of

his points proposed the creation of the League of Nations. This is significantly deemed a turning point in the operation of international relations as it launched the background for international cooperation.

The concept of international cooperation alludes to the significance of the presence and functionalism of the international and multilateral institutions. Wilson's suggestion to establish an international security organisation so as to enable the peaceful settlement of disputes between states spawned the establishment of the League of Nations which operated until the outbreak of the Second World War. This initiative inappropriately failed at the demise of the League in 1939. Yet, this failure was the first formal essay from which the international community realised the shortcomings and defects of the League that led to such a collapse and the re-outbreak of a global war. Briefly, hopes for liberal peace were originally shattered by Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 and the subsequent militarisation and expansionism of Italy, Germany, and Japan in the 1930s leading to World War II. These events were initially devastating to the credibility of liberal internationalism until the end of the Cold War in the 1980s (Griffiths, 2007: 21). Along this period of frailty, however, the school of liberal internationalism was in a state of reincarnation attempting to reformulate its presumptions and adapt its provisions to the changing international conditions. This normative and empirical parturiency, along with the establishment and development of the United Nations, entailed a renewed interest in the field and a new wave of liberal internationalism.

Liberal internationalism appears to be an optimistic theory believing in the power of the effective cooperation between international actors. It considers the critical role of cooperation in the elimination of violence and anarchy in the international system. States and non-state actors are supposed to combine their efforts and unite through the tool of diplomacy and try to reach solutions on issues affecting them. Therefore, violence should be the last tool as a resort. Accordingly, liberal internationalism emphasises the crucial role of international law in organizing international cooperation and relations. Peace cannot be attained unless the principles and norms of international law are respected and implemented. Reverence to the

international normative ethos is certainly the first effective dynamic behind the fruitfulness of international cooperation and the preservation of global stability.

Furthermore, liberal internationalism is admired for its vociferous stance towards violations of human rights. For that reason, also, the momentous role of international institutions in protecting human rights and combating their violations is stressed, especially the United Nations. More revealingly, international organisations and supranational structures are potential agents to create a cooperative, secure, and peaceful international space. Thus, the construction of international institutions, according to liberal internationalists, is among the most appropriate strategies to achieve global stability and international security.

So as to achieve the liberal goals, liberal actors have then engaged in proactive foreign and international policies. There has accordingly been a specific emphasis on the pivotal role of international organisations in the pursuit of these goals. The promotion of democracy has been equally important, and it is organised through a variety of forms. Democracy is promoted, for example, through economic and political incentives, financial and technical aid for the consolidation of electoral processes, economic pressure for conditional aid to the developing world and military operations. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the liberal norms began to be conspicuously, integrated into the legal and institutional structure of the international system. Subsequently, protection of human rights was accentuated through a reform of the UN Human Rights Council and also the appeal for the legitimisation of the principle of humanitarian intervention which resulted in the adoption of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (Jahn, 2013: 2-3).

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine focuses on the international community's responsibilities related to human security. First, a State has a responsibility to protect its citizens from war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Second, if the State is unable to protect its citizens, the international community has a responsibility to assist the state in building capacity for different actions, for example early-warning, security sector reform and resolving conflicts. Third, if a State fails to protect its population from mass atrocities or itself

commits these acts against its own population, the international community then has the responsibility to mediate diplomatically in the first place applying peaceful measures, then more coercively through several forms of sanctions, and turning to force as a last alternative (3P Human security, 2011). In this last context, humanitarian interventionism is then considered as an imperative to promote peace and human rights and to establish democracy for instance UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.

Yet, the principle of humanitarian intervention poses specific problems for liberal internationalism. This theoretical school sustains the view that all persons are free and equal and then are to be equally treated. On that account, it is entrusted to maintain the norm of nonaggression in the pursuit of international peace. Thus, the democratic claims of the liberal internationalist school about intervening militarily for humanitarian goals might cause the decline of its moral authority. This question is deeply contested within the liberal internationalist school for its blurred conceptual implications. The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001) on the 'Responsibility to Protect' stated that the legitimising possibilities of humanitarian intervention cannot conceal the fact that in many democracies the underlying wisdom of such interventions is vaguely imprecise and that the political will is conflicting.

> *The question of military intervention forces differences and uncertainties over national identity to the surface like no other, for it cannot but be discussed except with reference to the nature of state's national interest and international role and thereby often stirs and intensifies deep divisions in national political cultures.* (Griffiths, 2007: 30)

Therefore, the concern of military intervention is deemed the eccentricity straining liberal internationalism.

However, some liberal internationalist observers hold that as long as the world is not wholly set up by liberal democracies, the "burden of proof" should be not only on the shoulders of those who support resorting to aggression as a means to maintain freedom and equality for all, but also on those who prefer to resist it (Fabre, n.d.: 4). Accordingly, there appears to be a disjunction between liberalism as a theory and

liberalism as a practice which is the main cause behind its inconsistent achievements (Jahn, 2013: 5). For that reason, the esteemed triumph of liberalism at the end of the Cold War turned to be "demise" by the end of the 1990s. According to Ikenberry, the current dilemmas of liberal internationalism are partly due to the "unresolved intellectual and political tensions within liberalism itself" (Ikenberry, 2011: 282).

Excluding the element of military humanitarian interventionism, liberal internationalism represents the most appropriate theoretical background of this research. The context of international organisations and cooperation then fits well into the liberal framework of this field of study. The whole research is based on one mechanism of the United Nations which is the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. This machinery of global cooperation regarding the refugee issue is the basic bulk in the international refugee protection regime assuming responsibilities to manage coordination of international refugee protection between states. International cooperation is, therefore, the key to impede the grant of asylum from being a burden for some states and to find suitable solutions to the problems of refugees. As the refugee issue is essentially social and humanitarian, it should not then be a reason of dispute between states. UNHCR then is the catalytic agent which has an influential role in reducing tension related to the refugee issue between the concerned states. Cooperation of states with UNHCR is equally necessary to guarantee the effective coordination of measures taken to tackle the problem of refugees.

Indeed, international organisations are crucial for international liberalism, yet there is a continuing challenge for these institutions which is the concern of under-resourcing. The UN system widely depends on state contributions which appear to be relatively very small and inadequate given the challenges the UNHCR faces. For the agency to properly fulfill its humanitarian and protection tasks, it is necessary to have sufficient financial resources. It is ludicrous to compare the whole UN budget to some governments' military budgets. For example, in the year following President H. W. Bush's call for a New World Order, "the sum of the UN regular budget and peacekeeping costs for 1992, was less than the cost of two Stealth bombers, or the combined cost of operating New York city's Fire and Police Departments for one year" (Macmillan: Ogata, 1993: 2). However, under-resourcing is not only related to

finances. This challenge has also connection with the lack of assistance and facilities required for the promotion of international peace and security (Griffiths, 2007: 31).

1.3.3. Human Security

The second theoretical background for this research, being interconnected to liberal internationalism, is human security. It is a post-Cold War concept developed as a result to the realisation that the disappearance of the superpowers' military threats did not provide greater level of security for citizens within their states. Along with a much more globalised world, security discourse has been recurrent because of the need to address globally interconnected social problems. Thus, the circle of threats to peoples' lives and well-being has become enlarged from military to economic, social, environmental, and health concerns. Security has moved from the narrowed scope of the state to primacy of human beings. Individuals are the subjects of the human security approach whose objective is to protect people from threats (Gregoratti, n.d.). Non-traditional threats and deprivations such as poverty, ethnic violence, human trafficking, health pandemics and international terrorism equally lead to instability and absence of peace.

The concept of human security was firstly defined in 1994 in the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The report proclaimed that human security is essentially concerned with human life and dignity. The definition provided by UNDP was exhaustive. It consisted of security from chronic threats like hunger and disease and also protection from sudden disruptions of the daily life. After the establishment of the Commission on Human Security (CHS) in 2001, the definition of the concept has concentrated on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment. The Commission identified human security in its final report "Human Security Now" as:

> *"[...] to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means*

creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity." (CHS, 2003: 4)

The CHS subsequently defined protection as "strategies, set up by states, international agencies, NGOs and the private sector, [to] shield people from menaces". These strategies consist of the values, procedures and institutions essential to protect people from serious and prevalent threats. It also defined empowerment as "strategies [that] enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations", i.e. to develop the capabilities of individuals and communities so as to be able to provide solutions for their security (United Nations Human Security Unit, 2009: 7). Therefore, protection and empowerment are intertwined and reciprocally reinforcing and both of them are necessary in nearly all situations of human insecurity (CHS, 2003: 10).

The report then stipulated seven types of human security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political. Each type of security is to be ensured against some certain human security threats: The economic security against, for example, persistent poverty and unemployment; food security against hunger and famine; health security against unsafe food, malnutrition, mortally infectious diseases, and lack of access to fundamental health care; environmental security against natural disasters, environmental degradation, resource depletion, and pollution; personal security against physical violence, crime, terrorism, domestic violence and child labor; community security against inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions; and political security against political repression and human rights abuses (UN Development Programme, 1994: 24-40). It is also important to denote in this context that both threats and responses are strongly interconnected when addressing these insecurities in two ways. First, threats to human security have chain reaction in the sense that each threat nurtures the other. For example, conflicts can engender poverty which in turn could engender education deficits, resource depletion, etc. Second, threats can spread outside a given country and have regional character which in turn could affect regional and even international security (United Nations Human Security Unit, 2009: 6-7).

Overall, human security has five characteristics. First, it is people-centred focusing on the safety and protection of individuals and communities. A human security approach empowers people to evaluate vulnerabilities and potential menaces and then outline and participate in strategies to build security. Second, human security is comprehensive in that its strategies are practically wide-ranging including "freedom from fear," "freedom from want" and "freedom from indignity". Third, human security is multi-sectoral in that it addresses a variety of interdependent global and local vulnerabilities, insecurities and threats in development, security and human rights. Fourth, human security is context-specific in that it acknowledges that insecurities differ significantly across various situations and as such build up contextualised resolutions that are approachable to the particular settings they attempt to address. Fifth, human security is prevention-oriented. It manages to prevent conflict and develop peacebuilding strategies so as to provide sustainable solutions for structural root causes behind fear, want and humiliation (3P Human Security, 2011).

Human Security is broadly based on two visions: "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear". The phrase "freedom from fear and want" was first coined by President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his speech to Congress on January 6, 1941, in which he stipulated the four freedoms conceived to bring his country closer to the world: freedom of speech, freedom to worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. Later, on August 14, 1941, freedom from want and fear were stated in the Atlantic Charter, signed by Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and President Roosevelt. Edward Stettinius, the then US Secretary of State, predicted that these concepts would be the central components of the strategy of peace of the UN. He proclaimed that:

> *the battle of peace must be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory spells freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.* (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, 2010)

Freedom from fear focuses on peace by referring to protection of individuals from threats to their physical security including various forms of violence that may arise from the acts of individuals against other individuals, the acts of one group against others, the acts of a State against its citizens or much more broadly the acts of external States. Some example elements of these forms of violence could be violent threats to physical security, conflict and crime, small arms, land mines, women in conflict, etc. Freedom from want focuses on development by referring to protection of individuals from threats having economic, social, environmental, and political dimensions and also from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. Human security also integrates another particular freedom which is called freedom from indignity focusing on human rights and referring to improving the quality of life and promoting human welfare which allows people to make choices and seek opportunities and empowers them to live in dignity and equity without discrimination and exclusion (Krause, 2008; Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, 2010; Katsuma, 2011).

Relating human security to the focus of this field of study, it is possible to argue that conflicts have engendered aspects of human insecurity, particularly the displacement of people through conflict-related problems (Hanlon and Christie, 2016: 28). This has accordingly resulted in the rise of refugee and migrant problems. Therefore, human security approach is strongly related to the refugee issue as it has been among the most critical humane concerns nowadays due to the globally escalating rate of conflicts given the fact that the vast majority of refugees are women and children. Thus, in relation to the theoretical sphere of this research, the central institutional component of human security is the United Nations, being the first international organisation to provide humanitarian responses and protection of human rights worldwide. Being the responsible organ of the UN for refugees, UNHCR activities of refugee protection correspond to human security as an operational tool for the international enhancement of the refugee status. UNHCR attempts to deal with the disruptions caused by forced displacement due to conflicts, civil wars, and gross violations of human rights because they represent the major source behind human insecurities and deprivations as it is the case for Syrian refugees. UNHCR's interventions concerning refugee protection are considerably among human security

strategies. The Agency is then considered to be the international institution seeking to provide human security for vulnerable refugees by protecting IRL and supervising states' compliance with international law standards so as to ensure security for refugees against potential threats.

CHAPTER TWO

2. REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY IN LEBANON, JORDAN, AND TURKEY

Since the beginning of the unrest in the Syrian Arab Republic, the neighbouring countries of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey have kept their borders open for Syrians fleeing conflict and have generously provided protection and assistance. Evidently, Syrians did not need a visa to enter these three countries and the governments have notably accepted those Syrians who reached the country through unofficial border crossings. Since March 2011, UNHCR along with other UN agencies and NGOs, in close cooperation with the respective host governments of Jordan and Lebanon, have been working together to respond to the protection and humanitarian assistance needs of those crossing into these two countries fleeing violence in Syria. In Turkey, the government has led the response to the unprecedented influx from the Syria, cooperatively with UNHCR.

It is highly important to consider refugee laws and policies maintained in the three countries before examining UNHCR's operation there, taking into account that among them only Turkey is a state party to the Refugee Convention of 1951. Lebanon and Jordan are solely signatories to Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with UNHCR.

2.1. LEBANON

2.1.1. General Overview

Lebanon is a party neither to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 nor to its 1967 Protocol. Added to that, it has not adopted any domestic legislation particularly addressing the status of refugees. Refugee status in Lebanon is at present settled for the most part by the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding signed between Lebanon and the UNHCR.

Lebanon today hosts the largest number of refugees in the world in proportion to its estimated population of 6.2 million. Syrians represent the highest percentage of refugees in this country with a number of 991,165 registered Syrian refugees by UNHCR in April 2018 (UNHCR, 2018(j)). Yet, the Government of Lebanon (GoL) estimates that the total displaced Syrian population is 1.5 million in Lebanon, including those not registered with UNHCR (The GoL and the United Nations, 2017: 116).

In addition, there are currently over 521,592 Palestine Refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in Lebanon (UNRWA, 2017: 1). However, it is estimated that many are no longer present in the country. According to UNHCR, there are about 277,985 Palestinian refugees remaining in Lebanon as a pre-existing population along with 31,502 Palestinian refugees who fled violence in Syria coupled with about 35,000 Lebanese returnees from Syria, too (The GoL and the UN, 2017: 8).

The legal status of refugees in Lebanon inappropriately lacks certainty. For example, Syrian refugees are not referred to by the government as "refugees" but as "displaced" persons. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), the key document laying out the UN agencies and the GoL response to the country's Syrian refugee presence, uses the following terminologies to refer to persons who have fled from the Syrian territories after March 2011:

1. "Persons displaced from Syria" (which can, depending on context, include Palestine refugees from Syria and Lebanese Returnees as well as registered and unregistered Syrian nationals);
2. "Displaced Syrians" (referring to Syrian nationals);
3. "Persons registered as refugees by UNHCR." (The GoL and the UN, 2015)

This approach is held so as to vaguely release the refugee response in Lebanon from its prospected responsibilities. The existing legal instruments dealing with refugees have been criticised as deficient. UNHCR, in its 2010 report submitted for

the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, states that "refugees enjoy few, if any, legal rights in Lebanon" (UNHCR, 2010(b): 2).

2.1.2. Domestic Legislation

The GoL asserts that it is not a country of asylum, and principally opposes the local integration of refugees. This stance clearly appears in the Lebanon Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 (3RP), which states that: "Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor a final destination for refugees, let alone a country of resettlement" (UNDP and UNHCR, 2014: 1).

In Lebanon, there is no legislation recognising the specific situation of refugees. As a result, refugees who enter or who are staying illegally in the country are considered as "illegal aliens under applicable law" (UNHCR, 2010(b): 1).

The domestic legislation that governs the situation of refugees in Lebanon is principally the Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country, which was enacted in 1962, labelled the 1962 Law. The main stipulations of this law are articles 26, 31, and 32.
Article 26 states that:

> *"Any foreign national who is the subject of a prosecution or a conviction by an authority that is not Lebanese for a political crime or whose life or freedom is threatened, also for political reasons, may apply for political asylum in Lebanon."*

Article 31 states that:

> *"In the event that a former political refugee is deported, he or she may not be removed to the territory of a country where his or her life or freedom is threatened."* (Lebanon National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, 1962)

Article 32 stipulates that foreigners who enter Lebanon unlawfully can be imprisoned for one month to 3 years and/or fined (International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1962: 6).

2.1.3. Memorandum of Understanding between Lebanon and the UNHCR

Due to the lack of a national refugee law in Lebanon, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the UNHCR and the General Security Office (GSO) in the Ministry of Interior in September 2003. The MOU emphasises persistently Lebanon's position not being an asylum country. It mainly presents a mechanism for the "issuing of temporary residence permits to asylum seekers, normally limited to a period of three months, during which the asylum claim is reviewed by UNHCR". After recognition, the residency permit may be extended for a further six to nine months allowing UNHCR to find a durable solution for the refugee (generally resettlement in a third country). The MOU provides some protection space and essentially accepts UNHCR Refugee Status Determination (RSD)[6] procedures and the Organisation's protection role, provided that refugees recognized by UNHCR are resettled within a six-month period (which can be extended once by three months) (UNHCR, 2004: 1). Accordingly, Lebanon temporarily tolerates the presence of refugees under UNHCR mandate, until their resettlement to third countries.

2.1.4. Influx of Syrians into Lebanon

Since 2013, authorities have shifted their initial open-door policy and started to impose restrictive measures on those seeking to enter Lebanon from Syria beginning with Palestinian refugees from Syria. In June 2014, the GoL declared that only Syrians from areas bordering Lebanon where there was violence would be allowed to enter the country (Amnesty International 2015: 8). These regulations were further tightened in October 2014 when Lebanon's Council of Ministers adopted a new policy on Syrian displacement whose explicit goal is to decrease the number of Syrians in Lebanon by limiting access to territory and stimulating return to Syria (Janmyr, 2016(a): 59).

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[6] "Refugee Status Determination, or RSD, is the legal or administrative process by which governments or UNHCR determine whether a person seeking international protection is considered a refugee under international, regional or national law." (Source : UNHCR https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-status-determination.html)

Graph 1: *An Annual Trend of Syrian Refugee Registration by UNHCR in Lebanon 2013-2019*

Source: UNHCR (Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Syria Regional Refugee Response: Lebanon)[7] (Last Updated 30/04/2019)

In December 2014, Lebanon issued new criteria for Syrian nationals applying for and renewing their residency permits to be implemented in January 2015. These criteria are introduced to all Syrians, including those who are recognised as refugees by the UN refugee agency (Palestinian refugees from Syria are not included). The new procedures requiring refugees to obtain several documents from different sources are so burdensome and expensive (as described by Amnesty International) that many Syrians are unable to renew their permits, a fact which leaves them in a precarious legal position (Amnesty International, 2015: 5). Even recognised, without a valid residency permit, refugees are considered to be in breach of Lebanese law. The new measures are applicable only to Syrian nationals, a fact which led some scholars to describe the approach as "discriminatory" in comparison to other foreigners (Frangieh, 2015).

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[7] Official Website: data2.unhcr.org. (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71)

Map 1*: Registered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*[8]

Source: (UNHCR, 2020(a)).

Alongside, the GoL requested UNHCR to suspend registration of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon in May 2015. These new regulations are then adopted so as to discourage Syria's refugees from seeking protection in Lebanon (Janmyr, 2016(b):13). Graph 1 above illustrates the development of UNHCR registration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon between 2013 and 2018. It is evident that between 2013 and 2015 UNHCR registration of displaced Syrians had an unprecedented increase. The number of

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[8] The map is for purely illustrative purposes. Total number of registered refugees is 910,256 according to data published on 31 January 2020.

registered Syrians reached its peak in April 2015. However, after the Government instruction to suspend registration in the following month, the official number of refugees has relatively been at a standstill, with a slight decline due to refugees leaving the country.

2.2. JORDAN

2.2.1. General Overview

Jordan is not a party either to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 or its 1967 Protocol. Although its Constitution provides protection against extradition for political asylum seekers, it has not enacted any domestic legislation particularly addressing the status of refugees. Refugee status in Jordan is at present settled for the most part by the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding signed between Jordan and the UNHCR.

Jordan's total population is about 9.5 million of which around 2.9 million are non-Jordanians residing in the country. Foreigners represent about 30.6 % of the whole population. Syrians constitute 46 % of non-Jordanians living in the Kingdom and 13.2 % of the overall population, according to the results announced by the Jordanian Department of Statistics in 2016 (Ghazal, 2016). There are currently 661,859 registered Syrians with UNHCR: 131,666 in-camps and 530,193 out-of-camps (UNHCR, 2018(i)). Added to that, there are other refugee populations and persons of concerns that Jordan hosts which consist of 65,922 Iraqis and more than 13,000 from Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen (Jordan INGO Forum, 2018). Moreover, Jordan significantly hosts over 2 million Palestinian refugees representing then the largest number of Palestinian refugee population of any other country in the world according to 2015 ILO report (ILO, 2015: 9). Accordingly, Jordan hosts the second highest number, (89) of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants in the world (UNHCR, 2017(j): 1).

From time immemorial, Jordan has generously hosted refugees. It is considered a welcoming country which has provided refugees with security, health, and educational services. Despite its scarce resources, being a small and middle-income country with considerable levels of unemployment, Jordan has shown tolerance and

hospitality to a large refugee and asylum-seeker population. It has also offered the land on which the two Syrian refugee camps of Azraq and Zaatari were built. However, Jordan lacks a clear legal mechanism to deal with refugees and asylum seekers.

2.2.2. Domestic Legislation

As there is no special legislation addressing the status of refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan, they are then subject to Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and Foreigners' Affairs. This Law applies to all foreigners: any person who does not possess Jordanian nationality as defined in article 2 being a refugee or a non-refugee. Some articles of this Law refer to refugees, but do not define them as a separate category. For instance, article 4 denotes that a travel permit issued to a refugee by the country of his/her residence is a valid documentation allowing him/her to enter Jordan. Another example is article 10 which states that the Minister of Interior has the authority, based on the recommendation of the General Security Director, to "specify by decree the forms and particulars of travel documents granted to certain categories of foreigners, refugees and emigrants, and the conditions and procedures for granting them" (Jordan National Legislative Bodies / National Authorities, 1973).

Jordan is criticised by (ILO) in its 2015 report for the absence of adequate legal protection for refugees in:

"Jordanian law makes limited references to asylum seekers and refugees. Despite having the highest ratio of refugees to citizens in the world, Jordan has not signed the Refugee Convention of 1951 or its subsequent 1967 Protocol. Several concerns are usually cited over Jordan's non-signatory status, including the politically and socially complex—and yet unresolved—Palestinian refugee issue, popular sentiment against refugee integration, lack of resources and capacity to provide for refugees, and misinformation about the perceived social and economic burden of refugees and related questions of national security." (ILO, 2015: 11; Saliba, 2016)

The Government of Jordan (GoJ) eschews the use of the phrase "Syrian refugees" and refer to them as "visitors", "Arab brothers", "irregular guests" or just

"guests"; a fact which debilitates the refugee issue from any legal responsibility under domestic laws. Syrians who enter the country as asylum seekers or who register as refugees with UNHCR are not given residency; limiting then their ability to seek lawful employment. Refugees registered with UNHCR who live in camps receive humanitarian assistance, shelter, free legal aid and assistance with access to courts. However, refugees residing outside camps have access only to government-subsidized primary medical care and schooling (ILO, 2015: 12).

2.2.3. Memorandum of Understanding between Jordan and the UNHCR

A Memorandum of Understanding setting the parameters for cooperation between UNHCR and the GoJ on the issue of refugees and asylum-seekers was signed in 1998. The MOU allows the UNHCR to act within its mandate so as to provide international protection to refugees. It accordingly represents the legal framework under which refugees are treated in Jordan. The MOU outlines the major principles of international protection and stipulates that Jordan accepts the definition of "refugee" stated in the 1951 Convention. In addition, Jordan approves to respect the principle of non-refoulement. Jordan also consents to respect the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees according to internationally accepted standards. Under the MOU, asylum-seekers may stay in Jordan pending refugee status determination (RSD) and can stay for a period of six months after recognition (UNHCR, 2013(d): 1). During this period, a durable solution must be found, be it voluntary repatriation to the country of origin or resettlement in a third country. According to the provisions of the MOU, Jordan and the UNHCR also accept to respect the following rights and privileges of refugees and asylum seekers:

- *"Freedom to practice their religion and provide religious education to their children, and freedom from discrimination based on race, religion, or nationality, provided that religious rights are not contrary to laws, regulations, and public decency;*
- *free access to courts of law with the same right of litigation and legal assistance as are accorded Jordanian nationals, wherever possible; and*
- *exemption from overstay fines and departure fees."*

The UNHCR is permitted to interview asylum seekers who enter Jordan unlawfully and to make RSD within seven days. If there are exceptional cases needing another procedure, the determination period should not exceed one month (Official Gazette No. 4277, 1998; Saliba, 2016).

However, after the unprecedented influx of Syrian refugees in Jordan, the MOU has become outdated and no longer adapted to respond to current protection challenges. In 2012, the GoJ requested UNHCR to propose amendments to the MOU. The latter then has been partially amended (only 2 articles) in 2014, extending the time for UNHCR to examine refugee applications to 90 instead of the previous period of 21-30 days and also "the validity of a refugee identification card to one year instead of six months" (Malkawi, 2014(a)). Thus, the MOU still forms the basis for the Office's activities in Jordan. It should be noted that the 2014 amendment has not been made publicly available as reported by the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in 2015 (Saliba, 2016).

2.2.4. Influx of Syrians into Jordan

Like Lebanon, since mid-2013, Jordanian authorities have shifted their initial open-door policy and started to impose restrictive measures on Syrians seeking to enter into the country, although the decision was not officially proclaimed as it was in Beirut. This reveals that the Syrian refugee crisis has placed an enormous strain on both countries. King Abdullah said the influx of Syrians into his country was stretching its national resources. The number of refugees entering Jordan from Syria has then "fallen from about 2,000 per day in mid-2013 to several hundreds per day until the beginning of October 2014, when it halted". Only those injured, women and children continue to enter; however, those who cross are subject to security assessments in the field. In May 2014, Jordan officially banned entry of all Syrians without valid Jordanian residency permits at Amman's Queen Alia International Airport unless they were transit travellers (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Fanack, 2014; Malkawi, 2014(b)). The GoJ claimed that Jordan has reached its capacity to assist refugees.

Graph 2 below illustrates the development of UNHCR registration of Syrian refugees between 2013 and 2019. It is evident that until the end of 2013, UNHCR registration of displaced Syrians had an unprecedented increase. However, after January 2014 hitherto, Syrian registration trend started to be roughly constant with a slight increase.

Graph 2: A Six-monthly Trend of Syrian Refugee Registration by UNHCR in Jordan 2013-2019

Source: UNHCR (Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan)[9] (Last updated 04/07/2019)

While the ILO report states that Syrians who enter Jordan as asylum seekers or who are registered as refugees with UNHCR are not given residency, UNHCR claims that Syrian nationals do not require a visa to enter or a residence permit to remain in Jordan (UNHCR, 2013(d): 2). Jordan has progressively restrained Syrian refugees' freedom of movement in urban areas since the second half of 2014. Before July 2014, refugees were able to register with UNHCR no matter the status of their documentation. However, according to a 2015 report by the European University Institute, starting from 14 July 2014, the GoJ has instructed UNHCR to stop issuing

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[9] Official Website: data2.unhcr.org. (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36)

Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASCs) to Syrian refugees who have left the camps without proper "bail out" documentation.[10] ASCs are obligatory for refugees to have access to UNHCR and its services and to be able to benefit from the services provided by its implementing partners (IPs) such as cash and food assistance. The certificate then demonstrates that the Syrian refugee is registered as a person of concern. Equally important, the 14 July procedure disables Syrian refugees to profit from the services offered by the GoJ. The ASC is essential to obtain the Service Card provided by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) for refugee access to public health care and education services in host communities (Achilli, 2015: 5). This policy, as a matter of fact, has affected several Syrian households, particularly those who left the camp after these procedures.

Map 2: Syrian Refugees in Jordan - Governorate Level[11]

Source: (UNHCR, 31 May 2019)[12]

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[10] The "bail out" is the legal process by which the Jordanian authorities permit Syrian refugees to leave camps.

[11] The map is for purely illustrative purposes. Total Number of Syrian refugees in Jordan by end of December 2019 is 654,692 individuals.

[12] https://www.acaps.org/country/jordan/crisis/syrian-refugees

2.3. TURKEY

2.3.1. General Overview

Turkey ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 in 1962 and acceded to its 1967 Protocol in 1968. However, it is important to assert that Turkey adopted the geographical limitation in the Convention. Article 1 B (1) of the 1951 Convention stipulates that

"For the purposes of this Convention, the words 'events occurring before 1 January 1951' in article 1, Section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) 'events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951'; or (b) 'events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951', and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purposes of its obligations under this Convention."

Turkey embraced alternative (a) and explicitly affirmed its declaration of geographical limitation upon acceding to the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, (n.d.(c)): 4-5; UNHCR, 2010(a): 15).

However, although Turkey's prerequisite of accession to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees restrains the scope of the Convention's application to European asylum seekers, the majority of refugees seeking asylum in Turkey are from non-European states. The country hosts about 3.9 million refugees, making Turkey the country with the highest number of refugees in the world (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, 2018: 1). As determined by the Directorate-General for Migration Management (DGMM), the number of Syrian refugee population in Turkey is about 3,671,553: 63,204 are sheltered (in-camps) and 3,608,349 (98 per cent) are unsheltered (outside-camps) as updated on 3 October 2019 (DGMM, 2019). In addition, there are about 207,000 Iraqis, 133,000 Afghans, 32,000 Iranians, 4,000 Somalis and about 9,500 other nationalities (Ministry of Interior of Turkey: 2017; UNHCR, 2017 (g): 1).

It should be noted that Turkey has increasingly become a preferable destination of asylum seekers in that international protection applications soared in recent years. Graph 3 below demonstrates the unprecedented increase in the number of applications to Turkey between 2010 and 2018. It is evident that this number surprisingly doubled in a period of one year between 2014 and 2015 from 34,112 to 64,167. The same is denoted between 2016 and 2017 as it soared from 66,167 to 112,415. The nationalities of those who have applied for international protection in 2017 are orderly distributed as follows: Iraq (68,685), Afghanistan (31,148), Iran (9,619), Somali (1,082), Pakistan, Yemen, Turkmenistan, Palestine and Uzbekistan (DGMM, 2018).

Graph 3: *International Protection Applications in Turkey by Years 2010-2018*

Source: Directorate-General for Migration Management[13] (Last updated 09/10/2019)

As a matter of fact, Turkey's Settlement Act still primarily concentrates on "persons of Turkish descent and culture as the immigrants eligible for settlement and possible citizenship" in the country (Zeldin, 2016). The majority of asylum seekers in Turkey are classified as recipients of "temporary protection" for resettlement in a third country rather than being admitted as refugees for settlement in Turkey despite the fact that Turkey's Law on Foreigners and International Protection has introduced several

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[13] https://en.goc.gov.tr/international-protection17

changes in the country's asylum mechanism. Concerning the situation of the Syrian displaced population into Turkey, although the Government of Turkey (GoT) has increasingly promoted their rights and protections, they remain ineligible to obtain regular refugee status and instead are placed under temporary protection.

2.3.2. Types of International Protection in Turkey

2.3.2.1. Refugee Status

The definition of "refugee" under Turkish law is the same the definition set out in the Refugee Convention combined with the geographical reservation limiting applications only to persons seeking asylum "as a result of events occurring in European countries". Accordingly, refugee status shall be granted to a

> *"Person who as a result of events occurring in European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his citizenship and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."*

Refugees from European countries or stateless persons have the right to work independently or be employed without a work permit, after being granted the status (Turkish Labour Law, 2016; DGMM, 2016).

2.3.2.2. Conditional Refugee

The definition of "conditional refugee" under Turkish law is the same the definition set out in the Refugee Convention combined with the geographical difference accepting applications of persons seeking asylum in Turkey "as a result of *events occurring outside European countries*". Accordingly, those who qualify for this definition shall be granted conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional refugees then shall be permitted to reside in

Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country (Turkish Labour Law, 2016; DGMM, 2016).

This category is generally the most applicable to asylum seekers in Turkey, particularly Iraqis, Afghans, Iranians and Somalis (with the exception of Syrians fall under temporary protection). This temporary type of protection entitles its holders with limited rights until resettling them to a third country by UNHCR. They automatically do not have a right to work. They may apply for a work permit; however, very few practically can be obtained one. Moreover, they do not have family unification rights (Gürakar Skribeland, 2016: 14; Turkish Labour Law, 2016).

2.3.2.3. Subsidiary Protection

This type of protection is to be granted for those who do not qualify for refugee or conditional refugee status under Turkish law, but who nonetheless are in need of protection, because if returned to the country of origin or country of habitual residence would:

a) *"be sentenced to death or face the execution of the death penalty;*
b) *face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;*
c) *face serious threat to himself or herself by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or nationwide armed conflict."*

Upon being granted the status, subsidiary protection beneficiaries have the right to work independently or be employed without a work permit and also the right to family reunification. However, this status is not proposed to provide long-standing prospects in Turkey. (Turkish Labour Law, 2016; DGMM, 2016; Gürakar Skribeland, 2016: 14).

2.3.2.4. Temporary Protection

Article 91 (1) of the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which came into effect in April 2014, stipulates that:

"Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived

at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection" (DGMM, 2014(a): 93) *and "whose international protection requests cannot be taken under individual assessment."* (DGMM, 2014(b))

Article 91 of LFIP, however, does not directly provide any explanation concerning principles and procedures to be applied to persons concerned. A regulation then has been adopted to lay down the details of the implementation framework of temporary protection. The Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) was then published in October 2014 (Asylum Information Database, (n.d.)).

2.3.3. Domestic Legislation

2.3.3.1. Law on Settlement

The Law on Settlement, Law No. 2510, was the first regulation to govern the formal settlement of foreigners in Turkey between 1934 and 2006. This law restricted the right of asylum and immigration only to the persons of Turkish descent and culture. Additionally, it was criticised particularly for the 4th Article which indicated types of migrants to be accepted in Turkey. Those who had no attachment to Turkish culture, itinerant gypsies, anarchists, spies and deported persons were deprived of migration right to Turkey. For that reason, the Settlement Law has been amended in 2006. Yet, the background variable is retained for the right to permanent settlement in Turkey and still represents the most appropriate channel to obtain formal settlement and thereafter citizenship in a short period of time for this category of migrants (Tokuzlu, 2007: 11; Zeldin, 2016).

2.3.3.2. Law on Foreigners and International Protection

Turkey had no specific legislation on migration regulation up to the new millennium other than the Settlement Law of 1934, particularly after accession to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1999, Turkey endeavoured to join the European Union and managed to introduce a new set of policies and laws. The 2005 National Action Plan for Adoption of Acquis on

Asylum and Migration was maintained to modernize the country's legal configuration of migration. More importantly, the (LFIP) was adopted in April 2013 and became effective in April 2014. It is considered to be the most comprehensive act concerning migration issues. As stipulated in article 1 of this law, the purpose of the LFIP is to

> *"regulate the principles and procedures with regard to foreigners' entry into, stay in and exit from Turkey, and the scope and implementation of the protection to be provided for foreigners who seek protection from Turkey, and the establishment, duties, mandate and responsibilities of the Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior."* (DGMM, 2014(a))

2.3.3.3. Temporary Protection Regulation

The TPR is considered the chief domestic legislation to manage the regulation of Turkey's *de facto* temporary protection practice that was already in place since 2011 (Asylum Information Database, (n.d.)). The objective of this Regulation as determined in its first article is to determine the procedures and principles regarding temporary protection proceedings that may be provided to its beneficiaries.

> *"[…] to determine proceedings to be carried out related to their reception to Turkey, their stay in Turkey, their rights and obligations and their exits from Turkey, to regulate the measures to be taken against mass movements, and the provisions related to the cooperation between national and international organisations under Article 91 of the Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection of 4/4/2013."* (DGMM, 2014(b))

The Syrian temporary protection regime in Turkey currently covers Syrian nationals, refugees (i.e., non-Syrians who were refugees in Syria) and stateless persons (for example stateless Palestinians in Syria) who fled from Syria to Turkey on or after 28 April 2011. The TPR was amended in 2016 stipulating that those Syrians who have irregularly travelled through Turkey to Greece and are sent back by Greece on or after 20 March 2016 "may (i.e., not "shall"), upon request, be provided with temporary protection under the TPR". However, the TPR is not specifically maintained for the Syrian case of mass influx. It is a general regulation which can be applied in any mass-

arrival situation upon decision of the Turkish Council of Ministers (Gürakar Skribeland, 2016: 15).

2.3.4. Influx of Syrians into Turkey

Turkey has generously retained an open-door policy towards Syrian refugees since the onset of conflict in Syria in 2011 while Turkey's Syrian border is strictly controlled particularly for security concerns. UNHCR has repeatedly commended Turkey for its high standard emergency response. Since the beginning of 2016, the number of Syrian displaced population in Turkey has remained at a comparatively steady level due to the absence of major arrivals into Turkey. Yet, although Turkey continues to welcome Syrians entering the country's land borders, a new policy was introduced by the Government in January 2016 requiring Syrians to obtain a visa so as to be able to enter Turkey by air or sea. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the new rules were intended to reduce the numbers of Syrians arriving indirectly from third countries like Libya or Egypt because most of these entrances occurred with fake passports (DW, 2016; UNHCR, (2017(e): 3).

Graph 4: *An Annual Trend of Syrian Refugee Registration by UNHCR and DGMM in Turkey 2012-2019*

Source: UNHCR[14] (Last Updated 26/09/2019)

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[14] Official Website: data2.unhcr.org. (https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113)

As graph 4 indicates above, from the inception of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has incessantly received Syrian displaced people to become the country with the highest number of Syrian population. More importantly, as figures illustrate, registration of Syrian refugees in Turkey unprecedentedly increased between 2014 and 2016. Particularly, in a period of just one year from January 2014 to January 2015, it approximately tripled from 571,512 to 1,622,839 recalling the serious exacerbation of the situation in Syria and the then subsequent restrictive measures taken by the governments of Lebanon and Jordan in this interval of time due to the unaffordable influxes of refugees. According to the statistics provided by UNHCR, the end of 2014 represented a turning point in refugee registration as the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey doubled in a period less than four months. It is illustrated in the following data of registered Syrian refugees by date (UNHCR, 2018(k)):

Table 1: Refugee Registration Between September and December 2014

Date	Registered Syrian Refugees in Turkey
14 September 2014	847,266
02 October 2014	1,065,902
31 December 2014	1,622,839

Source: UNHCR (Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Syria Regional Refugee Response: Turkey)[15]

Overall, the rise of the number of Syrian people in Turkey specifically in late 2014 was one direct repercussion to the gravely worsening situation in Syria from a civil unrest to a civil war and the new concomitantly restraining policies of both neighbouring authorities of Lebanon and Jordan.

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[15] Ibid.

Map 3: *Distribution of Syrians under Temporary Protection by Top 10 Provinces in Turkey[16]*

Source: (DGMM, May 2020)[17]

Table 2: *From civil unrest to civil war, the Syrian refugee presence in Turkey has radically changed the humanitarian response of the Turkish government [18]*

Situation	2011-2013	2014-2015
Syria situation viewed as	Civil unrest	Civil war
Government response	Responsive	Anticipatory
Government planning presumptions	Short term, then return	Protracted
Supposed durable solution	Voluntary return	Repatriation and resettlement
Government stance	Syrians are guests	Temporary Protection
Syrian border	Open and loosely managed	More and more rigidly managed
Legal regime pertaining to Syrians	Syrian received as "guests"	LFIP and TPR
Government coordination by	Deputy Prime Minister and AFAD	DGMM and Prime Minister's Office
Government management pattern	Mostly in camps	Mostly outside camps
Syrian are registered	Mostly in camps	Nationwide

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(a): 7-8).

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[16] The map is for purely illustrative purposes. Total Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey by May 2020 is 3,579,008 individuals.

[17] https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27

[18] The demarcation between years is relative to show contrast.

CHAPTER THREE

3. UNHCR'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE THREE COUNTRIES REGARDING THE PROTECTION SECTOR

3.1. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROTECTION SECTOR

UNHCR has been leading the response to the Syrian refugee crisis along with some national and international development and humanitarian partners and the authorities of hosting countries through two plans: RRP and 3RP. It is essential to note that this study is concerned only with the response to the Protection Sector being the focal point of the whole research. This chapter will focus on UNHCR's role in the management of this sector in the three countries and the extent of its efficiency.

As a principal component of those plans, the Protection Sector is first and foremost considered a priority area of intervention in regard to the other remaining sectors, namely food security, education, health and nutrition, basic needs, shelter, WASH, and social cohesion and livelihoods. All of these represent priority areas of humanitarian intervention significantly considered in the Syrian Regional Response Plan, led by UNHCR.

The Protection Sector comprises the following framework variables which are concurrently addressed as a reticulated pattern of protection.

- **Favourable Protection Environment**

A favourable protection environment is a climate in which: refugees and asylum-seekers are admitted and protected from the risk of non-refoulement; their rights are acknowledged in national law; the administrative measures to manage their concerns

are adequate; the Protection Sector is addressed by all interested parties; local populations are receptive to these displaced persons; and their needs and potential contributions are recognised and constitute part of national and regional development strategies (UNHCR, 2008: 3).

- **Fair Protection Processes and Documentation**

This refers to registration, status determination and individual and civil documentation. A person is a refugee the moment they meet the criteria of the 1951 Convention or other applicable national, regional or international instrument. Although an individual's refugee status is existent autonomously of formal recognition, national authorities have procedures to differentiate between refugees whom they have an obligation to protect, and other individuals who do not need international protection. "Fair protection processes are those which receive, register and determine refugee claims in a timely manner and in accordance with international and regional protection standards."

Equally important, the provision of documents to refugees and asylum-seekers confirming their protected and civil status has a crucial protection dimension. It ensures security against measures that may be enforced on others due to their illegal presence, for example arrest, detention and possible deportation. Indeed, documents confirming civil status namely birth, marriage and death certificates also have a significant protection dimension. (UNHCR, 2008: 8-14)

- **Security from Violence and Exploitation**

Protection takes account of being secure from acts of violence, abuse and exploitation. A safe environment is one where potential risks of armed conflict are reduced, fair law enforcement mechanisms are reached, community security management systems are set, and measures are taken to prevent and react to occurrences of violence and exploitation of women and children. (UNHCR, 2008: 17)

- **Freedom of Movement and Access to Legal Remedies**

Protection comprises the freedom to move freely within the territory of the hosting country and "not being arbitrarily deprived of liberty". Equally important, the provision of access to adequate and timely legal remedies without discrimination is a requirement for a protection environment to be just (UNHCR, 2008: 23).

- **Community Participation, Self-Management and Self-Reliance**

Community participation is an important protection instrument since it paves the way for refugees and asylum-seekers to build their careers and live with dignity. It also enhances the sustainability of any potential durable solution, and accordingly reduces their vulnerability to protection risks (UNHCR, 2008: 33).

- **Opportunities for Durable Solutions**

Durable solutions allow displaced persons to settle and secure constructive lives de novo. In order to achieve this, firm and continuous international cooperation and support are required (UNHCR, 2008: 38). Durable solutions consist of three main types which are voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement.

UNHCR protection role regarding the Syrian refugees is identified mainly through the following objectives in specific contexts with different levels of intervention in the three countries:

Table 3: *UNHCR Protection Objectives According to Protection Contexts*

Context	Objectives
Favourable Protection Environment	- Access to territory/asylum - Reception (at the border, in camps, community centres, government institutions, etc.) - Reducing the risk of refoulement

	• The improvement of public attitudes towards Persons of Concern (PoCs).
Fair Protection Process and Documentation	• Registration and profiling • Access to Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures • Civil status documentation
Security from Violence and Exploitation	• Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGVB) prevention and response • Child Protection
Freedom of Movement and Access to Legal Remedies	• Freedom of movement inside the country of asylum • Non-arbitrary detention • Legal assistance
Community Empowerment and Self-Reliance	• Community self-management and participation • Community mobilisation • Co-existence with local communities • Self-reliance and livelihoods
Durable Solutions	• Resettlement or humanitarian admission to third countries

3.2. UNHCR'S RESPONSE PLAN TO THE PROTECTION SECTOR UNDER SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN (RRP) (2012-2014)

3.2.1. RRP: Overview

It is evident that international and national agencies, along with close coordination with the host governments, have been responding to the immediate needs of Syrian refugees in the region, yet UNHCR denoted the importance of developing a common strategy and coordination mechanism as a key for an effective planning of a comprehensive humanitarian response to these refugees. For that reason, it has prepared the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) which is a strategic framework document drafted to address the needs for protection and assistance of refugees fleeing from the Syrian Arab Republic into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and later Egypt (United Nations, n.d.(b)).

The Syria Regional Response Plan firstly contains a regional overview with regional strategic objectives, planning assumptions and financial overview. Secondly, it states the country response plans in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq respectively. Every country response plan highlights the context, humanitarian needs, coordination, strategic objectives, financial requirements by sector and the financial requirements by agency. Its revision also adds an update on activities, achieved results and current strategy. It has been revised and updated six times as follows: RRP1 (March 2012), RRP2 (June 2012), RRP3 (September 2012), RRP5 (January to December 2013), and RRP6 (January to December 2014). Starting from the 2nd RRP, Egypt has been included (United Nations, 2013(a); United Nations, 2014(a); United Nations, 2014(b); United Nations, n.d.(a); United Nations, n.d.(b)).

3.2.2. RRP Protection Response Plan in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey

3.2.2.1. Lebanon Response Plan

3.2.2.1.1. Planned Objectives and Activities

Table 4: Lebanon RRP Funding Figures (millions of US$) 2013/2014

Year	Required	Received	Percentage
2013	144	89	62%
2014	137	64	47%

Source: (UNHCR, 2014(b): 5); (UNHCR, 2015(b)): 44).

In Lebanon, the RRP with its six updates as an inter-agency plan chaired by UNHCR concentrated on the following strategic objectives and activities regarding refugee protection response.

Table 5: *Planned Objectives and Activities of UNHCR in the RRP -Lebanon-*

Targets	Activities	Agency
Objective 1: Access to territory		
Non-refoulement	• Systematic and independent border monitoring • Interviews with refugees • Monitoring the situation of (PoCs)	UNHCR
Training of government officials	• Capacity building of the government agencies mainly (Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA), Social Development Centre (SDC) and High Relief Commission (HRC)): programme support, preparedness, emergency response, coordination and data management	UNHCR with Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
Objective 2: Quality of registration and profiling improved or maintained		
Registration on an individual basis	• Registration of all new arrivals on an individual basis • Updating registration data on a continuous basis • Establishment of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)[19] • Profiling populations of concern by dint of the Refugee Assistance Information System concentrating on persons with specific needs (PwSN)[20] particularly women and children at risk	UNHCR with DRC
Assistance of third country nationals (TCNs)	• Monitoring border areas for any influx of migrants who are not refugees requesting assistance • Registration of TCNs • Facilitating evacuation and repatriation to countries of origin: authorisation from host government, flight booking, transportation from centre to the airport, provision of operational and medical escorts when recommended	International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and its partners

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[19] "Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are an essential tool for planning and implementing registration activities, and all registration operations should have SOPs to guide their work. SOPs describe each step of the registration process and the actions to be taken at each stage before moving on to the next." (Source: UNHCR https://www.unhcr.org/registration-guidance/chapter3/develop-registration-standard-operating-procedures/#:~:text=Standard%20Operating%20Procedures%20(SOPs)%20are,moving%20on%20to%20the%20next.)

[20] Specific needs registered by UNHCR are child at risk; disability; older person at risk; family separation; specific legal and physical protection needs; unaccompanied or separated child; serious medical condition; single parent; SGBV; torture survivors; woman at risk.

Identification and assistance of victims of trafficking (VoTs)	• Provision of screening tool[21] for VoTs	

Objective 3: Access to quality refugee status determination procedures as needed		
Access to all those who need RSD	• Conducting RSD • Special procedures for PwSN and for delicate cases where individuals are at risk in Lebanon	UNHCR

Objective 4: Protection from effects of armed conflict		
Access of PoCs to humanitarian workers	• Ensuring government permission and access to impacted community groups • Monitoring the situation of PoCs	UNHCR
Participation in mine and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) awareness sessions	• Campaigns for raising awareness on the UXO/mines risks to PoCs dwelling in the border area	DRC, Save the Children and UNICEF

Objective 5: Reducing risk of SGBV and improving quality of response		
Support of survivors	• Analysis of scope of the problem and participatory assessments • Establishing measures to prevent and respond to SGBV mainly referral mechanisms • Establishing and sustaining special procedures for child victim/survivors • Establishing confidential reporting systems	UNHCR with its partners[23]

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[21] "This screening tool on identifying and addressing situations of vulnerability is a UNHCR and IDC collaboration intended to help guide and inform frontline workers and decision-makers on the relevance of vulnerability factors to detention decisions, referrals to alternatives to detention, open reception facilities, community-based placement and support options, in the context of asylum and migration procedures and systems." (Source: UNHCR and IDC https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57f21f6b4.pdf

[23] The partners for this section are DRC, Save the Children, UNICEF and UNFPA with partners (i.e. KAFA, LECORVAW, ABAAD)

	• Establishing SOPs[22] • Organising awareness sessions at community level (centres) • Counselling by social workers and referral to special partners for support Training of social workers, Primary Healthcare doctors, nurses and UNHCR staff to identify, manage and refer SGBV cases	
	• Providing humanitarian, medical and legal assistance, counselling and psychosocial activities	Caritas Lebanon Migrant Centre (CLMC)
	• Supporting the establishment of women safe spaces, listening counselling centres and crisis centres • Creating support groups and helpline support	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
Mitigation of negative coping mechanisms and risks to SGBV	• Embarking on community-based initiatives • Increasing capacity of frontline workers	UNHCR and its partners[24]

Objective 6: Protection of Children		
Identification and assistance of children with specific needs	• Identification of children at risk and assistance: identification of community-based accommodation for unaccompanied minors and separated children (UAM/SC), financial assistance, counselling, traineeship for parents of children at risk).	UNHCR with its partners[28]

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[22] "The SOPs describe guiding principles, procedures, roles, and responsibilities for actors involved in the prevention of and response to SGBV. They are developed to guidance on the implementation of the prevention and response interventions to support individual SGBV survivors and communities for the members of the SGBV Task Force providing such services. These SOPs provide basic information on what services are available and how services are delivered, including how partners coordinate with each other to provide quality and holistic care to SGBV survivors." (Source : UNHCR https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/inter-agency-standard-operating-procedures-sops-sgbv-prevention-and-response-lebanon)

[24] The partners for this section are UNICEF (IRC, Heartland Alliance, ABAAD, MAP, RI, Intersos, DRC, SCI, Mercy Corps, Terre des Hommes Lausanne, Arcenciel, KAFA,), UNFPA (KAFA and partners), CLMC, Makhzoumi Foundation, Refugee Education Trust -RET, IRAP, IRC

[28] The partners for this section are DRC, Save the Children, UNICEF, IOM for TCNs, Mercy Corps and IMC.

	• Conducting Best Interest Determination (BID)[25] • Establishing main child protection mechanisms (particularly systematic evaluations and referrals to specialised services) • Providing targeted activities for adolescents • Establishing measures for the assistance of children with mental and/or physical disabilities • Providing special measures for protection and care of UAM/SC • Providing Psycho-social Support (PSS)[26] to children and their caregivers • Vulnerable children are provided with holistic support[27] via appropriate and effective referral and case management • Launching campaigns on birth registration and awareness against statelessness	
Availability of periodic reports on serious child rights violations and others protection concerns	• Monitoring and reporting of serious violations and other concerns • Building local capacities of communities to stimulate engagement to prevent any occurrence of violence against children and monitor the violations.	UNICEF and Child Protection in Emergency Working Group (CPiEWG)
Protection of children at risk against violence,	• Child Protection (CP) Rapid Assessment implemented to refer cases of violence against children • Establishing and supporting safe spaces such as Child Friendly Spaces	Save the Children and UNICEF

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[25] A BID is the formal process with meticulous procedural safeguards intended to determine the child's best interests for crucial decisions impinging on the child. It should enable adequate child participation without discrimination, involving decision-makers with specific areas of expertise, and balancing all significant factors in order to decide the leading option. (Source: UNHCR https://www.refworld.org/docid/49103ece2.html).

[26] Psychosocial support is defined according to the Psychosocial Framework of 2005 – 2007 of the International Federation as "a process of facilitating resilience within individuals, families and communities [enabling families to bounce back from the impact of crises and helping them to deal with such events in the future]. By respecting the independence, dignity and coping mechanisms of individuals and communities, psychosocial support promotes the restoration of social cohesion and infrastructure". (Source : Psychosocial interventions http://pscentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/PSI-Handbook_EN_July10.pdf)

[27] Holistic health consists of the physical, mental, emotional and spiritual needs of the child. These dimensions are strongly connected where each other enhances, supports and affects the others creating the whole being of the child. For that reason, each dimension is to be equally supported for ensuring the individual wellness of the child.

neglect and exploitation	• Establishing a monitoring mechanism of CP issues • Establishing a referral mechanism identifying service providers	
Strengthening resilience of children and adolescents and their caregivers	• Structured activities for children seeking to enhance their resilience skills. • Connecting with local stakeholders and institution • Rehabilitating the facilities where the children are hosted so as to create a safe environment.	Terre des Hommes (TDH) Italia
Enabling caregivers, community facilitators and teachers to providing primary PSS	• Capacity building on PSS to identify, address and refer children with psychosocial needs.	UNICEF and International Medical Corps (IMC)
Provision of children with PSS	• Assessment of the situation and needs • Activities for community mobilisation • Empowerment and extracurricular activities offered to youth and children	Mercy Corps[29] and Save the Children
Implementation of projects benefiting both, host and displaced communities	• Establishment and management of Child Friendly Spaces with recreational activities for children and adolescents. • Outreach[30] activities and monitoring of protection gaps • Implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) within the areas of Child Friendly Spaces	World Vision Lebanon

Objective 7: Risks related to detention reduced and freedom of movement increased		
Finding instances of detention due to status or displacement	• Cooperation with civil society for monitoring and support to detainees • Following-up on cases with specific needs, including survivors of GBV, separated children and persons in need of emergency healthcare	UNHCR

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[29] Mercy Corps is a global humanitarian aid agency operating for transitional environments which have endured shocking situations such as natural disaster, economic collapse, or conflict.

[30] The two main types of outreach are physical: targeted visits, outreach volunteers, community spaces & centres, community-led structures, community-led initiatives; and virtual: Infolines/hotlines, call centre, WhatsApp and SMS, Facebook & other social media and dedicated web pages. (Source: UNHCR and UNDP, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67370).

	• Interventions for release • Legal assistance	
Identification, monitoring and assistance of detainees	• Visiting refugees in detention • Provision of social counselling and administrative follow-up	CLMC
Provision of legal assistance	• Cash assistance with renewals of entry permits. • Legal assistance, legal representation before Courts • Legal counselling	International Relief and Development (IRD) CLMC
Objective 8: Community self-management and participation		
Participation of PoCs in needs identification and service delivery	• Participatory assessments of protection concerns and needs with WGBM of different backgrounds • Training of community outreach workers • Meetings and cooperative planning with all stakeholders	UNHCR with its partners[31]
Implementation of projects benefiting host and displaced communities	• QIPs to benefit refugees and hosting communities • Establishing and managing community centres[32] for life skills training, information counselling, outreach, recreational activities, protection gaps assessment	UNHCR with its partners[33]
Representation of PoCs in leadership management structures	• Information, awareness raising and counselling activities, referral system • Social and recreational activities in community centres • Livelihood support activities such as skills development	UNHCR with DRC
Establishment of and running community-based	• Awareness sessions on CP, including psychosocial distress, SGBV, the prevention of child	UNHCR with Save the Children

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[31] The partners for this section are IOM for TCNs, NRC, World Vision Lebanon

[32] Community centres are safe and public places where WGBM of different backgrounds can assemble for recreation, social events, education and livelihood programmes, information exchange, and other objectives. They are founded with the main purpose of empowering refugee and host communities to enhance their participation in decisions that impinge on their lives. (Source: Community-Based Protection in Action https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/573d5bc64.pdf)

[33] The partners for this section are DRC, IOM for TCNs and NRC.

child protection mechanisms	involvement into armed forces, alternative discipline • Investigation, family mediation or conflict resolution and referrals of children who are victims or at risk of physical harm, SGBV, exploitation, psychosocial distress and mine risks • Monitoring CP issues • Training of social workers from schools, local NGOs and others on case management	
Coordination and leadership of local authorities in participatory engagement for planning related to absorbing Syrians	• Training on efficiently managing resource allocation • Proposing local initiatives seeking to support disadvantaged communities within the municipality • Initiating mechanisms for advocacy, coordination and fundraising • The commencement of community-based projects as a result of participatory planning at the municipal level	Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli (CISP/RI)
Objective 9: Self-reliance and livelihood improved		
Access of PoCs to work opportunities and assistance to displaced and host families to create and sustain livelihoods	• Provision of vocational training and PSS especially for women • Awareness sessions, life skills, education course in community centres • Traineeship and job placement services	UNHCR with DRC
	• Establishing of vocational and entrepreneurial training centres, targeting young people aged between 18 and 30 in particular • Awareness training for women on social and economic rights intended to enhance empowerment	CISP/RI
	• Training of job skills, strengthening of labour market, and discussion groups for promoting economic resilience	IRC
	• Business development skills for particularly for young women, and cash grants for small business start up	Save the Children
	• Computer training and English language training	Mercy Corps

Objective 10: Durable and humanitarian solutions are made available[34]	
Output	**Partners**
Identification of most vulnerable persons via fair and transparent processes	CLMC, IRD and Oxfam
Status Determination	AJEM[35], AMEL, Caritas[36], IRC, IRD, Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Oxfam
Benefit of refugees from resettlement and humanitarian admission	Oxfam and SHEILD[37]

Source: Source: Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP1) March 2012 (United Nations, n.d.(b): 45-50); Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP2) June 2012 (United Nations, 2014(a): 51-56); Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP3) September 2012 (United Nations, 2014(b): 62-67); Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP5) January to December 2013 (United Nations, 2013(a): 36-60); 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP6) (United Nations, (n.d.(a): 11-23); 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP6) (United Nations. (n.d.(a): 23).

3.2.2.1.2. Achievements and Impact

a. 2013 Achievements against RRP1-RRP5 Indicators

Table 6: Lebanon Achievements against RRP5 Indicators in Figures

Indicators	**Number**
Syrian refugees registered and awaiting registration	858,641
Children received PSS	238,570
PwSN referred for services	25,444
Children at-risk referred to CP actors for follow-up support and services	3,000

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[34] This objective has been approached starting from RRP6 of 2014.

[35] The Association Justice and Mercy (AJEM) is a Lebanese non-profit, non-political and non-sectarian nongovernmental organization engaged in the rights of prisoners in Lebanon in particular, and in human rights in general. It works with the refugees and asylum seekers in all Lebanese prisons without any discrimination. It operates against torture and all cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments, and endeavours to abolish the death penalty. (Source: World Coalition Against the Death Penalty http://www.worldcoalition.org/Association-Justice-et-Misricorde-AJEM.html ; UNHCR http://www.data.unhcr.org/syria-rrp6/partner.php?OrgId=148)

[36] Caritas Internationalis is a confederation of over 160 Catholic relief, development and social service organisations operating in almost every country worldwide. (Source: CARITAS Internationalis https://www.caritas.org/).

[37] Social, Humanitarian, Economical Intervention for Local Development (SHEILD) is a local, national humanitarian nongovernmental association promoting economic development by dint of supporting livelihood and capacity building of the marginalized communities. It also offers protection initiatives to vulnerable community groups mainly women and children. SHEILD operates during times of wars, armed conflicts and natural disasters, too. It responds to ensuing emergency situations and brings relief to affected populations. Source: SHEILD https://www.sheild-lb.org/).

Parents and other caregivers provided with PSS programmes and services	+40,000
Dignity kits distributed to Syrian women and girls	59,350
Social workers, safe-space animators and health professionals trained on SGBV prevention and response	+360

Source: (UNHCR, 2014(b): 9-10)

b. 2014 Achievements against RRP6 Indicators

Table 7: *Lebanon Achievements against RRP6 Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Syrian refugees registered and awaiting registration	850,000	**441,684**	52%
Persons provided with individual legal counselling	35,000	**35,436**	101%
Persons reached with legal awareness	110,000	**124,180**	113%
Persons benefited from empowerment activities	140,000	**194,786**	139%
PwSN receiving specialised support	85,000	**32,958**	39%
Persons submitted for resettlement of humanitarian admission	7,000	**7,247**	104%
Boys and girls benefitted from PSS	300,000	**381,867**	127%
Caregivers benefitted from PSS	200,000	**146,350**	73%
Boys and girls individually assisted with specialised services	2,500	**5,592**	224%
Vulnerable women and girls who received dignity kits	60,000	**29,323**	49%
Persons accessed SGBV prevention and/or support activities within safe space	95,000	**77,496**	82%
Service providers and frontline workers trained on SGBV prevention and response	4,000	**2,752**	96%
Refugees and host community members sensitised on SGBV services and referral pathways	200,000	**162,662**	81%

Source: (UNHCR, 2015(c)): 48).

3.2.2.2. Jordan Response Plan

3.2.2.2.1. Planned Objectives and Activities

Table 8: *Jordan RRP Funding Figures (millions of US$) 2013/2014*

Year	Required	Received	Percentage
2013	95	95	100%
2014	149	107	72%

Source: (UNHCR, 2014(b): 5); (UNHCR, 2015(c)): 32).

  In Jordan, the RRP with its six updates concentrated on the following strategic objectives and activities regarding refugee protection response.

Table 9: *Planned Objectives and Activities of UNHCR in the RRP -Jordan-*

Targets	Activities	Agency
Objective 1: Access of Syrians to the territory, seeking asylum and receiving protection, including protection from *refoulement*, violence, SGBV and exploitation		
Admission of all persons fleeing Syria and seeking access to Jordanian territories, whether through official border crossings or outside of official border crossings	- Supporting border authorities for the provision of suitable reception conditions to new arrivals - Capacity building activities for government officials on screening, registration and filing documentation concerning the new arrivals - Training and awareness sessions on the concept of access to protection and asylum for members of the Jordanian Armed Forces deployed at border crossing points - Monitoring of Jordanian open-border policy - Transportation from the border to the camp - Medical screening - Advocating for freedom of movement, including for those who did not enter the country through official border points - Intervention with authorities when obtaining reports of denial of access at border points - Information/counselling of PoCs fleeing Syria upon arrival	UNHCR with IOM

	• Developing counter-trafficking programmes • Preparing an outline document on current trafficking risk for Syrian refugees in Jordan and developing a prevention strategy.	IOM
Non-refoulement	• Intervention in reported cases via established channels and procedures with the Ministry of the Interior so as to prevent deportations and refoulement • Monitoring the voluntary returns organised by Jordanian authorities to secure that Syrians are repatriated after making a voluntary and informed decision	UNHCR
Registration in urban areas and camps	• Registration and documentation of all Syrians seeking asylum • Establishment of new registration centres in the northern governorates and mobile registration teams for the centre and the South to enhance UNHCR's capacity to register all urban Syrians in need of registration • Continuous registration of new arrivals at Zaatari camp at the household level and issuance of ration cards[38] • Introduction of biometrics into registration process • Increase of registration staff capacity to be capable of registering all Syrians in a timely manner and in accordance with registration procedures and standards, with a particular emphasis on vulnerable individuals	UNHCR
Protection interventions: Access to detention facilities	• Access to Syrians in detention and intervening to ensure that protection needs are met	UNHCR
Protection interventions: Monitoring of bailed out system[39]	• Monitoring and advocacy for the establishment of clear and transparent procedures of bailing out system from the camp established by the GoJ for Syrians entering illegally • Monitoring of bailed out cases in urban areas via outreach activities, protection follow up and intervention on claims of potential exploitation	UNHCR with IRC

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[38] The ration card is an official document entitling the holder to a ration of food, clothes, or other goods.
[39] The bailout system, allowing refugees to transfer from camp to host communities, with the support of a Jordanian sponsor, was introduced in July 2014 and suspended early 2015, with a first cut-off date of 14 July 2014.

Access to legal services	• Legal services, referrals and awareness raising workshops for Syrian refugees • Response to emergency calls through a hotline (open 24/7)	UNHCR with its partners[40]
Identification of and referral to sexual and other forms of GBV cases	• Identifying and documenting SGBV survivors in camp/transit sites and host communities • Managing GBV cases via provision of multi-sectoral services (legal/protection including shelter, health, social and psychosocial) for survivors of SGBV, and also through hotlines • Develop anti-trafficking programmes	UNHCR with its partners[41]
Reporting CP cases registered and responded to (including child labour, violence in school, violence at home, abuse, neglect and UAC/SC)	• Identifying, registering and documenting UAM/SC • Conducting BID assessment, family tracing and where necessary place in alternative care arrangement. • Identifying and responding to CP cases, providing services including educational services and life skills training • Evaluating vulnerabilities of the whole family where child labour cases are identified and referral to appropriate assistance	UNHCR with its partners[42]
Monitoring and reporting on serious protection concerns for children and adults and response	• Training partners on monitoring and reporting • Establishing functional system to record protection issues • Monitoring of serious protection concerns • Improving protection sensitisation and camp outreach for better identification and referral of protection cases	UNHCR with its partners[43]

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[40] The partners for this section are ARDD-Legal Aid, South Society for Special Education, Development and Training Foundation, UPP/JWU.

[41] The partners for this section are NHF, IMC, IRD, UNFPA, JHAS, Family Protection Department, Dar al Wafaq, JRF, JWU/UPP, IRC, UN Women.

[42] The partners for this section are NHF, IMC, SC International, UNICEF, UPP/JWU, INTERSOS, IRC, IFH, JRF, ACTED.

[43] The partners for this section are UNICEF, UNFPA, IRC, ACTED, DRC.

Objective 2: Mobilising communities and CBOs to respond to Syrian refugees' needs and to support self-reliance through the provision of social and PSS to vulnerable persons, particularly women and children		
Targets	**Activities**	**Agency**
Provision of support corresponding to the specific needs of adults or children with disabilities, vulnerable elderly, and persons at risk of developing definitive impairments	• Identifying and referral of vulnerable persons according to their needs • Provision of assistance tools, rehabilitation services (including physical rehabilitation) and counselling to persons with disabilities • Provision of peer support[44], family and individual counselling as well as PSS • Assessments of accessibility and advocacy	UNHCR with its partners[45]
Implemented of projects providing support in host communities	• Launching projects to enhance positive coexistence, integration, and tolerance for the mitigation of conflict among refugee and host communities • Strengthening of local government and civil society actors so as to encourage dialogue, peaceful co-existence and conflict-resolution skills • Implementation of QIPs in host community areas (rehabilitation of playgrounds, construction of roads, provision of utility heavy duty vehicles, refurbishment of municipal buildings) • Economic empowerment, capacity building and provision of life-skill development activities for Syrians and host communities • Recreational and life skills activities with community members and CBOs for children, women, men and youth	UNHCR with its partners[46]

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[44] Peer support connects people living with a chronic condition such as diabetes. People with a common illness are capable to share knowledge and experiences. Peer support has several forms such as phone calls, text messaging, home visits, group meetings, taking strolls together, and even grocery shopping. It complements the other health care services by creating the emotional, social and practical assistance essential for managing the disease and staying healthy. (Source: Peers for Progress http://peersforprogress.org/learn-about-peer-support/what-is-peer-support/)
[45] The partners for this section are NHF, MC, ZENID, HI, JHAS, IRC, MDM, IMC, INTERSOS, SC International, MPDL.
[46] The partners for this section are IRD, ICMC, MC, ZENID, UN Women, INTERSOS, MPDL, UPP, JRF.

Access to PSS	• Provision of community and family support (the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)[47] level 2 activities[48]) including recreational activities, life-skills activities and support groups with community members and CBOs to children, youth, women, men and elders • Provision of focused non-specialised support (IASC level 3 activities[49]) • Establishing of confidential spaces for case management and counselling • Establishing of child- youth and -friendly spaces and women spaces • Operating child, youth and women-friendly spaces (broken down in camp and urban settings)	UNHCR with its partners[50]

Objective 3: Equipping direct service providers and community members with timely, well-targeted information, knowledge and tools to respond to protection needs of affected population and host communities

Targets	Activities	Agency
Training and sensitising government officials on basic refugee protection principles, SGBV and CP	• Training of government entities (residency and border directorate, governor and sub-governor, military and law enforcement officials, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour) to sensitize officials on refugee protection principles, particularly on non-refoulement • Training of Family Protection Department, police, border patrols, MOH and other government officials on CP, SGBV and PSS	UNHCR with UNICEF UNFPA, IFH, IRC

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[47] The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is the unique, longest-standing and highest-level humanitarian coordination forum involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The IASC was established in June 1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance through ensuring coherence of preparedness and response efforts, formulating policies, and agreeing on priorities. It is chaired by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). (Source: IASC https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/).

[48] Level 2 Response: Emergency Response operations requiring regional augmentation of country level response capability.

Level 3 Response: Emergency Response operations requiring mobilisation of WFP global response capabilities in support of the relevant Country Office(s) and/or Regional Bureaux, i.e. a Corporate Response. (Source: WFP https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/278134b5c2d74f55bfe340764b3ab561/download/).

[49] "The IASC Principals have agreed that major sudden-onset humanitarian crises triggered by natural disasters or conflict which require system-wide mobilization (so-called 'Level 3/L3' emergencies) are to be subject to a Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Activation (henceforth referred to as 'L3 activation')". (Source: IASC, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/humanitarian-system-wide-emergency-activation-definition-and-procedures-iasc#:~:text=The%20IASC%20Principals%20have%20agreed,activation')%2C%20to%20ensure%20a

[50] The partners for this section are UNICEF, NHF UNFPA, Zenid, SC International, TDH, MC, UPP, IRC, Jordanian Association for Orphans and Widows Care, Kitab Al-Sunna, SC Jordan, Care International, IMC, WHO, JWU, IFH, JRF.

Supporting civil society structures' and humanitarian workers' capacity to respond to the protection needs of Syrian refugees in camps and host communities	• Training, technical assistance and mentoring in CP, SGBV, Psychological First Aid (PFA), Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA), referral pathways, SOPs and PSS for CBO workers in host communities • Training community mobilisers in CP, SGBV, PFA and PSEA in camps and host communities • Improving outreach capacity of national agency in charge of the camp management • Training humanitarian workers and other service providers in CP, SGBV, PFA, PSEA, referral pathways and SOPs • Training media personnel in CP, SGBV issues and "do no harm" practice	UNHCR with its partners[51]
Reaching awareness raising activities to community members	• Community based awareness activities for individuals on protection, CP, SGBV and PSS • Disseminating media messages on protection, CP, SGBV and PSS • Preparation and dissemination of information materials on protection, CP, SGBV and PSS • Provision of information to vulnerable individuals concerning available basic services • A live, twice a week radio programme providing life-saving information to urban Syrian refugees in Irbid and surrounding areas. • Youth training on radio techniques and reporting.	UNHCR with its partners[52]
Provision of functioning referral system to governorates	• Establishment of mapping and referral system of relevant services in specific geographic locations • Establishing national and camp level SOPs • Producing and regular updating service guides and referral leaflets • Staffing UNHCR help desks which operate in 5 locations in the northern part of the country so as to increase outreach capacity	UNHCR with its partners[53]

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[51] The partners for this section are UNICEF, IRD, TDH, NHF, WHO, IMC, SCI, International, UPP, UNFPA, IRC, HI, UN Women, DRC, JRF.

[52] The partners for this section are UNICEF, UNFPA, SCI, SC Jordan, NHF, UNESCO, TDH, UPP, IRC, Jordanian Association for Orphans and Widows Care, Kitab Al-Sunna, DRC, Care International, INTERSOS, Internews, ACTED

[53] The partners for this section are UNICEF, IMC, UNFPA, SC International, ACTED, UNESCO, ICMC, IRC, Internews

Objective 4: Durable and humanitarian solutions are made available[54]	
Targets	**Activities**
Priority for women and girls at risk, survivors of violence and/or torture, elderly refugees at risk, refugees with physical protection needs, refugees with medical needs or disabilities, children and adolescents at risk, refugees in need of family reunification and LGBTI persons.	• Enhancement of refugee status determination capacity • Development of referral pathways

Source: (United Nations, 2013(b): 25-28); 2014 Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP6) (United Nations. (n.d.(a): 28).

3.2.2.2.2. Achievements and Impact

a. <u>2013 Achievements</u>

Table 10: Jordan Achievements against RRP5 Indicators in Figures

Indicators	**Number**
Syrian refugees registered and awaiting registration	**576,354**
Children received PSS	**128,693**
Adults received PSS	**45,546**
UAC/SC and children at risk received multi-sectoral services	**4,670**
SGBV survivors referred to or supported with multi-sectoral services	**2,944**
Syrian refugees received legal counselling and legal advice	**13,315**
Community members reached with awareness-raising activities	**+122,000**
Governmental, civil society and humanitarian workers trained on refugee protection, child protection and SGBV	**9,500**

Source: (UNHCR, 2014(b): 20-21)

b. <u>2014 Achievements</u>

Table 11: Jordan Achievements against RRP6 Indicators in Figures

Indicators	**Target**	**Achieved**	**Percentage**
Syrian refugees registered	-	**46,511**[55]	-
Women, girls, boys and men benefiting from PSS services (level 2 and 3)	386,492	**352,004**	91%

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[54] This objective has been approached starting from RRP6 of 2014.
[55] reaching 622,865 as a total.

Women, girls, boys and men receiving legal information, counselling and/or representation	75,439	**56,700**	75%
Women, girls, boys and men with specific needs receiving specialised support	44,794	**15,175**	34%
Girls and boys benefited from multi-sectoral services	36,987	**26,665**	72%
Women, girls, boys and men SGBV survivors benefiting from case management services	18,142	**10,837**	60%
Persons submitted for resettlement or humanitarian admission	5,625	**6,086**	108%

Source: (UNHCR, 2015(c)): 36; UNHCR, 2018(i))

3.2.2.3. Turkey Response Plan

3.2.2.3.1. Planned Objectives and Activities

Table 12: Turkey RRP Funding Figures (millions of US$) 2013/2014

Year	Required	Received	Percentage
2013	46	34	75%
2014	82	28	35%

Source: (UNHCR, 2014(b): 5); (UNHCR, 2015(c)): 56).

In Turkey, the RRP with its six updates concentrated on the following strategic objectives and activities regarding refugee protection response.

Table 13: Planned Objectives and Activities of UNHCR in the RRP -Turkey-

Objective 1: Reception conditions improved		
Targets	**Activities**	**Agency**
Conducting and recording monitoring visits for POCs in satellite cities (the	• Ensure wider outreach and support protection and assistance needs of PoCs in satellite cities • Conduct regular visits to satellite cities to assess the protection situation and living conditions of Syrians	UNHCR and its partners[56]

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[56] The partners for this section are Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, Human Resources Development Foundation.

urban locations)	• Identifying and profiling the Syrians in urban locations, ensuring registration, profiling and related assessment of protection identification and needs for future considerations of individual status determination and durable solutions, comprising support on voluntary repatriation or other solutions when relevant • Undertaking UNHCR mandate functions for refugees in urban setting and identifying areas in which assistance is required/can be provided in conformity with asylum policies • Ensuring emergency protection and coordinating potential assistance delivery in urban settings	
Capacity-building to the authorities providing assistance and protection in the camps	• Provision of technical expertise and advisory support on protection and aid delivery, especially in relation to reception, registration, vulnerabilities, camp management, refugee outreach, PSS and refugee vocational activities • Ensuring registration, profiling and related assessment of protection identification and needs	UNHCR
Supporting government provision of material, psycho-social and legal assistance to PoCs	• Assist the government to ensure the continued civilian character of protection • Securing continuous training and awareness raising on international protection	UNHCR

Objective 2: Registration and profiling supported		
Targets	**Activities**	**Agency**
Registration of Syrian refugees: capacity building of authorities conducting registration in the urban context and camps	• Provision of technical expertise and advisory support on identification and registration of Syrians in camps and urban settings • Conducting reception and registration of POCs to ensure protection in satellite cities they are referred to • Assist the government to secure a consolidated data collection methodology for registration and profiling for vulnerabilities and needs	UNHCR

Registration of TCNs fleeing Syrian crisis and entering Turkey and assistance to those requesting evacuation or repatriation	• Monitoring the situation of TCNs at the border in coordination with local authorities and partner agencies • Provision of reception and transit assistance as appropriate • Facilitation of evacuation/repatriation assistance to country of origin • Post-arrival/ reintegration support for VoTs	IOM and partners

Objective 3: Conduct of RSD

Targets	Activities	Agency
Implementation of RSD procedures	• Strengthen UNHCR's RSD assessment procedure to improve the processing of cases and decisions	UNHCR

Objective 4: Strengthening protection of children and youth[57]

Targets	Activities
Monitoring and reporting on protection concern for all affected children and youth	• Development of a monitoring and reporting format and system • Training partners on monitoring of serious protection concerns and reporting • Launching joint GoT-led thematic missions to obtain a better understanding of the support requested by the GoT in the area of Education, CP, Early Childhood Development and PSS; hence, adjust response accordingly
Providing children and adolescents with PSS in education programmes	• Provision of safe, child-friendly learning environments so as to enhance educational, recreational, cultural and psychosocial interventions for children of different age groups • Provision of technical support to PSS and counselling for all school children in the camps, including mental health referrals • Adapting existing psychosocial training materials for teachers and service providers
Training and equipping adolescents in the camps to act as youth volunteers	• Procuring and distributing learning and recreational supplies to children and youth • Mobilising and training Syrian youth to organise extracurricular sport and recreation activities for children • Building the capacity of Kizilay social workers to support children with special needs • Participating in winterization initiatives with other UN agencies, such as supplies of warm clothes for children • Initiating mine-awareness education in collaboration with camp managers and other UN agencies

Source: (United Nations, 2013(b): 93-95; United Nations, n.d.(b): 67).

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[57] UNHCR in cooperation with UNICEF.

3.2.2.3.2. Achievements and Impact

a. 2013 Achievements

Table 14: Turkey Achievements against RRP5 Indicators in Figures

Indicators	Number
Syrian refugees registered	560,129
Refugee children in camps reached with activities facilitated by youth workers	19,704
Volunteers trained by youth workers to conduct activities with youth and children	657
Camp officials, social workers and Syrian women trained on PSS and SGBV	630
Government officials trained on international protection	519
Refugees in camps provided with safe and secure transportation assistance	15,503
Stranded migrants completed rapid screening, registration and fitness-to-travel checks and were assisted to repatriate back to their countries of origin	33

Source: (UNHCR, 2014(b): 31)

b. 2014 Achievements

Table 15: Turkey Achievements against RRP6 Indicators in Figures

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Syrians registered by the GoT	1,000,000	**1,552,839**	155%
Authorities and partners trained on International Refugee protection principles and standards	3,080	**1,961**	64%
WGBM provided with PSS	91,925	**3,158**	3%
Syrians whose voluntary return interviews were observed	41,300	**6,712**	16%
Community centres established or supported	11	**7**	64%
Person submitted for resettlement or a humanitarian admission	10,000	**5,550**	56%
Partner, government, and UN Staff trained on SGBV prevention and response and referral mechanisms	1,500	**1,517**	101%
Children and Youth participating in targeted programmes	103,500	**63,618**	61%

Source: (UNHCR, 2015(c)): 60).

3.3. UNHCR'S RESPONSE PLAN TO THE PROTECTION SECTOR UNDER REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN (3RP) (2015-2018)

3.3.1. Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan: Overview

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) coordinates the plans developed under the leadership of national governments of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq to guarantee protection, humanitarian aid and strengthen resilience (3RP Syria Crisis[58], 2018(c)).

The 3RP is a "nationally-led, regionally coherent framework" which comprises the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) as the Lebanon chapter, the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) as the Jordan chapter, and the country chapters of Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. All plans of 3RP countries are "developed, coordinated, and implemented with the full involvement of the respective governments". The 3RP is a "programme strategy" to act in response to refugee protection and humanitarian needs, and strengthen the resilience of persons, households, communities, and state bodies to encounter the impact of the Syria crisis on its neighbouring region. It is a broad "partnership platform for planning, advocacy, fundraising, information management and monitoring" which combines Syrian refugees; governments and impacted populations in the increasingly strained host countries; donors; and more than 240 national and international development and humanitarian partners in the respective countries (3RP Syria Crisis, 2018(a)).

The 3RP is a continuation for the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) having a more developed profile with new added elements. After the implementation of 6 RRPs, there have been four 3RPs -at the time of preparing this research- as follows:

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[58] The 3RP Syria Crisis is an official site provided by UNHCR and UNDP offering information about the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans. URL: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org.

Table 16: The 3RPs – Date of Launch

Name of 3RP	Date of Launch
3RP (2015-2016)	December 2014
3RP (2016-2017)	December 2015
3RP (2017-2018)	December 2016
3RP (2018-2019)	December 2017

Source: UNHCR and UNDP (3RP Syria Crisis, 2018(b)).

The 3RP represents a pattern shift from preceding regional response plans. First, it integrates humanitarian and resilience interventions in a single response platform. Second, it ensures alignment to national and local development planning frameworks and strengthens national ownership. Third, it rearranges investment in local delivery systems, especially municipalities. Finally, it sets up multi-year programming to improve financial predictability. The 3RP then demonstrates that integration of humanitarian and development capacities and resources is considered a priority in the pursuit for efficient responses to protracted crises. This approach was also endorsed by world leaders at the London Conference in February 2016 and at the Resilience Development Forum at the Dead Sea, Jordan, in November 2015 ((UNHCR, 2016(c)): 4).

The 3RP is fundamentally formed of two interlinked components: the 3RP refugee protection and humanitarian component and the 3RP resilience/stabilisation-based development component. The 3RP is a coherent strategy, with UNHCR guiding the refugee response and UNDP guiding the resilience response. (UNHCR and UNDP, 2015(b): 15).

The 3RP refugee protection and humanitarian component chiefly tackles the protection and assistance needs of refugees who live in urban, peri-urban and rural areas, alongside those living in camps and settlements. It mainly addresses their needs in all sectors. Equally important, it comprises the most vulnerable members of impacted communities. This component significantly attempts to strengthen the

approach of Community-Based Protection (CBP)[59] through recognising and responding to urgent support needs of shared services in impacted communities.

The 3RP resilience/stabilisation-based development component deals with the resilience and stabilisation needs of affected and vulnerable communities in all sectors. It aims at fostering the capacities of national and subnational service distribution systems and strengthening the ability of governments to manage the crisis response. It also offers the strategic, technical and policy support to enhance national responses (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(b):10).

The concept of resilience is based on the consideration that under stressful or negative situations, some people manage and surmount them while others fail to do so. The term "resilience" describes the traits of those who manage and cope well -to some extent- their personal characteristics, the conditions of their family life, their social and moral supports et cetera. The term "resilience" per se is traced to the natural sciences and describes the ability of a material or product to turn to its original shape after being stressed or stretched: when applied to people it depicts the ability of the person to "bounce back" after hard or traumatic experiences. (UNHCR (n.d.(a)): 3)

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[59] "Community-based protection (CBP) puts the capacities, agency, rights and dignity of persons of concern at the centre of programming. It generates more effective and sustainable protection outcomes by strengthening local resources and capacity and identifying protection gaps through consultation. UNCHR takes a community-based approach in all its work with the people it serves. Through consultation and participation, communities engage meaningfully and substantively in all programmes that affect them, and play a leading role in change. UNHCR recognizes that, without the engagement of persons of concern, external intervention alone cannot achieve sustained improvement in their lives." (Source: UNHCR, Emergency Handbook. https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/50478/community-based-protection).

3.3.2. 3RP Protection Response Plan in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey

3.3.2.1. Lebanon Response Plan

3.3.2.1.1. Planned Objectives and Activities

Table 17: Lebanon 3RP Funding Figures (millions of US$) 2015/2018

Year	Required	Received	Percentage
2015	147	85	58%
2016	173	113	65%
2017	188	112	59%
2018	217	130	60%

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(c)): 40); (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(a): 38); (UNHCR and UNDP, May 2018: 38); (UNHCR, 2019(a): 8).

The Lebanon Response has retained the same objectives in both consecutive 3RPs: 2015-2016 and 2017-2020.

Table 18: Planned Objectives and Activities of LCRP (2015-2020) [60]

Outcome and Targets	Output and Activities
Respect to the basic rights of persons displaced from Syria and access to justice and legal stay	Access to territory
	Access to justice, documentation, and legal remedies
	Favourable protection environment (strengthening administrative institutions and practices)
Empowerment of communities to contribute to their own protection solutions and encouragement for community self-management	CBP and empowerment
	Collective sites management and coordination
Ensuring access to protection and services, identifying the most	Access to services for PwSN
	Identification of protection vulnerabilities

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[60] This includes 2 LCRPs: Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016 and Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020. Concerning both of them, the lead ministry is Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and the coordinating agencies are UNHCR, UNICEF and UNFPA.

vulnerable WGBM, and realising durable solutions	Resettlement
	Mine Action
Protection of vulnerable girls and boys from violence, exploitation, abuse and neglect through equitable access to quality CP services	Engaging communities
	Addressing CP violations
	Strengthening national systems
Reducing the risks and consequences of SGBV and improving access to quality services	Access of individuals at risk and survivors to quality services
	Strengthening community's resilience to SGBV and reducing vulnerability (Actively engaging communities to address SGBV)
	Strengthening national system through capacity building and generation of knowledge

Source: (The GoL and the UN, 2015: 101-102; 2017: 115-133).

3.3.2.1.2. Achievements and Impact

a. <u>LCRP 2015</u>

Table 19: *2015 Achievements against LCRP Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Children provided with quality information	400,900	**334,154**	83%
Caregivers provided with quality information	170,272	**445,150**	261%
Boys and girls received structured PSS	302,001	**135,027**	45%
Male and female caregivers received structured psychosocial support	66,495	**45,382**	68%
Male and female adolescents benefitted from life-skills programming	58,956	**23,793**	40%
Children assisted through case management	9,972	**6,017**	60%
Children and adult community members mobilised to promote CP and PSS	9,454	**11,296**	119%
CP actors trained on CP standards	1,989	**3,410**	171%
Non-CP actors trained on CP standards	3,792	**1,908**	50%
Individuals provided with individual legal counselling	125,377	**37,908**	30%
Individuals participating in community centre and community-based activities	214,090	**135,705**	63%
Community-self management structures established in collective sites	608	**608**	100%
PwSN (excl. Children and SGBV survivors) identified and supported through case management services	57,771	**9,812**	17%

Individuals submitted for resettlement and humanitarian admission	9,000	**13,312**	148%
Adolescents at risk involved in GBV risk reduction interventions	43,400	**30,548**	70%
Community members sensitised on GBV and referral pathways	277,349	**183,433**	66%
Individuals participated in community-led initiatives to reduce risks	23,390	**7,494**	32%
Individuals reached by mobile services	81,940	**88,966**	109%
Individuals who accessed static safe spaces	73,211	**39,261**	54%
Men and boys involved in SGBV prevention initiatives	21,147	**1,366**	6%

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(c)):43).

b. <u>LCRP 2016</u>

Table 20: *2016 Achievements against LCRP Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	**Target**	**Achieved**	**Percentage**
Individuals who benefitted from counselling and assistance to obtain civil, legal stay or other documentation	250,000	**230,040**	92%
Displaced persons and vulnerable individuals engaged in community-based activities	320,000	**368,545**	115%
Individuals benefitted from individual assistance and services	50,000	**24,787**	50%
Individuals received legal counselling on obtaining legal stay documentation	30,000	**16,126**	54%
Individuals received individual legal counselling on birth registration	50,000	**29,731**	59%
Interventions implemented to mitigate protection concerns and ensure access to services (including referrals)	20,000	**16,530**	83%
Individuals reached through awareness sessions	309,328	**366,230**	118 %
Individuals benefitting from individual counselling and case management	10,916	**16,014**	147 %
Boys and girls referred from community-based programmes to case management and focused PSS programmes	14,000	**12,793**	91%
Girls and boys sensitised on CP and PSS	187,000	**374,096**	200%
Girls and boys benefitted from structured community-based child protection, PSS and life-skills programmes	125,000	**201,666**	161%

Caregivers/community members sensitised on CP/PSS	215,470	**290,068**	135%
Caregivers benefitted from caregivers' programmes and parenting support groups	100,000	**71,394**	71%
Girls and boys at high risk who received focused PSS and life-skills programmes	27,682	**23,046**	83%
Girls and boys assisted through case management (receiving specialist child protection support)	8,304	**9,865**	119 %
Individuals accessed PSS and individual services in safe spaces	120,000	**75,952**	63%
Community members engaged in GBV awareness activities	250,000	**324,838**	130%
Actors trained demonstrating an increased knowledge on GBV	4,000	**7,631**	191 %
Community leaders and gatekeepers trained/engaged on GBV activities	4,500	**1,556**	35%
Community members involved in risk identification and mitigation	10,906	**9,148**	84%
Individuals sensitised on GBV	237,900	**309,319**	130%
Individuals trained on child protection	2,550	**7,338**	287%
# of individuals (girls, boys and caregivers) reached with community mobilization, awareness or information	402,470	**664,189**	165%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(a): 42). (The Inter-Agency Information Management Unit, 22 March 2017: 2)

c. <u>LCRP 2017</u>

Table 21: *2017 Achievements against LCRP Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	**Target**	**Achieved**	**Percentage**
Individuals who benefitted from legal counselling, assistance and representation regarding legal stay	40,000	**37,839**	95%
Individuals who benefitted from counselling, legal assistance and legal representation regarding civil registration including birth registration, marriage	70,000	**96,157**	137%
Individuals benefitting from community-based interventions	61,491	**58,661**	95%
Individuals supported, trained, and monitored to engage in community-based mechanisms	4,728	**5,437**	115%
PwSN receiving specific support (non-cash)	16,831	**20,056**	119%
Interventions implemented to reduce SGBV risks and ensure access to quality services	390,125	379,463	97%

Boys and girls at risk and survivors of violence, exploitation and abuse accessing an improved and equitable prevention and response	613,289	487,000[61]	79%
WGBM at risk and survivors accessing SGBV prevention and response services in safe spaces	140,000	**97,361**	70%
WGBM sensitised on SGBV	250,000	**282,102**	113%
Boys and girls accessing focused PSS and/or assisted through CP case management services	53,788	**45,659**	85%
Caregivers accessing CP prevention (caregivers' programmes)	104,711	**52,180**	50%
Boys and girls accessing community-based PSS	177,183	**172,764**	98%
Boys, girls and caregivers reached on key CP issues	613,289	**448,997**	73%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, May 2018: 43) (The Inter-Agency Information

Management Unit, 2018(a): 1)

d. <u>LCRP 2018</u>

Table 22: 2018 Achievements against LCRP Indicators in Figures

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Individuals who benefitted from legal counselling, assistance and representation regarding legal stay	40,000	**30,497**	76%
Individuals who benefitted from counselling, legal assistance and legal representation regarding civil registration including birth registration, marriage	91,000	**74,515**	81%
Individuals benefitting from community-based interventions	67,640	**27,070**	40%
Individuals supported, trained, and monitored to engage in community-based mechanisms	5,201	**3,324**	63%
PwSN receiving specific support (non-cash)	16,000	**13,851**	86%
WGBM at risk and survivors accessing SGBV prevention and response services in safe spaces	140,000	**83,868**	59%
WGBM sensitised on SGBV	286,750	**135,478**	47%
Boys and girls accessing focused PSS and/or assisted through CP case management services	24,000	**18,733**	78%

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[61] Children receiving more than one service may be counted more than once.

Caregivers engaged in activities to promote wellbeing and CP	29,262	**52,997**	181%
Boys and girls accessing community-based CP activities	91,445	**129,186**	141%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, 2019(a): 2)

3.3.2.2. Jordan Response Plan

3.3.2.2.1. Planned Objectives and Activities

Table 23: Jordan 3RP Funding Figures (millions of US$) 2015/2018

Year	Required	Received	Percentage
2015	155	115	74%
2016	170	96	56%
2017	183	82	44%
2018	105	112	107%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(a): 48); (UNHCR, 2016(c)): 50); (UNHCR and UNDP, May 2018: 48); (UNHCR, 2019(a): 9).

The Jordan Response has retained the same objectives in the three consecutive 3RPs: 2015, 2016-2018 and 2018-2020.

Table 24: Planned Objectives and Activities of JRP: 2015-2020 [62]

Refugee Response	Resilience Response
Objective 1	
Strengthening and developing national and sub-national protection mechanisms which meet the international and social protection needs of vulnerable communities within the governorates most affected by the Syrian crisis	
Activities	
• Strengthen national procedures and mechanisms to secure access of refugees to the Jordanian territories, seeking asylum and understanding their rights and obligations	• Strengthening and expanding quality services and governmental and non-governmental agencies' prevention and response to SGBV in accordance with

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[62] This includes 3 JRPs: Jordan Response Plan 2015, Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018 and Jordan Response Plan 2018-2020.

• Ensuring refugee registration, documentation and profiling • Strengthening Syrian families and communities through quality PSS interventions, safe spaces, community centres, engagement and empowerment to contribute to their own protection solutions, while improving systems for identification and assistance for the most vulnerable WGBM. • Supporting community participation and self-management • Building community capacity • Reducing and mitigating the risks and consequences of SGBV experienced by WGBM, and improving the quality of response, in accordance with survivor-centred approach and Age, Gender and Diversity (AGD) principles. • Increasing equitable access for boys and girls affected by the Syria crisis to quality CP interventions. • Responding to needs of individuals with disabilities, elderly, and all vulnerable persons through referral systems, and targeted assistance • Meeting the basic household needs of refugees in camp and non-camp settings through the provision of in-kind[63] or monetised voucher assistance • Ensuring access to durable solutions	survivor-centred approach and AGD principles • Promoting protective environment that prevents exploitation, abuse and neglect, eliminates child labour, and responds to the needs of vulnerable children • Providing children in conflict with the law with community-based services for their rehabilitation and reintegration within their societies • Strengthening the protective environment through improving capacity and outreach; and reducing social tensions in the host communities • Strengthening community-based multisectoral protection systems through outreach and community mobilisation. • Ensuring that vulnerable groups (including elderly, survivors of trafficking, and persons with disabilities) have improved access to quality social protection services. • Prevention and response to the problem of drug abuse among children and adults in Jordan.

Objective 2
Improving social protection systems and poverty alleviation mechanisms for vulnerable people affected by the conflict so as to ensure that basic household needs are met
Activities

• Providing life-saving basic needs assistance to Syrian refugee households and vulnerable families impacted by the crisis inside the	• Expanding NAF, MOSD, Zakat Fund and other cash and in-kind assistance programmes, comprising cash assistance 'graduation' and social protection platform programmes to reach vulnerable Jordanians in communities affected by the Syria crisis. • Providing secure, sustainable and hygienic housing units to vulnerable Jordanian families

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[63] In-kind assistance: Flows of goods and services with no payment in money or debt instruments in exchange.

camps and in non-camp settings.	• Ensuring access to quality services to persons with disability through Disability Rehabilitation Centre (Shelters)
• Winterization Support	• Providing secure, sustainable and hygienic housing units to vulnerable Jordanian families and furnishing and refurbishing existing social housing units
	• Mitigation of violence and social tensions in host communities

Source: (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation of Jordan. (n.d.(a)): 62-68; 124-128; (n.d.(b)): 118-127; 33-35; (n.d.(c)): 101-104).

3.3.2.2.2. Achievements and Impact

a. JRP 2015

Table 25: 2015 Achievements against JRP Indicators in Figures

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
women safe spaces operational	38	**95**	250%
WGBM participated in information sessions or receiving information about services	838,407	**556,147**	66%
WGBM received rehabilitation sessions and counselling	4,188	**3,261**	78%
WGBM accessed and benefited from PSS services (level 2 &3)	278,203	**351,127**	126%
WGBM sensitised on CP issues, services available and referral pathways	339,547	**131,127**	39%
Children at risk and UAC/SC provided with multi-sectoral services	21,025	**2,628**	12%
WGBM sensitised on SGBV issues, services available and referral pathways	370,735	**51,640**	14%
SGBV survivors benefited from timely safe, confidential and survivor centred case management and multi-sectoral services	12,262	**8,935**	73%
WGBM submitted for third country resettlement	6,000	**10,122**	169%
WGBM received legal information, counselling and/or representation	46,634	**46,634**	100%

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(c)): 53)

b. JRP 2016

Table 26: *2016 Achievements against JRP Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
WGBM participated in information sessions or receiving information about services	511,075	**644,300**	126%
WGBM received rehabilitation sessions and counselling	8,312	**10,210**	123%
WGBM benefitted from PSS services (level 2 & 3)	511,640	**350,189**	68%
women safe spaces operationalised	386	**150**	39%
individuals sensitised on CP issues, services available and referral pathways	284,928	**187,491**	66%
UAC/SC, boys and girls at risk provided with multi-sectoral services	16,157	**12,003**	74%
WGBM sensitised on SGBV core principles and referral pathways	324,508	**67,796**	21%
SGBV survivors benefitted from timely safe, confidential and survivor-centred case management and multi-sectoral services	26,429	**9,657**	37%
WGBM submitted for third country resettlement	9,200	**28,265**	307%
WGBM receiving legal information, counselling and/or representation	35,693	**47,900**	134%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(a): 52)

c. JRP 2017

Table 27: *2017 Achievements against JRP Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
WGBM participating in sensitisation sessions or receiving information about services	620,921	**299,852**	48%
WGBM receiving assistive tools or devices	10,371	**7,385**	71%
WGBM in MHH & FHH with protection concerns receiving urgent or emergency cash assistance	13,379	**10,706**	80%
WGBM sensitised on SGBV core principles and referral pathways	171,437	**10,333**	6%
WGBM survivors of SGBV who access case management and multi-sectoral services	19,249	**5,316**	28%
WGBM benefiting CP general awareness raising (including inter-agency information	256,492	**441,773**	172%

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campaigns) (one off events, non-structured, community events)			
Girls and boys who are receiving specialised child protection case management and multi-sectoral services	11,868	**15,246**	128%
Safe, community and Makani spaces operational (camps, urban, rural, by-sub district)	260	**176**	68%
WGBM with safe access to sustained and structured PSS activities (IASC 2 and 3) (camp/urban/ other affected populations)	219,849	**107,298**	49%
WGBM receiving legal information, counselling and/or representation	31,205	**54,335**	174%
WGBM submitted for third country resettlement	26,000	**8,139**	31%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, May 2018, 51)

    d. <u>JRP 2018</u>

Table 28: *2018 Achievements against JRP Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Girls and boys participating in structured, sustained child protection activities	151,629	**82,978**	55%
WGBM sensitized on SGBV through awareness raising and outreach activities	99,347	**20,573**	21%
WGBM participating in awareness activities concerning obligations, services	263,328	**87,046**	33%
WGBM (include survivors) accessing SGBV prevention and response services in safe spaces	21,535	**12,654**	59%
WGBM receiving legal counseling and/or legal representation	62,101	67,658	108%
Girls and boys who are receiving specialized child protection case management and multi-sectoral services	19,068	6,867	36%
WGBM accessing sustained and structured PSS services (level 2 & 3)	79,095	24,897	31%
WGBM benefiting from child protection communication campaigns and /or community events (one-off awareness raising events, outreach with CP messages, information related to CP services)	278,494	59,800	21%
FHH & MHH households with protection concerns receiving urgent or emergency cash assistance	11,521	1,512	13%

WGBM receiving assistive tools or devices	6,087	606	9%

Source: (UNHCR Inter-Agency Coordination Unit, 10 March 2019) and (UNHCR Jordan, 2018).

3.3.2.3. Turkey Response Plan

3.3.2.3.1. Planned Objectives and Activities

Table 29: *Turkey 3RP Funding Figures (millions of US$) 2015/2018*

Year	Required	Received	Percentage
2015	85	48	56%
2016	111	28	25%
2017	204	91	44%
2018	225	177	79%

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(c)): 32); (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(a): 30); (UNHCR and UNDP, May 2018: 30); (UNHCR, 2019(a): 7).

The Turkey chapter has retained the same objectives in the three consecutive 3RPs: 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018.

Table 30: *Planned Objectives and Activities of TRP: 2015-2018*

Refugee Response	Resilience Response
Objective 1	
Continuing ability of Syrian refugees to access the territory and be provided with effective protection under a legal framework	
Outputs and Activities	
• Improving access to territory, justice and international protection for all Syrian nationals and stateless persons from Syria • Guaranteeing access to justice, legal remedies, necessary services and protection under the national law for all refugees. • Ensuring sensitive protection for all refugees disaggregating gender regarding registration and verification • Supporting authorities to identify and refer cases in need of a resettlement solution	• Strengthening legal aid mechanisms and gender-sensitive legal assistance and remedies through capacity-building and awareness-raising to ensure availability to refugees • Identifying resettlement and protection solutions

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• Improving information and access to civil documentation, notably for marriage, birth and death certificates.	

Objective 2
CBP: Strengthening, engaging, and empowering families and communities as a means to contribute to their own protection solutions, while identifying vulnerable WGBM and addressing their needs by providing apposite protection and assistance channels

Outputs and Activities	
• Promoting existing mechanisms for the identification of PwSN so that individuals are identified and referred to relevant intervention/services, comprising community-based support groups of adolescents, youth, adults, elderly and parents • Supporting and stimulating community self-management, representation and leadership in urban, peri-urban, rural and camp settings • Maintaining and reinforcing outreach and information dissemination mechanisms to support two-way communication and raising awareness of the refugee and host populations as well as of the humanitarian community • Provision of CBP and PSS interventions for WGBM impacted by the Syria crisis. • Increasing capacity of adolescents and youth to exercise their rights and potential fully for self-protection	• Continued and reinforced support to national institutions and partners for the purpose of providing targeted assistance and supporting the most vulnerable refugees and host communities • Supporting local partner institutions so as to strengthen comprehensive support services, specifically PSS, CBP and engagement for WGBM and to enhance opportunities to promote social cohesion, reciprocally beneficial relationships and peaceful co-existence • Promoting and supporting community self-management and representation

Objective 3
Mitigation of the risks and consequences of SGBV experienced by WGBM, and improvement of the access to quality services

Outputs and Activities	
• Increasing the access of refugees and most vulnerable affected communities to information on their rights, safe, confidential and quality multi-sectoral SGBV services and support programmes such as on child marriages, referral mechanisms, and to relevant national protection mechanisms adapted to their AGD • Mitigating and reducing risks to SGBV by means of community-based initiatives and increased capacity of all humanitarian workers in relevant sectors	• Strengthening capacity of government actors and services in all sectors to effectively respond to increased SGBV caseload • Implementing national policies that address SGBV prevention and response in accordance with the national legal framework and international standards

• Access of survivors of SGBV to expanded support programmes	

Objective 4
CP: Reinforcing CP for girls and boys affected by the Syria crisis and providing more equitable access to quality CP interventions
Outputs and Activities

• Promptly identifying children at risk and referral to CP specialised services in accordance with the national legal framework • Conducting enhanced evidence-based advocacy on key CP issues, including child rights violations • Providing community-based CP interventions and services for girls and boys affected by the Syria crisis including PSS	• Strengthening capacity of CP actors and national services, and enhancing mechanisms to prevent and respond to CP risks, including inter-sectoral coordination, particularly in emergencies, in the context of the existing legislation • Creating improved life opportunities for Syrian and Turkish impacted adolescents by dint of peer support for social adaptation, youth mobilisation and advocacy, to enhance social inclusion and reduce CP risks

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, 2015(a): 17-25; 2016: 17-27; 2017(b): 17-28; 2018(b): 18-25; 2019(b): 20-27).

3.3.2.3.2. Achievements and Impact

a. TRP 2015

Table 31: 2015 Achievements against Turkey Chapter Indicators in Figures

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Partners supported with specialised activities to promote social engagement and cohesion of youth	8	**3**	38%
Persons trained on strengthening SGBV response	725	**4,200**	579%
Individuals trained on access to territory and international protection	650	**3,351**	516%
Youth attending specialised training courses	15,461	**15,461**	100%
Syrians submitted for resettlement by UNHCR	10,000	**8,099**	81%
Syrians registered by the GoT	2,503,549	**2,503,549**	100%
Community centres established or supported	12	**11**	92%
Partners empowered to support CBP and PSS interventions	17	**12**	71%

Persons benefitting from services in the community centres	138,474	**138,274**	100%
Individuals reached through information campaigns or cross-cultural activity events	126,000	**24,752**	20%
Persons provided with SGBV brochures	873,500	**879,400**	101%
Applicants who received PSS (individual and in groups)	42,000	**22,064**	53%
Children who receive CP services	189,400	**56,182**	30%
Most vulnerable children (cases) supported through government services	8,800	**1,207**	14%

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(c): 35)

b. TRP 2016

Table 32: *2016 Achievements against Turkey Chapter Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Syrian individuals registered by the GoT	2,750,000	**2,814,631**	102%
Syrian refugees submitted for resettlement or humanitarian admission	17,000	**16,677**	98%
Children participated in structured, sustained CP or PSS programmes	90,000	**135,583**	151%
Individuals who received support, including PSS and specialist support	153,000	**17,640**	12%
Individuals benefitted from services in the Community/ Multi-service centres	164,000	**477,168**	291%
Partners empowered to support CBP and PSS interventions	15	**48**	320%
Vulnerable individuals identified and referred	11,205	**35,242**	315%
Persons reached through information campaigns, activities to raise public awareness on rights, entitlements, services, assistance	392,000	**414,515**	106%
Persons trained on CP mechanisms from government and service providers	1,367	**2,648**	194%
Persons trained on strengthening SGBV response from government and service providers	875	**1,085**	124%
Children with protection needs identified and referred to specialised services	1,100	**652**	59%
Individuals identified and referred for targeted assistance	10,000	**26,791**	268%
Persons reached through information, education and communication materials	2,750,000	**127,500**	5%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, 2017(a): 34) and (UNHCR, 2016(i))

c. <u>TRP 2017</u>

Table 33: *2017 Achievements against Turkey Chapter Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Protection monitoring missions and visits conducted (to the authorities, communities, and camps)	10,000	**2,205**	22%
Individuals benefitting from services in community centres / multi-service centres / multi-functional spaces / field / protection outreach offices	645,420	**717,207**	111%
PwSN identified and referred to government and partner services	67,370	**118,021**	175%
Persons reached through information campaigns, participatory evaluations, activities to sensitise the public on rights, entitlements, services and assistance (including on social cohesion)	904,450	**595,851**	66%
POCs provided with individual legal aid, legal support and legal assistance	16,295	**48,257**	296%
Youth and adolescents attending empowerment programmes (peer and community support sessions)	230,000	**145,433**	63%
Individuals who are survivors of GBV receiving support, including PSS and specialised support (individual or in groups)	15,184	**76,406**	503%
Persons reached by all actors through training, sessions, workshop, events on strengthening GBV prevention and response from government and non-government actors	8,780	**10,199**	116%
Persons reached through community-based initiatives for prevention and mitigation of GBV	120,708	**18,793**	16%
Children with protection needs identified and referred to services	80,655	**205,749**	255%
Children participating in structured, sustained CP or PSS programmes (individuals and in groups)	124,650	**115,225**	92%

Source: (UNHCR and UNDP, May 2018: 37) (UNHCR, 2018(b): 1)

Table 34: *2018 Achievements against Turkey Chapter Indicators in Figures*

Indicators	Target	Achieved	Percentage
Community centres supported	248	248	100%
individuals benefitting from protection services in community centres	824,232	574,306	69%
youth and adolescents attending empowerment programmes (peer and community support sessions)	220,850	121,696	55%
Syrian refugees/vulnerable host community member provided with individual legal aid/legal assistance	51,749	32,644	63%
individual persons with specific needs identified and referred	108,419	38,609	35%
individuals receiving material assistance to meet their urgent protection needs target	50,060	30,549	61%
individual persons assisted through case management service	86,228	19,100	22%
individual GBV survivors receiving support, including PSS and specialized support	15,130	36,118	238%
individuals reached through community-based initiatives for prevention and mitigation of GBV	93,900	37,521	39%
children with protection needs identified and assessed	168,400	88,387	52%
children who are referred to specialized services	49,000	53,657	109%
children participating in structured, sustained child protection or psycho-social support (PSS) programmes	122,000	120,653	99%
individuals trained on child protection mechanisms and PSS in emergencies	3,215	5,262	164%
Persons reached through information campaigns, participatory evaluations, activities to sensitise the public on rights, entitlements, services and assistance	884,700	519,417	59%

(UNHCR Turkey, 21 January 2019: 1); (UNHCR and Global Protection Cluster, 31 December 2018: 2); (UNDP, 26 June 2019: 16).

CHAPTER FOUR

4. EVALUATION OF UNHCR'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE RRPS AND THE 3RPS IN LEBANON, JORDAN, AND TURKEY

This research tends to evaluate UNHCR's efficiency in the international protection of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. According to the UN, the term "evaluation" is

"An assessment, conducted as systematically and impartially as possible, of an activity, project, programme, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operational area or institutional performance. It analyses the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results by examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality using appropriate criteria such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability." (UNHCR, 2016(a): 4).

It is significant to note that this thesis is concerned with UNHCR's efficiency in the Protection Sector as a criterion of evaluation. Meaningfully, the term "efficiency" is in most cases confused with the term "effectiveness". For that reason, it is crucial to distinguish between the meanings of the two buzzwords which are commonly misused and misinterpreted. In general terms, borrowing from Oxford dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2019), they are defined as follows:

- **Effective** (adj.): Successful in producing a desired or intended result.
- **Efficient** (adj.): Achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense.

The difference between effectiveness and efficiency can be construed through their different concentration on intents and purposes. The first focuses on getting to the expected result; yet, the second concentrates on the manner of performing without wasting time or energy. In the context of this research, effectiveness is defined as any

evidence demonstrating depth and scale of results in the lives of refugees; however, efficiency is conceived as any example demonstrating how the operational model responds to the use of input resources which can maximise scale of outputs and adequate outreach. The operational models in this frame of reference are the response plans of RRPs and 3RPs.

This part will examine the Protection Sector in both operational models: RRPs and 3RPs. In the first part, RRP1-RRP5 (2012-2013) and RRP6 (2014) will be separately scrutinised. In the second part however, the 3RPs will be concurrently analysed according to the protection categories as well as their indicators.

The first part will not be divided into protection categories on the grounds that the first response plan, RRP1-RRP5 (2012-2013) was an immediate one set in an attempt to urgently respond to the escalating crisis. It is crucial to observe that this plan had repeatedly been updated six times as it was still unshaped. This periodical update mainly occurred owing to the nascent deepening plight which had overwhelmingly been requiring joint and intensified efforts in order to be able to respond to the unprecedented refugee flow and the unmanageable crisis. For that reason, this plan consisted primarily of main protection elements for maintaining favourable environment and fair protection processes and documentation as well as security from violence and exploitation given that not all of these elements had indicators in LJT[64] plans along with the absence of target figures.

RRP6 was the turning point where UNHCR managed to shape this response into an advanced plan so as to be able to exhaustively handle the emergencies. Starting from this plan, the achievements against protection indicators have occurred with respect to anticipated target figures. RRP6 paved the way for patterning a new response system that builds on the previous and embarks on other necessary and complementary plans demanding resilience as an indispensible element alongside basic protection elements. Resilience then has been momentously considered in the 3RPs by

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[64] LJT is an abbreviation for Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.

concentrating on empowerment and community mobilisation as requisites to facilitate and sustain it.

4.1. THE PROTECTION SECTOR IN THE RRPS

4.1.1. RRP1-RRP5 (2012-2013)

It is evident that during the first years of the conflict in Syria and the ensuing influx in the neighbouring LJT, all of the three countries have concentrated on access to territory and registration as primary elements of protection in RRP1-RRP5 between 2012 and 2013. This response plan uniquely lacked target figures for its achievements owing to the nascence of the war in Syria and the ongoing mass-influx. For that reason, a full assessment of the UNHCR's efficiency in this plan has no reference to specific target figures.

For maintaining favourable protection environment and fair protection processes and documentation, UNHCR managed to establish its presence at land borders to advocate for access to territory, including for PRS, and to support authorities in the enhancement of border management. Equally important, UNHCR acted to expand the registration capacity by opening new registration centres, employing mobile registration teams, providing transportation assistance, supporting registration for hospitalised persons or persons with disabilities, decreasing the waiting period of refugee registration and strengthening information outreach on registration procedures. For example, these procedures have contributed to the elimination of registration backlogs in Jordan, so that Syrians are registered on the same day that they first approach registration centres. In addition, the introduction of biometric technology (iris scan) starting from 2013 as part of the registration process in urban registration centres has significantly advanced the registration capacity.

As far as the framework of security from violence and exploitation is concerned, UNHCR developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the provision of services to SGBV survivors as well as for child protection. It identified case management agencies in each governorate and developed referral pathways to enable

safe and confidential access to services. It also organised information campaigns and disseminated leaflets among communities and frontline workers. It arranged training for social workers, safe-space animators and health professionals on SGBV prevention and response.

Concerning child protection, UNHCR provided psychosocial support programmes and services to boys and girls, as well as parents and other caregivers. It managed to refer UAC/SC, other children at-risk and also children with the most pressing specific needs to child protection actors for follow-up support and multi-sectoral services. It attempted to address key child protection concerns through training and information materials. The Protection Sector of UNHCR also works closely with national child protection services to ensure that children receive appropriate assistance.

It should be noted that most of these activities have correspondingly been performed in LJT. The contents of UNHCR's operation in these countries have fairly been equivalent. However, the different social, economic, political contexts of the three countries have shaped UNHCR's functioning on their respective territories. It is also crucial to mention that Jordan and Turkey were establishing camps for refugees, whereas Lebanon completely rejected having refugee camps on its territories.

It is highly important to dwell on the fact that neither Lebanon nor Jordan is a signatory to the 1951 Convention; that is, they are not asylum countries. They are solely signatories to Memoranda of Understanding with UNHCR which is the responsible to act on account of refugees. Accordingly, in both of these countries, UNHCR is considered the provider of first protection response in the RRPs. Conversely, Turkey, a state-party to the Refugee Convention, has determinedly introduced Temporary Protection to Syrian refugees although it adopts the geographical restriction in the Convention to 'events occurring in Europe'. In Turkey, UNHCR works closely with the national authorities in the Protection Sector. It leads the response along with the Turkish government for example by supporting the authorities to expand registration of urban Syrians through mobile registration centres. It has also established a working group on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

to support authorities to develop strategies, information materials, manuals and SOPs to strengthen prevention and response mechanisms.

4.1.2. RRP6 (2014)

It is evident that, in 2014, LJT have continuously concentrated on access to territory and registration as primary elements of protection in RRP6. Yet, the shift of policies adopted by the governments of Lebanon and Jordan has markedly influenced UNHCR's response to these elements and Turkey's context of response. From the launch of this response, UNHCR has set specific numerical targets to be achieved; a fact which facilitates accurate assessment of UNHCR's operation and role in the international protection of Syrian refugees in LJT.

The restrictions on entry adopted by the governments of Lebanon and Jordan have dramatically represented a turning point concerning registration of refugees in 2014 in both countries. These new policies have resulted in a striking reduction in registration numbers particularly in Jordan where the number of the registered Syrian refugees in that year did not exceed 46,511. In Lebanon too, the registration achievements reached only 52% of the anticipeted target. Accordingly, in the light of these restrictions, UNHCR has efficiently reinforced border monitoring and enhanced its border interventions so as to enable persons in need of international protection having access to territory.

The restrictive new policies of entry in both countries along with the transformation of the civil unrest into a civil war in Syria have spawned an exponential influx of refugees into Turkey in 2014. This unprecedented influx has overwhelmed national structures and debilitated their capacity to manage the needs of the population in certain provinces. The registration achieved by the Turkish government exceeded the target by reaching 155%. This has represented a serious challenge for neighbouring Turkey to cope with. For that reason, UNHCR managed to crucially support the authorities by providing training on protection to government officials. It concentrated on training authorities and partners on international refugee protection principles and standards reaching 64% of this target. It also focused on training government, partners,

and UN staff on SGBV prevention and response and referral mechanisms achieving 101% of the target. Furthermore, UNHCR along with GoT undertook the operation of establishing community centres and supporting the existing ones, achieving 64% of the target. It should be noted that UNHCR did not achieve its target concerning its CP services for children and youth participating in targeted programmes reaching only 61% due to the concentration on prior indicators. Equally important, only 16% of voluntary return interviews were observed owing to the unsustainable conditions for return.

The reduction in registration numbers in Lebanon and Jordan has smoothed the path of UNHCR's operation. The achievements of this plan response in both countries have relatively been corresponding. For example, services of psychsocial support provided for girls and boys reached 91% of the target in Jordan 127% in Lebanon (along with 73% for caregivers) and, compared with only 3% in Turkey given that 50% of the Syrian refugee population was in need of psychosocial support. The number of boys and girls individually assisted with specialised services achieved more than two-fold (224%) of the target in Lebanon and the number of children benefitting from multi-sectoral services in Jordan reached 72%.

In addition, UNHCR's assistance to refugees concerning the provision of legal counselling and representation reached 75% in Jordan and 101% of the target in Lebanon along with 113% for those reached with legal awareness. UNHCR also provided 139% of targeted refugees with empowerment activities. More importantly, the number of submissions for resettlement and humanitarian admission reached 104% of the target in Lebanon and 108% in Jordan, however in Turkey it did not exceed 56% of the target owing to the unparalleled refugee influx into the country. Thus, UNHCR in 2014 achieved optimum outcome in Lebanon and Jordan in comparison with its operation in Turkey which has been obstructed by the exacerbated situation of the refugee influx.

UNHCR has however achieved minimal efficiency concerning the provision of specialised support to WGBM with specific needs. The number of Syrian refugees with specific needs who benefitted from specialised support did exceed neither 39% nor 34% of the target in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively. The achievements of

UNHCR regarding this type of support have been modest due to the fact that almost three out of four Syrian refugee households included at least one person with specific needs representing then a considerable figure of the refugee population. On that account, the Protection Sector interventions have been made primarily for those with immediate legal or physical protection needs, women and girls at risk, survivors of violence or torture, older persons at risk, persons with disabilities or medical needs, LGBTI, and children and adolescents at risk. For that reason, better results are achieved concerning SGBV survivors, in that 60% of this targeted group benefitted from case management services in Jordan, and vulnerable women and girls, in that 49% received dignity kits in Lebanon.

4.2. THE PROTECTION SECTOR IN THE 3RPS

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) has been a continuous work to the precedent RRP by adding a 3rd 'R' referring to a new added element which is 'resilience'. The 3RP framework has chiefly involved the engagement of the respective governments of Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (along with Iraq and Egypt, too). It has been a strategic programme tending not only to responding to refugee protection and humanitarian aid, but also to strengthening the resilience of individuals, families, communities and state structures so as to be able to cope with the repercussions of the Syrian conflict on the contiguous states. It is a broader response plan combining not only Syrian refugees, but also governments, impacted populations in the increasingly strained hosting countries; donors; and multiple national and international development and humanitarian partners in the respective countries. The 3RP as a response plan has been concentrating for the most part on the empowerment of affected and vulnerable communities in all sectors.

The Protection Sector throughout all 3RPs has aimed to achieve the fundamental elements of international protection as for the RRPs in the three countries. The Protection Sector in LJT has continued its operation concerning access to territory and registration. Yet, as influxes of refugees into Turkey continued to occur up to 2018, UNHCR along with the Turkish government have intensified their concentration on protection elements of access to territory and registration. UNHCR in cooperation with

the respective governments of LJT have also focused on the reduction of SGBV risks and the improvement of access to quality services. They have managed to provide boys and girls at risk and survivors of violence, exploitation and abuse with access to enhanced prevention and response and equitable access to quality child protection services. Regarding the resilience element, they have supported and actively engaged community members in creating a safe protection environment. They have attempted to work on community self-management and to empower communities so as to contribute to their own protection solutions.

As an assessment to the achievements of the Protection Sector in the 3RPs, the analysis of the data collected will evaluate the percentage achieved with reference to the target expected to be attained in the determined year. It should be noted that the target varies according to the emergencies of each response plan. Put differently, target figures of the same indicators are not constant and differ from one 3RP to another. The analysis of the data then will concentrate on the comparison of the percentages of the achievements with regard to the anticipated targets of each response plan. Thus, the 3RPs will be assessed according to the percentages of the achieved results. Furthermore, it is crucial to observe that the 3RPs concerned do not consist of the same indicators. In other words, some indicators might be taken into account in one or more RPs and not considered in the other(s). This could be explicated on the ground that some indicators are abbreviated under one indicator or simply unavailable.

UNHCR along with its partners and the involved governments of LJT have efficiently tackled main protection emergencies in the 3RPs. Protection Services and CBP, child protection, and SGBV prevention and response have considerably been the most important. It should be noted that the provision of PSS and case management services in LJT is intensely dedicated to children as a category.

4.2.1. Protection Services and CBP

4.2.1.1. LCRP

The following analysis attempts to evaluate LCRP through the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results. This depends on the observation of the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality using particularly the criterion of efficiency.

In the 3RP of 2015, the number of PwSN accessing specific support and case management services reached only 17% (9,812 out of 57,771).

In the 3RP of 2016, LCRP has reached 63% (75,952 out of 120,000) regarding the number of individuals accessing PSS and individual services in safe spaces. In addition, the number of individuals who benefitted from individual assistance and services in the 3RP of 2016 reached 50% (24,787) of the target (50,000). However, the number of individuals benefitting from individual counselling and case management amounted to 147% (16,014) of the target (10,916) in 2016. Thus, 2016 indicators in unison stand for/pertain to community-based interventions producing 65% (116,753 out of 180,916).

In the 3RP of 2017, the number of individuals benefitting from community-based interventions reached 95% (58,661) of the target (61,491). The number of PwSN accessing specific support and case management services amounted to 119% (20,056 out of 16,831). Combining these two sub-indicators constitutes the main indicator achieving 101% of the whole targets in 2017 (78,717 out of 78,322).

In the 3RP of 2018, the number of individuals benefitting from community-based interventions decreased to 40% (27,070) out of (67,640). The number of PwSN accessing through specific support and case management services reached 86% (13,851 out of 16,000). Combining these two sub-indicators constitutes the main indicator achieving 49% of the whole targets in 2018 (40,921 out of 83,640).

Graph 5: *Total Statistical CBP Achievements by Indicator in LCRP*

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2017 achieved optimum results as a percentage fulfilling the target. Building on this, the 3RP of 2016 accomplished optimum figures. Furthermore, it is evident that the 3RP of 2015 accomplished the minimum results and the 3RP of 2018 obtained middling achievements.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that in 2015, Lebanon had the highest registration rate due to the previous mass-influx (in reference to graph 1). In light of this, UNHCR had focused on access to territory, reception conditions, registration, documentation and reducing the risk of refoulement as priorities. Secondly, the 3RP of 2016 had the optimum received funding percentage (65%) according to the required figure among all funding figures of the 3RPs. Thirdly, the target of 2017 had virtually decreased to less than the half of the target of 2016. This decline in the target figure could be explained by the standstill of the flow of refugees due to the shift of Lebanon's initial open-door policy and imposing restrictive measures on those seeking to enter its territories from Syria. Furthermore, it should be stressed that Lebanon had the highest rate of resettlement submissions in 2016 when

compared with previous years (in reference to graph 23), a fact which led to decrease in 2017 target.

4.2.1.2. JRP

The following analysis attempts to evaluate JRP through the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results. This depends on the observation of the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality using particularly the criterion of efficiency.

The results of Jordan Response Plan (JRP) have been declining from 2015 to 2018 regarding the indicator of individuals accessing and benefitting from PSS and counselling services.

In the 3RP of 2015, the number of WGBM accessing and benefitting from PSS services strikingly exceeded the target achieving 126% (351,127 out of 278,203). The percentage of WGBM receiving rehabilitation sessions and counselling reached 78% (3,261 out of 4,188). Combining these two sub-indicators constitutes the main indicator achieving 125% of the whole targets in 2015 (354,388 out of 282,391).

In the 3RP of 2016, the number of WGBM accessing and benefitting from PSS services reached 68% (350,189 out of 511,640). The percentage of WGBM receiving rehabilitation sessions and counselling exceeded the target achieving 123% (10,210 out of 8,312). Combining these two sub-indicators constitutes the main indicator achieving 69% of the whole targets in 2016 (360,399 out of 519,952).

In the 3RP of 2017, the main indicator of individuals accessing and benefitting from PSS and counselling services reached 49% (107,298 out of 219,849).

In the 3RP of 2018, the main indicator of individuals accessing and benefitting from PSS and counselling services reached 31% (24,897 out of 79,095).

Graph 6: *Total Statistical CBP Achievements by Indicator in JRP*

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2015 achieved optimum results as a percentage fulfilling the target. Building on this, the 3RP of 2016 accomplished optimum figures. Furthermore, it is evident that the 3RP of 2017 accomplished middling achievements and the 3RP of 2018 obtained the minimum results.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that, JRP has focused on this sub-cluster in 2015 and 2016 as it is the prior protection feature to be considered due to the previous mass-influx (in reference to graph 2). For that reason, the target figures were the highest in these two years, given that the target in 2016 was nearly the double of the target of 2015. Secondly, the 3RP of 2015 had the optimum received funding figure ($115 million) among all funding figures of the 3RPs. Thirdly, the target of 2017 had virtually decreased to less than the half of the target of 2016. This decline in the target figure could be explained by the standstill of the flow of refugees due to the shift of Jordan's initial open-door policy and imposing restrictive measures on those seeking to enter its territories from Syria. Furthermore, it should be stressed that Jordan had the highest rate of resettlement submissions in 2016 when compared with previous years (in reference to graph 23), a fact which led to decrease in 2017 target.

4.2.1.3. TRP

The following analysis attempts to evaluate TRP through the level of achievement of both expected and unexpected results. This depends on the observation of the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality using particularly the criterion of efficiency.

Graph 7: Total Statistical CBP Achievements by Indicator in TRP

*This indicator includes only GBV survivors for 2017.

- <u>PSS, Specialist Support and Case Management</u>

Regarding Turkey response plan, it has not achieved the anticipated target concerning the number of individuals receiving support, including PSS and specialist support, reaching 53% (22,064 out of 42,000) and only 12% (17,640 out of 153,000) in 2015 and 2016 respectively. In 2017, this indicator adding GBV survivors soared to 503% (76,406) of the target (15,184). In 2018, the number of individual persons assisted through case management service reached 22% achieving (19,100 out of 86,228).

In respect of this indicator, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2017 achieved optimum results and fulfilled fivefold of the target as a percentage, given that it included only GBV survivors for this year and that the target of 2017 was one tenth of the target of 2016. Building on this, the 3RP of 2016 accomplished minimum figure and percentage. Furthermore, it is evident that the 3RP of 2015 accomplished middling achievements and the 3RP of 2018 obtained modest results.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that, TRP has focused on this sub-cluster in 2015 and mainly 2016 and 2017 as it is the prior protection feature to be considered due to the recent mass-influx (in reference to graph 4). For that reason, the highest target figure was in 2016, given that this target was nearly fourfold of the target of 2015 and tenfold of the target of 2017. Yet, it should be noted that in 2017 the achieved figures were nearly fourfold of those in 2016. Secondly, the 3RP of 2016 had the minimum received funding percentage (only 25%) and the 3RP of 2017 had the optimum funding figure ($91 million) among all funding figures of the 3RPs. Building on this, it is crucial to argue that from 2017 funding figures began to increase after the EU Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. The Statement stipulated that the EU would, "in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey". (European Commission, 2016:1). Thirdly, the decrease in the targets of 2017 and 2018 might be explained by the highest rate of resettlement submissions in 2016 (in reference to graph 23), given that later submissions of 2017 and 2018 were the highest among LJT.

- Identification and Referral of (Vulnerable) Individuals and/or PwSN

In 2016, the percentage of individuals identified and referred for targeted assistance reached 268% (26,791) of the target (10,000). The number of vulnerable individuals identified and referred reached 315% (35,242 out of 11,205) in 2016.[65] Thus, in 2016, the total number of individuals identified and referred reached 293%

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[65] This indicator may include PwSN.

(62,033 out of 21,205). The number of individual PwSN identified and referred to government and partner services reached 175% (118,021) of the target (67,370) in 2017, however it decreased to 35% (38,609) out of (108,419) in 2018.

Regarding this indicator, it should be noted that the 3RPs of 2016 and 2017 fulfilled the targets. The 3RP of 2016 achieved optimum results, nearly threefold of the target as a percentage, given that the target of 2016 was one sixth of the target of 2017 and that the 3RP of 2017 achieved optimum results as a figure. The 3RP of 2018 obtained minimum and modest results, given that the target of 2018 approached the double of the target of 2017.

It is evident that in 2015 there were no data for this indicator as it was the year of mass-influx. For that reason, during this period, Turkey had been concentrating on identifying and referring refugees to targeted assistance and specialist support to manage the refugee crisis. Therefore, it is conventional to denote the achievement percentage in 2016 as threefold of the target and in 2017 as nearly twofold of the target, given that the achievements figures of 2017 were threefold of 2016 according to the targets. Furthermore, it is also conventional to notice the increase of the target between 2016 and 2018 due to the increasing registration rate and registration figures.

- Training on Access to Territory and International Protection

Moreover, in 2015, the percentage of persons trained on access to territory and international protection also reached more than fivefold of the target (which was 650) achieving 516% (3,351).

It should be noted that in 2015, the focus was on training access to territory and international protection owing to the escalating influx of refugees into Turkey. Therefore, it is conventional to denote that this indicator was only addressed in 2015.

4.2.2. Child Protection

4.2.2.1. LCRP

Graph 8: Total Statistical CP Achievements by Indicator in LCRP

*Regarding the statistics of 2015, this indicator refers to male and female caregivers who received structured psychosocial support.

- Child Services

Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) has gradually reached optimal results concerning child protection services. In the 3RP of 2015, the percentage of male and female adolescents benefitted from life-skills programming reached only 40% (23,793) of the target 58,956 and the percentage of the provision of structured PSS also reached only 45% (135,027 out of 302,001). The percentage of assistance to children through case management reached 60% (6,017 out of 9,972). Thus, these indicators combined might be represented as one sub-indicator labelled child services achieving 44% (164,837 out of 370,929) of the whole targets in 2015.

In the 3RP of 2016, this indicator increased to 119% (9,865 out of 8,304). Moreover, the percentage of girls and boys at high risk who received focused PSS and life-skills programmes rose to 83% (23,046 out of 27,682). The number of boys and girls referred from community-based programmes to case management and focused PSS programme reached 91% (12,793) of the target (14,000). It is important to note that, the number of girls and boys who benefitted from structured community-based child protection, PSS and life-skills programmes exceeded the target (which is 125,000) achieving 161% (201,666). Hence, child services as a sub-indicator amounted to 141% (247,370 out of 174,986) of the whole targets combined in 2016.

In the 3RP of 2017, the percentage of boys and girls accessing focused PSS and/or assisted through CP case management services reached 85% (45,659 out of 53,788). The percentage of boys and girls accessing community-based PSS approached the target achieving 98% (172,764 out of 177,183). Child services as a sub-indicator then achieved 95% (218,423 out of 230,971) of the whole targets combined in 2017.

In the 3RP of 2018, the percentage of boys and girls accessing focused PSS and/or assisted through CP case management services reached 78% (18,733) of the target (24,000). The percentage of boys and girls accessing community-based CP activities exceeded the target (91,445) amounting to 141% (129,186). Child services as a sub-indicator then achieved 128% (147,919 out of 115,445) of the whole targets combined in 2018.

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2015 accomplished the minimum results and the 3RP of 2016 achieved optimum results fulfilling the target as a percentage and as a figure. The 3RP of 2017 approached the target and the 3RP of 2018 exceeded the target. Building on this, UNHCR operation regarding this indicator had been satisfactory between 2016 and 2018.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the 3RP of 2015 had the highest target which decreased to nearly its half in the following year. Secondly, the elements considered in the precedent sub-cluster of protection services

(CBP), which are funding, registration rate, and resettlement submissions, are the potential factors to be scrutinised when observing the results achieved in the 3RPs of 2015 and 2016. Thirdly, it should be noted that there was a focus shift between 2016 and 2017 regarding the services provided to adult and child categories. This is deduced from target figures of both indicators in 2016 and 2017. The target of community-based interventions was (180,916) in 2016 and decreased to more than its half in 2017 (78,332), whereas the target of child services was (174,986) in 2016 and rose to (230,971) in 2017. It should be noted that the targets of child services began to decline after 2015 due to the standstill of the refugee flow in the wake of Lebanon's shift of its initial open-door policy.

Table 35: CBI and CP Targets of the LCRP (2015-2018)

	2015	2016	2017	2018
CBI	*57,771*[66]	180,916	*78,322*	83,640
CP	*370,929*	174,986	*230,971*	115,445

Moreover, it should be mentioned that the target of child protection was more than six-fold of the target of CBP in 2015, and nearly threefold in 2017. This might be explained by the considerable percentage of children among age categories[67], which represents 55.3%.[68] For that reason, child protection is considered a prior protection issue to be addressed.

- Caregivers Services

Furthermore, the number of caregivers who benefitted from caregivers' programmes and parenting support groups reached 68% (45,382 out of 66,495) (caregivers receiving structured PSS) in 2015, 71% (71,394) of the target (100,000) in 2016 and decreased to 50% (52,180) of the target (104,711) in 2017, however it exceeded the target (29,262) in 2018 achieving 181% (52,997).

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[66] This figure is only the target of PwSNs.
[67] The 3 age categories are (0-17), (18-59), and (+60).
[68] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that, as a percentage, the 3RP of 2017 accomplished the minimum results and the 3RP of 2018 achieved optimum results fulfilling the target. This was due to the fact that the highest target was in 2017 being threefold of the target of 2018.

As a figure, the 3RP of 2016 achieved optimum results and the 3RP of 2015 obtained minimum achievements. It is evident that the elements considered in the precedent sub-cluster of protection services (CBP), which are funding, registration rate, and resettlement submissions, are the potential factors to be scrutinised when observing results achieved in the 3RPs of 2015 and 2016.

- Training

In 2015 and 2016, the LCRP focused on CP training, in that the number of individuals trained on CP standards exceeded the target (1,989) achieving 171% (3,410) (for CP actors) and reached 50% (1,908 from among 3,792) (for non-CP actors) in 2015 (forming 111% in common), and 287% in 2016 (7,338 out of 2,550) for CP actors and non-actors together.

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the focus on training was mainly in 2015 and 2016 as these years had been considered the beginning of the focus shift from access to territory, reception and registration to the provision of services, given that 2015 was the nascence of the plan 3RP.

4.2.2.2. JRP

Concerning the JRP, there has been a noteworthy progress for the number of children (UAC, SC and children at risk) receiving CP multi-sector services and specialised case management from 12% (2,628 out of 21,025) in 2015, to 74% (12,003 out of 16,157) in 2016 and to 128% (15,246 out of 11,868) in 2017. However, in 2018, the percentage decreased to 53% (89,845 out of 170,697), given that it is a combination of two indicators: 36% (6,867 out of 19,068) for children (UAC, SC and children at risk) receiving CP multi-sector services and specialised case management and 55%

(82,978 out of 151,629) for girls and boys participating in structured, sustained child protection activities.

Graph 9: Total Statistical CP Achievements in JRP

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2015 accomplished the minimum results; the 3RP of 2016 achieved middling results; the 3RP of 2017 obtained optimum results exceeding the target as a percentage; and the 3RP of 2018 had the optimal achievements figures (considering the added indicator). Building on this, UNHCR operation regarding this indicator had been satisfactory between 2016 and 2018.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the 3RP of 2015 had the highest target for the indicator of children receiving CP multi-sector services and specialised case management which decreased in the following two years. Secondly, the funding factor is to be considered when analysing the optimal achievements, in that the 3RP of 2018 had the optimum received funding percentage among the other 3RPs (107%). Thirdly, there is the factor of focus shift between CBP and CP in the 2015, 2016 and 2017 on one hand, and 2018 on the other. JRP

concentrated on CBI in the first three years of the 3RPs, and on CP in the other following 3RP. The following table demonstrates the focus shift through the development of target during these years.

Table 36: CBI and CP Targets of the JRP (2015-2018)

	2015	2016	2017	2018
CBI	282,391	*519,952*	219,849	***79,095***
CP	21,025	16,157	11,868	***170,697***

It is noteworthy to argue that CBI targets in the first 3 years were more than twofold of 2018 target and that CP targets in the first 3 years were less than eightfold of 2018 target, too. Hence, the 3RP of 2018 represented a focus shift in sub-cluster target. It should be pointed out that the percentage of registered Syrian children (0-17) has been ranging from 50% to 52% of the whole registered three age categories[69] between 2015 and 2018 in Jordan (UNHCR, 2016(e)); UNHCR, 2017(c); UNHCR, 2018(n); UNHCR, 2018(m)). Therefore, child protection is considered a prior protection issue. For that reason, the target of the indicator of children participating in structured and sustained CP activities in 2018 was the highest.

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[69] The 3 age categories are (0-17), (18-59), and (+60).

4.2.2.3. TRP

Graph 10: Total Statistical CP Achievements by Indicator in TRP

- Identification and Referral to CP Services

In the 3RP of 2016, the number of children with protection needs identified and referred to specialised services reached 59% (652) considering that the target was (1,100), a modest one when compared with the other RPs.

In the 3RP of 2017, this indicator achieved optimum results with 255% (205,749) of the target (80,655).

In the 3RP of 2018, the number of children with protection needs identified and assessed achieving 52% (88,387) of (168,400) and the number of children who are referred to specialised services achieving 109% (53,657) out of (49,000). Thus, the total percentage of children identified and referred to services reached 65% (142,044 out of 217,400).

In respect of this indicator, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2017 achieved optimum results and fulfilled more than twofold of the target as a percentage and as a figure, too, noting that the target of 2017 was nearly seventy-threefold of the target of 2016. Building on this, the 3RP of 2016 accomplished minimum figure and percentage. Furthermore, it is evident that the 3RP of 2018 accomplished middling achievements and the 3RP of 2015 had no data figures.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that there were no identification and referral of children in 2015 due to the focus on the mass-influx and access to territory. Secondly, it should be argued that the 3RP of 2017 achieved optimum results due to the increase in funding figures after the EU Turkey Statement. Thirdly, it should be also noted that the targets were soaring between 2016 and 2018 due to the increasing registration figures of children (in reference to graph 4).

It should be pointed out that the percentage of registered Syrian children (0-17) is 44.6% of the whole registered three age categories[70] in Turkey.[71] Therefore, child protection is considered a prior protection issue. For that reason, the targets of the indicator of children identified and referred to CP services have been soaring along the four 3RPs.

- Access to CP Services

The first 3RP (2015) achieved minimal results in respect of child protection. The number of children who received child protection services reached only 30% of the target (56,182 out of 189,400). The percentage of vulnerable children (cases) supported through government services also did not exceed of the target 14% (1,207 out of 8,800). Thus, the total percentage of children accessing CP services reached 29% (57,389 out of 198,200). The percentage of children who participated in structured, sustained CP or PSS programmes reached 151% (135,583) of the target (90,000) in the second RP (2016), 92% (115,225) of the target (124,650) in the third RP (2017), and 99% (120,653) out of (122,000) in the fourth RP (2018).

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[70] The 3 age categories are (0-17), (18-59), and (+60).
[71] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113

In respect of this indicator, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2016 achieved optimum results and fulfilled more than the target as a percentage and as a figure. Furthermore, the 3RPs of 2017 and 2018 approached the fulfilment of the targets. Building on this, the 3RP of 2015 accomplished minimum figure and percentage.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the 3RPs of 2015 had the highest target. Secondly, the EU-Turkey Statement might be represented as an incentive behind the satisfactory results of the 3RPs between 2016 and 2018. Thirdly, it should be also noted that the targets were soaring between 2016 and 2018 due to the increasing registration figures of children (in reference to graph 4).

- Training on CP

In 2016, the number of individuals trained on child protection mechanisms from government and service providers exceeded the target (which was 1,367) achieving 194% (2,648). In 2018, the number of individuals trained on child protection mechanisms and PSS in emergencies exceeded the target (3,215) achieving 164% (5,262).

It should be argued that TRP fulfilled about twofold of the targets in both of the 3RPs due to the concentration on child protection as a protection cluster.

4.2.3. Security from Violence and Exploitation

4.2.3.1. LCRP

Regarding SGBV prevention and response, the LCRP has predominantly attained variable results.

Graph 11: *Security from Violence and Exploitation: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in LCRP*

- (S)GBV Risk Reduction Interventions

In the 3RP of 2015, the number of adolescents at risk involved in GBV risk reduction interventions reached 70% (30,548 out of 43,400). However, it should be noted that the number of individuals participated in community-led initiatives to reduce risks reached only 32% (7,494) of the target (23,390). Thus, these two indicators combined are represented as one sub-indicator labelled individuals involved in risk reduction interventions achieving 57% (38,042 out of 66,790) of the whole targets in 2015.

In the 3RP of 2016, the percentage of interventions implemented to mitigate protection concerns and ensure access to services achieved 83% of the target (16,530 out of 20,000) and similarly the number of community members involved in risk identification and mitigation reached 84% of the target (9,148 out of 10,906). Thus, the sub-indicator of individuals involved in risk reduction interventions for 2016 achieved 83% (25,678 out of 30,906) of the whole targets.

In the 3RP of 2017, the number of interventions implemented to reduce SGBV risks and ensure access to quality services reached 97% (379,463) of the target (390,125).

In the 3RP of 2018, there are no available data regarding this sub-indicator.

- (S)GBV Prevention and Response Services

In the 3RP of 2015, the number of individuals reached by mobile services (109%) (88,966 out of 81,940) was approximately the double of the number of individuals who accessed static safe spaces (54%) (39,261 out of 73,211). Accordingly, mobile services have proved more effective in SGBV response than accessing static safe spaces. Moreover, the number of men and boys involved in SGBV prevention initiatives did not exceed 6% of the target (1,366 out of 21,147). Thus, these indicators combined are represented as one sub-indicator labelled individuals accessing (S)GBV prevention and response services achieving 74% (129,593 out of 176,298) of the whole targets in 2015.

In the 3RP of 2016, the number of individuals accessing PSS and individual services in safe spaces reached 63% (75,952 out of 120,000).

In the 3RP of 2017, the percentage of WGBM at risk and survivors accessing SGBV prevention and response services in safe spaces reached 70% (97,361 out of 140,000). Accordingly, safe spaces operation has achieved progressive advance and recovering results. The number of boys and girls at risk and survivors of violence, exploitation and abuse accessing an improved and equitable prevention and response reached 79% (487,000) of the target (613,289). Thus, the sub-indicator of individuals accessing (S)GBV prevention and response services for 2017 achieved 76% (584,361 out of 753,289) of the whole targets.

In the 3RP of 2018, the number of WGBM at risk and survivors accessing SGBV prevention and response services in safe spaces decreased to 59% (83,868) of the target (140,000).

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2017 accomplished the optimum results as both a percentage and a figure. Equally important, it should be mentioned that the target of 2017 unprecedentedly rose to more than tenfold compared to the target of 2016. Accordingly, the 3RP of 2017 focused on primarily SGBV. This could be surmised as a result of the sensitisation campaigns on GBV and referral pathways performed particularly in 2016. It should be also argued that both indicators had their results more than the average.

4.2.3.2. JRP

Graph 12: *Security from Violence and Exploitation: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in JRP*

- <u>Operational Women and Makani Safe Spaces</u>

Regarding the JRP, the number of operational community and women safe spaces and Makani spaces(Camps/ Urban/Rural/by-sub district) reached 250% (95)

of the target (38) in 2015, 39% (150) of the target (386) in 2016 and 68% (176) of the target (260) in 2017.

It is evident that the 3RP of 2015 achieved more than the double of the target and the 3RP of 2016 did not reach the half of the target. However, it is important to note that the target soared tenfold in the latter. Thus, in respect of the target, the former accomplished the optimum outcome as percentage, yet with reference to achievements figures, the 3RP of 2017 achieved the optimal results. It should be noted that achievements figures had an increasing level from 2015 to 2017. Repeatedly, this might be explicated by the focus shift on CP.

- <u>Access to SGBV Prevention and Response Services</u>

In respect of SGBV prevention and response in the JRP, the percentage of SGBV survivors benefited from timely safe, confidential and survivor-centred case management and multi-sectoral services (accessing SGBV prevention and response services) have decreased from 73% (8,935) of the target (12,262) in 2015, to 37% (9,657) of the target (26,429) in 2016, and to 28% (5,316) of the target (19,249) in 2017. However, in 2018, there has been a considerable progress, in that it amounted to 59% (12,654) of the target (21,535).

Regarding this sub-cluster of services, it should be noted that, as percentage, the 3RP of 2015 accomplished the optimum results; the 3RP of 2016 approached middling results; the 3RP of 2017 obtained minimum and modest results; and the 3RP of 2018 achieved middling results, yet it had the optimal achievements figures.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the 3RP of 2015 had the lowest target for this indicator which increased to more than twofold in the 3RP of 2016. It is crucial to note that the number of persons in need of protection against SGBV overwhelmingly doubled between 2015 and 2016. Secondly, the funding factor is to be considered when analysing both the optimal figure and percentage of achievements, in that the 3RP of 2015 had the optimum received funding figure ($115 million) and the 3RP of 2018 had the optimum received funding

percentage among the other 3RPs (107%). Thirdly, there is the factor of focus shift between providing services and supplying operational women and Makani safe spaces in the 2015, 2016 and 2017 on one hand, and 2018 on the other. JRP concentrated on supplying operational women and Makani safe spaces in the first three years of the 3RPs, and on providing services in the other following 3RP. The following table demonstrates the focus shift through the development of achievements during these years.

Table 37: *Services Provision and Safe Spaces Supply Achievements of the JRP (2015-2018)*

	2015	2016	2017	2018
Provision of Prevention and Response Services	8,935	*9,657*	5,316	***12,654***
Supplying Operational Safe Women and Makani Spaces	95	150	176	**-**

4.2.3.3. TRP

Graph 13: *Security from Violence and Exploitation: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in TRP*

*This indicator includes all individuals receiving support, not only survivors of GBV.

- <u>Services of SGBV Prevention and Response</u>

Regarding SGBV prevention and response, the indicators and achievements of Turkey response plan are not as conspicuous as those of LCRP and JRP.

In the 3RP of 2015, it should be noted that there is only one indicator available which is the number of persons provided with SGBV brochures. This indicator attained 101% (879,400) of the target (873,500). The number of individuals receiving support, including PSS and specialist support reached 53% (22,064 out of 42,000).

In the 3RP of 2016, SGBV indicator was unequivocal in that the percentage of individuals identified and referred for targeted assistance reached 268% (26,791) of the target (10,000). The term "targeted assistance" could comprise several types of protection emergencies including protection against (S)GBV. Hence, SGBV survivors could be protected under targeted assistance, too. Furthermore, the number of vulnerable individuals identified and referred reached 315% (35,242) of the target (11,205) given that vulnerable individuals could contain SGBV survivors. Thus, the total percentage of individuals identified and referred reached 293% (62,033 out of 21,205) in 2016. The number of individuals receiving support, including PSS and specialist support, reached 12% (17,640 out of 153,000).

In the 3RP of 2017, the number of individuals who are survivors of GBV receiving support, including PSS and specialized support (individual or in groups) reached 503% (76,406) of the target (15,184). The number of individuals reached through community-based initiatives for prevention and mitigation of GBV reached only 16% (18,793) of the target (120,708).

In the 3RP of 2018, the number of individuals who are survivors of GBV receiving support, including PSS and specialized support (individual or in groups) reached 38% (36,118) out of (15,130). The number of individuals reached through community-based initiatives for prevention and mitigation of GBV reached 39% (37,521) of the target (93,900).

In respect of this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2015 had only the provision of SGBV brochures. However, it should be argued that there were also PSS and specialist support services to all categories, as a result of which SGBV survivors were included in all 3RPs.[72] Furthermore, in the 3RP of 2016, along with PSS services, there was the introduction of the indicator of identification and referral to targeted assistance. Accordingly, TRP proceeded from the simple activity of providing brochures to the operation of identifying and referring individuals to the targeted services. Regarding the 3RPs of 2017 and 2018, it should be noted that they focused on presenting services to GBV survivors. The target of 2017 was higher than that of 2018. However, the optimum figure and percentage of achievements were in 2018 (about twofold). This development is conventional as it has been gradual according to the progression of the Syrian crisis and its subsequent changing flows of refugees.

- <u>Training on SGBV Response</u>

Regarding the training on this sub-cluster, the number of persons trained on strengthening SGBV response reached 579% (4,200 out of 725) (exceeded more than fivefold of the target) in 2015, 124% (1,085 out of 875) in 2016 and 116% (10,199 out of 8,780) in 2017. It is crucial to observe that the target strikingly multiplied tenfold in 2017 and so did the achievement. UNHCR continues to enhance SGBV prevention and response mechanisms by disseminating leaflets on domestic violence and early/forced marriage, delivering training modules on SGBV identification and referral mechanisms, and, with the help of partners, identifying individual cases and referring them to specialised services.

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[72] This indicator is already analysed in the sub-cluster of Protection Services (CBP).

4.2.4. Access to Legal Remedies

4.2.4.1. LCRP

Alongside basic WGBM protection and SGBV prevention and response, access to legal remedies was another significant protection element involved in the 3RPs. The LCRP has progressively accomplished the target from 2015 to 2017. It should be noted that the 3RP of 2017 has achieved the optimum results for both types of counselling.

In the 3RP of 2015, the number of individuals provided with individual legal counselling was 30% (37,908) of the target (125,377).

In the 3RP of 2016, the percentage of individuals who benefitted from counselling and assistance to obtain civil, legal stay or other documentation in 2016 approached the target reaching 92% (230,000 from among 250,000). Legal counselling as an indicator has been clarified in the achievements of 2016 and classified into legal counselling on obtaining legal stay documentation and individual legal counselling on birth registration. They respectively reached 54% (16,126) of the target (30,000) and 59% (29,731) of the target (50,000). Thus, these indicators combined are represented as one indicator labelled individuals provided with individual legal counselling achieving 84% (275,897 out of 330,000) of the whole targets in 2015.

In the 3RP of 2017, the number of individuals who benefitted from legal counselling, assistance and representation regarding legal stay approached the target reaching 95% (37,839 from among 40,000). The percentage of individuals who benefitted from counselling, legal assistance and legal representation regarding civil registration including birth registration and marriage exceeded the target (which was 70,000) and soared to reach 137% (96,157). Thus, the indicator of individuals provided with individual legal counselling for 2017 achieved 122% (133,996 out of 110,000) of the whole targets.

In the 3RP of 2018, the achievements have slightly decreased according to the 3RP of 2017. The number of individuals who benefitted from legal counselling,

assistance and representation regarding legal stay has declined to 76% (30,497) out of (40,000). The number of individuals who benefitted from counselling, legal assistance and legal representation regarding civil registration including birth registration, marriage has also decreased to 81% (74,515) out of (91,000). Thus, the indicator of individuals provided with individual legal counselling for 2018 achieved 80% (105,012 out of 131,000) of the whole targets.

Graph 14: *Access to Legal Remedies: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in LCRP*

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that the minimum results were achieved in the 3RP of 2015, the optimum results were accomplished in the 3RP of 2017 as a percentage and in the 3RP of 2016 as a figure, and the results of the 3RP of 2018 approached the target.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the 3RP of 2015 had the minimum results considering the registration factor since Lebanon had the highest registration rate in that year due to the previous mass-influx (in reference to graph 1). Secondly, the elements considered in the precedent sub-cluster of protection services (CBP), which are funding, registration rate, and resettlement submissions, are the potential factors to be scrutinised when observing the results

achieved in the 3RP of 2016. Thirdly, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2017 had the optimum results as a percentage due to the target which decreased to one third compared to 2016.

4.2.4.2. JRP

The JRP as well has gradually achieved progress regarding legal counselling given that all achievements reached the target. In the 3RP of 2015, the number of WGBM who received legal information, counselling and/or representation fulfilled the target 100% (46,634). In the 3RP of 2016, this indicator amounted to 134% (47,900) of the target (35,693). In the 3RP of 2017, it climbed to 174% (54,335) of the target (31,205). In the 3RP of 2018, it also exceeded the target, although it decreased to 108% (67,658 out of 62,101).

Graph 15: *Access to Legal Remedies: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in JRP*

Regarding this sub-cluster of services, as a percentage, it should be noted that all the 3RPs exceeded the targets. The optimum achieved percentage was in the 3RP of 2017, given that this 3RP had the lowest target. As a figure, the achievements had an increasing level between 2015 and 2018. The optimum achieved figure was in the 3RP of 2018 as this plan had the optimum received funding percentage among the other 3RPs (107%).

4.2.4.3. TRP

Legal counselling as a protection indicator has been available only in the the 3RPs of 2017 and 2018 in regard to Turkey Response Plan. The available data maintain that the number of individual persons of concern provided with individual legal aid, legal support and legal assistance reached 296% (48,257) of the target (16,295) in 2017 and 63% (32,644) of the target (51,749) in 2018.

Graph 16: *Access to Legal Remedies: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in TRP*

Regarding this sub-cluster, it should be noted that data were unavailable for the first two 3RPs. This repeatedly translates their focus on prominent services afterwards the mass-influx in 2015. Those two years concentrated on the leading protection services concerning access to territory, reception conditions, registration, reducing the risk of refoulement and identification and referral to targeted assistance. The

succeeding two years (2017 and 2018) were the focus shift, in that TRP turned to concentrate on the provision of services including access to legal remedies. It is also crucial to note that optimum results were achieved during these two plans due to the increased funding figures, particularly after the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016.

4.2.5. Community Mobilisation for Empowerment

Community mobilisation is a process realised by dint of several patterns, namely sensitisation, awareness, information campaigns and participation in community centres for self-reliance, self-management, participation and empowerment. Community mobilisation is a crucial CBP approach immensely addressed in all 3RPs to promote empowerment of refugees.

> *"Community mobilisation is a process whereby local groups are assisted in clarifying and expressing their needs and objectives and in taking collective action directed at meeting them. It emphasises the involvement of the people themselves in determining and meeting their own needs. It is closely linked with the concepts of participation and resilience."* (UNHCR, n.d.(a): 3)

In their publication *A Practical Guide on Empowerment*, the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women and Gender Equality Unit at UNHCR defines the term 'empowerment' as follows

> *"A process through which women and men in disadvantaged positions increase their access to knowledge, resources, and decision-making power, and raise their awareness of participation in their communities, in order to reach a level of control over their own environment."* (UNHCR, 2001: 3)

4.2.5.1. LCRP

Sensitisation, awareness and information campaigns are crucial elements of refugee protection in the LCRPs.

Graph 17: *Community Mobilisation: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in LCRP*

- Legend:
  - # established community-self management structures in collective sites
  - # of individuals enrolled for the first time in life skills activities in community centres
  - # of individuals who participated in community centres and CB activities/benefitting from CB interventions
  - # of children and adult community members sensitised on/mobilised to/engaged in activities to promote CP and PSS
  - # of community members sensitised on GBV and referral pathways

- <u>Sensitisation/Mobilisation of Child and Adult Community Members on CP and PSS[73]</u>

In the 3RP of 2015, the number of children and adult community members mobilised to promote CP and PSS exceeded the target achieving 119% (11,296 out of 9,454). Furthermore, the number of children provided with quality information reached 83% (334,154) of the target (400,900). The number of caregivers provided with quality information exceeded the target (which was 170,272) achieving 261% (445,150). Thus, these indicators combined are represented as one sub-indicator labelled children and adult community members girls and boys sensitized on CP/PSS (or reached with community mobilization, awareness or information) achieving 136% (790,600 out of 580,626) of the whole targets in 2015.

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[73] This indicator might include the engagement in activities to promote CP and PSS.

In the 3RP of 2016, the number of girls and boys sensitized on CP/PSS reached the double of the target achieving 200% (374,096 out of 187,000). The number of caregivers/community members sensitized on CP/PSS exceeded the target achieving 135% (290,068 out of 215,470). Thus, the sub-indicator of children and adult community members girls and boys sensitized on CP/PSS (or reached with community mobilization, awareness or information) achieved 165% (664,164 out of 402,470) of the whole targets in 2016.

In the 3RP of 2017, the percentage of boys, girls and caregivers reached on key child protection issues reached 73% of the target (448,997 from among 613,289).

In the 3RP of 2018, both number of caregivers engaged in activities to promote CP and the number of children accessing community-based CP activities exceeded the target by achieving 181% (52,997 out of 29,262) and 141% (129,186 out of 91,445), respectively. Thus, these two indicators combined are represented as one sub-indicator labelled boys, girls and caregivers reached on key child protection issues achieving 151% (182,183 out of 120,707) of the whole targets in 2018.

- Sensitisation of Child and Adult Community Members on GBV and Referral Pathways

The number of community members sensitised on GBV and referral pathways reached 66% (183,433 out of 277,349) in 2015, 130% (309,319 out of 237,900) in 2016, 113% (282,102 out of 250,000) in 2017 and 47% in 2018 (135,478 out of 286,750). It should be noted that the response of 2016 achieved optimum results considering both optimal accomplished percentage and figure.

- Participation in Community Centres

The LCRP has gradually reached optimal results for community mobilisation in that it has focused on CBP approaches throughout different programmes. It should be noted that in 2015, the LCRP concentrated on the establishment of community-self management structures in collective sites accomplishing 100% of the target (608).

Consequently, the number of individuals enrolled for the first time in life skills activities in community centres in 2016 exceeded the target achieving 151% (25,825 out of 17,000).

The number of individuals who participated in community centres and community-based activities and/or benefitting from CB interventions reached 63% (135,705) of the target 214,090 in 2015, amounted to 115% (368,545) of the target 320,000 in 2016, approached the target in 2017 reaching 95% (58,661 out of 61,491); yet, it decreased to 40% (27,070 out of 67,640) in 2018.

Regarding these sub-clusters of sensitisation and participation in community centres, it should be noted that the optimum results as a percentage were achieved in the 3RP of 2016. Concerning the 3RPs of 2015 and 2018, there was correspondingly a focus shift between sensitisation on CP and PSS and sensitisation on GBV and referral pathways, in that the former exceeded the target and the latter achieved middling results in both years. This focus shift was inverted in the 3RP of 2017, in that sensitisation on GBV and referral pathways exceeded the target and sensitisation on CP and PSS achieved middling results.

Table 38: Sensitisation on CP and PSS and sensitisation on GBV and referral pathways Achievements of the LCRP (2015-2018)

	2015	2016	2017	2018
Sensitisation on CP and PSS	*136%*	165%	*73%*	*151%*
Sensitisation on GBV and referral pathways	*66%*	130%	*113%*	*47%*

Apropos participation in community centres, the first two years of the 3RPs concentrated on the establishment of community centres (2015) and the enrolment of individuals (2016) to benefit from community-based activities in these centres. It is worth noting that these sub-clusters sustained decreasing achievements figures between 2016 and 2018.[74] This decline is considered to be conventional since sensitisation and participation would be crucial in the first years of the 3RPs,

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[74] Regarding sensitisation on CP and PSS, it sustained decreasing achievements figures between 2015 and 2018.

particularly afterwards the predating mass-influxes and exponential registration numbers.

4.2.5.2.JRP

Graph 18: Community Mobilisation: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in JRP

- ■ # of WGBM sensitized on SGBV issues, services available and referral pathways
- ■ # of WGBM sensitised on CP issues, services available and referral pathways and benefiting CP general awareness raising (including inter-agency information campaigns) (one off events, non-structured, community events)
- ■ # of WGBM participated in information sessions or receiving information about services

- <u>Information Sessions and Awareness Activities</u>

The JRP has concentrated on information on services, sensitisation on CP and SGBV issues. The number of WGBM participated in information sessions and awareness activities or receiving information about services reached 66% (556,147) in 2015, 126% (644,300) in 2016, 48% (299,852) in 2017 and 33% (87,046) in 2018; of the respective targets (838,407), (511,075), (620,921) and (263,328).

Regarding this sub-cluster, it is noted that the JRP of 2016 accomplished optimum results both as a figure and as a percentage. The 3RPs of 2015 and 2017 achieved middling results, given that 2015 had the highest target, whereas the 3RP of 2018 had modest achievements as a percentage. Therefore, it should be argued that

this indicator had been mainly considered in the 3RPs of 2015 and 2016. However, in the following 3RPs, there were declining achievements. This might be explicated as a conventional development since the focus on this indicator had been in the first period of the crisis and the instigation of the 3RPs.

- <u>Sensitisation on CP Issues, Services Available and Referral Pathways</u>

Moreover, the number of WGBM sensitised on CP issues, services available and referral pathways and benefiting CP general awareness raising (including inter-agency information campaigns) (one off events, non-structured, community events) reached 39% (131,127) in 2015, 66% (187,491) in 2016, 172% (441,773) in 2017 and 21% (59,800) in 2018 of the respective targets (339,547), (284,928), (256,492) and (278,494). It is marked that the JRP of 2017 achieved optimal outcome.

Regarding this sub-cluster, it is noted that the JRP of 2017 accomplished optimum results both as a figure and as a percentage. The 3RP of 2015 approached half of the target, given that it had the highest target, and the 3RP of 2016 achieved middling results, whereas the 3RP of 2018 had modest achievements as a percentage. Therefore, it should be argued that this indicator had been mainly considered in the 3RP of 2017 (as an achievement figure) and in the 3RPs of 2015 and 2016 (as a target figure). However, in the following 3RP, there were declining achievements. This might be explicated as a conventional development since the focus on this indicator had been in the first period of the crisis and the instigation of the 3RPs.

- <u>Sensitisation on SGBV Issues, Services Available and Referral Pathways</u>

Furthermore, the number of WGBM sensitized on SGBV issues, services available and referral pathways reached only 14% (51,640) in 2015, 21% (67,796) in 2016, 6% (10,333) in 2017 and 21% (20,573) in 2018 of the respective targets (370,735), (324,508), (171,437) and (99,347). It should be observed that sensitisation on SGBV has been of the most modest achievements regarding sensitisation, awareness and information campaigns.

Regarding this sub-cluster, it is noted that the JRP of 2016 accomplished optimum results both as a figure and as a percentage. Yet, it should be argued that all 3RPs had modest results since they had not approached half of the target. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the targets of the 3RPs had decreased between 2015 and 2018. Repeatedly, this might be explicated as a conventional development since the focus on this indicator had been in the first period of the crisis and the instigation of the 3RPs.

4.2.5.3.TRP

Graph 19: *Community Mobilisation: Total Statistical Achievements by Indicator in TRP*

- <u>Sensitisation Through Information Campaigns, Participatory Evaluations and Activities</u>

The Protection Sector in Turkey chapter of the 3RP has concentrated on information campaigns, participatory evaluations, activities to sensitise the public on rights, entitlements, services, assistance and social cohesion. The number of persons reached through this plan was 20% (24,752) in 2015, 106% (414,515) in 2016, 66% (595,851) in 2017 and 59% (519,417) in 2018 of the respective targets (126,000), (392,000), (904,450) and (884,700).

In respect of this indicator, it should be noted that the 3RP of 2016 achieved optimum results when referred to the percentage according to target; yet, the 3RPs of 2017 and 2018 achieved optimum results when referred to the achievements figures, given that their targets were nearly twofold of that of 2016. Building on this, the 3RP of 2015 accomplished minimum figure and percentage.

This was due to several factors. Firstly, it should be mentioned that, TRP has focused on this indicator particularly after 2015 as it is considered a prong of the provision of protection services. For that reason, the target figure had been increasing. Secondly, the 3RPs of 2017 and 2018 had the optimum achievements figures particularly due to the increased funding figures after the EU-Turkey Statement.

- <u>Participation in Community Centres</u>

The achievements of the Protection Sector in Turkey response plan regarding community mobilisation are considerable in that they exceeded the target. The number of persons benefitting from services in the community centres reached 100% (138,474), 291% (477,168) and 111% (717,207) of the respective targets (138,474), (164,000) and (645,420) in the respective years 2015, 2016 and 2017. In 2018, this percentage has decreased to 69% (574,306) out of (824,232). Thus, the optimum outcome achieved regarding the target was in 2016 (291%); yet when not referred to the target, it was in 2017 (717,207).

In 2017 and 2018, the Protection Sector has chiefly concentrated on youth empowerment in that the percentage of youth and adolescents attending empowerment programmes (peer and community support sessions) reached 63% (145,433 out of 230,000) in 2017 and 55% (121,696 out of 220,850) in 2018.

In respect of these indicators, it should be noted that they had identical results as the preceding indicator. Accordingly, the aforementioned factors are effective for this indicator, too.

- <u>Community Centres Establishment and Support</u>

The number of community centres established / supported reached 92% of the target (11 out of 12) in 2015, and the number of community centres supported reached 100% (248 out of 248) in 2018.

It should be noted that the focus on the establishment of community centres was in the 3RP of 2015 due to the nascence of the refugee crisis in Turkey (in the aftermath of the mass-influx). Furthermore, the establishment of community centres approached the target in the 3RP of 2015 and the support to these centres fulfilled the target in the 3RP of 2018.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. DURABLE SOLUTIONS

According to the definition provided in UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, a durable solution for refugees is

> *"one that ends the cycle of displacement by resolving their plight so that they can lead normal lives. Seeking and providing durable solutions to the problems of refugees constitutes an essential element of international protection, and the search for durable solutions has been a central part of UNHCR's mandate since its inception."* (UNHCR, 2011(b): 28)

Return, resettlement, and local integration are deemed the three principal durable solutions for refugees, and function as the overarching groundwork for UNHCR's response to refugees, particularly those in protracted situations. According to UNHCR, as of end of 2018, more than three-fourths of all refugees (78%), or 15.9 million refugees, were in protracted refugee situations. A protracted refugee situation is defined by UNHCR as one in which "25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country" (UNHCR, 2019(c): 22). It is evident that there is unevenness when examining the data on protracted displacement notwithstanding the global responsibility to respond to international protection needs. Overall, in the case of Syrian refugees, neighbouring countries have undertaken a disproportionate share of the responsibility of hosting refugees. It is crucial to note that Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey continue to host the largest number of refugees according to their national population, in that 1 in 6 people is a refugee in Lebanon, (1 in 14) in Jordan and (1 in 22) in Turkey, ranking first, second and third respectively (UNHCR, 2019(c): 3).

The three durable solutions are:

a) Voluntary repatriation, in which refugees return to their country of origin in safe conditions and with dignity and re-avail themselves of national protection;

b) Local integration, in which refugees integrate in the host country legally, economically and socially, and avail themselves of the national protection of the host government;

c) Resettlement, in which refugees are selected and transferred from the country of refuge to a third State which has consented to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status.

The three solutions are complementary and, when practised together, can constitute a feasible and comprehensive strategy for the resolution of a refugee situation. All three durable solutions should be fully considered before regarding resettlement as the most apposite solution (UNHCR, 2011(b): 28).

5.1. NEW YORK DECLARATION FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (NYDRM) was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, on September 19, 2016. It sheds light on the significance of the international refugee regime and involves a wide range of commitments by Member States to consolidate and enhance mechanisms to protect refugees and migrants. It has set the stage for the adoption of two new global compacts in 2018: "a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration".

By the adoption of the New York Declaration, Member States:

- expressed deep solidarity with those who are obliged to flee;
- reasserted their duties to completely respect the human rights of refugees and migrants;
- admitted that the protection of refugees and supporting the countries hosting them are shared international responsibilities and should be borne more equitably and predictably;

- promised firm support to countries affected by large movements of refugees and migrants;
- consented upon the essential elements of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework; and
- consented to work towards the adoption of a Global Compact on Refugees and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

If the international community fails with regard to solidarity and responsibility-sharing, repercussions could ensue with more restraining policies towards refugees in their hosting countries. Hence, further pressures on refugees to prematurely return to Syria could be the result. This certainly would represent a disaster for the families affected and could further threaten the situation inside Syria.

- <u>The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</u>

The New York Declaration sets forth the core elements of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) applicable to wide-ranging movements of refugees as well as protracted refugee situations. The CRRF concentrates on the significance of supporting those countries and communities sheltering large number of refugees, advocating the inclusion of refugees in host communities, guaranteeing the involvement of development actors from an early stage, and "developing a 'whole-of-society' approach to refugee responses".

It has four major objectives which are to:

a) Lessen the pressures on host countries and communities;
b) Promote refugee self-reliance;
c) Expand third-country solutions; and
d) Sustain conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.

Since the adoption of the Declaration, UNHCR has been working with States and all other stakeholders to promote and commence the practical application of the CRRF in a number of countries. As of February 2018, the CRRF is formally applied

in several countries, involving two regional contexts in Africa and Central America. In terms of the "Somali Situation", the regional approach engages the Somali government and its neighbours to enhance responses to Somali refugees and IDPs, as well as to stimulate economic development in the host countries in the region (UNHCR, 2018(e): 27).

Following the summit in March 2017 among Heads of States of the countries concerned, the sates adopted the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia and a Plan of Action to implement the Declaration, which underscores a common approach for the region (Intergovernmental Authority on Development 2017a, 2017b). Hence, based on the lessons drawn from the CRRF and consultations with UN Member States and relevant stakeholders, UNHCR managed to develop the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018. However, it should be stressed that the analysis of this approach implementation is still unavailable owing to its recent nascence (Hendow, 2019:16).

One of UNHCR's core responsibilities is to support and secure comprehensive and durable solutions for refugees and IDPs so that they become able to rebuild their lives and assure dignity and safety. These solutions necessitate collective commitment for the resolution of the protection needs of refugees and the other displaced persons by means of a range of options and opportunities. The CRRF reveals UNHCR's vision to work with a variety of partners to build resilience and find solutions. These partners consist of governments and other UN agencies in the first place, and also the private sector, international financial institutions, and civil society, academia, and faith leaders. The Framework aims at achieving the following purposes: "to build the self-reliance of refugees, expand access to resettlement in third countries and other complementary pathways, and foster conditions that enable refugees to return voluntarily to their home countries" (UNHCR, 2018(e): 27).

- The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)

In addition to setting out the CRRF, the New York Declaration appealed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2018, to propound a 'global

compact on refugees' in his annual report to the UN General Assembly. The first draft of the Global Compact on Refugees was released at the end of January 2018 and has undergone formal consultations with Member States until July 2018. It is based on the CRRF and sets forth practical measures that can be held by a broad range of stakeholders to strengthen international cooperation responding to exponential movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations, and to assure a more equitable and predictable sharing of the burden and responsibility for providing protection to refugees.

- <u>The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration</u>

The New York Declaration also makes provision for the negotiation of a global, compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, which has been adopted in 2018. Although they are concomitant processes, the General Assembly has regulated that both of the global compacts are to be "separate, distinct and independent".

The migration compact is to improve coordination on international migration and to offer a framework for overarching international cooperation on migrants and human mobility. In the New York Declaration, UNHCR has also been asked to promote this process and to contribute to the elaboration of non-binding principles for migrants in vulnerable situations. Pertaining to the concerns to which UNHCR is contributing, there are the responses to influxes of refugees and migrants, the protection of migrants in vulnerable situations and in countries having crisis, and displacement owing to climate change and natural disasters.

UNHCR has been operating thoroughly with several stakeholders on complementary issues of the two global compacts, particularly regarding cross-cutting concerns of both refugees and migrants, for example data collection and analysis, trafficking and smuggling, rescue at sea, and advocating tolerance. In order to sustain consultations occurring in the context of the migration compact on the differentiation between refugees and migrants, UNHCR has promulgated a document entitled "the refugee concept under international law" (UNHCR, 2018(h)).

- Kartepe Summit

At Kartepe Summit on "Migration, Refugees and Humanity", which took place in Kocaeli, Turkey, on 26-28 October, 2018, Katharina Lumpp, the UNHCR representative in Turkey, proclaimed that the development of global compacts on refugees and migrants is a much more comprehensive response to their situations. They are legal frameworks building upon the experiences of hosting countries so as to lessen the pressure on them.

Lumpp asserted that the GCR is a "deal-breaker" which would deeply change the refugee system and provide equitable burden sharing. This compact supports not only refugees, but also the hosting countries and their systems. It is not only about humanitarian aid, but also the development of the skills of refugees and integrating them into their hosting communities.

Furthermore, the compact mobilises different resources and engage a myriad of partners along with the UN agencies, namely the civil society organisations, the private sector, the NGOs, and the international financial institutions in cooperation with the governments and its institutions.

Lumpp also emphasised the role of the local actors in standing against the negative discourses about refugees and migrants. Parliamentarians and politicians are to manage the manner of carrying and engaging positive discourses about these displaced people. They have to promote inclusive policies for a longer-term approach to create social cohesion and interaction between refugees and their hosting communities and bring them together. Lumpp described this as a 'whole-of-society' approach (Katharina Lumpp, 26 October 2018).

The New York Declaration has conspicuously introduced a distinctive modus operandi for handling the response to refugee situation. This novel approach would involve multi-organs, including local governments, and collaboration between countries. Solidarity is a necessity because a host country cannot hold the entire

refugee issue alone. The declaration stipulates that integration is the key secret element.

5.2. RETURN (VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION)

Refugees, in general, consider the return to their country of origin as the preferable solution. However, it is important to note that repatriation is conditioned to be based on a free and informed decision along with the full adherence of the country of origin to the reintegration process so as to guarantee that returnees are able to safely reconstruct their lives. For returns to be sustainable, it is crucial that they do not take place abruptly or at an inopportune time, without the apprised consent of refugees or the necessary elements of long-standing solutions in place (UNHCR, 2018(e): 28).

It should be noted that most of the returns in 2017 have occurred in a complex context under detrimental circumstances to situations in which sustainable reintegration is difficult to be maintained. In some cases, so-called unplanned returns occurred under a degree of threat in which conditions for voluntary, safe, and dignified repatriation not being met. Refugees intend to return for several reasons, such as family reunification, lack of employment, medical treatment, education, checking on property, documentation, improved situation in place of return, etc... (UNHCR, 2019(d)).

UNHCR's position is that present conditions in Syria are not favourable for voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity. Serious risks could face civilians across the country. UNHCR does not stimulate refugee returns at this stage, that is it neither promotes nor facilitates their impending repatriation. Yet, as there are self-organised returns, it is important to continue planning for ultimate UNHCR-assisted repatriation to Syria when conditions for a safe and dignified return are in place.

UNHCR's planning for return in Syria is marked by two phases:

Phase 1: It is the current phase, where the required conditions are not met for safe and dignified return, but there are some self-organised returns taking place. During this phase, return should not be stimulated. UNHCR involvement in return

throughout this phase is confined to "planning, monitoring, counselling, advocacy, and ongoing analysis of obstacles to and conditions necessary for return and identifying the necessary actions to address them". Self-organised returnees are assisted by dint of current humanitarian programmes.

Phase 2: It will take place when conditions have substantially changed, and wide-ranging voluntary repatriation can be promoted by UNHCR and partners. The shift to this phase would be governed by four criteria:

1. Legal framework is in place, that is ensuring rights of returnees and unrestrained access to them and return areas;

2. There is clear indication of protection thresholds being maintained in the place of return;

3. There is betterment of conditions in return areas;

4. There is an active request of refugees, in large numbers, for support from UNHCR to return (UNHCR, 2018(d): 2).

It is reported that there has been a total of 198,565 self-organised Syrian refugee returns to Syria from the 3RP countries, between 2016 and August 2019.[75] It should be noted that there were only 452 returns in 2015 and they were only from Egypt.

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[75] The numbers reported are only those monitored/verified by UNHCR and do not reflect the entire returns.

Graph 20: *Self-Organised Refugee Returns to Syria by Year from LJT (2016-2019)*

Source: UNHCR[76]

Pertaining to the return of the Syrian refugees from the three countries concerned in this research, it is evident that the majority of returns occurred in 2019, as demonstrated in graph 20. It should be argued that the chart of returns has had an increasing rate between 2016 and 2019, with the exception of those from Jordan having slightly decreased in 2017, as demonstrated in graph 21.

Table 39: *The Total of Self-Organised Refugee Returns to Syria from 3RP Countries (2016-2019)*

|	Turkey	Lebanon	Jordan	Iraq	Egypt
Total	84,725	53,286	53,038	38,117	1,252

Source: UNHCR[77]

According to the table, the largest number of returnees to Syria is from Turkey, followed by Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, respectively.

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[76] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions
[77] Ibid.

Graph 21: *Self-Organised Refugee Returns to Syria by Year from LJT (2016-2019)*[78]

Source: UNHCR[79]

5.2.1. Lebanon

It should be noted that the number of returnees from Lebanon is significantly substantial when compared to the number of refugees there, particularly when considering the soaring rate of returns between 2016 and 2019 (53,286). The parties within the Lebanese government have discussed the issue of returns, but there is clear evidence of a common consent to start preparing for and planning refugee returns which might occur in the immediate or near future.

Lebanon hosts the estimated 1.5 million refugees, accounting for one quarter of the population. Refugees have placed considerable strain on the country. It is incontrovertible that life in Lebanon is prohibitive, in that even Lebanese citizens

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[78] Concerning Lebanon data 2019, it includes only those verified by UNHCR, General Security reported additional figures from their Group Returns and of these a total of 1389 individuals were not known to UNHCR. Concerning Jordan data 2019, the figures following the re-opening of the border in October 2018 are tentative. UNHCR identifies returns based on departure lists regularly obtained from the government.

[79] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions.

struggle to find decent paid employment, affordable housing and access to services, namely health and education. This undoubtedly generates tensions between communities, and the government has reported growing expressions of outward hostility to refugees. Most of refugees are mainly illegal in the country and live in a highly miserable situation. Since the cost of maintaining residency in Lebanon is severely unaffordable for most refugees, many have let their residencies lapse. Accordingly, around 75% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon currently are not legally registered. This translates the fact that they can neither access services nor legally work. Furthermore, their freedom of movement is restrained as they are fearful of being stopped by the police. Equally grave, letting their residency lapse means paying a weighty fine of several hundred dollars when caught with expired documents. The absence of up-to-date residency papers is a very risky situation where refugees could be held at the border or pay large amounts when leaving Lebanon.

According to the findings of the 2017 UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, "economic vulnerability has worsened, with more than half of refugees living in extreme poverty, and that food insecurity rates are stable, but remain high" (UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, 2017). All these critical circumstances represent the leading reason for Syrian refugees to plan return to Syria considering it the most appropriate alternative, nonetheless the unsafe situation on the Syrian territory.

5.2.2. Jordan

Pertaining to the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan, it is estimated that the real number of refugees is the double of the officially registered Syrian refugees, accounting for a population of around 1.4 million many of whom are undocumented and illegal. With similar regard to the situation in Lebanon, this figure has burdened the country hosting them with a huge cost. However, the political context in Jordan has presented a much more welcoming atmosphere for Syrian refugees than in Lebanon. In late July 2018, the Foreign Ministry publicly asserted that refugees will not be obligated to leave the country and that the government would work with others to ensure the safe, voluntary repatriation and resettlement of refugees currently in

Jordan assuring that such conditions would include security, political, social and economic factors. Furthermore, it should be noted that since the re-opening of the border on 15 October 2018, the methodology for returns data was adapted. The return data after this date remains provisional and has undergone validation and re-adjustments.

In both countries, Jordan and Lebanon, there have recently been initial steps by the Russian Federation through a Russian Defence Ministry Initiative, in cooperation with the Government of Syria, to establish processing centres for refugees who plan to return. This initiative starts to get attention and interests of refugees planning to return, even though none of the aforementioned guarantees in the preconditions for return is fully addressed (CAFOD and SCIAF[80], 2018: pp. 3-4).

5.2.3. Turkey

From 2015, Turkish authorities shifted its policy from providing temporary protection, to integrating refugees into its society and promoting voluntary return. Yet, it should be stressed that the Turkish authorities and state institutions do not consider return as a main priority. It should be noted that UNHCR statistics of returnees from Turkey are not identical with those registered by DGMM. In 2018, according to statistics from DGMM, 254,000 Syrians voluntarily returned to Syria of whom 194,000 re-entered Turkey (about 76%).[81] These returns were encouraged in the aftermath of new government policies promoting return, in the shape of permits for holiday visits and family reunion. However, the re-entrance of their majority to Turkey after voluntary return and relocation to safe zones implied the conjecture of both policies of Turkey and conditions in Syria. According to the data published on 5 May 2020 by the Ministry of the Interior, 402,110 Syrian refugees have returned to Syria (Refugees and Asylum Seekers Assistance and Solidarity Association (RASAS), 2020).

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[80] CAFOD is the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and SCIAF is the Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund.
[81] These numbers are not allowed to public. They were obtained from the head of the DGMM with permission to be used in research performed by Başak Yavçan, an associate professor at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

The Turkish authorities has allowed visit permissions to Syria easing the mobility or re-migration of refugees to subdue their concern about return. Guaranteeing their original status upon re-entry to Turkey is an incentive for refugees to endure the possibility of return. These visit permits allow refugees to evaluate the circumstances in their hometowns and decide about their return. It should be mentioned that the Turkish authorities has stuck to this policy after realising the ineffectiveness of the previous limiting of the open border policy with Syria in the aftermath of EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. This policy along with ceasing the temporary protection status of refugees once exiting Turkey, not guaranteeing re-registration upon return to Turkey and denying registration to new arrivals was futile due to the high number of returnees after months. For these reasons, the Turkish government resumed registration.

Equally important, the Turkish authorities established safe zones for refugees to be settled there. Turkey created security perceptions of the safe zones in places such as Jarabulus and Efrin. However, it is crucial "to provide credible information regarding the safety conditions in these regions and inside Syria via domestic and international reports" for refugees to sustainably return in security. Furthermore, according to the interviews conducted with experts, Syrian refugees incline to the view of returning to their homelands in Syria rather than to the safe zones.

On the whole, it should be argued that both the introduction of visit permits and the creation of safe zones have not been as effective policies as expected. The lack of policies for economic support upon return regarding 4R programs (Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction), such as cash assistance, loans, and economic opportunities, prevents refugees to consider their return to Syria (Yavçan, 2019: 3-5).

5.3. RESETTLEMENT

According to UNHCR, Resettlement is defined as:

"the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with

permanent residence status. The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and provides a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependants with access to rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals. Resettlement also carries with it the opportunity to eventually become a naturalised citizen of the resettlement country." (UNHCR, 2011(b): 416)

Resettlement is intended to serve three crucial functions. First, it is an instrument to provide international protection and meet the special needs of individual refugees whose life, liberty, safety, health or other fundamental rights are at risk in the country where they have sought refuge. Second, it is a durable solution for refugees, along with the other durable solutions of voluntary repatriation and local integration. Third, it can be a manifest symbol of international solidarity and a responsibility sharing mechanism, allowing States to cooperate for sharing responsibility for refugee protection, and lessen the burden on the country of asylum. (UNHCR, 2011(b): 3).

According to UNHCR, there are seven Resettlement submission categories as follows:

a) *Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs* of the refugee in the country of refuge (including a threat of refoulement);

b) *Survivors of Torture and/or Violence*, where repatriation or the conditions of asylum could lead to further traumatisation and/or intensified risk; or where apposite treatment is not available;

c) *Medical Needs*, particularly when life-saving treatment is unavailable in the country of refuge;

d) *Women and Girls at Risk*, who have protection problems related to their gender;

e) *Family Reunification*, when resettlement is the only means to reunite refugee family members who are separated by borders or continents, owing to refugee flight or displacement;

f) *Children and Adolescents at Risk*, who have legal and physical protection needs, may be survivors of violence and torture;

g) *Lack of Foreseeable Alternate Durable Solutions*, which is mostly appropriate only when other resolutions are not operable in the near future, when

resettlement can be applied strategically, and/or when it may render contingencies for exhaustive solutions to refugees (UNHCR, 2011(b): 243).

UNHCR focuses on extremely vulnerable individuals and those with critically serious protection risks. The process consists of resettlement identification and referral of Syrian refugees. Cases are selected according to the global resettlement criteria. The first process which is case identification involves two phases:

- Pre-assessment which is a phone interview to establish the refugee's presence in the hosting country, family structure and interest in resettlement;
- Assessment which is a personal interview, the initial evaluation of the case's suitability for resettlement and to formally register the case in UNHCR's database.

The second process which is resettlement interview is a personal interview with each person in the family and the drafting of a Resettlement Registration Form (RRF) for submission.

Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are implementing the Identification-Based Methodology (IBM), which is a streamlined form of resettlement for Syrian refugees. (UNHCR, 2017(d): 1-2).

According to UNHCR, around 1.2 million refugees were in need of resettlement in 2017. It is crucial to note that this figure has steadily soared in recent years, a fact which reflects increasing needs from protracted as well as less protracted refugee situations. In 2017, UNHCR submitted 75,200 refugees to States for resettlement, accounting for a 54 % drop from 2016 owing to the decline in resettlement quotas. The final governmental statistics show that 102,800 refugees were admitted for resettlement during the year, whether with UNHCR's assistance or without it. However, it should be noted that the growth trend in resettlement quotas has endured a decline in 2017 in comparison with the year 2016 due to the decreasing global resettlement opportunities. In 2016, UNHCR submitted more than 163,200 refugees for resettlement (UNHCR, 2018(e): 3-30).

It should be noted also that the top 3 UNHCR resettlement operations between 2013 and 2016 were from Jordan (32,405 submissions), followed by Turkey (28,926) and Lebanon (24,426) (UNHCR, 31 December 2016(i): 1). In 2017, the top three resettlement submissions have been respectively from Turkey (17,200 submissions), Lebanon (13,800), and Jordan (8,500). These submissions have been driven chiefly by the Syrian refugee crisis accounting for 37,300, around 50% of all submissions worldwide (UNHCR, 2018(e): 3-30).

Nonetheless the decreasing trend in resettlement numbers, an increasing number of States have been keen on establishing or maintaining resettlement programmes. In 2017, the total number of the states which accepted UNHCR's resettlement submissions has been 35, a figure on equal terms with 2016. It is crucially important to stress that this figure has been higher than that in earlier years, indicating an overall increased multiplicity of global resettlement actors.

Resettlement is a manifest way to achieve boosted solidarity and responsibility-sharing, in the spirit of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. In the case of Syrian refugees, resettlement has been considered the most important instrument of protection and a durable solution for some of the most defenceless refugees worldwide on account of limited cases and opportunities for voluntary repatriation and local integration of refugees.

Graph 22*: Resettlement Submissions of Syrian Refugees by Year from LJT (2014-2018)*

Source: UNHCR[82]

Regarding the case of Syrian refugees, as demonstrated in graph 22, resettlement was not even considered until 2014, when there was a shift in trends as Syrian refugees, who did not previously appear in the top five submission nationalities, became the first nationality group submitted for resettlement (UNHCR, 2015(d)): 13). The trend of resettlement of Syrian refugees from JLT and other countries has been increasing from 21,154 in 2014, to 53,305 in 2015, to reach its zenith in 2016 accounting for 77,254 submissions. However, between 2016 and 2018, this trend has gradually been decreasing to 37,332 in 2017 and to 28,189 in 2018, due to the decrease in resettlement opportunities provided by states.[83]

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[82] UNHCR's official resettlement data site: Resettlement Data Finder. https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#w2cA.
[83] Ibid., https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#kOO3.

Graph 23: *Resettlement Submissions of Syrian Refugees from LJT by (2014-2018)*

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
■ Turkey	5.457	8.091	16.682	13.781	11.375
■ Lebanon	7.318	18.476	23.498	13.253	7.808
■ Jordan	6.084	22.273	30.181	7.573	5.696

Source: UNHCR[84]

Graph 24: *Resettlement Submissions of Syrian Refugees from LJT (2014-2018)*

According to graphs 23 and 24, it is noted that the resettlement submissions from LJT were inconsiderable when compared with 2015 and 2016. These two years were the apex of resettlement submissions for Syrian refugees from LJT, particularly Jordan and Lebanon. Submissions from Jordan were the highest in percentage accounting for

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[84] UNHCR's official resettlement data site: Resettlement Data Finder. https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#w2cA.

45,6% in 2015 and 42,8% in 2016 from the total submissions of LJT. It is important to stress that also Lebanon had crucial percentages during this couple of years with 37,8% in 2015 and 33,3% in 2016. There is clear evidence that Turkey had the minor opportunities for resettlement in this period (16,5% in 2015 and 23,7% in 2016).

There is a set of reasons behind this difference between LJT countries. The highest percentages of submissions were from both of Jordan and Lebanon due to the deplorable conditions endured by Syrian refugees there, particularly in Lebanon, since there are no camps as in Jordan. Most of refugees in Lebanon are indigent staying in dwellings unfit for human habitation without formal legal residences. Furthermore, Lebanon and Jordan do not provide Syrian refugees with temporary protection like Turkey, along with sparse opportunities of integration.

Furthermore, in this respect, it should be stressed that the density of refugee population is of significant role. Among the 3 countries, Lebanon has the highest number of refugee populace worldwide, accounting for 146 per 1000 inhabitants (by end of 2017). In Jordan, too, this number is noteworthy with 71 per 1000 inhabitants whereas it is respectively 43 in Turkey (UNHCR, 2018(e): 21). This enormous number of refugees in their hosting countries, particularly in Lebanon and Jordan, imposes economic and social burdens on their respective governments. Therefore, the situation of refugees in the two countries is much more urgent than in Turkey. The Turkish government has been more capable of handling the refugee plight on its territories, in that it has provided well-arranged camps, considerable opportunities for integration and temporary protection.

The shift has considerably occurred by 2017, nonetheless the notable decrease in resettlement submissions. Refugees in Turkey have been provided by more resettlement opportunities accounting for 39,8% in 2017 and 45,7% in 2018. The confirmed quotas for Turkey have palpably increased in recent two years and the DGMM has increasingly referred Syrian individuals for resettlement. However, it should be noted that Syrians with temporary protection status are subject to the permission of the DGMM to be resettled (Ineli-Ciger, 2017: 565).

5.4. COMPLEMENTARY PATHWAYS

Complementary pathways are other migration approaches which might not necessarily concentrate on vulnerability but on other criteria that may qualify a refugee for entry into a third country.

In September 2016, in the NYDRM and the annexed CRRF, 193 governments undertake commitments to work over complementary pathways as alternative instruments of achieving a temporary or durable solution for refugees. The objective is to provide resettlement places and complementary pathways on a scale that would facilitate the annual resettlement needs and other solution avenues to be met.

Complementary pathways for refugees include humanitarian admission programmes, (medical) evacuation programmes, family reunification, private sponsorship, labour mobility, scholarships, and student visas. Since 2016, there has been an intensified focus on complementary pathways which have been developed as experimental programmes by states, UNHCR, international agencies and NGOs. States and the UN organs have initiated plans to enhance access to third country protection and solutions for Syrians and others under the Global Compacts for Refugees and for Migrants (Norwegian Refugee Council & International Rescue Committee, 01 June 2018).

Humanitarian visas provide Syrians with a chance to access a third country for the purpose of applying asylum. They may also contribute to accessing accelerated asylum procedures.

They might also be effective in the context of addressing family reunification requests for members of extended family. Family reunification enhances the right to family unity and the crucial importance of family life, particularly in respect with protection of children and the separated from their families.

Furthermore, scholarships provided by third countries are considered prominent opportunities for carrying on education and skills training. These occasions represent

a threshold of a new life with hopes for a better future. They are deemed as a catalyst for the convalescence and rebuilding of lost careers of desperate, traumatised, helpless and, sometimes, homeless refugees.

Complementary pathways are momentous alternative solutions for vulnerable refugees since resettlement quotas have been dramatically reduced, along with the miserable conditions of most refugees in Jordan and Lebanon (over 80 per cent of refugees living below the poverty line) and with cash assistance programmes only reaching a fraction of these (UNHCR, 2018(c): 3).

Hence, scholarship programmes, labour mobility schemes in other countries and family reunification, are, therefore, for many Syrian refugees, the only instruments to achieve normalcy of life and a solution to their displacement. Subsequently, UNHCR will continue to pursue resettlement and complementary pathways as feasible solutions for refugees.

5.5. LOCAL INTEGRATION

5.5.1. Country Overview

Finding a home in the country of asylum and integrating into the hosting community might represent a durable solution to refugees' plight and an opportunity to build a new life, in cases where repatriation is not an option. Local integration is defined by UNHCR as "a complex and gradual process with legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions", which "imposes considerable demands on both the individual and the receiving society". This process ends with acquiring the nationality of the country of asylum, in many instances. According to UNHCR, ca. 1.1 million refugees around the world obtained the citizenship of their country of asylum over the past decade.[85]

It is crucial to consider Syrian refugees' numbers and shares in neighbouring countries, mainly in LJT as they are the first three countries hosting the largest number

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[85] https://www.unhcr.org/local-integration-49c3646c101.html

of refugees in the world and the focal point of this research. As demonstrated in the table below, Turkey has the highest percentage of share with ca. two thirds of the refugees in major refugee-hosting countries in the region, followed by Lebanon (16.3%) and Jordan (11.8%). Accordingly, local integration for refugees in LJT is an apposite solution considering the inappropriate conditions of return and the paucity of resettlement opportunities.

Table 40: *Syrian Refugee Numbers and Shares in Countries of Asylum in the Region (2020)*

Major refugee-hosting countries in the region	Syrian refugees	Share of displaced Syrians (%)
Turkey	3,579,008	**64.4**
Lebanon	910,256	**16.3**
Jordan	656,733	**11.8**
Iraq	247,440	4.5
Egypt	130,074	2.3
Other (North Africa)	31,657	0.6

Source: UNHCR (2020).[86]

It should be also argued that local integration is strongly connected with the resilience of hosting communities in LJT and resolving the protracted situation of Syrian refugees there. These two elements are completely intertwined, in that no one could be achieved without the existence of the other. The interests and needs of the host country are as substantial as the resolution of the protracted situation of hosted refugees. For that reason, "while donor decisions on funding areas have a major impact on which policy options can be implemented, the interests and needs of the host country should remain paramount". (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2019: 1).

Although the core of this part is evidently related to the third prong of local integration as a durable solution, it should be stressed that this approach can only be successful when exhaustively implemented within a more comprehensive global

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[86] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria

response which takes into consideration the other durable solutions of return and resettlement.

5.5.1.1. Lebanon

It is crucial to note that Lebanon continues to host the largest number of refugees according to its national population worldwide, in that 1 in 6 people is a refugee (UNHCR, 2019(c): 3). It should be mentioned that these refugees are unsheltered, in that Lebanon, unlike Jordan and Turkey, has no share of refugees in camps. Syrians were not allowed by the GoL to establish formal camps, unlike Palestinian refugees who fled to Lebanon during the 1948 (Care International, 2018: 7).

***Graph 25:** Share of Refugees in Camps in JLT*

Source: (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017: 22).

The GoL and communities are the first to bear the brunt of the refugee crisis. It is conventional that the density of refugee population deepens the political, economic, social and security plights in Lebanon. This critical situation along with the afore-mentioned elements in return part of growing popular hostility and restrictions on refugee entry, registration and movement have dramatically intensified the crisis of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and impeded attempts of local integration. Apart from the

perception of economic burden caused by refugees, the political context is of equal importance, in that

> *"fears grew that the presence of a large number of mostly Sunni Syrian refugees could be permanent, and that this will alter the demographic balance against the interests of Christian and Shia political groups in Lebanon and challenge the existing political order."* (Care International, 2018: 4)

Regarding the social context, the North of Lebanon has less negative perception towards Syrians as they have common social, religious, and cultural backgrounds. Accordingly, in the other remaining parts of Lebanon, where Shiites and Christians live, Syrians are much rejected.

For that reason, return for many refugees has been the potential alternative nonetheless the unripe conditions in Syria for return. This critical situation has then led 53,286 (including only those verified by UNHCR) to return between 2014 and 2019.[87] Furthermore, return has increasingly been compelled through the political context, in that chief Lebanese policymakers have proclaimed on several occasions that return needs soon to start happening in a larger way. The latent agenda behind this debate stems partly from the momentous political and military alliance between Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, given the increasing influence of Hezbollah with their allies after the elections of May 2018. For the part of Syrian government, refugees return represents a crucial step towards the normalisation of their international relations and the demonstration of their good governance being a government embracing its citizens, hence a legitimate government in the view of the international community (Care International, 2018: 4).

Lebanon seems to be a harsh haven for Syrian refugees for the growing popular hostility towards them. The refugees' arrival changed the image of the country in ways that made many Lebanese "uncomfortable".

> *"Not all refugees are poor, but it is the poor who most decisively shape the host society's perceptions. Wealthy Syrians blend effortlessly into privileged urban*

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[87] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions

quarters. Their impoverished co-nationals, on the other hand, are conspicuous as beggars and menial workers in city streets and by their squalid encampments in the country's predominantly agricultural periphery, in particular the Beqaa valley and the north. In these places, they share already inadequate public services and infrastructure with poor Lebanese and compete for jobs in the bottom bracket of the labour market." (International Crisis Group, 2020: 4)

Additionally, hostility has particularly sprouted when jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (ISIS) started to clash with Lebanese security forces in border regions as, specifically, Christian Lebanese strongly reacted. Consequently, several municipalities imposed "extra-legal restrictions" on the movement of Syrian refugees (International Crisis Group, 2020: 5).

Accordingly, increasing hostility is accompanied by restrictive administrative regulations. From October 2014, the Lebanese authorities have implemented new policies regarding the reception of Syrians into its territories aiming at reducing the number of displaced Syrians and encouraging them to return (Janmyr, 2016(a): 59). To achieve these goals, the government introduced visa requirements for arriving Syrians, required UNHCR to halt the registration of refugees and ceased the extension of refugees' visas free of charge (Janmyr, 2016(b):13). It is evident that entry restrictions reduced the influx; however, ceasing registration and ending visa extensions only increased the percentage of unregistered refugees and those without valid residency status.

Tightening residency regulations has then aggravated the status quo, in that no Syrian refugee is entitled to cross the border and come back, otherwise they would be deprived of their legal stay in Lebanon. It should be underlined that "a residency permit obtained on the basis of UNHCR registration does not allow a refugee to cross into Syria and come back to Lebanon". The GoL considers any crossing of the border a return; consequently, the right of the displaced Syrian to stay in Lebanon is inevitably ended. Lack of valid residency status per se does not expose refugees to deportation, yet it causes additional pressures, such as troubles at checkpoints and temporary detention (International Crisis Group, 2020: 7-8).

Furthermore, it should be accentuated that refugees have been evicted and their shelters have been demolished in late years. Since 2017 particularly, some Lebanese politicians have become increasingly strident in calling refugees to return. More importantly, several Lebanese municipalities have engaged in "forcibly evicting them from their homes and expelling them from their localities" since 2016. At least 3,664 displaced Syrians have been evicted from at least 13 municipalities between 2016 and the first quarter of 2018. According to UNHCR, ca. 42,000 Syrian refugees were at risk of eviction in 2017. Moreover, in the same year, the Lebanese Armed Forces evicted another 7,524 near the Rayak air base in the Bekaa Valley and, according to Lebanon's Ministry of Social Affairs, 15,126 Syrian refugees near the air base have pending eviction orders (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Since early 2019, the Lebanese Armed Forces started the demolition of Syrian refugee shelters claiming, "they did not comply with long-existing, but largely unenforced, housing codes" (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Hence, all these conditions have exacerbated the situation of vulnerable Syrian refugees and aborted the prospect of local integration.

Registered Syrian refugees were permitted to work in Lebanon until early 2015, when the government ceased such right. Syrian refugees are now required to sign a pledge not to work and can only maintain their livelihoods through humanitarian aid provided by the GoL and with support from the international community. It should be stressed that labour restrictions have been increasingly enforced since late 2018 (International Crisis Group, 2020: 6) In case Syrian refugees obtain sponsorship and a work permit, their legal status is changed to "migrant workers", although UNHCR still considers them refugees. Additionally, employment of displaced Syrians is mainly restricted to "third sector jobs" in construction, agriculture and cleaning services (demonstrated in the table below), as there is a labour shortage in these sectors and as these occupations do not respond to the skills and income expectations of the majority of the native Lebanese labour force. It should be noted that bureaucratic and financial factors are steep in front of a Syrian refugee to attain a work permit in any other sector. "An employer must first prove his inability to find an adequately skilled Lebanese worker for a given job, before he can request a permit for a qualified Syrian worker." (Errighi L., and Jörn Griesse, 2016: 11)

According to data published by the Lebanon Ministry of Labour on the website of the CAS, only 1,102 work permits were issued to Syrians in 2015, and only 200 in 2017 (Kabbanji, J., and Kabbanji, Lama, 2018: 14-29). A report published by UNDP, ILO, and WFP, entitled "Jobs Make the Difference: Expanding Economic Opportunities for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities- Egypt - Iraq - Jordan - Lebanon - Syria – Turkey", stated that only 0.5% of working-age refugees have their work permit applications submitted by employers in Lebanon (UNDP, ILO and WFP, 2017: 41).

Graph 26: Distribution of Syrian refugees by Occupation (%)

Source: (ILO, 2014: 25).

The restriction of the legal access to work for Syrian refugees in Lebanon translates their vulnerability and inability to meet their basic needs. This has certainly paved the way for the expansion of unregulated activities and informality. Equally important, "the difficulty and cost of obtaining a work permit for Syrian refugees are also harming Lebanese employers, who are facing substantial labour shortages in key economic sectors such as construction and agriculture" (Errighi L., and Jörn Griesse, 2016: 11-12).

On the other hand, there have been several initiatives to engage Syrian refugees in labour market. NGOs, in collaboration with local municipalities, have implemented programs and projects to provide labour-intensive work for Syrian refugees to improve basic infrastructure, such as clearing canals and solid local waste management projects. UN humanitarian and development agencies have also implemented programmes alike. However, these projects have been controversial despite their significance in meeting the condition of local integration. Additionally, there is no far-reaching programming underway despite the GoL's proposed five-year, multibillion-dollar infrastructure improvement and plans for development actors to fund a €22 million project to upgrade roads and agricultural lands and improve water (UNDP, ILO and WFP, 2017: 49).

Regarding the impact of the Syrian refugees on the education sector, it should be noted that their presence has affected the educational system in Lebanon. The GoL has allowed the access of Syrian refugee children to schools as one measure to impede the setting up of refugee camps. By mid-2015, more than half of the students registered in Lebanese schools were Syrians (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016: 51-52). However, according to the GoL's statistics for the 2016-2017 school year, their number decreased, in that Syrian children represented nearly half of the students in public schools that year (Kabbanji, J., and Kabbanji, Lama, 2018: 18). It should be stressed that important strides were noted in school enrolment for children aged 6-14. According to the Vulnerability Assessment report of 2017, prepared by UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, 70% of children aged 6-14 were enrolled in school, at the national level, compared to 52% in 2016. (UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP, 2017: 32).

As demonstrated in the chart below, the share of Lebanese students in Lebanon's public schools is nearly the half compared by non-Lebanese. To cope with this challenge, "the Lebanese government has set up second shifts at existing schools and opened new schools throughout the country". Hence, the presence of Syrian refugees has sustained the existing education system in Lebanon, in that international aid has supported the government to develop educational infrastructure and has provided temporary jobs for many unemployed Lebanese teachers. Furthermore, these efforts have increased enrolment rates of Lebanese as well as Syrian children at public school

and raised the number of refugee children receiving educational certificates, as observed by Lebanon's Ministry of Education and Higher Education. However, it should be underscored that Syrian and Lebanese children do not share the same classrooms in most cases. The instruction language is the chief impediment, given that Lebanese are taught in English and French, whereas Syrians are educated in Arabic (Kabbanji, J., and Kabbanji, Lama, 2018: 19).

Graph 27: Share (%) of Lebanese and Non-Lebanese Students in Lebanon's Public Schools (2011-2017)

Source: (GoL and UN, 2015, 52).

Concerning access of Syrian refugees to healthcare, it should be noted that the healthcare system in Lebanon is so fragmented that has left the majority of Syrians, along with vulnerable Lebanese, without easy access to health services. Syrian refugees, who are registered or recorded with the UNHCR, have access to 28 primary healthcare centres, primarily run by the UNHCR's NGO partners and MoSA. They can access primary healthcare in these centres for a fee between LBP 3,000 and 5,000 per consultation, while Lebanese are charged between LBP 10,000 and 15,000. Moreover, UNHCR provides vaccines, acute medication, and two ultrasounds for pregnant women free of charge; however, chronic illness medications are charged for a fee of LPB 1,000 per visit (UNHCR, 2014(a), 4). It should be argued that despite the

contributions by UNHCR, 71% of Syrian refugees with chronic diseases stopped the use of medication since they could not afford its fees. Hence, in spite of UNHCR's provision of services free of charge, the other remaining services are not affordable to refugees. Equally important, those who fall outside UNHCR's scope of assistance for primary care are not able to pay for healthcare costs (Lebanon Support, 2016, 9).

With reference to secondary and tertiary healthcare, in the case of life-threatening emergencies, UNHCR provides targeted assistance of 75% of the total medical cost (UNHCR, 2014(c): 2). Yet, regarding economically vulnerable refugees, UNHCR covers up to 90% of the whole cost, when funds permit (UNHCR, 2018(f): 27).

Regarding access to public hospitals, it should be noted that refugees have faced different challenges. The expensive treatments and lack of livelihoods are the leading challenges, in that hospitals stick to mischievous coping strategies so as to secure payment since Syrian refugees cannot afford the financial coverage for medical treatment. It should be underlined that hospitals which are not contracted with UNHCR are rejecting Syrians. Even the contracted hospitals face challenges concerning the payment of non-covered medical treatment. Some hospitals do not accept patients unless a guarantee that UNHCR, or any other NGO, will pay their share is provided. Another challenge is over-crowdedness, in that several hospitals usually refuse patients owing to lack of space. Rising tensions between the Lebanese community and Syrian refugees is considered another important challenge since 85% of registered refugees (70% of whom are under the poverty line) are living in areas where 67% of the host community is under the poverty line, too (Lebanon Support, 2016, 18-20). Tensions have been persistent between them, particularly in the beginning of the crisis when the international community was concentrating exclusively on displaced Syrians and ignoring the other vulnerable Lebanese. Consequently, while Syrians had been subsidised for their health services, the Lebanese were required to pay higher share for the same services (Kostrz, 2015). Sources of tension for Syrian patients emanate from experiencing longer waiting lines than Lebanese patients and less care by the staff (Lebanon Support, 2016, 21).

The GoL has proclaimed that the mass-influx of Syrian refugees has harmed the healthcare system in Lebanon. They partly blame UNHCR for the healthcare system crisis, in that it covers only 75% of the hospitalisation cost, accordingly 25% are to be paid by the patient's part. The government stresses that this measure has affected Syrian refugees, as well as the most vulnerable Lebanese. Additionally, the authorities argue that the healthcare system crisis has impeded public hospitals to respond and provide the necessary services to Syrian refugees, as well as Lebanese nationals (Kabbanji, J., and Kabbanji, Lama, 2018: 19-20).

Overall, due to several reasons, none of the durable solutions, whether that is return, integration or resettlement, are currently in sight for the majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The tensions between the GoL, and UNHCR and the wider international community are described as "a catch 22", in that what is suggested by one is rejected by the other leading to a stalemate. UNHCR substantially denounces any attempt to repatriate Syrian refugees, whereas the GoL urges the prospect of return. UNHCR resolutely advocates the local integration of Syrian refugees, while the Lebanese authorities and communities have not permitted their inclusion at all levels. The initiatives of the international community to raise resettlement quotas have dwindled, in the meantime some Lebanese authorities insist that they will not allow Syrians to remain in Lebanon much longer. Accordingly, the GoL abstains from planning for longer-term solutions (Care International, 2018: 5).

To conclude, the economic and political considerations make the prospects of enhancing the inclusion of Syrian refugees into mainstream Lebanese society an even greater challenge than in Jordan and Turkey (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016: 61).

5.5.1.2. Jordan

Jordan continues to shoulder a disproportionate refugee burden as it is the second largest refugee-hosting country per inhabitants in the world. The majority of Syrian refugee community in Jordan live outside camps (ca. 79%) and face precarious living conditions. In order to respond to the protracted refugee situation requiring new responses to refugee integration, the government along with its partners embarked on

the "Jordan Compact". It is deemed a paradigm shift in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis as it represents a roadmap for resilience of Jordanians and Syrian refugees alike by "shifting the focus from short-term aid to job creation, growth, and investment" (Amjad, R., et al., 2017: 4).

The Jordan Compact was signed in February 2016 at the London Conference hosted by the UK, Germany, Kuwait, Norway and the United Nations. It combines the international humanitarian and development actors under host country leadership. It raises humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants ($700 million annually for three years) and concessional loans ($1.9 billion). The payment of these grants and loans is matched to specific targets. One main target is linked to formal labour market access. According to this Compact, Jordan is "to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specified sectors". Moreover, it "commits the EU to relaxing trade regulations to stimulate exports from 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas in Jordan, in return for employment quotas for Syrian refugees in these businesses". Additionally, the Compact states "Jordan will institute reforms to improve the business and investment environment and formalise Syrian businesses". Equally important, it requires Jordan to "providing school places to all Syrian children, and some vocational training opportunities" (Barbelet V., Jessica Hagen-Zanker, et al., 2018: 2).

Jordan can be viewed as a crucially revealing case of "good practice" for the implementation of the GCR. A "good practice" is an initiative designed and submitted by people, states, organisations and businesses across the world to be implemented in order to support and find long-term solutions for displaced communities and stateless people (UNHCR, 2019(g)).

In the context of objective 2 of the GCR, which is to "build refugee self-reliance"[88], the right of Syrian refugees to legal work has been settled through Jordan's Labour Law 8, 1996. The Jordan Compact, sustained by concessional financing, has permitted refugees' access to work permits for specific labour sectors. Different policy decisions have been implemented to encourage labour market opportunities for Syrian

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[88] https://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html

refugees and Jordanians, such as a moratorium in June 2016 on new migrant workers entering Jordan. Moreover, as of April 2016, the Ministry of Labor (MoL) permitted a grace period of three months for Syrian refugees working without a work permit to regulate their employment status, which had been extended to the end of 2016. This involved waiving fees related to obtaining a permit to mobilise refugees and employers alike and the acceptance of identity card instead of a passport by the MoI (ILO, 2016: 13). The grace period had extensively brought about the issuance of more than tenfold of work permits between January and early December 2016 (Kattaa, 2016: 75).

Graph 28: *Number of Work Permits Issued for Syrian refugees Between January and November 2016*

Source: (Kattaa, 2016: 75: Reported from MoL).

The total number of work permits issued to Syrians has amounted to almost 100,182 by May 2018 (ILO, (n.d.): 9-20). Equally important, since November 2018, through a Cabinet decision, refugees have the legal right to launch home-based businesses, raising income opportunities, specifically for women.[89]

However, it should be stressed that only about 10% of the employed Syrians have formal work permits (ILO and FAFO, 2015: 6). This is perceived particularly in construction sector, in that 3000 Syrians have work permits; whereas 30,000 work

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[89] https://www.globalcompactrefugees.org/article/jordan-0

without permit (ILO, 2017: 32). Regarding the issuance of work permits by sector, it should be noted that the situation is partly similar to that in Lebanon. Refugees have mainly obtained work permits in the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, trade, food services and construction.

Graph 29: Number of Work Permits Issued to Syrians Disaggregated by Economic Activity (up to 2015)

Source: (ILO and FAFO, 2015: 54)

However, despite the increased incentives to enhance Syrian refugees' labour market participation in Jordan and to actively contribute to the Jordanian economy, the result is still not demonstrated to be as strong as hoped for. "Only six out of the 936 exporting companies who are eligible to apply for the relaxed rules of origin currently qualify by employing at least 15% Syrian refugees", and the number of Syrian refugees who have been issued work permits in the export industry remains restricted. This translates the presence of other barriers preventing Syrian refugees from either being able to or wishing to reach formal work in this industry, and employers from either being able to or wanting to employ Syrian refugees in their factories (Amjad, R., et al., 2017: 57).

Social inclusion is also upheld through the government's commitment to ensure refugees' access to education. The GoJ has opened its schools to Syrian refugee students, in that they can access education through the following schools or programmes: UNRWA schools, Ministry of Education (MoE) schools (in camps, single or double-shift schools in host communities), or non-formal or informal education programmes (Queen Rania Foundation, 2017: 1). As a response to the Syrian Crisis, the MoE established schools in camps and increased double-shifts in others in 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). It has scheduled teaching staff in double-shifts to accommodate the new children and to manage overcrowded classrooms (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016: 41). Camps' school enrolment rate reached 67% in the Za'atari and Azraq camps as of March 2015 (Queen Rania Foundation, 2017: 2). Additionally, it should be noted that the number of enrolled Syrian refugee children in formal education increased from 61.6% in March 2015 (UNICEF, 2015, 24) to 72% in January 2017 (UNICEF, 2017).

However, despite this positive development, the number of out-of-school children is still critically elevated, in that it counted for 73,137 by April 2018, as reported by the 'No Lost Generation' initiative during the Brussels Conference (NLG, 2018: 29). Such a situation is due to certain barriers including lack of proper enrolment documentations, discouraging family registration process, lacking birth certificates, three-year-rule[90] preventing (re-) entry to formal education, financial constraints (leading to child labour and child marriage), school violence (child protection & safety concerns), school being too distant from child's residency, and lack of mental health & psychosocial support (Younes, M. and Morrice, L., 2019: 9-11).

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[90] "The three-year rule is a policy in place within the Ministry of Education that states that no student can enrol in Jordanian public schools if they have been out of school for three years or more." (Prabhakar R., 2018: 12)

Graph 30: The Number of Enrolled Syrian Refugee Children in Formal Education in Jordan (2015-2017)

Source: (UNICEF, 2015, 24; UNICEF, 2017).

The MoE has continued its commitment to Syrian students despite the impact of their arrival into Jordanian schools, and the burden this has placed on the human and financial resources of Jordan's education system by dint of its "Education for All" vision supporting both vulnerable Jordanians and refugees. As an innovation in learning, initiatives supporting online learning have been introduced to both Jordanians and refugees permitting them to flourish alongside each other.[91]

As an effort to foster social cohesion, UNHCR and partners sustain CBP for those who are affected by the Syrian conflict. This approach depends mainly on building community centres across the country for refugees and local communities to participate in several activities together and promoting dialogue and trust, as the majority of refugees in Jordan live in urban communities.

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[91] Ibid.

Equally important, refugees have increasingly been included in financial life, by introducing iris-activated cash dispensers in order to facilitate cash assistance. Additionally, university students now receive their stipends through mobile wallets.[92]

Regarding access to healthcare by Syrians in Jordan, it should be stressed that it is fairly well established. Jordan has one of the most advanced health care systems in the region, with both public and private sector services that can be accessed by Syrian refugees. Jordan has managed to integrate refugees into their health system so they can have access to the public services in a similar way as Jordanians. Syrians who are registered under the MoI in Jordan are provided with healthcare access and services in the governorate where they live in, as uninsured Jordanians (Dator et al. 2018: 684).

In the context of objective 1 of the GCR, which is to "ease pressure on countries that welcome and host refugees"[93], Syrian refugees have now access to subsidised healthcare through a multi donor account, the Jordan Health Fund for Refugees, established in the Ministry of Health (MoH) to help lessen the burden on the Health infrastructure in Jordan. Another step towards meeting the objectives of the Compact in Jordan has been the issuance of Government Identity cards, facilitating refugees' access to healthcare and basic education, as well as enhancing the overall protection scope in the country.[94]

UNCHR also provides help for the refugees concerning healthcare. Free health services and resources are provided in the camps to help lessen the financial burden on Jordan in meeting the health needs of the refugees. UNHCR in its response plan has involved intersectoral working groups in an organised, systematic and specialised delivery of services in all sectors including health. Programmes, like the Mental Health and Psychological Support Sub-Working Group[95], manage clinical psychiatric care, along with other groups responsible for psychological support.

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[92] Ibid.
[93] https://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html
[94] https://www.globalcompactrefugees.org/article/jordan-0
[95] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/working-group/7

The GoJ and UNCHR have launched comprehensive programmes to address the health needs of refugees. Some refugees have, however, failed to access these services because of their lack of knowledge about them. For that reason, the Community Health Task Group[96] was created in 2013 to raise community awareness of their rights to access health care, the nature of care services and the places of their availability. The coverage of the community health programme targets both refugees and Jordanians.

Furthermore, since 2013, the government initiated a programme labelled The Host Community Support Platform/National Resilience Plan in parallel with RRPs. This initiative was established to impede "the deterioration of development achievements in Jordan while tackling the refugee crisis". It initially covered only northern Jordan, mainly Irbid, Mafraq, and Zarqa governorates, as the crisis has been intense in the northern area (Dator et al. 2018: 684).

However, many refugees still cannot access healthcare, particularly after the change in health policies in 2014 requiring refugees to cover the costs of medicines and consultations. Financial constraints are the first barriers for refugees to access health services, added to the far distance of clinics, especially from their camps (Doocy et al., 2016: 2). Although UNHCR provides cash assistance to Syrian refugees both in and out of the camps and to vulnerable Jordanian nationals, the financial constraint is still reported as a barrier to health access.

It should be argued Jordan has partly managed the crisis and developed its mechanisms to sustain the welfare of Syrian refugees in the country due to its extended experience of hosting refugees.

"Despite the enormous socio-political, environmental and economic burdens of handling refugees, Jordan has remained steadfast in its humanitarian commitment to refugees despite depletion of its resources and, to some extent, deprivation of its local population of government allocations." (Dator et al. 2018: 683)

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[96] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/working-group/64?sv=4&geo=36

While considerable progress has been made, several challenges remain overarching. The Compact did not integrate refugee perspectives at its inception, in that it has been slow to improve their daily lives. It is evident that financial support has raised school enrolment; however, predominant numbers of children have not joined schools owing to financial barriers and potentially to the quality of services provided. Furthermore, there has been a substantial progress regarding the issuance of work permits; yet, crucial sectors and self-employment remain closed to refugees. Additionally, concerning the indicators measuring progress, they should concentrate on the extent to which they improve life standards of refugees. Equally significant, donor governments, host governments and international organisations currently focusing on refugee compacts "should start with what refugees need and want, and be realistic about what such arrangements can achieve" (Barbelet V., Jessica Hagen-Zanker, et al., 2018: 1).

Overall, it should be noted that Jordan has represented a strong model for the local inclusion of Syrian refugees through mainly its Compact and multiple initiatives encouraged by the international community enhancing the concept of burden sharing. Several conferences have been held to promote the Jordan experience, particularly Brussels Conferences, organised by the European Union, to muster political support and humanitarian funding. Among the recent endeavours, the 2019 London Initiative is a joint action between the British and Jordanian Governments so as to support investments, growth and jobs in Jordan and to contribute to an economically strong and peaceful country.

5.5.1.3. Turkey

From 2015, Turkish authorities shifted its policy from providing temporary protection, to promoting voluntary return of refugees and integrating them into its society.

The Turkish authorities long considered the Syrian refugee situation as temporary and provided extensive humanitarian aid to displaced Syrians seeking

refuge within its territory. The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Turkey's main emergency management instrument, established camps and provided social assistance to the new arrivals. However, when the refugee situation started to become protracted, given that normalisation in Syria approaches a deadlock, the government decided to make policies considering Syrians' long-term prospects in the country.

It is crucial to note that both the scale and duration of the refugee influx also compelled Turkish policymakers to back off from their initial encampment policy and, hence, to urbanise refugees in camps for the long term. Currently, ca. 98% the Syrian refugee population in Turkey live in cities. The table and the charts below demonstrate the evolution of the policies of the Turkish authorities regarding the urbanisation of Syrian refugees in camps as an initiative of local integration. According to the data published by UNHCR Turkey, the number of camps has been reduced from 24 in 2016 to only 7 in May 2020. Equally important, the number of provinces retaining camps decreased to its half from 10 provinces (2016-2018) to 5 in May 2020. Accordingly, the total number of refugees residing in camps in Turkey dropped from 262,720 in 2016 to 217,356 in 2018 to only 63,437 in May 2020.

Table 41: Evolution of Encampment in Turkey (2016-2020)

Year	Number of Provinces with Camps	Total Number of Camps
2016	10	24
2017	10	22
2018	10	19
2019	8	13
2020	5	7

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(k)), (UNHCR, 2017(h)), (UNHCR, 2018(t), (UNHCR, 2019(f)) & (UNHCR, 2020(d)).

Starting from 2018, the pace of relocation process to Temporary Accommodation Centres (TACs) has been speeded up. In that year, UNHCR helped DGMM in the closure of six (TACs) hosting 51,200 persons, and the decongestion of three additional ones hosting ca. 45,200 persons. Syrian refugees residing in the TACs

were given the following options: relocating to an urban area in a province of their choice, moving to another TAC identified by DGMM if their TAC was closed, or staying in their own TAC if it was decongested. UNHCR provided support for the relocation of refugees who preferred to leave their TACs. A one-off cash relocation assistance package to cover transportation, rent and immediate needs was granted and more than 65 million Turkish Liras were provided for 60,490 refugees choosing to move to urban areas. Ca. 8,685 refugees preferring to move to another TAC received transportation assistance (UNHCR, 2018(s): 5).

Graph 31: *Total Number of Refugees in Camps in Turkey (2016-2020)*

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(k)), (UNHCR, 2017(h)), (UNHCR, 2018(t), (UNHCR, 2019(f)) & (UNHCR, 2020(d)).

Graph 32: *Sheltered and Unsheltered Syrian Refugees by Temporary Shelter Centres*

Source: (UNHCR, 2016(k)), (UNHCR, 2017(h)), (UNHCR, 2018(t), (UNHCR, 2019(f)) & (UNHCR, 2020(d)).

The regulation of temporary protection has been expanded over the years. The GoT has also introduced other measures regarding refugees' access to education, health services and the labour market. Meanwhile, restrictive regulations on mobility have been enacted, owing to the government's mounting interests concerning national and regional security. It should be noted that EU concerns have played role in introducing such measures, in that the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement required Turkey to take "any necessary measures to prevent new sea and land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU" (European Parliament, 2018: 1).

As an initiative to integrate Syrian refugees in the Turkish society, the Turkish authorities has enacted a regulation to grant Turkish citizenship to certain individuals. According to the data published on 30 December 2019 by the MoI, 110,000 Syrians have been granted citizenship: 53,000 adults and 57,000 children (RASAS, 2020). Additionally, the State of Turkey grants citizenship to any individual who has a mother or a father with Turkish nationality, or both or who is married to a Turkish national following three years of the marriage. These regulations have facilitated the issuance of citizenship to several Syrian refugees.

As Jordan, Turkey has significantly intended to reform work permit regulations to support Syrian refugees. It should be stressed that Turkey has been the primary to establish a formal procedure for Syrian refugees to access work permits, as the authorities issued the Regulation on Work Permits of Refugees Under Temporary Protection in January 2016. This regulation has also permitted Syrian refugees to access the government employment agency, ISKUR, which presents job matching and other services (UNDP, ILO and WFP, 2017: 46). According to the data published by the MoI, 31,185 Syrians have received work permits by 31 March 2019 (RASAS, 2020). However, it should be mentioned that the vast majority of permits have been issued to Syrians with residency permits (UNDP, ILO and WFP, 2017: 46). Furthermore, the number of granted work permits remains low, particularly in comparison to the total number of working-age Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Prior to 2016 regulation, most Syrian refugees were assigned to work in the informal sector. In 2015, ca. 300,000 Syrians were employed informally, including those under 18. It is evident that working in the informal sector has exposed Syrian to exploitation, in that most of them work informally in labour-intensive, low-wage jobs in sectors such as construction and agriculture. Accordingly, the regulation introduced by the MoL in 2016 has been a crucial action for the facilitation of fair and legal access to the labour market for Syrians, in that they are paid at least the minimum wage (Memişoğlu, 2018: 21-22).

The regulation, however, stipulates some caveats and requirements. Syrians have permission to work only in the province where they are registered. Additionally, according to the Turkish law of labour, the number of foreigners employed within a business cannot exceed 10% of the number of Turkish citizen employees. Some Turkish scholars have indicated that this quota brings about impediments, particularly in the southern and south-eastern provinces, where close to half of Syrian refugees live, let alone the high unemployment levels in some of them as demonstrated in the map below, for example Kilis. Such a situation may aggravate the labour market there as it increases competition between local and Syrian labourers for low-paid informal jobs (Kaymaz and Kadkoy, 2016: 4).

Map 4: *Unemployment Rate (2015) and Share of Syrians (2016) out of the Total Population of Turkey*

Source: (Kaymaz and Kadkoy, 2016: 4)

Overall, most Syrian refugees in Turkey have then difficulties to access formal employment. This conventional sight emanates from the existed conditions of restricted number of work permits issued so far, the limited availability of job opportunities, the tribulation of finding a job that matches the skills of the refugees and the number of occupations accessible to foreigners. Another hurdle should be underlined which is the lack of information among Turkish employers about the regular employment of foreigners and how to handle procedures for work permit applications. Overarchingly, taking these factors into account, refugees have retained their engagement in informal employment, hence being exposed to potential exploitation and discrimination (Memişoğlu, 2018: 22).

It should be underscored, however, that the existence of Syrian refugees has contributed to the Turkish economy by introducing new businesses, investments, and skills. According to the statistics published by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) on their website, the number of Syrian-partnered firms established annually in Turkey expeditiously soared from 30 in 2010 before the conflict to 81 in 2011, 165 in 2012 and 489 before the mass-influx, to 1,257 in 2014, 1,599 in 2015, 1,764 in 2016, 1,202 in 2017 and 1,595 in 2018 after the mass-influx starting from 2014. It should be noted that the whole number of Syrian-partnered firms

established in Turkey reached 15,159 by 26 February 2019 (RASAS, 2020 & TOBB, 2020).

Graph 33: The Development of the Syrian-Partnered Firms Established Annually in Turkey (2010-2018)

Source: (TOBB, 2020).

More importantly, as demonstrated in the chart below, these established firms have extensively contributed to the Turkish economy, in that their investment share is considerably substantial, let alone the job opportunities provided for the unemployed people. For example, their investment share was (₺) 271.093.500 only in 2018. Their total investment share counted (₺) 1.201.763.838 between 2013 and 2018 (TOBB, 2020).

Graph 34: *The Number of Syrian-Partnered Firms Established Annually in Turkey and Their Investment Share in TL (2013-2018)*

Source: (TOBB, 2020).

Regarding the classification of industries found in Syrian-owned enterprises, there is a variety of businesses, such as eatery and food, construction, textiles, property, travel, and transportation. It should be noted that Syrian enterprises are mainly located in southern parts of Turkey, for example the cities of Gaziantep and Mersin which had more than 1,000 registered Syrian enterprises each in 2016. It is important to stress the volume of trade between Syria and these cities, along with border cities like Hatay, in that it exceeded 2010 levels, given the strong connection the Syrian firms have with counterparts in Syria and in other Middle Eastern markets. Equally crucial, according to the bulletin published by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) regarding the month of June 2018, Istanbul has the largest number of companies established with joint Syrian capital, followed by Mersin, Bursa and Hatay (TEPAV, 2018: 2; Memişoğlu, 2018: 23).

According to some studies, it should be underlined that there has been a drop in unemployment in Gaziantep, Kilis and Adıyaman. After the influx of Syrian refugees

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in the southern of Turkey, these cities have experienced an economic revival. The Syrian labour force has increasingly contributed to the economic growth in this region. However, there has been a rise in unemployment in Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakir meanwhile. Some researchers have explicated such evolution by the downward pressure on wages following Syrians' participation in agricultural work particularly in seasonal work. Syrian labourers have considerably replaced agricultural labourers from Şanlıurfa, Adıyaman and Mardin (Kalkinma Atölyesi, 2016: 9; Memişoğlu, 2018: 24). Overall, some economists even argued that refugee influx may has been a leading factor behind Turkey's unprecedentedly high economic growth rate in 2015 (Devranoğlu, 2016).

Regarding the education sector, it should be stressed that half of the Syrian population in Turkey are school-age children. According to some studies, access to education for Syrian children has been a tribulation owing to "legal, bureaucratic and language barriers; financial hardship; and lack of the required educational materials, teaching staff and public school capacity" (Memişoğlu, 2018: 24).

According to the Turkish law, all children, even foreigners, have the right to access basic education free of charge in public schools. After the influx of 2014, the Turkish Ministry of National Education issued Circular 2014/21 concerning the educational services for foreigners, stipulating the establishment of Temporary Education Centres (TECs) so as to facilitate access to education for Syrian children and also introducing measures to enable them enrol in public schools (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2016: 66).

The TECs provide Syrian curricula in Arabic and Turkish, as an attempt to remove the language barrier, upon authorisation of the provincial directorates of national education. In TECs, children are instructed by Syrian teachers of several qualification levels (International Crisis Group, 2016: 5). Children living in camps have attended TECs within the camps. Regarding urban refugee children, they can attend TECs if there is one in the city they live in; otherwise, they can attend public or private schools. After the issuance of the circular, the number of Syrian children enrolled in public schools soared from 62,357 in the academic year 2015-2016 to

201,505 in 2016-2017. The school enrolment of Syrian children in Turkey rose from 30% in 2014-2015 to 62.52% in 2017-2018 as demonstrated in the table below.

The increase of school enrolment among Syrian refugees is partly explained by the positive impact of financial support through EU-funded education projects. For example, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) programme, as part of the EU Facility for Refugees, has been a sustainable instrument for promoting Syrian students' enrolment. This programme provides a monthly cash assistance sum of 35 TL for boys and 40 TL for girls in kindergarten and primary school, 50 TL for boys and 60 TL for girls at high school and additional support for families at the beginning of each school term in the form of 100 TL per beneficiary child in primary school, 200 TL in lower secondary school and 250 TL in upper secondary school. Moreover, about 83% of CCTE beneficiaries benefit from the Emergency Social Safety Net programme which provides monthly cash transfers of 120 TL per family member (UNICEF, 2020: 1).

Table 42: Number of Syrian Children Enrolled at School in Turkey (2014-2018)

School Year	Syrian Students in Public Schools	Syrian Students in TECs	Syrian Children Registered as Students	School-Aged Syrian Children in Turkey	School Enrolment of Syrian Children in Turkey (%)
2014-2015	40,000	190,000	230,000	756,000	30
2015-2016	62,357	248,902	311,259	834,842	37
2016-2017	201,505	291,039	492,544	833,039	59
2017-2018	387,849	222,429	610,278	976,200	62.52

Source: (Ministry of National Education, 2018).

It should be noted that, between 2014 and 2018, enrolment in TECs has been decreasing from 82.61% to 36.45%, meanwhile enrolment at public schools have been increasing from only 17.39% to 63.55% as demonstrated in the graph below (Memişoğlu, 2018: 25). Enrolment in TECs has been reduced due to the risk of "creating a marginalised community as a result of parallel education systems". The Turkish government has considerably planned to assimilate Syrian children into the national structure by eliminating TECs, in that Syrians starting primary and pre-school

cannot register in TECs, rather they can only attend public schools. Accordingly, TECs will be gradually ceased. Certainly, the government has responded to the fear of parents that their children will not develop proficiency in their mother-tongue and will have difficulties of reintegration into the Syrian school system upon return by "working on ways to enable the children to maintain their Arabic language with elective and extra-curricular classes in public schools" (International Crisis Group, 2016: 6). Furthermore, the Turkish government encourages families to send their children to school by providing 'education cash grant' for each child attending school as an attempt to guarantee education for Syrian children and impede child labour since many families need their children to earn money for household (International Crisis Group, 2014: 9 & 2016: 6-7).

Graph 35: Share (%) of Syrian Students Enrolment at Public Schools and in TECs (2014-2018)

Source: (Ministry of National Education, 2018).

Regarding healthcare, on the one hand, Syrians with temporary protection status are entitled to access social support and medical care under the LFIP and Temporary Protection Regulation. On the other hand, they may have access to healthcare only in the city where they are registered, though there are some suggestions that under specific conditions they may be able to use care services elsewhere. Healthcare services are provided by the MoH for Syrians in TACs. Unregistered Syrians receive emergency and essential public healthcare services free of charge (Memişoğlu, 2018:

27). According to report published in 2018 by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TGNA), there had been ca. 20 million treatments in outpatient clinics, ca. 1 million in inpatient clinics and ca. 1 million surgeries for Syrian patients (TGNA, 2018: 134).

The MoH has managed to resolve the problems of overcrowding in public hospitals, particularly those in border provinces by establishing a new unit called the Department of Migration Health. Ca. 103 Migrant Health Centres (MHCs) have been established within the framework of the Sıhhat project, funded by €300 million under the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (TGNA, 2018: 257). MHCs employ Syrian healthcare personnel to provide services to Syrians under temporary protection with supervision maintained by Turkish doctors. Ca. 764,000 consultations were provided, and ca. to 413,000 Syrian refugee children under the age of five had vaccinations in the MHCs in 2017. Additionally, ca. 2,200 Syrian doctors and nurses had training and certificates, of whom more than 780 work in MHCs by 2018. Furthermore, the EU has engaged in supporting 178 MHCs, as well as 10 community mental health centres for refugees (Memişoğlu, 2018: 28). According to a survey published by AFAD in 2013, Syrian migrants' satisfaction with the health services they received was 60% within the camps and 81.4% outside the camps (AFAD, 2013: 39).

Overall, according to the 3RP annual report of 2017, Turkey achieved the optimum results among LJT. The out-reach of Turkey to Syrian refugees was the highest, in that 80% of the refugee population were assisted although Turkey in that year received only 45% of the required funding (UNHCR and UNDP, 2018(a): 16)).

5.5.2. Challenges and Policy Recommendations

It is evident that none of the durable solutions are currently in sight for the majority of Syrian refugees in LJT, particularly Lebanon. For that reason, firstly, it is crucial to ensure that non-refoulement is respected by all parties. Second, it is in the interest of LJT, especially Lebanon, to seek to reduce hostility and ameliorate livelihoods of both hosting and refugee communities, hence contributing to the economic development and stability of their countries.

Better access to employment by all refugees is a key factor to manage the refugee crisis, by increasing their self-reliance and feeling of security thereby ensuring their inclusion of into local communities and maintaining economic stability. For Lebanon, the government is entitled to grant a stable legal status to refugees as a first step to achieve this end. It should then adopt a fair and transparent system that permits all refugees to obtain legal residency without fees or sponsorship and to facilitate the granting of work permits and its process.

It is evident that economic and employment-related considerations are significant to the refugees' long-term presence in Lebanon and Jordan, with a difference of much higher ratio of Syrian refugees to the local population in Lebanon. The situation is similar in both countries; however, the Jordanian government has efficiently initiated the Jordan Compact which has been achieving effective results. In Lebanon, the generally held belief that Syrian refugees are forcing wages down, bringing about greater unemployment, and increasing the number of Lebanese living below the poverty line should be mitigated by government. Such a belief constitutes an enormous hurdle in front of refugees' access to employment and their fraternisation with local Lebanese communities. In contrast, the positive multiplier effect on the Lebanese economy due to the inflow of humanitarian aid should be accentuated (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016: 60)

Equally important, better access to education by all school-aged refugee children is another pivotal factor behind efficient handling of the crisis and effective integration of refugees into local communities. It should be noted that despite the increase in school enrolment, there are still many children out of school in LJT. In all three countries, only a fraction of the school-age children currently attend school regularly; for example, only a third of the 621,000 school-age Syrian refugee children are accessing school in Turkey. The situation in Lebanon and Jordan is not more advantageously, in that several challenges keep children from attending schools regularly, including economic difficulties, and the "negative coping mechanisms" adopted for maintaining a livelihood. For that reason, initiatives addressing barriers to education must be planned, particularly those addressing administrative and financial

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constraints, issues of child protection and safety concerns, the fact schools being too far from child's residence, and the provision of psychosocial support to children.

However, in this educational context, the process of inclusion is much easier in Lebanon and Jordan than in Turkey since they share a common language with Syria. In Turkey, the greatest challenge for Syrian refugees, unless they are Turcoman, is language, in that they encounter a completely different linguistic environment. The Turkish initiative to teach refugee children the Arabic language in extra-curricular classes in public schools has been a positive step to help the new generation retain their mother-tongue. Yet, such an approach will not disregard the difficult linguistic context experienced by refugees and the repercussions engendered by it. It should be noted that this challenge is faced also in Lebanon, in that the language of education is usually in French or English, with Arabic being taught in parallel. Nevertheless, it is advantageous that Lebanon introduced double shifts at schools to accommodate the children.

Addressing the problem of out-of-school children is a critical issue to restrain child labour and early marriage across the three host countries. Child labour is a serious concern usually condoned by households since children are less exposed to arrest for working illegally than are adult men and women. Additionally, early marriage is permitted and even encouraged by some Syrian households as a solution to their disadvantageous situations. There are even those who submit their daughters to polygamous marriages, a fact which represents a serious legal issue in Turkey, where marriage under the age of eighteen and polygamy are both outlawed.

Another key challenge is the absence of proactive initiatives by the GoL to enhance relations between Syrian refugees and the Lebanese communities. According to a report published by Care International, this gap is "filled by other stakeholders" as a local NGO stressed "NGOs do the work that the national government should do to create a bridge between people and the municipality in which they live, and to link municipalities with each other". Syrian refugees and host communities quotidianly interact in shops and on the streets; yet, the level of meaningful interaction remains extremely low in general (Care International, 2018:9-10). The situation in Turkey is

not much better, particularly as both communities do not have commonalities as in Lebanon. Language barriers and inaccurate held beliefs are the main challenges faced to reduce tensions between communities. Regarding Jordan, the situation is less intensified due to the substantial cultural similarities coordinating Syrians and Jordanians.

Overall, for the three countries, consolidating social bonds is a compelling step to break down social barriers. A promising strategy is to bring communities together, create interaction and emphasise their commonalities. Equally crucial, ensuring aid transparency is efficiently convincing for host communities as an approach to excise erroneous held beliefs on government expenditure on refugees. It should be elucidated by policy makers that whether funds come from the governments or international donors, they are intended to benefit both communities and to ensure social stability.

Another pivotal challenge is the under-funding issue. It is evident that whatever the actual cost for Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, the financial assistance from the international community has inclined well downwards of what is needed. Turkey puts the direct cost of caring for the refugees at $7.6 to $8 billion, Jordan at $ 4.5 billion by 2016, and Lebanon at more than $4 billion so far. (Kirisci 64) It is conspicuous that the Syrian crisis has received a disproportionate share of global humanitarian funds.

To respond to these challenges and opportunities, some policy recommendations should be developed addressing the needs of both refugees and host countries. Some studies have been conducted by some international research centres assessing the development of the displacement situation in regional protection policies and managed to evaluate the status quo, thereby suggest some policy options. "Study on Refugee Protection and Development: Assessing the Development-Displacement Nexus in Regional Protection Policies" is one among them, conducted by International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), with co-funding from the OPEC Fund for International Development. These policy recommendations have been suggested on the ground of desk research and consultations with stakeholders (government institutions, NGOs, chambers of commerce, UN agencies, donors). The study stresses that, for national stakeholders, "not all policy options will be possible from the start,

thus smaller-scale or pilot versions, or gradual implementation, should be considered"
so as to best integrate development approaches.

Briefly, these policy recommendations concentrate on crucial areas of work and policy options, which should be taken into account from the time of first arrivals:

1) *Analyse the situation and design a tailored approach to it:*

- After registration, information on skillsets and needs of refugees should be collected.
- A participatory approach (horizontal and vertical) should be included in programme design: from donors to humanitarian agencies to policy makers to refugees to businessmen, and to national administration.
- A labour market assessment should be conducted.
- Evaluate (and adapt) service provision (e.g. education, health, social services) to enhance outreach to refugee and host communities, as well as to communicate needs to donors and planned responses.
- Consider wide-ranging and multi-year funding (for donors).
- Consider multi-country approaches and responses within a region.
- Balance expediency and accountability when reporting requirements to donors.

2) *Communicate host country needs, raise awareness and coordinate response:*

The engagement of the appropriate entities (governmental and non-governmental) and communicating approaches locally as well as regionally ensure a unified approach.

- Leadership (Main Ministries or other institutions) should be established.
- Structures for the coordination of actions and responses and avoiding repetition and gaps should be established and empowered.
- Awareness to counter misinformation about refugees should be enhanced and social cohesion should be promoted.

- host country's efforts should be acknowledged financially, politically and rhetorically by the international community.

3) *Integrate development perspectives into service provision:*

- Relevant policies to be prepared to mass arrivals and protracted displacement should be adapted, including contingency plans, migration and refugee policies, national (and regional) development plans, and sector-specific plans.
- Refugee children and other vulnerable populations (whether host or migrant) should be enrolled in school.
- Refugees should be integrated into the existing service infrastructure (health services, social services, education, water and waste services, welfare services, etc), and creating unsustainable structures should be avoided.
- Host populations (particularly the most vulnerable) should be integrated into programmes, such as awareness raising activities, vocational trainings, or job placement programmes, basic service provision services, community-building programmes, etc.
- National institutions should be strengthened, by dint of capacity building and technical assistance with longer-term impacts (e.g. staff training, infrastructure development, etc).

4) *Boost business and decent work:*

- Refugees and nationals should be certified and trained according to the needs of host country markets and potential future labour markets (country of return or resettlement).
- Refugees should be employed, based on a labour market assessment and refugee skills and capital.
- Decent work should be focused on.
- Business development should be supported by promoting investment and entrepreneurs from the refugee and host community (ICMPD, 2019: 2)

Graph 36: *Policy Recommendations for Promoting Employment of Refugees and*
Nationals

Source: (ICMPD, 2019: 2).

CONCLUSION

By analysing the objectives and activities of UNHCR's operation in the Protection Sector, this thesis has shown the Agency's efficiency in the international refugee protection regime. UNHCR had partly been efficient in handling the refugee crisis in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey through considering its approaches to the emergency related to this sector. It should be concluded that UNHCR had been successful in some measure to respond to refugee needs by dint of launching two successive response plans, RRPs and 3RPs.

To summarise, so as to evaluate UNHCR's operation in this specific sector, the followed chapter order is considered to dig into the Agency's work from the macro-image to the micro-image. The first chapter is a paving background stating UNHCR's establishment and history. The Office has a noteworthy account rendering it the sole international organisation concerned with the refugee issue worldwide. Despite having a restrictive mandate and authority, it is uniquely mandated to head and organise international action to protect refugees and solve their problems on a global scale ensuring them the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another state and striving to safeguard their rights and well-being.

Hence, this chapter tended to show the strong relation between its mandate and the existence of an international refugee protection regime. The presence of such a regime is imperative so that UNHCR could operate according to its mandate and states would be engaged in their commitments and adherence to the international and regional instruments of the three laws concerned, the International Refugee Law, the International Human Rights Law, and the International Humanitarian Law. However, it should be equally claimed that there were intermittent episodes of divergence with governments owing to mainly the change of their geopolitical agendas. Such discrepancies have conspicuously been among the leading challenges to UNHCR's mandate and the development of the international refugee regime. It should be concluded that UNHCR's operation would be efficient only if member states adhere and act in line with the core of the rules of the regime and the agency they created.

Relatedly, the chapter settles the appropriate theoretical framework to address the research questions. It should be accentuated that the whole focus of the research is incontrovertibly humanitarian, in that it aims at sustaining international refugee protection regime, enhancing refugee situations and consolidating States cooperation pertaining to this issue. Liberal internationalism as a theory dovetailed with the thrust of this research in the sense that its fundamental concepts serve the inadequacies of the international refugee regime and respond to its necessities. The cooperation between UNHCR, LJT and the international community was one key dynamic behind UNHCR's efficiency in its response to Syrian refugee crisis. The interdependence between UNHCR and LJT on one hand and UNHCR and its partners on the other, the multilateral solidarity structure and diplomatic gatherings held so far on finding solutions to the Syrian refugees had been leading liberal internationalist approaches that facilitated and expedited UNHCR's efficient operation. Equally crucial, it should be noted that the weakening of these approaches had enfeebled UNHCR's response to refugees in some plans, too, particularly in the beginning of the crisis.

Human security as a theoretical concept also corresponded to the fabric of this research. The conflict in Syria engendered aspects of human insecurities to the Syrian displaced refugees to which response is urgently needed, given that the vast majority of refugees are women and children. Human security as an approach to the refugee issue incorporating two fundamental elements, protection and empowerment, represents the quintessence of the Protection Sector mechanism responded to by UNHCR. The Agency is considered to be the international institution seeking to provide human security for vulnerable Syrian refugees by protecting IRL and supervising states' compliance with international law standards so as to ensure security for refugees against potential threats. Hence, UNHCR has been the central institutional component of human security and its operational tool adopting measures to master human insecurities encountered by the Syrian refugees in LJT.

The second chapter represented a succinct overview of refugee laws and regulations in LJT. Such policy statements essentially set up the groundwork for the prospective empirical part, as it was noted that UNHCR had differently approached the refugee issue in these concerned countries through its different response plan

activities. UNHCR had operated in Lebanon and Jordan according to its mandate agreed upon in its MoUs signed with GoL and GoJ, whereas, in Turkey, it had mainly responded according to its mandate agreed upon in the 1951 Convention and to the TPR and laws set by GoT. The parallel examination of the Syrian refugee influxes in LJT in this chapter also represented a preparatory work for handling the functioning of the two plans, RRPs and 3RPs, according to the different periods in which the influx happened in LJT. Such an occurrence had deeply impacted the response of both UNHCR and LJT governments as explained in the following chapters.

The third chapter was the empirical part of the research introducing the Protection Sector into both qualitative and quantitative input. The first part of this chapter meticulously scrutinised UNHCR's activities according to its planned objectives. As demonstrated in this qualitative section, UNHCR identified a macro-framework of Protection response to specific indicators with roughly similar objectives to be implemented in LJT, respectively. Nevertheless, this macro-framework distinctly developed micro-mechanisms to address peculiar needs of Syrian refugees regarding the Protection Sector.

After stating the whole frame of Protection response, the following quantitative section concentrated on achievements in figures. UNHCR's interventions to all indicators were reported in numbers in terms of total achievements according to specific targets. All the results were translated into percentages so as to pave the way for a relevant assessment of UNHCR in the field in the next chapter. It should be noted that this represents a typical reflection of how efficient the Agency is. Scrupulous attention was devoted to the detailed indicators of the Protection Sector, particularly PSS, case management, specialist support and counselling services. It is crucial to stress that data unavailability of some indicators in UNHCR's reports represented an enormous difficulty. This meticulous examination of such indicators per se represented a leading demonstration of UNHCR's efficiency (not effectiveness) in its response to the Protection needs of Syrian refugees in LJT. All Protection indicators were separately held and addressed by UNHCR's staff. To conclude, this chapter was a portraying segment of the nature and quality of services efficiently introduced to Syrian refugees by UNHCR and its partners in LJT.

The fourth chapter was the wielding part of Protection indicators data into evaluation. It was the practical space where all data were paraphrased into functional statistics calculated to accurately assess UNHCR's response to this sector. These statistics were attentively held by dint of combination of indicators and sub-indicators in most cases to obtain relevant numerical evidence of Protection sub-clusters. The arrangement of the researched input into appropriate sub-cluster services -namely protection services and CBP, child protection, security from violence and exploitation, access to legal remedies and community mobilisation for empowerment- was a difficult task as it was not provided in reports of UNHCR or any other Protection Working Groups. The order of these clusters and the arrangement of the services introduced in each cluster is purely peculiar to the author. Equally important, as an attempt to manage the crisis of data unavailability, the author stuck to combination of sub-cluster input as it was the unique resolution to produce statistics representing the Protection Sector response.

Regarding the evaluation of the two response plans introduced by UNHCR, the RRPs and the 3RPs, the chapter separately handled each plan. The division between these two plans, as held in the preceding chapter too, was chiefly based on the difference between them. The meaning of difference in this context is not attributed to dissimilarity or divergence separating the two plans. Conversely, it is interpreted in such a way that the first was an outset response, whereas the second was a response to protracted refugee situation building upon the first pattern.

As shown in chapters three and four, UNHCR in the RRP concentrated on the response to the emergency situation of the provision of favourable protection environment, fair protection processes and documentation and security from violence and exploitation. These were the prior emergency response between 2012 and 2013 in Lebanon and Jordan, and particularly in 2014 in Turkey owing to the refugee mass-influxes. However, the Agency in the 3RP has built upon the refugee component of the RRP and introduced a new element which is 'resilience' involving the engagement of the respective governments of LJT. As the situation started to be protracted, UNHCR perceived that by responding only to refugee protection and humanitarian

aid, the crisis might deepen since the humanitarian assistance depended mainly on funding from the international community. For that reason, it was indispensable to engage refugees in contributing to their own protection solutions and strengthening the resilience of individuals, families, communities and state structures alike so as to be able to cope with the repercussions of the Syrian conflict on LJT. The 3RP as a broader response plan has been concentrating for the most part on the empowerment of affected and vulnerable communities in all sectors whether refugees or hosts. On this ground, UNHCR has significantly concentrated on community mobilisation in this response as a sub-cluster. To conclude, the RRP focused on an urgent response along with the establishment of the structures to respond to refugee needs in the short term, such as the creation of registration centres, as well as in the long term, such as the establishment of community centres. The 3RP, conversely, has intensified its response to community participation, self-management, self-reliance, and empowerment, as well as security from violence and exploitation.

The intended target of the chapter was mainly to evaluate UNHCR's achievements in the field through assessing the results of the research. In this context, efficiency is conjointly considered with the criterion of effectiveness after revealing the findings. Regarding RRP1-RRP5 (2012-2013), evaluation was a hard task since there were no target figures beside the achievements since the registration flow was ceaseless. Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude that this response concentrated on the necessary elements of Protection since there were only few indicators pertaining to urgent activities. The plan was in a continuously periodical update in parallel with the escalation of the crisis. Its inchoate character emanated from the deepening plight which had overwhelmingly been requiring joint and intensified efforts in order to be able to respond to the unprecedented refugee flow and the unmanageable crisis.

It was found that RRP6 (2014) was the turning point where UNHCR managed to shape this response into an advanced plan so as to be able to exhaustively handle the emergencies. Starting from this plan, the achievements against protection indicators have occurred with respect to anticipated target figures. RRP6 paved the way for patterning a new response system that builds on the previous and embarks on other necessary and complementary plans demanding resilience as an indispensable

element alongside basic protection elements. It should be concluded that UNHCR achieved optimum outcome in RRP6 in Lebanon and Jordan in comparison with its operation in Turkey due to the shift of the refugee influx from these countries to Turkey.

Regarding the 3RP (2015-2018), the general reached conclusion is that both expected and unexpected results were achieved. The year 2015 achieved minimum outcome when compared with the following years. In contrast, the years 2016 and 2017 achieved optimum results in LJT. The year 2018, however, had shown different results as specified by some indicators for the three countries respectively.

The oscillation of the results was certainly due to considerable factors. The thesis managed to tackle the conspicuous determinants of this variation. The primary factor to be highlighted is the volume of the target. It should be noted that the increase or the decrease of the target in parallel played a substantial role in achieving the expected or unexpected results, respectively. This typical outcome translates the conventional level of UNHCR's operation in several cases. Nevertheless, when it is not the case, other factors are to be considered. The second factor to be underscored then is the received funding. In many cases, even when the target is considerably reduced and the other conditions are met, the lack of funding represents a leading reason behind the unexpected results. Inversely, even when the target is considerably expanded along with other unfavourable factors, the provision of adequate funding represents an influential cause behind the expected results. The third factor to be underlined is the focus shift. Many indicators have frequently shown unparallel results within the Protection Cluster in the same year plan and country respectively, even if when the conditions of target and funding are met. It was found that UNHCR had intermittently focused on some sub-cluster indicators according to the planned response referring to the targeted gender and age category more than others. The focus shift and the concentration on prior sub-clusters indubitably debilitate UNHCR's operation in some remaining sub-sectors, such as the focus shift between adult protection and child protection, yet they lead to optimum achievements in the concentrated sub-cluster.

The fifth chapter was the solution part which addressed the durable solutions stipulated in UNHCR's mandate along with new proposed resolutions by the Agency. Regarding return and repatriation, it was deduced that in recent years self-organised returns to Syria had increased from LJT for several reasons, such as family reunification, lack of employment, medical treatment, education, checking on property, documentation, improved situation in homelands in Syria. For Lebanon, Syrian refugee returns occurred mainly due to serious vulnerability and restrictive measures by GoL. For Jordan, returns started to happen chiefly after the re-opening of the border in October 2018. For both countries, returns also were encouraged and planned by the Russian government in cooperation with Syrian authorities. For Turkey, returns occurred through visionary policies of GoT promoting return, in the shape of permits for holiday visits and family reunion with guaranteeing their original status upon re-entry to Turkey and also the creation of safe zones. It was found that the re-entrance of their majority to Turkey after voluntary return and relocation to safe zones implied the conjecture of both policies of Turkey and conditions in Syria. To put it differently, both the introduction of visit permits and the creation of safe zones have not been as effective policies as expected.

Concerning resettlement, it was concluded that between 2014 and 2016 the highest percentages of submissions were from both of Jordan and Lebanon due to the deplorable conditions endured by Syrian refugees there, particularly in Lebanon, as there are no camps as in Jordan. Furthermore, Lebanon and Jordan do not provide Syrian refugees with temporary protection like Turkey, along with sparse opportunities of integration, especially in Lebanon. However, in 2017 and 2018, Turkey recorded the highest submissions as it had become the first country hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees worldwide. Nevertheless, from a burden sharing perspective, it was found that resettlement quotas had sharply declined after 2016. Hence, resettlement as a durable solution for Syria refugees from LJT could not be effective unless solidarity and responsibility-sharing between UNHCR and the international community is critically considered.

In reference to complementary pathways, it was concluded that this resolution was proposed by UNHCR as an approach not necessarily concentrating on

vulnerability criteria that may qualify a refugee for entry into a third country. They have introduced to Syrian refugees in the form of mainly humanitarian admissions, family reunification, private sponsorship, labour mobility, and scholarships. These solution initiatives had been an efficient and effective mechanism helping some Syrian refugees to rebuild their lives as alternative solutions for the reduction in resettlement quotas.

With respect to local integration, it was concluded that this process started to be considered in Turkey and Jordan when the Syrian refugee situation had turned to be protracted, with the exception of Lebanon which completely rejects any prospective of social inclusion. NYDRM was a ground-breaking initiative by UNHCR to efficiently contribute to integrating Syrian refugees in host countries. It was found that the Jordan Compact had been an illustrating paradigm and a good practice within this context starting to be implemented from 2016. Both Jordan and Turkey had significantly introduced initiatives to provisionally and informally include Syrian refugees in their communities through regulations on employment and the issuance of work permits, integration in the educational system and provision of healthcare services along with granting some refugees citizenship in the case of Turkey, until finding radical solutions. However, Lebanon had obviously retained reservations about such initiatives, apart from educational integration.

Despite these initiatives, it should be argued that Syrian refugees face multiple challenges in the long run. There are both similarities and differences across Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. One common challenge is how to cope with tension attributed to the refugees' long-term presence in LJT. In broad terms, LJT publics repudiate the idea that refugees might become a permanent part of their host communities; the notion of their eventually becoming citizens is generally unacceptable. In Jordan and Lebanon, integration constitutes a quasi-impossible option particularly for their small populations and limited national resources. In the case of Turkey, the challenge is nonetheless a cultural and linguistic one, along with the unfavourable presence of and resentment towards Syrian refugees in some parts of the country for the held belief that the current government tends to Islamize the country.

Some policy recommendations were drawn as none of the durable solutions are currently in sight for the majority of Syrian refugees in LJT, particularly in Lebanon. The three governments should secure better access to employment so as to increase refugees' self-reliance and guarantee economic stability of their countries. It is recommended for Lebanon to grant a stable legal status to Syrian refugees, thereby to facilitate the granting of work permits. Additionally, better access to education by all school-aged refugee children is another pivotal factor behind efficient handling of the crisis and effective integration of refugees into local communities. The LJT governments should also seek to reduce hostility of hosting communities towards Syrians and consolidate social bonds, especially the GoL.

To respond to these challenges and opportunities, some policy recommendations should be developed addressing the needs of both refugees and host countries. For better response, the following paradigm should be taken into account from the time of first arrivals: analysing the situation and designing a tailored approach to it, communicating host country needs, raising awareness and coordinating response, integrating development perspectives into service provision, and boosting business and decent work.

In view of these findings, the first and foremost recommendation of this thesis is to financially empower the Office so as to be able to adequately respond to Syrian refugee situation in LJT. UNHCR maintains its financial power from international funding, hence an effective mechanism to generate financial support for the Agency should be developed. The international community which relies on UNHCR in handling refugee crisis worldwide should promise financial commitments for the Office. This is considered the urgent obligation to be undertaken by states in order to render UNHCR more efficient and effective in its operation.

Equally crucial, this thesis recommends the international community to adhere to the concepts of burden-sharing and solidarity. Without the sense of responsibility and cooperation from the part of states, UNHCR's work will remain insufficient, inefficient, and ineffective. As demonstrated throughout the research, the absence of such international perception and commitment resulted in a disproportionate share of

refugee burden. This thesis also recommends the conduct of campaigns of awareness and sensitisation for the international communities, whether hosting they were or not, to raise the sense of accepting and respecting refugees as nationals. Indeed, it is critical to consider the refugee issue with a liberal internationalist approach in this context.

Overall, the thesis has confirmed a widespread perception and assumption held in some previous literature review that the Office is a "surrogate state" of refugees with its own territory (refugee camps), citizens (refugees), public ministrations (the Protection Sector along with the other clusters and even doctrines (community participation, gender equality, etc..). Not surprisingly, in the case of the Syrian response circumstances, UNHCR assumed (and was perceived to assume) an increasingly significant and even preeminent role. The thesis also represents a meticulous research on the Protection Sector addressed by UNHCR in the study case of Syrian refugees in LJT. It is a detailed work that contributed to the evaluation of UNHCR's operation in this specific cluster with a thorough examination of potential factors behind both the discerned efficiencies and inefficiencies.

Based on these conclusions, researchers should consider the Protection Sector indicators much more specifically to confirm the results of this thesis. Additionally, to better understand the implications of these findings, future studies could address other factors behind UNHCR's efficiency or inefficiency in its response to Syrian refugees in LJT, such as the political factors and the Agency's relationship with governments. Further research is needed to determine the causes behind both the expected and unexpected results of UNHCR's operation in the field.

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BIOGRAPHY

Hekma WALI was born on 17 May 1987 in Sfax, Tunisia. In 2010, she received BA in English Language, Literature, and Civilization from the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, University of Tunis. She completed MA in English Civilization from the same Faculty in 2012. Her Master research was on the US-Turkish Post-World War II Relations. She started her Doctoral Studies in International Relations at the Institute of Social Sciences at University of Kocaeli in 2014-2015. She obtained Certificate in Teaching Skills in English from SELT Academy, centre of Cambridge Language Assessment.

Regarding the vocational career, she worked as an English teacher in several language centres, academies, and schools both in Tunisia and Turkey. She was employed as a translator in a Turkish factory of plastics (Agora Plastik) and in a Tunisian gold company (Tunisia Gold) in 2011 and participated in different international trade fairs. She was also recruited as a clientele counsellor in Alitalia Air Company (Cos Tunisie) in spring 2012.